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Abstract 
In the 1930s and 1940s, different social welfare models were at the disposal of 
policy-makers of non-democratic countries. however, although social security models were 
being debated and advocated by experts and policy-makers, the non-democratic regimes of 
Latin America and Southern Europe only set up limited social insurance schemes, aimed at 
protecting particular groups of people, resulting in very fragmented management systems. 
Neither the welfare state literature nor the research on non-democratic regimes have 
attempted to explain why non-democratic regimes failed to set up comprehensive social 
security systems. Drawing on so-far unknown primary sources, this thesis examines the 
development of Social Insurance Schemes in Franco's Spain between 1936 and 1950. It 
studies the policy processes that led to the passing of each social insurance scheme and the 
evolution of the institution in charge of the social insurance system, the Instituto Nacional de 
Prevision (INP). 
By using a framework for the analysis of the policy-making process in non- 
democratic regimes, this thesis will show how political institutions of the Francoist regime 
shaped the resources of those actors (mainly Falangists and Social Catholics) involved in the 
power struggle for the control of the social insurance system. These institutions were: 1) the 
ministerial decrees and orders as the methods of passing legislation, 2) the bypassing of the 
Council of Ministers, 3) the absence of regulations within the Ministry of Labour, 4) the 
marginalisation of the Council of State and 5) the lack of formal procedures to resolve 
jurisdictional conflicts, and 6) the possibility ministers had to pass regulations. 
These permitted Falangist Labour Minister Gir6n de Velasco to manoeuvre to 
achieve Falange's goals at the time the party was being put at the service of the state. The 
National Office of Syndicates competed with the INP for control of the social insurance 
system. The result was a highly complex and fragmented system of overlapping schemes 
provided by several organisations rather than a comprehensive social insurance scheme. 
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Introduction 
In the decades of 1930s and 1940s, there was a wave of social reform all over the 
world, provoking the development of institutions of social welfare that were already in place 
as well as the introduction of new means of social insurance. Thus, Bismarckian social 
insurance schemes expanded, aiming to cover more people and more social risks, becoming 
more generous and better co-ordinated each one of them with the rest of the schemes in 
administrative terms. At the same time, the idea that, ultimately, the aim of social welfare is 
to protect the entire population against all possible social risks by the implementation of 
comprehensive and complete social security systems, gained ground. The best-known plan 
which put in place this idea was drafted by William Beveridge, but it was not, however, the 
only one considered at the time. 
So it was then that countries started following what can be broadly described as two 
different paths of social protection: one provided by social insurance schemes (independent 
of each other, fragmented management undertaken by several frequently competing 
organisations, low coverage of population and social risks and relying solely on workers' 
and employers' contributions) and another by a social security system (comprehensive with 
regard to social risks, administratively unified, covering the entire population and with high 
levels of state funding via state-provided contributions additional to those of workers and 
employers or via general taxation). 
This wave of social reform was widespread, in part thanks to the enthusiastic work 
of international organisations that spread ideas among social and political elite groups 
around the world. The entry of these innovative ideas and policy solutions into national 
political agendas led in many cases to new legislation and the implementation of policies. 
This happened not only in developed western democracies but also in countries which, at the 
time, were suffering with non-democratic political regimes, or were developing countries 
whose low economic and social conditions made the setting up of public modern social 
welfare systems ahighly difficult enterprise. 
All the non-democratic regimes that were then in place in Latin America and 
Southern Europe set up (or, at least, tried to set up) social welfare systems. Policy 
I 
innovations implemented around the world were known about and different elite groups 
advocated different social welfare systems 
-from the more conservative and minimal to the 
most radical and generous in terms of benefits, coverage and organisation. But, although 
different policies and solutions were known about and alternative plans were proposed and 
discussed, none of those political regimes ended up implementing social security systems but 
social insurance schemes along Bismarckian lines, of modest coverage, fragmented 
management, separation of social risks and very limited state participation in their funding 
(relying basically on workers' and employers' contributions). 
This thesis will focus only on one case-study 
-the Francoist regime in Spain- and 
will explain why the regime pursued the introduction of social welfare measures, but most 
importantly, why the social insurance model was implemented instead of the social security 
one. Although reality is always much more complex than our scientific accounts, the most 
satisfactory explanation points to the role of non-democratic institutions shaping the policy- 
making process. 
The literature on the origins and development of the welfare state has offered 
multiple theories and explanatory models. My research starts by reviewing this literature. 
However, these theories and hypotheses have arisen from the study of wealthy western 
democracies, so their usefulness here is quite limited. Non-democratic regimes have not 
attracted the interest of researchers of the welfare state. However, my second aim when 
looking at this literature is to find at least some way of approaching the topic, even if the 
literature itself has not done it. The Neo-Institutional approach offers, in my opinion, the best 
way of explaining the processes of non-democratic welfare states origin and development, 
providing us with a sound theoretical and analytical framework. 
The very first obvious hypothesis is that the nature of the political regime and its 
political institutions bear some kind of responsibility for policy outputs and outcomes. The 
institutions of the political regime become, therefore, the independent variable. This way, we 
can study the Francoist policy process that led to the creation of social insurance schemes. 
How did the policy process within the regime occur and how did it shape policy outputs? 
2 
What was the reason for the creation of several social insurance schemes instead of a unified 
social security system? Thus, progressively, my research moves from the literature on the 
welfare state to the public policy discipline, in order to develop my theoretical model. The 
debate among the Schools within the discipline has moved around the three major elements 
that form the policy process: ideas, the interests of the actors and institutions. My choice is 
that, although I acknowledge the role of ideas and the power of interests, these two interact 
within a framework of institutions. In addition, previous institutions (such as laws, policies, 
public bodies or traditions) set the path for future political developments 
-what is known as 
path-dependence. 
The next step is to identify the basic institutions that constitute the non-democratic 
political regime, when compared to a democratic political regime. The literature on political 
regimes seems to agree on the democratic characteristics which a non-democratic regime 
lack, which basically are: 
" Lack of formal and real civic and political rights; 
" Lack of free and public political elections; 
" Lack of free public discussion (free media, the right to defend 
political ideas in public); 
" Lack of free political parties which compete in elections for power, 
" Lack of legal and real separation of powers (through a proper system 
of check and balances). 
But this same literature cannot agree on the non-democratic characteristics that make 
up the non-democratic regime. The level of political pluralism, the role of the single party, 
the centralisation of power in a charismatic leader, the method of interest aggregation and 
elite recruitment, the role of the army, the freedom of the media, the use of political 
repression and violence or the ideological commitment of the regime are the elements around 
which endless debates have dominated the field. 
However, I believe it is necessary to go one step down along the scale of abstraction 
and identify how these "absences" (of rights, elections, public opinion, parties and separation 
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of power) arc translated in each particular case. By themselves, these characteristics just 
point to very abstract effects on the policy process and arc not very useful in attempting to 
understand it. In regard to the debates, it is my belief that we do not need to engage with 
them in this thesis. I am not trying to prove that "authoritarian" regimes created a concrete 
model of social welfare, while "totalitarian" ones opted for another model and 
"democracies" implemented social security systems. My division is between democratic and 
non-democratic regimes and how characteristics of non-democratic political institutions 
shaped the policy process to produce certain policy outputs. I believe that these 
characteristics change from one regime to another or within the same regime over time. 
Actually, the example of the Francoist regime given above shows that the same regime set 
up first social insurance schemes and twenty years later a social security system. In the 
meantime, political institutions changed the way the policy process performed. My concern 
is with those specific political institutions which may very well vary among non-democratic 
regimes. 
Thus, what has been said up to now forms the theoretical section of the thesis. 
Chapter One gives a comparative overview of social welfare policies in the 1940s around the 
world, mainly in Latin America and Europe. Chapter Two reviews the literature on the 
theory of the welfare state, while Chapter Three develops a theoretical framework which will 
be later used to analyse the non-democratic policy process of the case study and reviews the 
literature on political regimes. The rest of the chapters (Four to Eight) deal with the 
empirical part, the analysis of the case study 
-the creation of Francoist social insurance 
schemes between 1936 and 1950. 
The main reason for my choice of just a single case study is the limitations imposed 
by the lack of similar research. My review of the literature on the welfare state, on policy 
processes and on political regimes shows that my study is quite unique. I am exploring a 
topic that, to my knowledge, has not been researched to any degree with regard to other non- 
democratic regimes. Thus, although truly believing in the possibilities of my research for 
comparative purposes, I myself cannot undertake it at this stage. 
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The case-study of this thesis, as I have already said, will be the social insurance 
schemes created by Franco's regime in Spain between 1936 and 1950. Why did Francoism 
adopt such a social welfare model instead of the Social Security system that was being 
discussed elsewhere and that was being advocated by some elite groups within the regime? 
My argument is that the non-democratic nature of Francoism explains this choice for a 
model of social insurance schemes with limited coverage, low social benefits, uncoordinated 
schemes and management fragmented among several institutions. 
I thus apply the theoretical model developed in Chapter Three to the Spanish case. 
For the Neo-Institutional approach, there are path-dependence ffects of previous institutions 
that shape the prevailing policy process. Chapter Four narrates the history of the Spanish 
welfare state since 1900 when the first social insurance scheme was introduced. The 
Francoist regime received institutional legacies with regard to social insurance, particularly a 
few social insurance schemes and the public body in charge of the whole system, the INP 
(Instituto Nacional de Prevision- National Institute of Social Insurance) 
Francoism was a coalition of social groups that held different and in many cases 
opposed interests. These groups are commonly known as the "families" of the regime. Each 
family battled for power and control of different policy sectors at different moments, 
motivated by changeable interests. The social policy sector was the battleground for the 
power struggle between Falangists and Social Catholics, each one controlling different 
institutions of the regime. Falangists controlled the Ministry of Labour and the Syndical 
Organisation, while Social Catholics were present in the INP. Other institutions such as the 
General Directorate of Health or the National Board of Trustees for Fighting Tuberculosis 
had fewer resources in this struggle. Even more, individuals also played a crucial role and it 
is necessary to identify the personal motivations of people like Jose Antonio Girön de 
Velasco, the Minister of Labour, or Luis Jordans de Pozas, General Director of the INP 
during almost the whole period studied here. 
Foreign ideas for social reform also squeezed into these elite groups and institutions, 
providing policy solutions and innovations. Contrary to what we might have thought, elite 
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groups within the regime in the most autarkic phase of Francoism were well aware of policy 
developments across the world. Thus, Chapter Five studies both the role of ideas and 
interests of the actors. 
Chapter Six is dedicated to the analysis of political institutions. It starts by reviewing 
the historical evolution of governments and cabinet reshuffles from 1936 to 1951. Then, it 
looks at political institutions of the regime such as the Chief of State and Chief of 
Government, the position of Ministers in the policy process and the Council of Ministers, the 
National Movement and the Syndical Organisation and the most important consultative 
bodies. 
Thus, the Francoist regime put in place a set of political institutions that were clearly 
a reflection of its non-democratic nature. In Franco's Spain, political parties were banned 
and no elections were held. There was no such a thing as free public opinion. Political 
repression and violence was used against any possible political opposition. There was no 
separation of power, as Franco retained both legislative and executive powers. But more 
specific institutions shaped more directly the policy process, which was highly centralised in 
the Minister for each policy sector and was very ill-defined when it came to roles and 
jurisdictional competence. The most important section of this chapter spells out what I 
consider to be the six institutions which shaped the process of social insurance policy- 
making: 
1. The absence of regulations within the Ministry of Labour. 
2. The report by the Council of State was not a compulsory requirement for 
passing legislation. 
3. The Council of Ministers performed a technical-administrative function. 
4. The use of decrees and ministerial orders as the method of passing 
legislation. 
S. The lack of formal procedures for resolving jurisdictional conflicts among 
departments and public bodies. 
6. Ministers were granted the prerogative of passing regulations. 
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The outputs 
- 
that is, the social insurance schemes set up 
- 
are described in Chapter 
Seven. The first section of the chapter analyses each particular insurance scheme and other 
voluntary schemes that were established. In addition, it also considers the path-dependent 
effect of the taxation system as it imposed limitations on the possibilities of expanding the 
social welfare model. In the second section, by consulting fundamentally primary sources, I 
have reconstructed the evolution of the INP between 1936 and 1950 and the power struggles 
for their control. The FET de las JONS fought hard to monopolise the Francoist social 
welfare system, through the Ministry of Labour after it fell into the hands of Falangist Jose 
Antonio Girön de Velasco. Another Falangist organisation, the Syndical Organisation, 
dreamt of fully controlling the whole management of the social welfare system. As it is 
described in Chapter Five, FET de las JONS was trying to acquire spheres of influence 
within the state, at the same moment the party and its dependent institutions were being put 
at the service of the state. The way of doing this was by duplicating the state institutions and 
public bodies with its party parallels. This explains the duplication and fragmentation of 
social welfare institutions as analysed in Chapter Seven. 
The same struggle can be seen when analysing the policy processes that led to the 
passing of each social insurance scheme. This is the aim of the last chapter of the thesis. 
Again, by drawing from original and unpublished materials, I explain how the five non- 
democratic political institutions shaped the policy processes. 
In doing this, the thesis will also review some of the hypotheses that the literature on 
the Spanish welfare state holds as most probable (and that will be explained in Chapter Four 
with detail). The first one is that the Catholic Church cannot be made responsible for the 
backwardness of the Spanish welfare state. On the contrary, Catholic thought and Social 
Catholic people were very pro-active in developing welfare institutions. 
Secondly, Falangist Minister Girön de Velasco cannot take all the merit and the only 
merit for the creation of social welfare institutions during these years of the Francoist 
regime. Analysis of his motivations reveals that he held a political agenda (the conquest of 
spheres of influence for Falange within the state) that developed as much as blocked the 
development of a modern social welfare system. lIe might have pushed for the creation of 
the Compulsory Sickness Insurance Scheme, for example, but by allowing the Syndical 
Organisation to take part in the running and implementation of the scheme, he fragmented 
the management into different institutions. The Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions 
and other examples how this ambivalent role of Minister Girbn de Velasco. 
Thirdly, what in my opinion explains the inability of the Francoist social welfare 
system to imitate the innovations producing a more comprehensive and universal Social 
Security model was not factors such as the Catholic culture, the dire economic situation after 
the Civil War or the lack of a labour movement. Above all, what explains the Francoist 
regime was being held up on the social insurance model was the role exerted by political 
institutions of the non-democratic regime, which shaped the power struggle between families 
of the regime. 
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Chapter 1 
Social Security and 
Social Insurance Models in the 1940s 
During the late 1930s and 1940s, the world saw a proliferation of ideas and plans of 
social welfare'. It was a sort of "soup of ideas" that attracted the attention of many policy 
makers and led to the establishment of different welfare institutions in countries with very 
different political regimes. If at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth a first wave of social reform had already occurred in Europe, a second one was 
now coming with more impetus, reaching more countries, involving international 
organisations and producing a wider spectrum of initiatives, thus expanding the choices at 
the disposal of policy-makers. 
The type of policy reforms varied along a continuum that ranged from a social risk- 
centred system of social welfare for workers, with multiple and independent insurance 
schemes and fragmented management organisation to a universalistic, integrated and 
citizenship rights based system of social welfare under the control of a single public 
institution. The former resembled the social insurance schemes introduced by Bismarck in 
Germany by the end of the nineteenth century. The latter, in what came to be called "social 
security", was based on radically different principles. 
The setting up of modem social insurance schemes and even more, social security 
systems, meant a radical departure from the way state and society related, in the 
understanding of the role and functions of the state (mainly state intervention in new spheres 
1 Concepts like "social welfare", "social protection", "welfare policy", "social security" and "social 
insurance" will frequently appear in this essay. When referring to the general aim of states and society 
in order to protect the welfare of their individuals, the term "social welfare" will be used. When more 
specifically, the tool used to achieve that general aim is meant, "welfare policy" or "social policy" will 
be used. In this sense, all modern countries (no matter whether they are democracies or non- 
democracies) have a sort of "social welfare" aim, whatever it may be, and have implemented their 
own "welfare policies". Although the type and number of welfare areas available to the state to 
intervene has increased especially in the last fifty years, the primitive core of "social welfare" has 
been the protection of individuals against the risk of income loss (for example, due to sickness, old 
age, unemployment). This public system of workers' income maintenance, health assistance and 
certain personal social services (Guillen, 1997: 151) has been called since the beginning of the 
twentieth century "social prevision" (as it is the case in Spain, Portugal or all of Latin America). 
Nowadays, we call this "social insurance". It was from the 1940s onwards when a more 
comprehensive and advanced system of income maintenance, health assistance and social services 
developed in different countries, receiving the name of "social security". My concern here is not with 
housing, education, labour policies or family policies (all of them considered today to be, together 
with "social security", within the scope of the "welfare state"). Instead, I will be referring mainly to 
"social insurance schemes". 
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of the economic and social life) and the public administration. At a more practical level, 
things such as the way of organising tax revenue and contributory systems, generating 
statistical information and distributing benefits for a growing number of citizens also 
changed. 
As the new "social security" model started to be successfully implemented in some 
affluent democracies from the mid 1940s onwards, policy learning and diffusion processes 
commenced to spread among countries within the same geographical area or with common 
cultural and historical roots. The more successful these new experiences were in protecting 
the citizens against social risks (and in raising popular support for these policies which in the 
case of a democracy means votes), the more they created a desire for imitation. The aim of 
establishing such a comprehensive welfare system spread all over the world, or in the words 
of one Spanish policy-maker at the time, `the desire for social security dominates the 
world'2. North European countries were the pioneers in establishing universalistic social 
security systems, with mainly Britain and Sweden leading the way. 
However, the wave of social reform was not unique to democratic political systems. 
Totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Stalinist Russia planned 
advanced social security systems for their citizens. Nor was it restricted to the developed 
world, but reached developing countries of different continents. In fact, in some cases, social 
welfare projects were more advanced in the latter than in the wealthy nations of the old 
Europe. Central European countries, even before becoming communist countries, were 
already active in the promotion of social welfare systems. South European countries such as 
Spain, Portugal and Greece, despite the economic underdevelopment and their non- 
democratic political systems, established social welfare systems. 
In virtually all Latin American countries, a debate regarding the need to create social 
2 Gascbn y Marin, M., 'El Ansia de Seguridad Social domina el Mundo', Boletin de Informaciön del 
INP, November 1943, No. 11, pp. 15-33. 
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security systems or to expand existing social insurance systems took place, however 
successful or unsuccessful they were in actually introducing such measures. 
Therefore, the wave of social reform ideas travelled the world, affecting countries 
differently. While in some cases, a social security system was successfully established, in 
others not more than limited adjustments took place and major reforms had to wait until new 
opportunities would arise in the following decades. However, the delay or failure of the 
reforms must not obscure the fact that projects for introducing social security systems and 
advocates supporting them actually existed. Regardless of the political cultures of the 
country, ideas for universal coverage of population and risks and for a unified administrative 
system were on the agenda of politicians and decision-makers. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how social risks and the protection against 
them were real concerns for many political leaders in Europe and Latin America in the 1940s 
and how there was a real burst of ideas and programmes for social welfare reforms. Without 
doubt, the most popular of all social policy innovations was William Beveridge's plan for 
reforming the British social insurance schemes and social services. Many democratic 
countries in Europe and around the world later transformed their social welfare systems, 
adopting Beveridge's model of social security. The chapter will then review the distinctive 
social welfare measures set up by non-democratic regimes. Non-democratic regimes during 
the 1940s, although engaging in major social reforms, failed to create extended and 
comprehensive social security systems, such as the ones established by democracies. In spite 
of the fact that advocates of such systems existed and the debate was on the political agenda, 
only social insurance schemes were set or expanded. 
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1.1. Social Welfare Policies in Europe 
Among all the proposals for social reform, the Beveridge program stands as the most 
influential since it was presented in a first Report of 1942 and later, with the 1944 Report'. 
Beveridge's social security system core idea was the provision of flat subsistence benefits as 
well as flat contributions, irrespective of earnings, to all citizens. The entire population, 
conveniently organised in professional categories, was entitled to get a pension, receive 
medical care or use social services. The benefits, however, were deliberately set at a 
minimum, thus granting the citizen a right to be covered but not a right to live at the state's 
expense. 
In Beveridge's model, all social risks were covered. Medical care was provided as a 
national health service. A universal system of family subsidies was established. And when 
these social welfare schemes did not apply to certain cases, a complementary social 
assistance service was created. The social security system was funded by contributions from 
the employer, the employee and the state. The latter paid for a sixth of the cost of the 
insurance schemes, for a big part of the national health service and for the entire family- 
subsidies scheme (Baldwin, 1992). The employee made a single economic contribution to 
cover all social risks and, in case of need, received the income maintenance transfer in a 
single payment. Finally, regarding organisation, the system was centrally organised, run and 
managed. There was a central fund and regulations were unified. 
Beveridge's model soon attracted attention from all over the world, becoming 
without any doubt the most popular innovation regarding social policy of the time. It was 
equally comparable to the impact of Bismarck's social insurance plans. In 1942, Beveridge's 
view was that the best way of protecting citizens against the vicissitudes of modern life was 
by creating a comprehensive and integrated scheme, which provided universal coverage, 
3 The first report was entitled Social Insurance and Allied Services. The report of 1944 was entitled 
Full Employment in a Free Society. 
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with a much higher involvement of the state as direct provider of social services. As 
mentioned previously, this system became known as social security. A new term for a new 
concept4, to mark the contrast to the Bismarckian social insurance schemes. 
Beveridge's proposals were enacted in the UK in the National Insurance Act of 
1946. In that same year, the National health Service Act was passed, although the health 
program became operative later, in 1948. Other laws were the Family Allowances Act of 
1945, the Industrial Injuries Act of 1946 and the National Assistance Act of 1948. However, 
the difficulty in implementing Beveridge's plan must not be ignored nor the way its more 
universalistic claims were softened. The study of the social legislation-making process 
shows the struggle of competing interests among social groups and the bitter opposition to 
universal protection from groups within the Public Administration, especially the Ministry of 
Labour (Baldwin, 1992: 196). 
For Mishra, `in the immediate post-war years the Welfare state was generally 
regarded as an almost exclusively British phenomenon' (Mishra, 1981: 9). However, 
Beveridge's model was not the only one available in the 1940s for politicians and policy- 
makers. Different social welfare systems were being created in many other countries in 
Europe and around the worlds. In 1946, Sweden established a universal pension system, 
much more generous than the British one, together with a national health service, a family 
subsidies plan and complementary social assistance services for the poor. A distinctive note 
of the Swedish model was the way the welfare complex was financed. If Beveridge's Plan 
relied on the contributive principle, in Sweden the system was financed by taxes on 
consumption. As Baldwin (1992) notes, direct taxation (with a more economic distributive 
4 Although commentators have traced the use of the concept to earlier plans, in particular the 
Roosevelt's US New Deals of the 1930s, the concept became common in the decade later, and soon 
attached to the new model of social welfare. 
s New Zealand established, by the Law of 14 September 1938 a very comprehensive social insurance 
system that granted medical assistance and small old age pensions (called universal superannuation) 
to any national citizen without special condition of entitlement apart from being a national citizen (but 
no discrimination for the type of work, the number of years contributing to the system or the amount 
of income). The insurance scheme was financed by taxes and covered the following social risks: 
sickness, old age, disability, death (widowhood), unemployment and reparation to the civil population for war destruction. 
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effect) would had not been accepted by the affluent social classesb. Other countries followed 
later, Germany7 and France catching up in their reforms during the 1950s. But the "desire for 
social security" was not exclusive to the democratic nations. European totalitarian countries, 
such as Germany during Nazism, Italy during Fascism and Russia during Stalinism, had also 
created some sort of social welfare systems. 
In Hitler's Germany, social policy became a tool for social control, serving the aims 
of the totalitarian state. Thus, it was designed to achieve labour control, promote 
demographic policies (family formation and population growth) and racist strategies and 
pursue nationalistic ambitions. By a law of July 1934, the former deliberative assemblies for 
running the insurance schemes were abolished. Social welfare became a contentious political 
issue between the party and the Ministry of Labour, the latter formerly in charge of the social 
insurance schemes. 
The Nazi party and its syndical organisations had designed universal social security 
plans, which slightly resembled those of Beveridge (Baldwin, 1992: 308). In 1940, Robert 
Ley-Plan, the head of the Labour Front, ` advocated a comprehensive and uniform system of 
pensions for all disabled and all those reaching age 65 who have done their duty to the 
community. Ley was opposed to a system in which contributions determined benefits. The 
state was to consider taking care of the disabled and the aged as its most primordial duty and 
was to meet the cost out of general revenue. The pension level was intended to be high 
enough to secure a standard of living natural for a German but not so high as to discourage 
private saving. Those disabled in industrial accidents or in war would be entitled to a special 
6 There existed a much more revolutionary proposal of social reform although it never had the 
smallest chance of catching the eye of political leaders and social policy-makers. It was the Basic 
Minimum Income plan proposed by Lady Juliert Evangeline Rhys Williams (Harris, 1981). It was 
designed to provide a minimum income for the entire population, children and rich people included, 
and to be financed by a single flat-rate specific tax. As I say, it was completely ignored by politicians 
and specialists, Beveridge himself refusing to read it. 7 Baldwin noted that the delay in Germany developing a universal social security system could be 
explained by the fact that Nazis had designed a similar social security plan, and post-war Germany 
rejected even the slightest resemblance to their policies (Baldwin, 1992: 308). 
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bonus. The "enemies of the state" and the "unsociable minority" (Jews) were to be excluded 
from the program altogether' (Rimlinger, 1971: 134). 
Power was centralised in the hands of the party or party officials: 'hIitler abolished 
effective administrative participation by employers and workers and everywhere introduced 
the leadership principle. This meant that social insurance decisions were now in the hands of 
individuals picked by the Nazi party and devoted to their aims' (Rimlinger, 1971: 133). 
Therefore, social security was used to secure loyalty to the party: `the result would 
be the destruction of social rights as an attribute of citizenship and the creation of a system of 
paternalistic favours dependent on the zeal demonstrated in supporting the objectives of the 
ruling party' (Rimlinger, 1971: 134). 
The Nazis introduced changes not by enacting new laws but by issuing ordinances, 
making the system highly complex and overloaded with special provisions designed to 
support wartime manpower policies (Rimlinger, 1971: 135). Germany's defeat in the Second 
World War avoided the establishment of this comprehensive program. 
The Italian Fascist regime8 created the Fascist National Institute of Social Insurance 
to run the Fascist social insurance system, replacing the former National Office for Social 
Insurance. However, the new Fascist National Institute was only responsible for insuring 
workers against some social risks such as disability and old age, unemployment, tuberculosis 
and maternity but not for illness and working injuries which were schemes organised along 
professional categories and run by specific funds. Family subsidies were run by the Fascist 
National Institute, which also guaranteed and scrutinised the management of the special 
insurance schemes for fishermen and railworkers. These schemes, plus a scheme for 
agricultural workers, had the legal backing of the Labour Charter (Carta di Lavoro), the 
principal Fascist Law in which the system of economic and labour relations was framed. 
" Istituto Nazionale Fascista della Previdenza Sociale (1937), El Instituto Nacional Fascista de la 
Prevision Social alprincipio del Ano XVI de la Era Fascista, Rome: Istituto Nazionale Fascista della 
Previdenza Sociale. 
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The Fascist regime was particularly proud of the social welfare system for 
agricultural workers9. The involvement of the Fascist Party in the running of the social 
insurance schemes, in collaboration with the Fascist National Institute of Social Insurance, 
led to an increase in the number of those agricultural workers covered by the system. 
However, this led to a complicated and fragmented system of tiny funds providing insurance. 
In 1933, there were 18 independent funds. In addition, the Syndical Organisation had set up 
special funds for workers requiring urgent assistance1°. 
In 1918, Russia established a social insurance scheme to cover all who were 
`gainfully employed, as long as they were not employing hired labour' (Rimlinger, 1971: 
260). All the risks were included: cash benefits for illness, permanent disability, 
unemployment, old age, and the loss of breadwinner, maternity benefits and burial grants. 
The scheme was financed by employers' contributions. Due to hyperinflation, most income 
payments had to be made in kind. 
Only when the country abandoned War Communism, entering the stage of the so- 
called New Economic Policy of March 1921, new laws on social security were passed, 
abandoning the idea of universal protection: coverage was granted only to wage-earning 
workers, in particular, regular skilled industrial workers of state enterprises, excluding self- 
employed peasants, artisans and professionals. The system was still very comprehensive as 
far as the coverage of risks was concerned (free medical care, temporary disability benefits, 
unemployment, invalidity pensions, survivorship pensions, maternity leave with full pay for 
working mothers). The organisation of the system was in the hands of the party. 
Once Stalin became unchallenged dictator, social and labour policies were re- 
designed to serve the objectives of the five-year economic plans. Social insurance 
institutions had to take over the role of supporting the growth of labour productivity and 
9 ComitEs de Accibn para la Universalidad dc Roma (1935), La Previsidn y la Asistencia en el 
Regimen Fascista, Rome: publisher unknown, p. 5. 10 As we will see in the following chapters, in Spain, the running of the insurance schemes was also 
attempted by the Francoist single party, the FETde las JONS. 
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strengthen labour discipline. As a journalist wrote in those years, `during the recovery 
period, social insurance was an institution for securing the welfare of the working class. 
Today, in this socialist period, more is required of social insurance than security; social 
insurance must now serve the purpose of socialist offensive' (quoted by Rimlinger, 1971: 
273). 
Thus, the system of regional insurance funds was replaced by special occupation- 
based funds. The health care system was free for all citizens, and the state was responsible 
for financing it via the government budget". As social policy was now linked to economic 
objectives, the party needed `a system that was responsive to the party line and able to make 
day-to-day decisions in the spirit of the party directives' (Rimlinger, 1971: 277). 
The desire to develop a more comprehensive social insurance system also arrived in 
Southern Europe. The dictatorships of Portugal and Spain soon embarked on social welfare 
reforms and debated the convenience of introducing universal systems of social security. 
In Portugal, Oliveira Salazar's dictatorship created in 1933 the National Institute of 
Labour and Social Insurance and a corporatist system of social insurance schemes in 1935. 
The law through which the system was created literally pointed out that its aim was to 
replace the former system (`copied from foreign experiences which do not match the 
Portugal's traditional prevision practices') by a new structure organised through corporatist 
institutions ('which takes into account the differences based on economic or social hierarchy 
that are inherent to the living body a nation is') (Arnaldos Gimeno, 1941: 318). Following 
the corporatist ideas, the social insurance system split up in 49 different institutions of social 
insurance (24 syndical funds and 25 fishermen funds), plus 58 insurance funds and 252 
mutual aid insurance societies. Workers in Portugal were insured against illness, disability, 
11 This is not what the most relevant social insurance expert, Luis Jordana de Pozas (1954: 12-3) said 
about the Stalinist social security system. In his account, the system relied on the contributions of 
employers and employees, without the participation of the state, and it was only applicable to 
industrial workers. There were penalising measures to enhance labour productivity and discipline. 
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old age and unemployment12, although the benefits varied according to which fund they were 
affiliated to. 
Regarding Spain, as this dissertation is fully dedicated to the emergence of the 
Francoist welfare system, at this point I will only summarise some of the features of the 
Francoist social insurance system. During the civil war, a family subsidies scheme was 
established. Once the war was over and when Francoism was in the process of laying the 
foundations of its dictatorship, social policy development speeded up. A Subsidy for Old 
Age and Disability was granted in 1939 and a Compulsory Sickness Insurance Scheme was 
created in 1942. In 1947, the Old Age and Disability Subsidy was transformed into a proper 
insurance scheme. One year later, the Maternity Insurance Scheme, active since 1929, was 
integrated into the Compulsory Sickness Insurance Scheme. Health care plans were created, 
new hospitals erected and state-funded houses for poor people were granted. 
Although the INP remained the institution with the greatest responsibility over the 
social insurance schemes, other institutions (such as the Syndical Organisation, the Labour 
Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions or the Social Institute for Fishermen) were entitled to 
create their own insurance schemes and provide social services. The system was planned to 
cover wage-eamers against all social risks. Agricultural workers, fishermen, domestic 
workers, civil servants and the military had their own insurance schemes. Thus, it was 
established along the lines of the insurance model, with different schemes for different risks, 
separated benefits and administrative procedures and different institutions competing for the 
provision of social welfare. The system was not established by a single law but developed 
since 1900 by the passing of different laws. 
However, as will be shown in following chapters, there were policy-makers 
advocating the unification of the system and the extension of the coverage for the entire 
12 For further reading: Flunser Pimentel, I. (2000), `A Assistencia Social e Familiar do Estado Novo 
nos Anos 30 e 40', Analise Social, Vol. 34, Nos. 151-2, pp. 477-508; Lopes, M. A. (1997), 'Pobreza, 
Asistencia y Politica Social en Portugal en los Siglos XIX y XX. Perspectivas Ilistoriograficas', Ayer, 
Vol. 25, pp. 211.39. 
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population. Beveridge's and other reformers' ideas did arrive in Spain and were discussed in 
closed policy communities. Beveridge himself went to Spain in 1946 and his ideas on social 
security caused huge excitement and interest. In spite of the failure to create a social security 
system during the 1940s and 1950s, in Spain the debate existed and advocates tried hard to 
bring it to life. 
Greece is the third Southern European country that can be considered. Before the 
First World War, Greece had passed laws for the social protection of three social groups: 
fishermen, civil servants and miners. In 1922, Greece took the lead in Southern Europe by 
drafting a national social insurance system which included the following risks: sickness, 
widowhood, old age and disability. The institution in charge of this enterprise was the 
Chamber of Social Insurance. However, it was not possible at the time to set up the system 
and a second attempt in 1928 also resulted in failure. A group of international experts, under 
the leadership of Schoenbaum'; proposed a new plan, which led again to new legislation in 
1932, which was successfully voted through Parliament. 
However, as soon as the new government took power in 1933, the law was 
suppressed. One year later, the social insurance system was taken again under the 
Parliament's consideration, in a draft that comprised the same social risks as in the 1922 
Plan. The Greek system was inspired by a similar scheme in Czechoslovakia. Working 
injuries were supposed to be included in the Sickness Scheme. An institution for the 
centrally-run insurance system was established under the name of Idruma Koinonikon 
Asfaliseon. 
But the definitive push for setting up the social insurance system came with the 
Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1941) (Kofas, 1983). The regime set up the Consultative Council 
of Social Insurance on 24 August 1936, which designed a plan for insuring wage-earning 
workers against old age, unemployment, sickness, working injuries and maternity. The 
13 M. Schoenbaum was the Director of the Czechoslovak Social Insurance Institute and one of the 
most international experts. Ile took part in the developments of other Latin American welfare systems, 
as it will be later shown. 
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system was not intended to eliminate other (private) insurance schemes or funds already in 
place but to co-ordinate them with the new schemes and place them under state direction 
(Kofas, 1983: 69). The plan came into effect at the end of 1937. In the decision-making 
process, a debate on the extent of coverage of the population came to the fore: ` Contrary to 
the Cabinet's claims, the social insurance program did not cover the entire working 
population' (Kofas, 1983: 70). 
1.2. Social Welfare Policies in Latin America 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, social policies of the kind introduced by 
Bismarck in Germany also attracted attention in Latin America. Working injuries and old 
age were among the first social risks against which certain privileged groups of workers 
were insured. Already in the 1930s, some Latin American countries followed the example of 
others in Europe and created institutions for organising and supervising the different social 
schemes that were in place, sometimes centralising the system in a single public body. In 
1935, Ecuador'4 created the National Institute of Social Insurance, and in 1936, Peru's 
established the National Fund of the Social Insurance Scheme. 
During the late 1930s and 1940s, debates on reforming social insurance schemes 
towards more comprehensive social security systems took place in Latin America. The burst 
of ideas and policies for social reform were facilitated by processes of policy learning and 
diffusion. Politicians and policy-makers learned from others. In helping these exchanges of 
" Boletin de Informacidn del INP, November 1943, No. 11, and December 1943, No. 12; 
Organizacibn Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1960), Los Seguros Sociales en El 
Ecuador, Serie Monograflas Nacionales, Madrid: OISS. 
15 Conferencia Interamericana de Seguridad Social (1994), La Seguridad Social en Perri, Serie 
Monografias No. 12, Mexico, D. F.: Secretaria General dc la CISS. 
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ideas and polices, international organisations and communities of experts played a crucial 
role. 
The International Labour Organisation was very keen on promoting inter- 
governmental agreements and the creation of regional institutions for developing social 
welfare programs. Thus, different conferences were held under the patronage of the 
International Labour Organisation, such as the Inter-American Conference of Social 
Insurance, held in Lima in December 1940, which accorded the establishment of a Inter- 
American Committee on Social Security to co-ordinate social insurance systems in Latin 
America. The success of this meeting led to the creation of the Inter-American Conferences 
of Social Security. The first one took place in Santiago dc Chile in September 1942, with the 
attendance of 21 American countries, and concluded with a declaration in which the 
participants committed themselves (and their governments) to the extension of social 
insurance all over the continent and to make progress on the unification of social insurance 
benefits and contributions in a single national scheme. After the success of this first 
conference, the second conference held in Brazil in November 1947 and the third in 
Argentina in 1951 did not attract the same attention, but were also relevant for the diffusion 
of social security reforms around the continent. 
The diffusion of ideas and innovations on social security was also carried out by 
individuals with expertise in this field. In fact, a few key international experts appear 
frequently when studying social insurance reforms all over the world. For example, Emil 
Schoenbaum worked in Ecuador in 1940 preparing the draft of the Law of Social Insurance, 
and later in Bolivia in 1943 presiding over the commission which wrote the final Social 
Insurance Plan before becoming law. Oscar Barahona Streber was the Costa Rican16 social 
16 Miranda Gutierrez, G. (1988), La Seguridad Social y el Desarrollo en Costa Rica, San Jose: Caja Costarriccnse dc Seguridad Social; Munoz Fonseca, E. (1944), El Seguro Social. Su Desarrollo en 
Costa Rica, San Jose: Trejos Iierminos; Organizacibn Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) 
(1962), Los Seguros Sociales en Costa Rica, Serie Monografias Nacionales, Madrid: OISS; 
Rosenberg, M. B. (1979), 'Social Security Policymaking in Costa Rica: a Research Report', Latin 
American Research Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 116-33; Secretaria dc Prevision Social (1942), Caja 
Costarricense de Seguro Social. Ley y Reglamento, San Jose: Imprenta Nacional. 
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policy expert who draw up the system in his own country in 1942 and was later called on by 
the Guatemalan government in 1946 to establish the social insurance system and to be the 
first Director of the Guatemalan Institute for Social Security'7. The Peruvian expert Edgardo 
Rebagliagi wrote the social insurance laws of both Peru and the Dominican Republic. 
Some of these key experts worked for the International Labour Organisation and 
helped to set up many of the Latin American insurance systems. For example, the first study 
in Bolivia was done by a pair of International Labour Organisation experts, Oswald Stein 
and David Bleiloch. In Venezuela, the Law of 14 June 1940 was drafted in collaboration 
with the International Labour Organisation. In El Salvador, a group of national specialists 
were sent to International Labour Organisation headquarters in Montreal (Canada) and to 
Chile to improve their knowledge. 
Although the ideas were being discussed by politicians, academics, civil servants 
and policy-makers, no Latin American country succeeded in establishing a system with the 
I3everidgean characteristics of having fully-unified management practices, being financed by 
the state (partially as it might be, but at least effectively) and covering all the population and 
all social risks. True, some countries moved along in this process of unifying and co- 
ordinating their social insurance schemes but they did not go any further than integrating 
procedures for administration and management or expanding the number of the population 
covered to some privileged groups. In any case, it is important to emphasise that everywhere 
projects for the unification of their social insurance systems were discussed and a lively 
debate was in progress. 
One of the most striking findings when researching Latin American welfare states is 
that in many cases, these insurance schemes were introduced by non-democratic regimes18. 
" Organizacidn Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1963), Los Seguros Sociales en 
Guatemala, Serie Monografias Nacionales, Madrid: OISS; Revista Espanola de Seguridad Social, 
October 1947, No. 10, pp. 665-89. 1e It is really difficult to tell which country was a democracy in 1940s in Latin America. It seems 
easier to know which ones were not democracies. In this part of the world, most of the countries 
suffered from fragile semi-democracies that were deposed every now and then by coup-d'etat. 
Although bearing in mind this difficulty, in this section a definition of democratic regime which 
embraces the very basic prerequisites of open elections and formal separation of powers will be used 
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Perrin (Argentina)19, Vargas (Brazil)20, Morinigo (Paraguay)21, Benavides (Peru), Odria 
(Peru), Arroyo del Rio (Ecuador), Trujillo (Dominican Republic)22, Magloire (Ilaiti), 
Somoza (Nicaragua)23, Osorio (El Salvador) 2' were active in legislating social insurance 
systems. On the other hand, Colombia25, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Chile26, Bolivia", 
Honduras28, Panama29 and Mexico30 had democratic or semi-democratic governments at the 
time social insurance systems were introduced. 
In fact, social reforms were put in place with much more difficulty in democratic 
countries than in those non-democratic countries. In less than one year after becoming 
Labour Director, Juan Domingo Peron managed to pass the Decree-Law of 27 October 1943 
by which the National Institute of Social Insurance was created. On the contrary, democratic 
Chile failed to reform the health care system and the proposed reform drafted by Salvador 
Allende and discussed in Parliament in 1941 could only become law eleven years later. In 
Colombia, the social insurance system that was being discussed since 1929 was finally 
in order to qualify countries as democratic. I will also rely on the judgement of more authoritative 
literature specialising on Latin American politics. 
19 Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1965), Los Seguros Sociales en 
Argentina, Serie Monografias Nacionales, Madrid: OISS. 
20 Malloy, J. M. (1979), The Politics of Social Security in Brazil, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press; Organizaci6n Iberoamericana dc Seguridad Social (OISS) (1964), Los Seguros Sociales en 
Brasil, Serie Monografas Nacionales, Madrid: OISS; Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Seguridad 
Social (OISS) (1970), A Previdencia Social no Brasil, Madrid: OISS. 
21 Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1961), Los Seguros Sociales en El 
Paraguay, Serie Monografias Nacionales, Madrid: OISS. 
u Revista Espanola de Seguridad Social, November 1947, No. 11. 
23 Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1961), Los Seguros Sociales en 
Nicaragua, Serie Monografias Nacionales, Madrid: OISS. 
24 Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1962), Los Seguros Sociales en El 
Salvador, Serie Monografias Nacionales, Madrid: OISS. 
25 Conferencia Interamericana de Seguridad Social (1994), La Seguridad Social en Colombia, Serie 
Monografas No. 7, Mexico, D. F.: Secretar{a General de la CISS. 
26 Del Fierro Court, E. (1953), Nueva Estructura del Seguro Social en Chile, Santiago de Chile: 
Universidad dc Santiago de Chile. 
27 Cortes Arteaga, E. (1949), 'Estudio sobre el Nuevo Seguro Social Boliviano', Revista Espanola de 
Seguridad Social, No. 2, February, pp. 211-33; Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1961), Los Seguros Sociales en Bolivia, Serie Monografias Nacionales, Madrid: OISS; 
Conferencia Interamericana de Seguridad Social (1994), La Seguridad Social en Bolivia, Serie 
Monografias No. 22, Mexico, D. F.: Secretarfa General de la CISS. 
23 Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1963), Los Seguros Sociales en 
Honduras, Serie Monografias Nacionales, Madrid: OISS. 
29 Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS) (1963), Los Seguros Sociales en Panama, 
Serie Monografas Nacionales, Madrid: OISS. 
30 Spalding, P. J. (1980), 'Welfare Policymaking. Theoretical Implications of a Mexican Case Study', 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 419-37. 
23 
passed in 1946. In Peru, major social welfare reforms were only undertaken during the non- 
democratic phases of General Benavides (who passed the Law of 12 August 1936 creating 
the Workers' Insurance Scheme) and General Odria (who decreed the Employees' Insurance 
Scheme of 19 November 1948), but nothing was established during the democratic periods 
in between these dictatorships. 
Latin American dictatorships created social insurance systems with very limited 
coverage of people. On the contrary, democratic countries such as Guatemala, Costa Rica 
and Bolivia were the ones that passed laws with the most ambitious coverage of the 
population. 
In Guatemala, the so-called "democratic spring" of Arevalo's rule offered an 
excellent moment for social reform. Social security was established as a right of every 
citizen by Article 63 of the 1945 Constitution. The law which created the Guatemalan 
Institute for Social Security of 28 October 1946 foresaw insurance against all social risks 
(except unemployment) for the whole Guatemalan population. Sadly, the economic situation 
of the country would not allow policy-makers to introduce but a step-by-step coverage 
system. 
In Bolivia, the Decree-Law on Social Insurance of 11 October 1947 embodied quite 
advanced principles: a unified view of all social risks, a single payment for all schemes, and 
unified administration (single document, single affiliation). A policy commentator pointed 
out, two years after the system was established that this Decree-Law was inspired by a strong 
principle of solidarity31. 
Although Costa Rica's system was created in 1942, before the idea of universality 
and the image of citizenship embodied on the social security system became fashionable in 
affluent democracies of Europe, it followed the principles of unification and coordination 
(1luber, 1996: 152), and so it remained throughout its history. In addition, Costa Rica insured 
31 Cortes Arteaga, E. (1949), 'Estudio sobre el Nuevo Seguro Social Boliviano', Revista Espanola de 
Seguridad Social, No. 2, February, pp. 211-33. This is said in p. 227. 
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its population against the highest number of social risks of the region. The rest of the Latin 
American democracies or semidemocracies established social insurance systems with less 
ambitious coverage of risks and people. 
A major innovation of this period was the establishment of an institution in charge of 
the supervision and even direct management of the social protection system. In some cases, 
single institutions were allocated sole responsibility for running the whole system without 
interference from other private or public institutions. This was the case in most Central 
America: Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama. 
In Costa Rica, the Costa Rican Institute of Social Security shared the management of the 
working injury scheme with the National Institute of Insurance. In other cases, such as in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia, the major institution in charge had to co- 
ordinate with other public bodies, insurance funds or private institutions. 
1.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the wave of social reforms reached many countries 
around the world and different political regimes. Non-democratic countries of Latin America 
and Europe were especially pro-active in developing social welfare systems. But these 
political regimes established social insurance systems of the IIismarckian type, instead of the 
more comprehensive and unified Beveridgean systems. This thesis will focus only on one 
case-study 
-the Francoist regime in Spain- and will explain why the regime was so eager to 
introduce social welfare measures, but most importantly, why the social insurance, and not 
the social security, model was implemented. 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of Welfare State Development 
and Non-Democratic Welfare States 
What explains the introduction and development of social insurance systems in 
authoritarian regimes during the 1940s? The purpose of this chapter is to review the 
literature on welfare states emergence and expansion', in the search for theories and concepts 
that can explain the politics of non-democratic welfare states. 
One of the most striking facts when reviewing the welfare state literature is that we 
only know about a number of very few privileged countries (and even what we seem to 
know are a bunch of competing and contested hypotheses) that happen to be located in what 
we have agreed to call the Western democratic developed world. Democracies which 
managed to introduce universal social security and healthcare systems became the object of 
scholarly research, and the laggards or unsuccessful cases were explained using the same 
hypotheses and arguments as the successful ones, only by making statements in negative. For 
example, if Scandinavian and British well-developed welfare states were explained by the 
presence of a strong labour movement which had pushed for them, the United States' failure 
was explained by the absence of a comparable movement in that country. 
In any case, these theories aimed at explaining "democratic" welfare states. Non- 
democratic welfare states or even those of underdeveloped countries were not taken into 
account by the literature on welfare state. Thus, lacking theories that specifically address the 
emergence of non-democratic welfare states, we are compelled to start first by reviewing 
those existing theories of the politics of democratic welfare state expansion in order to apply 
them to some of the countries not included in the mainstream welfare state comparative 
research. The questions in mind will be how useful these theories are and which one better 
explains the emergence and development of welfare state on non-democratic regimes. 
1 Review articles of the comparative research of welfare state development basically agree on the 
number of competing theoretical schools. See, for example, Skocpol and Amenta (1986), Baldwin (1992), Immergut (1992a), Van Kersbergen (1995) and Guillen (1996). 
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2.1. Modernisation Theories 
The welfare state is a modem phenomenon. It is the most recent form adopted by 
that political institution that came with Modernity, the nation-state. However its novelty, the 
welfare state has become a crucial institution of the "polis", to the extent that, it can 
nowadays depict the personification of the "raison d'etre" of the state in contemporary 
capitalism. At this stage of its historical development and seeming to have grounded its place 
in the capitalist economy quite securely, the modem state claims to exert a beneficial role for 
the individual. The modem state has taken over the responsibility of looking after the welfare 
of the citizens. It might be hard to find any state all around the world without some form of 
social provision or welfare policies, and it might not be risky to guess that when this does not 
happen, then there is no functioning state at all. 
As a crucial socio-political phenomenon, it has obviously appealed to the interest of 
social scientists. Aiming at discovering the causes of its origin and development, welfare 
state research has looked at a constellation of variables, has generated multiple and many 
times contradictory explanations. Thus, this sub-discipline of the broader area of 
comparative public policy has come up with radically different types of research: from 
"cross-national analysis" based on quantitative data to which sophisticated analytical 
methods are applied, to single but in-depth case-studies that require hours of archive work 
and the full display of forensic skills. 
It seems to be commonly acceptable to trace back the origins of the welfare state to 
the social reforms introduced by Bismarck in the Germany of the end of the nineteenth 
century. However, the moment of institutional maturity came about during the twentieth 
century, especially after World War H. Thus, the welfare state was born and developed 
during and due to the historic, sociological and political events and contexts of the nineteenth 
and twentieth century. The historical standing posts are the two World Wars. The economic 
context is that of the expansion of the industrial and financial capitalism, that through 
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cyclical processes of depression and growth societies and polities were transformed. The 
access of the masses to political activity through the extension of suffrage and the 
consolidation of mass parties in this "age of ideologies" and nationalism, with liberal 
democracies facing new enemies (the modern forms of non-democratic regimes) formed the 
political context. Finally, the time of emergence and development of the welfare state 
coincided with a moment of cultural crisis, of the loosening of traditional identities and 
social models, not the least of which the religious model due to secularisation. 
These processes, contexts and junctures did not pass unnoticed for the first 
generation of welfare state researchers. Working during the 50s and 60s, when 
developmental studies were all the rage, these first scholars adopted what it has come to be 
called the Industrialisation approach. Harold Wilensky was perhaps the most salient 
representative of this school. Using a functionalist logic, this approach conceived the welfare 
state as the institutional response to the growing demands from citizens exposed to the 
capitalist industrial revolution. Thus, the existence and extension of social insurance schemes 
depended on prior social and economic transformations that had lead the system from an 
agricultural-based economy to a industrialised one2. The development of the welfare state 
was negatively correlated with the percentage of the agricultural labour force and positively 
with the percentage of the industrial labour force. Equally, demographic trends, labour union 
strength and the need for a qualified and protected human capital (as a need of modern 
complex capitalism) were also pointed out as catalysts of welfare state development: 
`Economic growth and its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are the root cause of the 
general emergence of the welfare state.. 
. 
such heavy brittle categories as "socialist" versus 
"capitalist" economies, "collectivistic" versus "individualistic" ideologies, or even 
"democratic" versus "totalitarian" political systems.. 
. 
are almost useless in explaining the 
2 It is in this sense that the Industrialisation school is also known as the "Prerequisites school": see 
Collier and Messick (1975: 1303-1305). 
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origins and general development of the welfare state' (Wilensky, 1975: xiii; quoted in 
Pierson, 1991: 16). 
The inheritor of this approach, the Modernisation theory included in its explanation 
not only socio-economic trends which were the product of the industrial revolution, but also 
the socio-political transformations that had taken place since the political revolutions of the 
eighteenth century. The birth and growth of the welfare state was thus explained as a result 
of capitalist accumulation, industrialisation and urbanisation processes, the extension of 
mass democracy and religious secularisation. 
Cutright (1965) sought to explain the different levels of social security development 
among nations by looking at the number of social risk programs established (working 
injuries; old age, disability and death; sickness and maternity; unemployment; family 
allowances) and the years of experience of these programs (from 1934 to 1960). The two 
independent variables that came immediately to the fore were "political representativeness" 
and "socio-economic development". Cutright started with the former as his working 
hypothesis, pointing to the link between degree of democracy and social security 
development: `Government in nations whose political structures tend to allow for greater 
accessibility to the people of the governing elite will act to provide greater social security for 
their populations whose rulers are less accessible to the demands of the population' 
(Cutright, 1965: 538). 
In other words, the more democratic political structures are, the greater the social 
security programs. But this formulation, rather than the division between democratic and 
non-democratic regimes, refers to the degree of democratic policy-making. And a democratic 
country can very well have a policy-making process that restricts or discourages people from 
accessing their governing elites to present their demands. Thus, Cutright was not directly 
concerned with the study of social security institutions in non-democratic regimes, although 
from the logic of his hypothesis 
-the more democratic the policy process, the bigger the 
social security system- naturally follows this other one: democracies have bigger social 
security systems than dictatorships. 
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However, in Cutright's account, the variable "political representativeness" (or as I 
stated before, the degree of democratic policy-making) was not the strongest one. In fact, no 
qualitative differences were observed when comparing the "most democratic" countries of 
the sample, that is, the countries in the first two groups of the political representativeness 
scale. Instead, a stronger correlation was noticed between socio-economic variables and 
development of social security. Energy consumption and literacy levels scored higher than 
political representativeness when correlating with the years of experience of social security 
programs. Urbanisation was another socio-economic indicator of importance. 
In order to further test the findings, Cutright introduced a second indicator to reflect 
the Social Insurance Program Completion, by relating the political situation (progress 
towards democratisation or regressing) and the introduction of new social insurance 
schemes. Thus, this indicator measured `the amount of social insurance change associated 
with each change in Political Representativeness' (Cutright, 1965: 544). Again, Cutright 
found that economically developed countries tend to culminate the process of social security 
completion and that those countries which have advanced in the process of democratisation 
but still remain economically underdeveloped have made no major move towards the 
development of social insurance programs. Thus, the level of social and economic 
development (especially, the level of energy consumption) appears as a stronger independent 
variable than the degree of political representativeness (democratisation): `In many nations, 
we would conclude that the introduction of social security measures is a response by 
government to changes in the economic and social order that are not strongly affected by 
some degree of departure from ideal democratic organisational forms. Similar levels of 
social security coverage are found in nations whose governments are thought to act in 
response to the popular will as occur in nations whose governments are thought to act with 
less regard to public demands. It appears that the level of social security in a nation is a 
response to deeper strains affecting the organisation of society' (Cutright, 1965: 548). 
In a later paper, Cutright (1967) compared the different levels of social security 
Expenditure of 40 countries in 1960, measured by the percentage of Gross National Product 
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allocated to that expense. A first criticism might arise when considering such a static 
measure of the dependent variable. There is only one single analysis of social expenditure, 
that of 1960, without any longitudinal analysis or long-term study. Cutright explained the 
differences among countries as a result of two political variables and one socio-economic 
variable. The former were the level of democratic participation and the power of the social 
security bureaucracy. The latter was the level of socio-economic modernisation, that is 
assumed to increase the degree of popular control over the environment. 
The level of democratic participation (the equalitarian pressure in the political 
system), was linked to the redistributive effort: `A political system that fails to hold 
elections, or discourages participation by disenfranchising large segments of its population 
should be one in which neither the full force of a developed equalitarian democratic 
ideology, nor a developed socialist or communist ideology will be translated into effective 
government programs involving large transfer payments' (Cutright, 1967: 183). 
This variable was operationalised as the percentage of voting age population who 
voted during the 1950's national elections of the countries of the sample. It can be both 
interpreted as including every country, regardless of whether it held elections or not in the 
50's or excluding those countries that do not hold elections at all (authoritarian, totalitarian, 
sultanistic regimes). In the first case, if we include every country, countries such USSR and 
other communist countries (apart from Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia which were 
included) or democratic regimes such as Costa Rica, Uruguay and Ecuador are missing. In 
the second case, if only countries who actually held free and regular election were to be 
considered, some countries on the list should not be there: Spain, Portugal, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia or Poland, for example. 
The second political variable used by Cutright to explain the different levels of 
social security expenditure was the power of the social security bureaucracy. Ile used the 
Social Insurance Program Experience measure, which was an account of the number of years 
that the different insurance programs had been running, as the indicator of the power of that 
particular bureau. However, it seems quite surprising that the same indicator would measure 
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both the superiority and ascendancy of the social security bureaucracy (Cutright, 1967: 183) 
and the degree of responsiveness of governments to the needs of the governed (Cutright, 
1965: 541). Anyway, however concerned we might be about the accuracy of this indicator, 
Cutright hypothesised that the greater the level of Social Insurance Program Experience, the 
larger the social security expenditures. 
The level of modernisation appears to be as the third independent variable. Although 
Cutright claimed that by modernisation, he meant both an economic and a political trend, the 
truth is that the indicators used to measure this variable were purely socio-economic: level of 
education, of urbanisation, GNP per capita, percentage of population over 65 years old and 
percentage of population employed in the industrial sector. The latter measured, according to 
Cutright, the ability of the population to put pressure on governments. Making this 
assumption, Cutright hypothesised that ` the higher the level of modernisation, the greater the 
control of the population over its environment; and the greater the control, the larger the 
social security expenditures' (1965: 184). 
Later Modernisation studies paid more attention to the long-term developments of 
the welfare state and the role of institutions, although socio-economic changes and 
increasing political mobilisation remained as the major explanatory variables. Equally, the 
welfare state continued to be functionally explained as the institutional answer to the 
pressure put on by those social, economic and political trends. However, as I say, more 
contemporary studies within the school liked to see social changes in a historical perspective 
(Flora and Iieidenheimer, 1981) or introduced institutional variables. Kuhnle's comparative 
study (1981) of the welfare state development of the four Scandinavian countries is an 
example of the latter. Although he recognised that a process of policy diffusion took place 
during the time of institution building, Kuhnle gave more credit to levels of socio-economic 
development, political mobilisation and organisational characteristics of existing welfare 
laws. All these factors would explain the "timing" and "scope" of social insurance 
legislation, while the "type" of insurance (compulsory or voluntary schemes) depended on 
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the strength of liberal ideology and entrenched position of previous voluntary insurance 
funds. 
Most of the criticisms of the Modernisation theories have been directed at the macro- 
level of abstraction of their analysis. In their search for generalisations, these theories are 
incapable of understanding how concrete social policies were created (in a self-criticism 
Kuhnle, 1981: 145), of discovering the causal mechanisms among variables (Amenta, 1993), 
of explaining the timing of policy emergence (Skocpol, 1995: 15), or the differences among 
social policies (Baldwin, 1992: 72). At a first glance, prior to any in-depth testing study, the 
theory seems to fail to explain important cases, such as France, which, even while retaining 
high levels of socio-economic development and political mobilisation, introduced social 
insurance schemes comparatively quite late3. A criticism also arises of the `deterministic 
mode of analysis' (Mishra, 1981: 45) implied in these theories, neglecting the room to 
manoeuvre available to policymakers. And finally, it has been argued that the Modernisation 
approach does not explain `the most attractive issues' (Baldwin, 1992: 73). 
2.2. Cultural Explanations 
Another school of research paid attention to cultural factors that might encourage or 
discourage the process of institutional development. Harris (1981) found in the adoption of 
Idealism by the social scientific community the key variable that explains the transformation 
of the British welfare institutions between 1870s and 1940s. The Victorian social welfare 
provision was transformed during the Edwardian and post-Edwardian period into a financed 
and controlled centralised system. What allowed this was the triumph of Idealism over its 
3 Flora and Alber (1981: 73) were aware of this problem, mainly with France, but also with Belgium 
and Netherlands. 
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competitor, Positivism. As a set of tenets, Idealism had a positive view of humanity (with 
room for individual altruism and ethical imperatives governing human behaviour) and a 
positive view of the individual-state relationship (promoting citizenship participation). The 
Idealist objective of establishing an "ideal state" sustained by perfect justice encouraged 
intellectuals and policymakers to transform the whole of British society by implementing 
social laws, creating social-reform institutions and "social sciences" departments in British 
universities and influencing the intellectual environment and public opinion. 
Helga M. Hernes observed that in Scandinavian countries, the universal coverage of 
social risks and population, the egalitarianism and the redistributive outcomes of the existing 
welfare states have been linked to the existence of communitarian values that encourage the 
act of sharing, the feeling of mutual aid and other civic values (see Baldwin, 1992: 107). 
Rimlinger (1971) explained the early development of social welfare in Germany as a result 
of the weakness of the Liberal ideology, the strength of the Catholic Social movement and 
the patriarchal model of social relationships. For others, however, it is precisely the contrary: 
Catholicism correlates negatively with welfare state development (Castles, 1994a; Ferrera, 
1996). 
Quite an important debate has been this one on the role of religion as a determinant 
of social policy. The Industrialisation and Modernisation theories also made used of the 
religious factor in explaining the differences between welfare states. The type of religion and 
the level of secularisation4 would explain why in some countries, welfare institutions would 
be more developed that in others. Protestantism would have encouraged the development of 
welfare state while Catholicism would have delayed it. Thus, Flora believed that `the 
Protestant nationalisation of the territorial culture in the North favored the mobilization of 
voice from below: the early development of literacy encouraged the mobilization of lower 
strata into mass politics, and the incorporation of the church into the state apparatus reduced 
4 For hypothesis linking the levels of secularisation and welfare state development, see Ileidenheimer (1983) and Higgins (1981). 
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one potential source of conflict and produced a clear-cut focus for the opposition of the 
dominated population. By contrast, the supra-territorial influence of the Catholic Church 
favored a mobilization "from above": the late development of literacy retarded spontaneous 
mass mobilization and the conflicts over the control over the educational system led to 
efforts by the church to mobilise against the state' (quoted in Kersbergen, 1995: 194). 
In Protestant nations, where state and religion developed in a non-conflictual way, 
the welfare state found roots for its development. In Catholic countries, however, `the 
conflict between state and church inhibited or at least retarded the emergence of a welfare 
state' (Kersbergen, 1995: 194). Flora and Alber (1981: 43) observed that `the countries with 
strong Protestant state churches developed early a notion of state responsibility for public 
welfare, whereas in the religiously mixed and Catholic countries the tradition of private 
charity and the principle of subsidiarity, giving priority to the responsibility of smaller 
collectivities, remained strong'. 
However, Higgins (1981: 91) stated precisely the contrary: `the impact of 
Protestantism on social policy historically has been to retard social reform'. Protestant 
insistence on individualism and self-help, and the view of poverty as consequence of moral 
weakness and sin, opposed any state attempt to get involved in providing social welfare. 
Stephens (1979: 100) theorised that some anti-capitalist aspects of Catholic ideology such as 
"Fair Wage", the Church's concern with the welfare of the poor or the condemnation of 
usury would have encouraged the increase of welfare expenditure. Wilensky (1981) 
concluded that Catholicism (measured by the strength of Catholic parties and their 
representation on the executive) fosters corporatist economic systems and this leads to 
increasing social expenditure, especially in situations of catholic-left party competition. 
New Culturalist arguments have focused on the negative influence exerted by 
Catholicism on the low levels of public expenditure on welfare and the institutional design 
(mainly its fragmented composition) of the welfare state. Ferrera (1996: 30) noted that `the 
presence of a strong Catholic Church and the resilience of corporatist traditions for instance, 
bear obvious responsibility for the low level of state welfare, and whole segmented labour 
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markets and a family-centred social fabric (again connected with Catholic subsidiarity) have 
in turn unquestionably contributed to the uneven development of income maintenance'. 
Castles (1994a) argued that religion explains differences across a variety of areas of 
social policy among countries and also helps to identify commonalties between those nations 
that have similar policy outcomes, thus constituting "families of nations" (Castles, 1993). 
For him, the main religious "divide" is between Catholicism and Protestantism and it is 
possible to show a `linkage between measures of Catholic adherence and a wide variety of 
policy outcomes' and it is not his intention `to give a detailed account of the actors involved 
in the policy-process or the channels through which policy outcomes are determined' 
(1994a: 20). 
In my opinion, it is not possible to show such a link without proving how Catholic 
people and Catholic ideas made it possible. Without historically detailed accounts of what 
actually happened, this kind of statistical analysis remains unproved. Therborn (1994), 
although agreeing with Castles on the need to include the religious factor in the agenda of 
the comparative public policy, rejected the quantitative approach and preferred in-depth 
studies of how religion actually influences public policy. Castles (1994b) finally admitted 
that `a historically detailed account of both the actors and channels through which particular 
outcomes have been shaped by religious factors' (1994b: 111) was needed. 
As far as I am concerned, the "Catholic-Protestant divide" is too simple. 
Protestantism embraces too many different national political and religious experiences 
(broadly the Anglican-Liberal, the Lutheran and the Calvinist-Methodist traditions). In 
addition, religion is depicted as "doctrines, beliefs and traditions", but these are different. 
While doctrines are directly related to religion, "traditions" might be a consequence itself of 
a mixed influence of other factors. The patriarchal tradition of male-dominance might not 
come from Catholic religion but from premodern economic systems, historical legacies or 
lack of cultural modernisation. Finally, what Castles pointed out as "Catholic doctrines, 
beliefs and traditions" that actually influence social policy outcomes, are none of these. 
Subsidiarity, Etatism, Corporatism or cultural aversion to state interventionism are neither 
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doctrines of faith nor religious beliefs that commit Catholics to them. In fact, few Catholics 
would be aware of them. More than anything, they arc so-called "guiding instructions" 
which are just circumstantial, temporal, problem-solving and evolutionary teachings. With 
time, they can become a well-established tradition but most probably, they will be replaced 
by other social solutions until they become fashionable again or simply vanisheds. My point 
here is that these instructions and teachings are not rooted in a sort of "Catholic soul" 
(whether that might possibly exist) as doctrines of faith or beliefs might be. As Popes and the 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy get advice from professionals and experts in different areas in order 
to elaborate Catholic Social Doctrine, it is hard to say whether the ideas and receipts for 
social reform arise from within the Catholic doctrine or simply reflect previous ideas of 
different "epistemic communities" that are equally available to Church leaders and to 
politicians in Catholic countries. The latter is most probable. The most fruitful questions are 
then: Why did Churchmen become interested in those ideas and solutions? How did religious 
figures, once equipped with those ideas, influence politicians in different countries and why 
did they succeed in doing it? 
To summarise, cultural explanations of the influence of religion in welfare state 
emergence have produced contradictory hypotheses and the research has subsequently 
focused on in-depth case studies. 
At this point, thus, the most we may well be able to state is that "religion somehow 
shapes policies". But once this has been said, it does not seem that much more can be added. 
Not if we do not engage with the policy process and the actors and channels enclosed on it. 
As many of the countries that by 1950 had introduced systems of social insurance were 
Catholics (with very high levels of catholic populations and with high involvement of the 
Church on national politics), it might be wise to ask several questions. Were there Catholics 
s Thus, although concepts like Subsidiarity and Social Justice can still be found in contemporary 
Catholic Social Doctrine, others based on the Corporatist doctrine, Fair Wage, or on a explicit 
rejection of state intervention on economy, which were fashionable once, are no longer present in the 
Catholic Social Doctrine. 
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(laymen or clerics) involved in the establishing of social welfare policies? Which was the 
Church's position on this? Were these actors promoting or blocking the development of a 
universal-solidaristic type of welfare state? Were there any ideological (grounded on 
Catholic Social teachings) reasons for them to follow any of this two courses of action? ' 
In addition to the debate on the influence of religion, other cultural explanations 
have also been highly criticised. For Skocpol (1995), the cultural approach cannot explain 
why in the United States, notwithstanding the strength of Liberalism, different pension 
programs for mothers and ex-combatants were created. The same can be said, from my point 
of view, about the Latin American cases. In Central and South America, Liberalism and 
Catholicism shared the ideological monopoly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. However, social insurance schemes were introduced, comparatively, quite early. 
Recent comparative studies have noted that projects for solidarity-based and 
universal-coverage reforms were discussed in many more countries than the few predicted 
by the Cultural theories. Irrespective of the success achieved in order to implement those 
policies, the projects existed all around the world, from France, Switzerland and Sweden 
(Immergut, 1992), to the United States (Skocpol, 1995) to Spain, Portugal and most of the 
Latin American countries, for example Argentina and Guatemala. If such reformist projects 
were in the public debate or were considered by politicians and policymakers, then the 
political culture is not to blame for the failure of establishing them. 
6 This sort of alternative approach that looked into the facts with detail was taken by Joan Higgins 
(1981) by looking at the role of the Catholic Church in shaping social policy outcomes in Ireland in 
accordance with its belief on the principles of subsidiarity, the centrality of the family, the recognition 
of private property and the notion of just wage. The role of the state as provider of welfare remained at 
the minimum level. The most salient moment of the process of welfare state emergence where the 
power of the Church was displayed in its full capacity to block any further development of state take 
over was when passing the Mother and Child Health Bill in 1950 (Higgins, 1981: 81).. The opposition 
of the Irish bishops to provide universal and free health education and medical care for all women and 
their children under 16 years old arose from their fears that such a policy would allow the state to 
control the education of controversial topics such as sex relations, chastity and marriage. The Bill was 
ultimately withdraw and substituted by another one which did not contain any reference to health 
education. 
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2.3. War and Welfare States 
The collective experience of total war changed European societies. Thus, a group of 
social scientists found relationships between the historical juncture of World War II and the 
emergence of new social policies. 
In a lecture delivered in 1955, Titmuss (1963) observed that the scale and intensity 
of the latest war, affecting the majority of the population (as all were victims of bombing), 
led to new developments in the British welfare system. Thus, the Emergency Medical 
Service, originally established to give assistance to small numbers of wounded combatants, 
was soon overwhelmed when Nazi's bombs hit English land, thus much more capable 
welfare institutions were required. But more deeply, there was a change in the relationship 
between the state and society: `the waging of modern war presupposes and imposes a great 
increase in social discipline; moreover, this discipline is only tolerable if 
-and only if- social 
inequalities are not intolerable' (Titmuss, 1963: 85). 
So, when social inequalities are reduced, 
-creating social measures that reduce 
differences in standards of living, social recognition, in brief, improving the quality of life or 
equal recognition before the law ('indulgences of many kinds' said Titmuss)- the citizens are 
happy to co-operate in the war effort. Civilians give their consent and their support to the 
state's aim of winning the war, while the state commits itself to the diminishing of social 
inequalities and privileges. War is then the independent variable of the extent and 
organisation of the welfare state. The more the masses are involved on the war effort, the 
more extended the welfare state is: `the aims and content of social policy, both in peace and 
in war, are thus determined 
-at least to a substantial extent- by how far the co-operation of 
the masses is essential to the successful prosecution of war' (Titmuss, 1963: 86). 
This hypothesis was openly criticised. How can we explain the failure in the setting 
up of a welfare state in countries which also suffered the war, such as Germany, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands or Russia? If the German population was as involved in the war effort 
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as the British, as was the case, why were the policy outcomes so different? In the case of 
Spain, the Civil War, as an undoubtedly war scenario in which not a single citizen could 
avoid being involved, led to a split between the winners and the losers, deepening for forty 
years the ideological divisions and social inequalities. Skocpol (1995) pointed out that 
neither in the UK nor in the US were the first modem pensions created during or just after 
wars7. 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961) raised a different argument. They explained that wars 
increase the legitimacy and capacity of the state to extract resources from society, a difficult 
task that can only happen in extreme situations. As social policies require a huge amount of 
resources, wartime and its consequent drain on fiscal revenues becomes an optimum moment 
for increasing social expenditure. Skocpol (1995) also rejected the theory, arguing that the 
US had more fiscal capacity than the UK but failed to implement the extensive welfare state 
established by the latter. Another criticism is that many countries, once the war is over, 
actually reduce their taxation levels. 
2.4. Policy Diffusion Theories 
The scenario described in the introduction, that of many countries coinciding in 
creating similar types of welfare systems and in the very short period of time of a decade, 
alerted the scholars to the possibility of mechanisms of policy diffusion having taken place R. 
7 Baldwin's criticism (1992) in the form of a question of why the medium classes accepted measures 
that allegedly were against their interests, just for the sake of sharing a common sense of 
psychological solidarity, seems to misinterpret Titmuss' point. As far as I am concerned, in Titmuss's 
theory everybody wins: the government achieves the necessary level of social discipline conducent to 
winning the war; the middle and working classes achieve a reduction of social and political 
inequalities. 
"In his list of "internal and external" determinants of welfare state creation and expansion, Rys (1964) 
quoted the diffusion factor as one of the latter. He did not offer, however, any explanatory model or 
descriptive account of how diffusion can take place. 
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Collier and Messick (1975: 1305-6) observed that diffusion can take place in three 
ways: by copying legislation ("imitation"), by influencing new policy adoptions or by 
advising and making suggestions (international organisations and experts) and by 
encouraging policy innovations (international agreements). Taking the timing of the first 
adoption of social insurance schemes among 59 countries as the dependent variable, they 
tested the extent to which a process of policy diffusion had taken place". They discovered 
that among the earliest adopters of social security, there was a "upward" diffusion along the 
hierarchy of development (from countries with lower modernisation rates to countries with 
higher modernisation rates). At the middle stage of social security adoption (we can call it 
the second wave), there was a "spatial diffusion" among countries with very different levels 
of modernisation. With the later adopters, both hierarchical diffusion and spatial diffusion 
were found. 
Not much more can be said about diffusion processes using this analytical 
perspective. From Collier and Messick's account, it can only be said that some countries 
coincided on the timing and perhaps on certain policies. But nothing can be said about why 
and how this happened 
-thus, about causality. 
It is however one of the claims of this thesis that the mechanisms of policy learning 
and policy diffusion do usually happen. International organisations like the International 
Labour Organisation, the International Social Security Association, the Ibero-American 
Social Security Organisation and the Inter-American Social Security Conference have played 
a crucial role in encouraging social welfare developments and the standardisation of social 
A first concern arises when looking at the identification of what in each country happens to be "the 
first adoption". A painstaking investigation on Collier and Messick's data discovers that the authors 
did not use a consistent and similar measure for all the countries. Were they considering "compulsory" 
or simply "voluntary" schemes? Public or private? Covering homogeneous working groups (let us say, 
all the "blue collar workers", all farmers, civil servants) or just certain categories ("banana workers" 
or "gold miners")?. This seems to be crucial to me, as it can be that the authors are comparing what it 
cannot be compare. Thus, in their account, Spain's first adoption appears to be in 1919, when the Old 
Age Compulsory Retirement Scheme was passed. However, the first social scheme adopted in Spain 
was Working Injuries Insurance Scheme of 1900. Portugal is described as having created its first law 
in 1910, which is simply wrong. The first one, the Working Injuries Insurance Law was created in 
1913. The same could be said of Argentina, Panama or El Salvador. 
41 
security legislation. On many occasions, the innovations of neighbouring countries or of 
those sharing a common language or a common colonial heritage encouraged imitation. On 
other occasions, policy experts were responsible for the dispersion of ideas and policy 
solutions1°. 
This thesis will show that the best way for searching for policy diffusion processes is 
by looking into the policymaking process. Irremediably, this strategy implies searching for 
the actors, ideas and institutions involved on it. The question is then why and how in some 
countries, policymakers succeeded in transforming ideas of social reform into coherent 
policies, while failing in others. 
2.5. The "Politics Matters" Approach 
A second stage in the process of accumulating knowledge on the politics of the 
welfare state emergence and development came as a reaction to the Modernisation theories. 
These were criticised as neglecting the importance of other variables apart from the socio- 
economic ones. For a group of scholars, political variables happened to be the main 
omission. In their account, Modernisation explanations cannot explain the difficulties in 
establishing social reform projects even in those most successful cases such as Britain. If 
levels of modernisation determined the content of social security, why did government 
bureaucrats in the UK 
- 
precisely those who were more aware of the situation of the 
population and the risks of unfair capitalism because of their social knowledge 
- 
bitterly 
oppose Beveridge's plans for universal coverage? 
10 This is a conclusion of my own research on the emergence of social insurance systems in Central 
and South America. The expert in charge of the creation of the social insurance system of Costa Rica 
in 1942, Oscar IIarahona Streber, was brought to Guatemala later, in 1946, to establish the 
Guatemalan Social Security System. 
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Alternatively, other scholars selected class-based variables. In the capitalist polities, 
class is the major cleavage of conflict. Different social and political actors, structured under 
class identity and loyalty lines, take part in power struggles pursuing their own interests. 
Neo-marxists Piven and Cloward (1971) argued that social policy change occurs as a result 
of popular protest. The revolts and agitation of the poor and workers forced political and 
economic elites to make concessions in the form of social security benefits and more 
permissive labour regulations. Empirical evidence, however, has not come in support of 
Piven and Cloward thesis, as Skocpol and Amenta (1986) showed. The latter authors 
concluded that `mass disruption arguments are most applicable to times and places where 
working classes and other organised democratic forces lack access to regular institutional 
channels for affecting social policies. Even so, the effects of disruption may be slight and not 
in line with the demands posed, and analysts must probe for possible backlash effects against 
those who protest' (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 139). 
More recent Neo-Marxist approaches have used Poulantzas' class-struggle theory" 
to create more sophisticated explanatory models of welfare state emergence. The "Corporate 
Liberalism" thesis `contends that class-conscious capitalists manipulate the polity so that 
government comes to pursue policies favourable to capitalism' (Quadagno, 1984: 632)12. 
Social policies are used as a mean to control the political process by the capitalist class. 
For Quadagno (1984), the key group in shaping social policy (more specifically, the 
US 1935 Social Security Act) was businessmen. However, this was not a homogeneous 
group as the divide between monopoly and non-monopoly companies existed. These 
different capitalist groups had different leverage on bureaucrats and state managers, with the 
working-class playing no significant role. The state, following Poulantzas' thesis, operated 
11 For Poulantzas, the state stays as a relatively autonomous political arena mediating between 
different power blocs in the inter-class struggles and intra-blocs. 12 Representatives of these school are authors such as Kolko, G. (1963), Afain Currents in Modern 
American History, New York: Harper and Row; Domhoff, W. (1979), The Powers that Be: Processes 
of Ruling Class Domination, New York: Vintage; O'Connor, J. (1973), The Fiscal Crisis of the State, 
New York: St. Martin's Press. From a historical-descriptive approach, see Berkowitz, E. and 
McQuaid, K (1978), `Businessman and Bureaucrat: the Evolution of the American Social Welfare 
System, 1900-1940', The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 38, Issue 1, pp. 120-42. 
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as a 'mediating body, weighing the priorities of various power blocs within it' (Quadagno, 
1984: 646). Thus, the Social Security Act was a compromise between non-monopoly capital 
which was `struggling to keep social-welfare measures outside the jurisdiction of the state' 
and `a core group of influential monopoly capitalists, national state managers and various 
citizen coalitions' who were pursuing increasing centralisation (Quadagno, 1984: 646). 
Drawing on Poulantzas's theory and adding insights from theories of social protest 
(Piven and Cloward, 1977) and Domhoff's analysis of capitalist dominance, Jenkins and 
Brents (1989) also explain the US Social Security Act of 1935 as the result of two factors: 
social protest from excluded groups and lower classes who were suffering the harshness of 
the Great Depression, extending among political elites the fear of crisis and the commitment 
to avoid it; and struggles between capitalist coalitions, with the ultimate triumph of the 
"Corporate-Liberal coalition" that presented its policy proposals. They make a good point 
when noting that existing theories (in particular, state-centred approaches like Skocpol's) 
have failed to distinguish between policy formulation and policy making. 
In his seminal book The Democratic Class Struggle, Korpi (1983) offered a model 
of social change whose central concern is how power is distributed among collective actors 
in society and what power resources are available to social actors in different moments and 
in different situations. In Western societies, actors have at their disposal different power 
resources such as the means of violence, capital, means of production or human capital. 
Collective organisation is another power resource, as it maximises the limited power of 
individual resources 
- 
that is, increases their human capital. Aware of the increase of their 
power resources, social groups can feel capable of engaging in societal bargaining, thus 
bringing about social change. 
Following the argument, Korpi specified how power struggles can happen. Crucial 
social developments that have taken place in capitalist countries have been the result of the 
increase of the power resources of the working-class movement. Thus, the achievement of 
political democracy, the institutionalisation of corporatism in many capitalist democracies or 
the development of the welfare state after World War II can be seen as a result of the 
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increasing level of organisation (resulting in the increase of power resources) of the unions 
and left-wing political parties. The independent variable here 
-the power resources of the 
working-class movement- is operationalised by the degree of working class organisation 
both in trade unions and political parties and the degree of control of left wing parties over 
the executive (Kotei, 1980). 
The "power resources" model was applied to the study of the welfare state 
development after World War II by many scholars. For Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1984), 
the change in working-class power resources after the World War II allowed workers to push 
for their interests. The increase in the levels of unionisation and the rise in the electoral 
results of left-wing parties opened the door for further welfare policy innovations towards a 
system of universal coverage, generous benefits and the progressive loosening of welfare 
entitlement conditions. Thus, the working hypothesis of the theory can be stated as 
following: the greater `the power resources of the labour movement and the stronger the left 
party hold over the government' (Korpi, 1983: 25), the more likely that public policies will 
reflect the working-class interests. In their comparative study, Esping-Andersen and Korpi 
concluded that the existence of a strong union confederation and socialist party, together 
with the absence of previous developed programs of welfare provision allowed in Sweden 
the great developments towards an extensive and universal welfare state which it was not 
possible to create in Austria and even more, in Germany. 
The social democratic theory became the dominant explanatory framework during 
the 80s and 90s. The amount of criticisms that has lately been harvesting reflects precisely its 
centrality in the sub-discipline of comparative social research. To start assessing the limits of 
the theory, the authors themselves were aware of the fact that the Socialdemocratic theory 
applies better to post-war welfare state developments. Before 1945, welfare state institutions 
were created from above, "for" the working-class but "without" the working-class. As 
Esping-Andersen and Korpi put it, the working class was a mere `object of the concerns and 
worries of the traditional ruling elites' (1984: 180). 
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Some of the criticisms are directed at the array of assumptions implied by this 
theory. Skocpol (1995) argues that it has in mind only centralised and bureaucratised states, 
with party systems that struggle for power in the legislative arena. Paul Pierson (2000: 797) 
criticises `its focus on zero-sum class conflict over social provision', neglecting the 
possibility (and the fact) that policy outputs and outcomes are most of the time the product of 
consensus and agreements. Baldwin (1992) noted that as important the middle class also 
benefited from the introduction of the welfare state (not only the working class). The 
literature on "Corporate Liberalism" already analysed or the "Elite Conflict" theories studied 
below open to more actors the dual accounting of social democratic theories. Thus, it is hard 
to see the welfare state as an institutional outcome of zero-sum class conflicts. 
Also, Korpi's (1983) model makes the assumption that the government makes policy 
in reaction to social and political demands. Thus, there is no room in this theory for 
governmental autonomy or for a non-reactive policy making style. However, public policy 
literature has shown extensive scope for government autonomy and the uneven access of 
interest groups to policy communities and to policy-makers. 
Baldwin's model (1992) was both a critique and a refinement of the 
Socialdemocratic theory. I share with Pedersen (1993: 7) the view that Baldwin has simply 
`furthered the tendency to see class as the only relevant social division and the only possible 
basis for a politics of interest'. Baldwin included the urban middle classes and agricultural 
forces as equally relevant for the explanation of welfare state emergence and development. 
The secret of welfare state emergence lies in the encounter of interests of the poor, the 
workers and the middle classes, the latter agreeing to introduce universal benefits only 
because they would gain more from the measure. 
As presented by Cameron (1984), the Neo-Corporatist approach's main hypothesis is 
that the "openness" of a country to the international economy and its dependence on the 
waves of the international markets foster policy responses of the sort of welfare-corporatist 
solutions. The Polanyian logic of welfare state as barriers against modern capitalist maladies 
rests in this. The smaller and more dependent upon international trade a country is, the 
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bigger the power of labour and the more probable its welfare state development: `Since 
small, open economies tend to be industrially concentrated, they also tend to develop strong 
and unified interest organisations. The capacity to forge broad consensus and to mobilise 
power is further helped by the homogeneity and concentration of the labour force' 
(Kersbergen, 1995: 17). 
2.6. Elite Theories 
In dialogue with the social democratic theory (Kersbergen, 1995: 17), another 
approach to the issue of welfare state development paid attention to the role of elites in 
overcoming conflicts through achieving compromises over the policies to be created. For Dc 
Swaan (1988: 9, quoted in Pierson, 1998b: 95), `social security was not the achievement of 
the organized working classes, nor the result of a capitalist conspiracy to pacify them 
... 
The 
initiative for compulsory, nation-wide and collective arrangements to insure workers against 
income loss came from reformist politicians and administrators in charge of state 
bureaucracies'. 
Mesa-Lago (1977) explained the gradual emergence and expansion of Latin 
American social security systems as a consequence of the power of pressure groups to obtain 
concessions from the state". The military, followed by political elites and civil servants, 
obtained their particular social security systems first, with better benefits, better services, less 
strict eligibility conditions than the programs granted to less powerful pressure groups such 
as "blue collar" workers and the agricultural workforce. The outcome of this power-led 
13 For another elite-analysis of social security, applied to the Chilean case, see Tapia, I. and Parrish, C. 
J. (1970), 'Welfare Policy and Administration in Chile', Journal of Comparative Administration, No. 
1, February, pp. 455-76. 
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bargaining process was the non-egalitarian, non-redistributive and fragmented social 
insurance systems which were established. 
A more radical version of the approach can be named, following Baldwin (1992), the 
"Bonapartist model". It is suggested that elite groups in power make concessions in the form 
of social policies in order to ensure their status quo and exorcise social unrest. Thus, Fraser, 
(1981) stated that the English welfare state was created as an instrument of social control to 
replace the existing "Poor Law", which had proved to be inadequate for such a goal. Hay 
(1984) also noted that British businessmen before World War I made concessions on social 
welfare hoping to achieve social discipline and to raise productivity so as to cope with 
foreign competitive pressures. 
Can social policies in non-democratic regimes be explained from this theoretical 
standpoint? It could certainly be argued that dictators and their supporters sought to exorcise 
the risk of social revolts and popular opposition to their regimes by making social (but not 
political) concessions, without threatening, however, the status quo of the wealthier social 
strata and the unequal social stratification and economic system. However, it could also be 
argued that many non-democratic regimes which introduced social security policies did not 
face the risk of social revolt or there was not a foreseeable danger of the institutions of 
dictatorship being dismantled. For example, Francoism did not face any risk of social unrest 
in the immediate post-Civil War years, and even so different social insurance schemes 
covering most social risks were created. 
In any case, I am convinced that the explanatory power of this approach can be 
enhanced by integrating it into a policy-making study which takes into account the role of 
actors and their interests, ideas and institutions in forging public policies. One of the main 
goals of this dissertation is to develop a model where the role of elite groups in non- 
democratic regimes is understood in conjunction with the other elements of the policy 
process. 
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2.7. The Institutional Approach 
The history of welfare state development has always interested scholars, since the 
first accounts by the Webbs in England as early as 1911, through the studies by Durand in 
the 1950s, Rimlinger in the 1970s and Flora as late as 1986. From this tradition of welfare 
state research, a cluster of scholars has been analysing the way particular welfare state 
institutions have been developing through the time, stressing the importance of historical 
sequences, non-linear relationships and complex causation processes (Pierson, 2000: 810). 
Heclo's research (1974) on the long-term development of unemployment and old 
age insurance schemes of Britain and Sweden can be consider as a path-breaking study 
within this school. Ashford's book (1986) and Momsem's collection of articles (1981) also 
traced the historical evolution of the welfare state of different countries such as Britain and 
Germany. 
One use of this historical approach to the study of the welfare state lies in how it 
teaches us to avoid simple linear causation thought. Also, it has proved to be extremely 
helpful to assess the validity of hypotheses generated by other research schools. Many of the 
statements that were made by theories of modernisation, the cultural approach and the debate 
on the influence of religion on social policy outcomes, the "Politics Matters" theories and the 
analysis of war and welfare state have actually been discredited when tested with particular 
case-studies. Huber and Stephens noted that much of the literature on the welfare state has 
applied the causes of short-term institutional change to long-term change (see Pierson, 2000: 
813). This mistake could be avoided by testing the hypothesis with in-depth historically- 
based studies that bring to the fore the causes of the long-term social and political 
transformations. 
In the Institutional approach, state capacities, political institutions such as 
constitutional rules or electoral systems, long-term historical and political legacies and actors 
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within the state (mainly bureaucrats14) play a substantial role. Eckstein (1960), for example, 
explained the passing of the British National Insurance Act of 1911 and the National Health 
Service Act of 1946 as a result of the room for autonomous decision-making allowed by 
parliamentary majorities (quoted in Immergut, 1992: 240). 
Skocpol's (1995) theoretical framework for explaining the US social policy looked 
at how historical processes of state formation produced specific state institutions which 
shaped the power relations between groups (and their possibilities for forging alliances) and 
their power positions in the policy making process. The long-term political processes of state 
formation embrace the constitutional formation process, the war experiences, the democratic 
struggles and the bureaucratisation processes. 
Using this framework, Skocpol and her colleagues launched their attempt to explain 
the whole history of the US welfare system. To begin with, the mother-friendly welfare 
system and the special protection of war veterans in the form of pensions that were 
introduced during the nineteenth century reflected the successful lobbying power of 
women's and ex-combatants groups. Skocpol explains their capacity to access the nucleus of 
decision-making due to the existence of a highly fragmented polity, `a polity of courts and 
parties operating in a multi-tiered federal framework' (Orloff and Skocpol, 1984: 741). 
Although this system was developed in the nineteenth century, the US system did 
not follow other countries' social policy innovations in the early twentieth century. Although 
proposed, old age and disability pensions for the working and middle classes were not 
introduced. Orloff and Skocpol (1984) explained this failure when compared to the more 
successful case of Britain by the lack of an established civil bureaucracy that could push for 
increases in social expenditure and the fear of entrenched "patronage politics". The reformist 
spirit for the purity of democracy that the "Progressive Era" brought about wanted to 
suppress the patronage practices of former political periods. For many, the pension system 
14 On the role of bureaucracy, see Davidson, R. and Lowe, R. (1981), 'Bureaucracy and Innovation in 
British Welfare Policy, 1870-1945', in Mommsen, W. J. (ed. ), The Emergence of the Welfare State in 
Britain and Germany, 1850-1950, London: Croom Helm, pp. 263-95. 
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for war veterans was an excellent example of a "patronage-politics" outcome. So, the fear to 
create another mechanism of "patronage politics" blocked, at least temporarily, the 
expansion of the welfare system. 
The design and content of the welfare system created by the 1935 Social Security 
Act can also be explained as a result of specific institutional features of the US polity. These 
features (the independent variables) were the `decentralised federalism, the legacies of 
patronage-orientated forms of democratic politics that prevailed in the nineteenth century 
United States, the weakness and fragmentation of the new realm of public administration 
built from the late nineteenth century onwards and public policy-making processes centered 
in legislative log-rolling rather in programmatic political parties or executive planning 
agencies' (Skocpol 1995: 138). These characteristics of US politics affected the way 
advocates of different social policies manoeuvred to get their projects adopted. 
However, the effect of these features needed to be catalysed by an external 
component. Policy change, from this approach, seems to take place after something exterior 
to the simple theoretical framework brings about the possibility for institutional activity's. 
That is, in order for institutions to exert their shaping role over the policy-making process, 
something has to activate them. This is the function of the so-called "critical junctures". If 
the "Progressive era" was the critical juncture in the previous period, in the case of the 
creation of the 1935 US Social Security Act, the Great Depression acted as the critical 
juncture that opened the opportunity for the coming of different teams of policy advocates, in 
this case the "School of Wisconsin". The institutional features listed above allowed them to 
create a very closed policy community, sheltering them to implement their own ideas and 
policy solutions. That is why the resulting social security system was not fully 
comprehensive of all citizens and all social risks, was not nationally extended, the programs 
were independent from each other and there were not national standards of public benefits - 
15 This point has been made by Alley, B. (2001), `New Institutionalist Explanations for Institutional 
Change: a Note of Caution', Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 137-45. 
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the opposite to the model that Skocpol has in mind for her comparisons, the Beveridgean 
model. 
World War II became the "critical juncture" for the post-war development of US 
social policy (Skocpol and Amenta, 1995). The war opened a window of opportunity for 
policy reform but was not satisfactorily used, in contrast to the UK, again for reasons that 
have to do with institutional features of the American polity. US also had its sort of 
Beveridgean report in the Security, Mork and Relief Policies of March 1943, but its 
advocates failed to implement it because they did not achieve the broad social and political 
consensus that advocates in Britain achieved. The difficulty to create coalition governments 
and the presidential political system (as long-term characteristics of the state), the fact that 
elections continued to be held during the war, together with the lack of central economic 
planning and the failure to successfully incorporate the working classes (resulting in strikes 
and agitation) (as more immediate temporal reasons) are all institutional consequences of the 
US experience of the war. And these features eliminated any possibility of achieving cross- 
class and cross-partisan social and political support for expanding the prevailing social 
policies towards a comprehensive and national welfare state. 
In a chapter of a book fully dedicated to investigating the effect of institutions on 
policies and politics (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992), Immergut (1992b) explains the 
emergence and development of national health systems in three countries, France, 
Switzerland and Sweden. In all the three countries, projects for creating a national health 
service, fully comprehensive of all citizens and health risks were proposed. In all the three 
countries, movements both advocating and fiercely opposing the social reforms grew up. The 
outcomes, however, differ radically. Sweden managed to create such a developed national 
health service, France could not go any further than creating a Sickness Insurance Scheme 
and Switzerland rejected any possible measure for a public system, irrespective of it being a 
universal system or a insurance scheme. Immergut found the explanation on the role of 
institutions: `Institutions establish different rules of the game for politicians and interest 
groups seeking to enact or to block policies. "De iure" rules of institutional design provide 
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procedural advantages and impediments for translating political power into concrete policies. 
"De facto" rules arising from electoral results and party systems change the ways in which 
these formal institutions work in practice. Together these institutional rules establish distinct 
logics of decision-making that set the parameter both for executive action and interest group 
influence' (Immergut, 1992b: 59). 
So, both constitutional rules and electoral results moved along the nucleus of 
decision-making from the executive to the legislative or the electoral arena, changing the 
opportunities of pressure groups for shaping the policy-making process. Depending on the 
resources for shaping the policy process, pressure groups might or might not be able to make 
use of their resources to veto legislation. Thus, in Sweden, the executive branch benefited 
from the autonomy for decision-making provided by the constitutional configuration of the 
polity, making it immune to the demands of pressure groups opposing health policy reforms. 
In France, the Parliament became the locus of decision-making, benefiting doctors' demands 
to fit health policies to their interest. Finally Switzerland's constitution allows the call for a 
popular referendum, a powerful tool in hands of pressure groups for blocking any policy 
project. Just by threatening the government with calling for a referendum, doctors managed 
to block the health reforms. 
Pedersen (1993) makes a comparative study of family policies established in the 
British and French states between 1914 and 1945. Family policies in both countries varied 
enormously, to the extent that, while in Britain the policies followed "a male breadwinner 
logic of welfare" by redistributing income primarily to the father, in France they were 
"women friendly", designed to protect children by distributing income directly to the family 
(1993: 17). Pedersen finds the reason for this divergence in economic, ideological or political 
structures. One is the structure of the labour market (the rate of labour-force participation for 
married women and presence of women in the labour market, rather than in the home) but 
most important is the way social and political demands were presented to public opinion and 
to the groups with the ability to determine the policy making process: `we can best 
understand why policies toward dependence developed so differently in these two welfare 
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states if we examine how proposals to base social entitlements on family status or gender 
role were articulated and received within two realms 
- 
the open realm of public and political 
debate and the more restricted realm of political or economic consultation' (Pedersen, 1993: 
13). 
Thus, from here, the approach leads to the study of the policy making process: `The 
policy-making arena was crowded in both countries with those claiming to represent a wide 
array of interests putting forward very different visions of distributive justice.. 
. 
and 
attempting to build coalitions and to interest state actors in their cases' (Pedersen, 1993: 18). 
Therefore, proposals, projects and ideas with different social welfare solutions existed in 
every country. Why were some projects successful in one country and a failure in another? 
Women's groups in Britain launched a strong campaign for the recognition of maternity as a 
beneficial value for the whole society, thus asking for policies that benefited women with 
dependent children. But it was precisely the strength of the movement that was advocating 
for such policies which provoked fear and opposition from equally strong male 
organisations, civil servants and trade unionists. On the contrary, the weakness of women's 
groups in France did not put pressure on the politicians and business people who agreed to 
establish family policies with a high income-redistribution content. To conclude, it was the 
structure of the polity what shaped the channelling of demands and the success of ideas and 
policies. 
2.8. The Debate on Welfare State Regimes: The `Latin Rim' 
Regime 
One of the most important debates within the comparative study of the Welfare State 
is the discussion on regime types. By far the most influential work has been Esping- 
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Andersen's (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, in which he constructed a 
typology of welfare state regimes using three criteria: 1) the "de-commodification" or 
opportunity possessed by the individual to remain out of the labour market; 2) the social 
stratification system created by the WS; 3) the relationship between state and market (later 
including the family as well). The combination of these three criteria creates similarities and 
differences among countries, that allow a presentation in a three-fold typology of WS: a 
Liberal, a Conservative/corporatist and a Social Democratic model (Pierson, 1998). 
The Liberal Welfare State (as in the USA, UK or Australia) follows the logic of the 
market, thus the state's public expenditure is low and benefits are rather modest and means- 
tested. In contrast, the Social Democratic model (as in Sweden and Norway), committed to 
the principles of universalism, de-commodification and solidarity, has high levels of public 
expenditure and grants welfare benefits as a citizens' right. In the Conservative Welfare 
State (as in Germany or France), the market also plays an important role as provider of 
public services, but the state is much more involved than in the Liberal type. However, the 
logic of protection is linked to labour market participation, thus resulting in poor de- 
commodifying results and in the reinforcement of social stratification. 
Since Esping-Andersen's 1990 study, much of the comparative welfare state 
literature of the 1990s can be seen as a `settling of accounts' with him (Pierson, 1998: 779), 
either by fitting in new cases into the three ideal types or by providing alternative regime 
types. Thus, researchers paid attention to welfare state developments in Southern Europe and 
suggested the existence of a group of nations which Leibried (1993) named the "Latin Rim" 
model. These countries are Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. They would all have a mixture 
of features of both the Continental and the Liberal models. The system is based on the 
contributory principle, linked to labour market participation and social assistance remains 
"rudimentary" (Leibried, 1993; Gough, 1996). However, while in these countries of South 
Europe social welfare expenditure is still very low, the health service is well developed, in 
some cases funded by general taxation (Spain, Italy) and covers almost the entire population 
(99 per cent of the population in Spain). Ferrera (1996) summarised the common features of 
55 
the southern model of the Welfare State as follows: `I) A highly fragmented and corporatist 
income maintenance system, with peaks of generosity for an institutional labour market 
accompanied by macroscopic gaps of protection; 2) The departure from corporatist traditions 
in the field of health care and the establishment of National Health Services based on 
universalistic principles; 3) A low degree of state penetration of the welfare sphere and a 
highly collusive mix between public and non public actors and institutions; 4) The 
persistence of clientelism and the formation of "patronage machines" for the distribution of 
cash subsidies' (Ferrera, 1996: 17). 
The existence of common features that justify the labelling of a new regime type 
different from the other three of Esping-Andersen's typology was rejected by Katrougalos 
(1996). For him, the Greek Welfare State belongs to the continental model. Katrougalos did 
not find any cultural or institutional factors conforming to a separate model, a Latin type of 
Welfare State, only common problems in the development of the societies and economies of 
those South European countries that can be historically explained. 
It is not, however, so much the features of the Southern model but the factors which 
produced such an institutional configuration which interests us in this thesis. Advocates of 
the existence of a Southern welfare regime have only referred to an array of possible 
independent variables, without providing a convenient theoretical framework. 
According to Ferrera (1996), socio-economic and cultural factors explain the 
existence of these common features of these South European welfare states. Persistent 
economic underdevelopment and segmented labour markets are among the socio-economic 
factors, while the presence of a strong Catholic Church and the resilience of corporatist 
traditions are the cultural variables (Ferrera, 1996: 30). Together with this developmental 
approach, Ferrera pointed to political-institutional features. Thus, the causes of the 
backwardness of the South European welfare states are the weakness of state institutions, the 
multi-party system and the existence of a radical and divided Left. Rhodes (1997) followed 
the same analysis. By the same token, Moreno (2000) points to socio-economic factors (low 
modemisation), political institutions (weak state institutions) and, specially, cultural 
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variables (Catholicism, clientelism and corruption, family patterns and styles of life). 
Matsaganis et al. (2003) find the causes of the underdevelopment of social assistance in 
Southern Europe in cultural (the role of the family) and political (the "softness" of state 
institutions) variables. As I will argue in the next section, the usefulness of this literature and 
debate for my purpose in this thesis is limited to the highlighting of two political and 
institutional variables. 
2.9. Assessing these theories 
How can the birth and growth of welfare states in non-democratic regimes during the 
forties be explained? Can the theories reviewed here offer us any help? 
Modernisation theories did include non-democratic welfare states in their cross- 
national analysis and were aware of the possible effect of the nature of the political regime in 
the development of their social policy. Cutright (1965; 1967) used `political 
representativeness' as one of his two independent variables. Kuhnle (1981), Flora and 
lleidenheimer (1981) talked about `political mobilisation' and Wilensky (1981) about `party 
competition'. But it is also true that they were always of secondary importance compared to 
the main independent variable, the economic development, (measured as GNP per capita, 
energy consumption, levels of urbanisation or levels of industrialisation). Thus, Cutright 
(1965: 548) concluded that the level of social security is dependent upon 'deeper strains 
affecting the organisation of society'. Wilensky (1975: xii) stated quite emphatically that 
political factors were `almost useless' to explain the origins and general development of the 
welfare state, economic development and its demographic and bureaucratic consequences 
being the true determinants. 
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At the same time, findings were not conclusive and on many occasions disappointing 
(Skocpol and Amenta 1986: 137-8). The level of analytical abstraction and the only use of 
quantitative methods impeded any attempt to understand the policy process that led to the 
emergence of welfare state institutions. From this standpoint, we might know that different 
countries cluster in the timing and content of their welfare states and we might be able to 
hypothesise that it is due to the extent of industrialisation or extension of universal suffrage. 
But we cannot explain much more. In fact, this type of research feels much more 
comfortable explaining similarities (and convergence) rather than differences. For example, 
how can we explain differences among countries within the same cluster? Why do countries 
that share similar levels of development and democracy differ so much in the timing and 
content of welfare state creation? Why did non-democratic regimes introduce social 
insurance systems and why did they fail to create social security systems? The 
Modernisation theory draws a cold, distant and deterministic picture or, as Peter Baldwin put 
it, this approach does not explain `the most attractive issues' (Baldwin, 1992: 73). 
Cultural explanations, especially those linking religion and welfare state 
development are simply dismissed by several counter-cases. The Culturalist perspective 
suffers from the same problems as the Modernisation and Industrialisation theories. 
Therefore, although it might help to discover why some countries have managed to run faster 
in their process of welfare state expansion, it cannot explain the process of policy making, 
the timing or the differences among established social programs. The positive effect of 
liberalism or the contradictory effect of Catholicism cannot explain why democratic 
Guatemala created a law enabling a fully-comprehensive social insurance system while its 
non-democratic neighbour EI Salvador failed to do the same. Nor it can explain why Peron's 
first social insurance system of 1944 was much more universal and integrative than the 
fragmented system that came later in 1953. 
The debate on the influence of religion on welfare state outcomes has ended up with 
claims for the need for in-depth case studies. We need to engage with the policy process and 
the actors and channels enclosed in it. We need to ask in each case to what extent Catholics 
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and Protestants (laymen and the ecclesiastical hierarchy) and the Catholic Social Doctrine 
were influential (in a positive or a negative way) in the policy process and how they shaped 
the final welfare institutions. But for this, Cultural explanations cannot help much. 
Theories linking war and welfare state development are too narrowly focused on 
West European countries which fought World War II, especially the UK. The case study 
chosen in this dissertation, the Spanish experience, did suffer a bloody war, but neither 
created a sense of collective responsibility as in the Titmuss account nor raised the fiscal 
capacity of the state. In fact, the opposite of these arguments is more accurate. The Civil War 
split the country in two, the winners identified as Spain and the losers as the "anti-Spain", an 
ideological gap that took more than forty years to fill. And the creation of the welfare system 
came about precisely at a moment when the economy was in its worst state. 
From the perspective adopted in this dissertation, the "Politics Matters" approach (in 
particular, the social democratic theory) leaves us with little room to manoeuvre, as it can 
only be applied to political regimes with non-limited pluralism. In fact, this theory seems to 
identify welfare state and democracy and its advocates themselves doubt that the Social- 
Democratic thesis might be applicable to countries other than advanced industrial 
democracies (Esping-Andersen and Kersbergen, 1992). The most which can be done by 
applying the social democratic theory to the study of non-democratic welfare states is getting 
an account of policy failures. However, the aim of this thesis is to highlight both the 
"presence" and "absence" of welfare institutions in order to get the correct picture of the 
non-democratic welfare state. 
Baldwin's model does not take us much further than the social democratic theory. In 
a non-democratic regime, the goal is to exclude certain groups and classes from the political 
process through de-mobilising mechanisms that lead to political apathy or to maintain a high 
level of popular mobilisation in a very much controlled environment. In a non-democratic 
regime, policies are rarely the result of political pressures from below. 
The debate on the existence of a Southern model of welfare state has left us with a 
vague explanation of the emergence and development of the social welfare systems of Italy, 
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Spain, Portugal and Greece based on a shopping-list of independent variables. Ferrera (1996) 
and Moreno (2000) pointed to cultural factors, socio-economic developments and political- 
institutional variables. This is obviously useful in getting a general picture of the 
phenomenon, but it is insufficient if we are seeking to attribute causality (or at least 
influence among variables). In this latter case, a sound theoretical framework has to be based 
on a few selected independent variables. 
I have already argued my rejection of developmental explanations. Thus, the 
variables brought forward by the regime debate which in my opinion are worth rescuing for 
my theoretical framework are those which point to political-institutional variables. Basically, 
I will pay attention to two: the weakness of the state institutions and the role of the Catholic 
Church and the Social Catholic movement as participants in the policy process. 
Historically-based studies that carefully assess the way policies happen to emerge 
have proved to be "the accurate verifiers" of the validity of those hypotheses offered by other 
research schools with a much higher level of analytical abstraction. Neo-institutional 
theories, looking at the policy-making process of specific case studies, have helped to test 
hypotheses and come up with new explanations. 
By highlighting the fact that "institutions matter", these theories have opened a 
window of opportunity for bringing the "type of political regime" variable back into the 
research agenda. In addition, the institutional paradigm is capable of integrating many of the 
insights provided by the Elite theories and Policy Diffusion theories. Actors make decisions 
in pursuing their interests. Powerful ideas and neighbouring successful experiences can exert 
a considerable effect. But both actors and ideas occur in a concrete institutional framework 
of political interaction 
- 
in our study, the non-democratic political regime. 
It is, however, my belief that the origins and development of welfare state can not be 
fully explained by taking into consideration a single (or a few) `discrete, independent master 
variables' but rather `a number of interdependent causal factors' with a cumulative effects on 
outcomes (Pierson, 2000: 809). I do not simply try to replace "socio-economic development" 
or "labour movement strength" by "type of regime" and continue to hold a one-way model of 
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causality. Many variables come into play at the same time. However, the solution can neither 
be using an explanatory model that takes into account all the possible variables, in a sort of 
list of all the causes "available in the market". For the sake of analytical sharpness and 
methodological refinement, at the end of the day it is a must to highlight the most relevant 
causes. This will be the task of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Public Policy and 
Non-Democratic Regimes 
In this chapter, a theoretical framework for analysing the policy process in non- 
democratic regimes will be proposed. In addition, a review of the literature on non- 
democratic political regimes will be conducted. The chapter closes with the presentation of 
my methodology, plan of research and choice of case study. 
3.1. Public Policy Theories 
One of the sub-fields of Political Sciences that is currently growing fast is that of 
public policy research. A "public policy", quite straightforwardly, is a programme 
undertaken by the public authorities which hold the power in a given political community. 
But it is not only the content of these programmes that interests public policy researchers, 
but the processes by which they come into existence. Jenkins, for example, defined a public 
policy as `a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or groups of actors 
concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specific situation 
where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve' 
(Jenkins, 1978)'. 
As if they were two sides of a coin, public policy scientists embark on analysis of 
policy content and analysis of policy determination (Gordon, Lewis and Young, 1977), and it 
could be argued that the latter is what raises the most fruitful questions from the political 
science perspective. In fact, when authors try to define public policies, they usually end up 
describing the policy process by which a political community produces policies. 
As a process, it can be understood as moving through different stages or cycles. 
Thus, authors have talked about the cycles of the policy process and different lists of stages 
1 See other definitions that also emphasise the dimension of process: Anderson, J. (1990), Public 
Policy-Making, Boughton Mifflin: Boston; Peters, G. (1986), American Public Policy, Chatham (NJ): 
Chatham House. 
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have been provided. For example, Ilogwood (1987) differentiated between agenda-setting, 
processing the issue, selection of an option, legitimisation of that option, allocation of 
resources to the policy, implementation, adjudication and, finally, impact and evaluation. 
However, we do not need to be so specific in here, so we can adopt a very basic 
division of the policy cycle, and distinguish between the following stages: 
0 Policy formulation (agenda-setting, policy-drafting and negotiation 
between the incumbent actors). 
" Decisions taken by the relevant authorities. 
0 Implementation of the policy. 
" Evaluation (feedback). 
My study of the creation of welfare systems in non-democratic regimes will only 
look at the first two stages. I am not concerned here with the phases of implementation of 
social policies and their evaluation (in order to provide knowledge to the organisation which 
set them up). 
The policy process results from the interaction of three components: ideas, actors 
and institutions. These elements are also affected by the surrounding social, historical and 
economic conditions (Hall, 1992; King, 1992; Hall 1997; John, 1999; Majone, 2001). The 
different schools of the discipline of Public Policy have tried to identify the mechanisms of 
causality that occur during the whole process. 
Thus, regarding ideas, there is no doubt that they play an important role in producing 
both policy change and policy stability (John, 1999). However, what the so-called Ideational 
approach argues is that ideas are "the" explanatory factor of the policy process. Thus, it is 
not only that ideas are embedded within political institutions (hall, 1989; Hall, 1993; Weir, 
1992) or ideas enhance the drive of already motivated actors or provide them with road maps 
(Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), but `ideas both give substance to interests and determine the 
form and content of new institutions' (Blyth, 1997; Blyth, 2000). 
The Rational Choice school maintains that ultimate decisions are made by rational 
political actors, therefore making worthy of attention their preferences and interests over 
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other factors. These actors seek to maximise their interests by making the most out of the 
varying constraints on their actions, 
- 
these being institutions, decisions of another actors or 
socio-economic conditions. (John, 1999). As Scharpf says, `actors and their interacting 
choices, rather than institutions, are assumed to be the proximate causes of policy responses, 
whereas institutional conditions, to the extent that they are able to influence actor choices, 
are conceptualised as remote causes' (Scharpf, 2000: 764). 
Those working within the New Institutionalism see institutions as determining the 
policy process. However, there is no single definition and conceptualisation of what an 
institution is. The one adopted here is that given by one of the best-known representatives of 
this School, North, who defines institutions as `legal arrangements, procedures, norms and 
organisational forms that shape human interaction' (North, 1990). Thus, institutions shape 
human behaviour by limiting or enhancing their scope of action, reducing uncertainties, 
channelling ideas and values, mediating among conflicts and offering systems of incentives 
(Subirats y Goma, 1998). Even more, previous institutions also shape future decisions or 
future policy processes in either a restrictive way or by broadening the possibilities of the 
actors. In this sense, institutions make the process path-dependent. 
In between the Rational Choice and the Institutional schools, the Networks approach 
finds that political actors interact following stable patterns of action which determine both 
policy outputs and outcomes (John, 1999: 15). These interactions take the form of different 
types of relationships, from open networks (that have loose and shifting actors) to closed 
policy communities (with a small number of participants) (John, 1999). 
The current trend within the discipline is to reach unified models of causality that 
integrate different approaches or that, although giving primacy to a single causal factor, do 
not neglect others2. 
The approach adopted in this thesis to explain the origins of the Francoist welfare 
system will be Neo-Institutionalist. There are three reasons for taking this approach. First, 
ideational, network and rational choice theories have been built with a democratic polity 
2 For example, Weir (1992), King (1992) and Hall (1992), Kingdon (1984) or John (1999). 
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community in mind. Rational Choice theories see power distributed among, at least 
potentially, all people who constitute the polity. Ideas can float freely until their time comes 
to become policies but, at least potentially, everyone can pick them up and bring them into 
the public arena. The Networks approach holds a highly positive view of the way interests 
are aggregated, 
-generally in a consensual way. However, how do we explain the policy 
process in a political community in which there is no free public arena in which to discuss 
ideas, political action excludes most of the population and the existence of networks (when 
that is the case) only depends on the arbitrary decision of the political authority? Researching 
the non-democratic policy process demands an institutional explanation of how the non- 
democratic regime shapes the interests of the actors, their ideas and policy outputs. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the empirical findings of my case-study 
themselves demanded an institutional explanation. My analysis has been, since the very 
beginning, of an inductive nature. Lacking a previous theory of non-democratic welfare 
systems development that allowed me to deduce a sound set of hypothesis and variables 
against which test my chosen case study, I was forced to explore the case study first and 
devise the corresponding hypotheses afterwards. As my empirical findings revealed, actors' 
actions and ideas were being shaped by institutions of the non-democratic political regime. 
Non-democratic political 
. 
institutions turned out to be the ultimate and most relevant 
explanatory variable. 
The third reason is paradoxically linked to one criticism that has been posed to the 
Neo-Institutional school. It has been said that focusing our explanations on the role of 
institutions is more useful for explaining stability than for explaining change (see Immergut, 
1992). The fact, however, is that the empirical findings of our case study show that the 
Francoist welfare system during the 1940s maintained the same model of social insurance 
system that had been in place in Spain since 1900. Francoism failed to set up a more 
comprehensive, Beveridge-type model of social security. Thus, the theory that we need is 
that which emphasises continuity, evolution or even "non-action", rather than radical 
transformation and sudden change. 
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The policy-process from the institutional approach adopted here could be depicted as 
follows: 
Environment 
Ideas 
I Institutions 
Interests 
Environment 
Institutions 
Environment 
Policy 
Outputs 
Environment 
The whole system develops within a complex environment in which social, 
economic, political, cultural and historical factors operate. Previous institutions, in a path- 
dependent mode, pre-determine political behaviour to some extent. But even exerting a more 
direct effect, political institutions circumscribe the interaction of ideas and interests of 
policy-makers, shaping them both. However, institutions just set up the "rules of the game" 
(Immergut, 1992: 63), leaving much of the process open to different policy outputs and 
outcomes. 
This theoretical model allows us now to generalise about policy processes in non- 
democratic regimes. I will suggest that similar patterns in the policy processes of non- 
democratic regimes can be identified. 
The most obvious general statement is that those elements that differentiate between 
non-democratic and democratic regimes have an impact on their respective policy processes. 
Thus, we can identify these as: 1) lack of formal and real civic and political rights, 2) lack of 
free and public political elections, 3) lack of free public discussion (free media, the right to 
defend political ideas in public), 4) lack of free political parties that compete in elections for 
power and 5) lack of legal and real separation of powers (with system of checks and 
balances). 
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These non-democratic elements determine the way the three basic components of the 
policy process identified above 
- 
ideas, actors' interests and institutions 
- 
perform and 
interact. In the following pages, I will systematise these common patterns of interaction by 
drawing insights from previous research on the following case studies: the Vargas regime in 
Brazil (Malloy, 1979), the Mexican case (Kaufman, 1973) and the Francoist regime 
(Anderson, 1970; Medhurst, 1973; Gunther, 1980; Payne, 1985; Chulia, 1999; Linz, 2000). 
Actors 
In non-democratic regimes, the lack of free political parties and free media reduce 
the number of actors involved in the policy making process. Power is hierarchically 
organised with the dictator at the top of the scale. In each ministry, the minister, in the same 
way, has the maximum level of power. 
In general, laws are drafted only by a very small number of people. For example, in 
Spain, the Francoist Labour Charter was drafted by two teams of just two or three people 
(Payne, 1985). The Press Law of 1938 was also prepared by a small number of Falangists 
(Chulia, 1999). Only two people, Severino Aznar and Jordana de Pozas drafted the Law of 
Official Property Chambers3. 
In Brazil, the drafting of most of the social insurance laws was in the hands of only 
one top civil servant, Oliveira Vianna (Malloy, 1979: 62). In Mexico, it was the President 
himself and a group of close collaborators, the artificers of the "profit-sharing" law 
(Kaufman, 1973). 
Non-democratic regimes do not pursue a high involvement of the masses in the 
policy-making process. The fewer opportunities for the masses to make themselves heard, 
the better. In such a policy-making framework, there are no institutional channels available 
for the masses, classes or social groups to express themselves. The policy process is 
designed to include very limited demands. That was the role of the so-called Vertical 
3 Archive of the Spanish Congress (Madrid), Legado 1299/2 (from 16/04/43 to 30/04/43). 
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Syndicates in Spain, a hierarchical institution to enlist all workers under the control of the 
single party. The same function was intended to play the Brazilian syndicate system during 
Vargas' dictatorship (Malloy, 1979). 
Neither is there any room for interest groups to easily access the decision-making 
nodes. In fact, interest groups in non-democratic regimes seem to be more influential in other 
stages of the policy process (mainly in the implementation moment) than in the moments of 
agenda setting or selection of a policy. Kaufman (1973) noted how interest groups usually 
have a reactive role in the policy process. Gunther (1996: 14) also showed this occurring in 
the Francoist dictatorship and Malloy (1979) observed that interest groups in Brazil during 
the Vargas authoritarian period were more reactive than pro-active, seldom initiating policy 
although they might oppose policy reforms. In any case, people trying to influence decisions 
act more on their own initiative than as representatives of social groups. In other words, 
although it might be well known that this or that person is a prominent businessman in a 
particular economic sector or landowner, he is not bounded by any sort of mandate (neither 
representative nor imperative) to follow the orders of its group of reference (Gunther, 1980: 
34). 
These elements have two consequences that mark the policy-making style of non- 
democratic regimes. A first consequence is that, due to the really closed policy communities 
in control of a policy area, change usually occurs incrementally. Policy network approaches 
have emphasised how the `closed nature of relationships causes policy stability and 
incremental change' (John, 1999: 94). Describing the social insurance system put in place by 
the Vargas dictatorship (1930-1945), Malloy (1979) notes this as a characteristic of the 
policy-style. The policy process is entrenched in the institutional framework of the 
"corporatist state" making the policy process highly "standardised" and stagnation usually 
appears as a natural consequence. Anderson (1970: 248) also observed that authoritarian 
regimes are incapable of being innovative. 
A second consequence is that the stage of agenda-setting proceeds in a very secretive 
manner, although the phase of implementation might be more open. The policy making 
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process of the social insurance system in Brazil and Spain proceeded without public 
discussion, and was in fact only known about by a handful of actors. That seems also to be 
the case for the Alvarado dictatorship in Peru (Hughes and Mijeski, 1984). 
Ideas 
I should start here by clarifying the boundaries between ideas and ideology and the 
neglect of the latter as the explanatory variable of this study. It is true that the public policy 
literature still needs to find a way of integrating ideology into the policy process. Ideas and 
ideology are commonly used interchangeably. I have opted for focusing on ideas as 
"technical solutions" or "practical proposals" for policy makers to transform into policies4. 
Undoubtedly, ideology matters in politics. However, the question here is whether it 
matters equally in all political regimes and whether it matters in the policy-making process. 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis shows that, in the case-study presented here, 
1) ideology did not shape the policy process and 2) ideas and new policies about social 
insurance were learned and taken from various countries with a variety of political regimes. 
First, as I will show below, Linz (2000) has suggested that certain non-democratic 
regimes lack an ideology capable of determining policy and politics. My study reinforces 
Linz's suggestion. Second, in those non-democratic regimes in which ideology does not lead 
policy, the boundaries of what is ideologically acceptable are quite flexible, facilitating a 
broad spectrum of policies, either inspired by or even copied from countries with different 
political regimes. The system is open to various and even contradictory policy solutions, 
only if they are "ideologically neutral". Therefore there is room for the existence of what 
Kingdon (1984) has called "primeval soup". He meant that ideas floated around at the 
disposal of policy-makers, waiting to become policies. Linz noted this happening specifically 
4 That is why, when explaining the social insurance ideas of Falangists and Social Catholics in 
Chapter Five ("Approaches to Social Insurance within the Francoist Regime"), I have focused on 
technical solutions and policy designs rather than on vague ideological concepts and doctrines. 
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in "authoritarian" regimes: `Since the founding group or leader has no or few ideological 
commitments before taking power except some vague ideas about defending order, uniting 
the country, modernising the nation, overthrowing a corrupt regime, or rejecting foreign 
influences, they find themselves without ideological justification, without ideas attractive to 
intellectuals, removed from the mainstream of international ideological confrontations. In 
that vacuum the rulers will search for acceptable symbols and ideas to incorporate into their 
"arcana imperi". Those ideas are likely to be the ones dominant at the time and congruent 
within "the march of history"' (Linz 2002: 173). 
The limited number of decision-makers can explain why the "local" solutions soon 
run out and it is necessary to search for innovations outside the country. Therefore, processes 
of policy learning and diffusion become, in a way, necessary for policy-makers of an 
authoritarian regime. With the Francoist control of the press, it was easy to present as 
"home-grown" solutions what had been literally copied from outside. 
In many cases, the presence of international organisations or national groups of 
experts (when allowed by the regime) promotes the diffusion of ideas. In the case of 
Francoism, the International Labour Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Inter-American Development Bank and the Ibero-American Social Security Organisation are 
perhaps the most relevant among the international organisations (Anderson, 1970). With 
regard to group of experts, in Francoism, the Royal Academy of Moral and Political 
Sciences acted as a sort of think-tank in social policy matters. Divided into five sections, the 
so-called Social Section was composed of leading academic and civil servants who had a 
long-standing record of research or experience on social policy. They met quite regularly to 
study foreign legislation, to discuss national projects, to make their own studies or to draft 
laws. 
Institutions 
In non-democratic regimes, the executive tends to predominate over the legislative 
and the judiciary. Policies are drafted by the executive power, or more specifically by the 
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dictator himself and his ministers. There is a high degree of personalism (Gunther, 1996) or 
what Kaufman defined as "patrimonial rulership": `a style of rulership in which the ruler 
grants privileges, goods or similar benefices to a select portion of the ruled. In return, the 
individual recipients (clients or subjects) acknowledge the authority of the ruler and defer to 
him' (Kaufman, 1973: 30). 
Vargas' government in Brazil was always the initiator of the policy process (Malloy, 
1979) and in Salazar's regime, power was also concentrated in the executive, more 
specifically in Salazar's himself as chief of the government (Loff, 2000: 142-144). In 
addition to their role as policy innovators, the dictator and his ministers also perform a veto 
role. First, the dictator himself can be a major veto-point in all those issues that might put the 
regime in danger. Gunther (1996; 1997) cited four kind of issues on which Franco held a 
very strict control: public order, Church-State relations, the armed forces and issues 
regarding the basic institutions of the regime. In theory, the dictator could have "boundless 
authority" (Gunther, 1980) but he seldom took part in the day-to-day life of the regime. 
Second, ministers were extremely powerful within their own ministry, so they could promote 
or block any initiative that might fall into their scope of influence. Anderson (1970: 178) 
pointed out how the policy-makers of the Development Plans of the 1960s in Spain did not 
expect any resistance from the Council of Ministers once the draft of the law had been 
submitted by the minister responsible. So, once the law was backed by a minister, no further 
vetoes (except the dictator himself) should be expected. The outstanding role of the 
executive power in the policy process is reflected by the fact that legal norms are usually 
passed in the form of executive decrees. 
The emphasis here is on the role of the dictator and the ministers, but not so much 
the Council of Ministers, which is not the locus of effective decision-making nor the place 
where legislation is blocked. If the draft of the law presented by the incumbent minister 
receives the approval of the dictator, success can be predicted. Thus, although formally the 
Council of Ministers is the institution in charge of signing and passing legislation, in practice 
policies are not decided in it. At it, only minor adjustments are made to the drafts of the 
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policies. Therefore, sudden swings of policy at this stage are extremely rare. Once the policy 
has been designed at the ministerial level and has the acceptance of the dictator, its result 
becomes quite predictable. By the same token, the Council of Ministers is not responsible for 
the failure of certain policies. Only the relevant minister is accountable before the dictator. 
The dictator would govern, helped by a very close number of advisors, -what 
Gunther (1980) calls the "inner circle", who were not necessarily members of the 
government. In Francoist Spain, the "inner circle" changed over the long period of the 
dictatorship. During the very first years, Franco was surrounded by his closest family, his 
brother Nicolas Franco and his brother-in-law Ramon Serrano Suer. Later, Admiral Carrero 
Blanco would occupy the post as his right-hand. In the Peruvian dictatorship of General 
Alvarado (1968-1975), the policy process regarding highly risky issues were decided by the 
dictator himself and a very close group of advisors 
- 
but not the Council of Ministers, that 
was left aside and could only decide on minor issues (Hughes and Mijeski, 1984). 
The Parliament is not the locus of legislative power. Since the Francoist Cortes were 
restored in 1943, it became a forum of debate and policy advice, but not the effective body of 
passing legislation. As Medhurst (1973: 214) reckons, since 1943 only two laws were passed 
due to the initiative of the Cortes. 
Inter-ministerial committees are not set up in order to draft or to block legislation. 
When they are created, it is to ensure that political demands are heard at some point and 
perhaps incorporated into the original project, or to exert some sort of control when decisions 
might affect other departments. A feature of non-democratic policy-making seems to be the 
abundance of "ad hoc commissions" for drafting policies and solving political or technical 
problems (Kaufman, 1973). The policy-making which thus results is highly uncoordinated, 
due to departmental fragmentation and a lack of cabinet supervision over the whole policy- 
making process and across all policy areas. 
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3.2. Non-Democratic Regimes 
Having reviewed the literature on welfare state development and the literature on 
Public Policy, a third sub-discipline from which we can draw insights to strengthen our 
theoretical model is that which studies non-democratic regimes. I will review two things: 1) 
the way this literature has explained their policy process and 2) the way this literature has 
explained non-democratic welfare states. As we shall see, the discipline did not dedicate 
much attention to either the issues of nondemocratic social policies or to the non-democratic 
policy process, but got involved in an ongoing debate on the suitability of concepts such as 
authoritarianism or totalitarianism. I consider this to be of little use in the context of my 
argument. I will deal with this debate first and come back to the other two main points later. 
3.2.1. The Nature of Non-Democratic Regimes 
One of the best-known areas of comparative research in Political Science is that of 
the nature of political regimes. The simple divide between democracies and non-democracies 
was later complicated with the development of sub-categories within the non-democratic 
type of political regime 
- 
basically, the sub-categories of totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism. 
Totalitarianism 
Although the term originated in the 1920s and 1930s with the Fascist movement in 
Italy, it became theoretically attractive for Political Science in the 1950s. Hannah Arendt in 
her book The Origins of Totalitarianism of 1951 argued that Nazism and Stalinism were, 
basically, identical types of regimes that sought to exert a permanent control over everyone, 
in every sphere of life (Brooker, 2000). Friederich and Brzezinski, in their 1956 book 
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Totalitarian Dictatorships and Autocracy identified six characteristics of totalitarian 
regimes: the existence of a strong ideology, a charismatic leader, a single party, a system of 
terror and violence exerted by the police and other state armed forces, an absolute control 
over the media and a centralised economy (Linz, 2000; Brooker, 2000). 
Drawing from this literature, Linz stated what he considered to be a totalitarian 
regime: `There is a monistic but not monolithic center of power, and whatever pluralism of 
institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that center, is largely mediated by it, 
and is mostly a political creation rather than an outgrowth of the dynamics of the pre-existing 
society. There is an exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually elaborate 
ideology with which the ruling group or leader and the party serving the leaders, identify and 
which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimize them. The ideology goes 
beyond a particular program or definition of the boundaries of legitimate political action to 
provide, presumably, some ultimate meaning, sense of historical purpose and interpretation 
of social reality. Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective 
social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channelled through a single party and 
many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive obedience and apathy, retreat into the role of 
"parochials" and "subjects", characteristic of many authoritarian regimes, are considered 
undesirable by the rulers' (Linz, 2000: 70). 
In the 1960s the concept was seriously challenged and lost attractiveness. Although 
attempts for its revival were undertaken later5, it never became prominent again (Brooker, 
2000). During the years of the Cold War, the term totalitarianism was also used with a clear 
political intention. Politicians and journalists in the ideological confrontation that was 
motivated by the Cold War used the term to refer to the communist political systems that 
integrated the Soviet block6, while authoritarianism was reserved to those West-friendly non- 
democratic regimes. 
s For example, Schapiro, L. (1972), Totalitarianism, London: Pall Mall; Ilough, J. F. (1977), The 
Soviet Union and Social Science Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: I larvard University Press. 
b For an analysis of the political intentions of the use of the concept, see Gleason, A. (1995), 
Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press. 
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Authoritarian regimes would be useful to the West and, therefore, tolerable, while 
totalitarian regimes would be abominable. 
Authoritarianism and its critics 
The term authoritarianism was originally defined for comparative purposes within 
the realm of the Social Sciences. In a seminal article written in 1964, Juan Jose Linz 
introduced the concept authoritarianism to define those political regimes that differ from 
democracies and totalitarian dictatorships. Linz was concerned with the difficulties in 
classifying certain cases, Franco's Spain amongst them, as totalitarian regimes. The question 
for him was whether it was necessary to define a new type of political regime, different from 
democracy and totalitarianism, or just broaden the existing categories to take into 
consideration those special cases which were in the process of transforming themselves 
either into democratic or totalitarian countries. Linz argued for the specific nature and 
identity of what he called the "authoritarian model"7. He defined authoritarian regimes as: 
`political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and 
guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political 
mobilisation (except at some points in their development); and in which a leader (or 
occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually 
quite predictable ones' (Linz, 2000: 159). 
As can be seen, this is a formal definition of how the regime works, which Linz has 
re-emphasised in a very recent work (Linz, 2000). There is no reference to the `content of 
policies, the goals pursued, the "raison d'etre" of such regimes' (Linz, 2000: 160) nor to the 
institutions or social strata that take part in the political process. So, no social or economic 
variables are included in the definition, only political ones. 
"Political pluralism" is by far the most important component of the definition. It 
refers to the existence of processes of political interaction between political and social 
7In the Spanish version, Linz warns that his study can not be applied to the post-war years of 
Francoism when totalitarian features produced another image of the regime. 
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groups that have not been created by nor are dependent upon the state (Linz, 2000: 161). The 
decision about which groups can take part, however, is taken by the dictator, and is not 
formally unlimited as in a democratic regime. However, Linz's definition does not point out 
through which institutions the limited political pluralism occurs. Thus, in his account, the 
existence of a single party is not the "defining characteristic" of an authoritarian regime. 
Authoritarian regimes also lack an ideology capable of determining policy and 
politics. Instead, they have mentalities or modes of thinking that do not go any further than 
to provide people with some ideas for reacting to different situations (Linz, 2000: 162). In 
any case, it has to be remarked that the question at stake here ` is not so much the presence or 
absence of ideology but whether ideology motivates policy' (Brooker, 2000: 163). 
The third aspect, the absence of extensive and intensive political mobilisation might 
vary over time. However, in general terms, authoritarian regimes tend to keep a low profile 
with regard to mass participation. The ruling elite is very keen on discouraging the masses 
from participating in politics. 
Finally, in Linz's definition, power in authoritarian regimes is exerted `within 
formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones'. As Linz notes in passing, `it is 
no accident that years after having been established, such regimes are still, in the view of 
their rulers, in a constituent stage, that constitutional law after constitutional law is being 
enacted, and that the political edifice remains unfinished for a long time, giving hope to a 
variety of political forces of building it according to their particular blueprints. 
Paradoxically, democratic regimes seem to have a shorter period of constitution making' 
(Linz, 2000: 182). 
Linz went on to apply this authoritarian model to the study of different dimensions 
of the Francoist state, such as the role of interest aggregation, the single party or the 
opposition movements to the dictatorship. Other scholars also found Linz's definition 
`conceptually and empirically productive' (Di Palma, 1995: 233; Huneeus, 1993: 94). 
Gunther used the concept to define Francoism: `Spain under Franco can best be regarded as a 
personalist, authoritarian, no-party political system, which suppressed organisations that 
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engaged in social and political conflict (especially if they represented working-class 
interests), but which tolerated a limited pluralism in which the conflictive demands of certain 
social groups (especially those which supported the regime) could be articulated by 
prominent individuals' (Gunther, 1980: 31-32). 
However, it has been common among Linz's followers to choose those components 
of Linz's definition that suited them best to prove their own arguments. For example, Susan 
Kaufman (1973) defined authoritarianism by just two components of Linz's definition 
(limited political pluralism and low subject mobilisation), ignoring another one (ideology) 
and replacing the original meaning of the leadership variable 
-the predictability of the 
leaders' actions- by the attitude of the leaders towards power 
-patrimonial rulership. It is 
arguable, however, that this latter dimension would be applied more appropriately to 
sultanistic8 regimes than to authoritarian ones. Iiuneeus (1993) referred to three major 
components in his definition of authoritarianism. First, the degree of personalisation and 
institutionalisation of power. Secondly, the use of coercion, which, more than a policy or a 
policy style, is a crucial component of the policy process. Finally, the existence of limited 
synchronisation and limited pluralism, and the mechanisms of political participation for the 
co-option of civilian groups. The dimension of synchronisation refers to the suppression of 
institutions of the previous democratic regime. Totalitarian regimes are allegedly more 
successful in cancelling former institutions of the state and the society, while authoritarian 
regimes have only achieved this aim partially. 
The definitive test for Linz's model was its usefulness in classifying existing 
political regimes. Linz, however, claimed that its model was only an "ideal type" which did 
not necessarily have to reflect every single real case (Chuliä, 1997: 21). Thus, the original 
trilogy of political regimes (authoritarianism, totalitarianism and democracy), with its 
attractive parsimony, crumbled under the avalanche of non-democratic regimes that could 
a For a definition of Sultanism, see Chehabi and Linz (1998). This regime type encompasses the 
following distinctive features: existence of a blurring line between the regime and the state; 
personalism and tendency towards dynasticism; constitutional hypocrisy; narrow social bases; and functioning of a distorted capitalist system. 
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easily joined the "authoritarian family". As 90 per cent of non-democratic countries could be 
called "authoritarian", the concept suffered from conceptual-stretching. As Linz and Stepan 
recognised, the `tripartite regime classification has not only become less useful to democratic 
theorists and practitioners than it once was, it has also become an obstacle' (Linz and Stepan, 
1996: 39). 
Drawing from Lint's concept, O'Donnell (1979) argued that the South American 
dictatorships of the 1970s were the result of the common process of industrialisation suffered 
by these countries since the 1930s. They all could be labelled Bureaucratic-Authoritarian 
Regimes. Although not constituting a different category but a sub-type of the broader 
authoritarianism, they would comprise some new features that were not characteristic of the 
prototypical examples considered by Linz: `The term "bureaucratic" suggests the crucial 
features that are specific to authoritarian systems of high modernisation: the growth of 
organisational strength of many social sectors, the governmental attempts at control by 
"encapsulation", the career patterns and power-bases of most incumbents of technocratic 
roles, and the pivotal role played by large (public and private) bureaucracies' (O'Donnell, 
1979: 90). 
Thus, the tripartite regime classification soon developed into more complicated ones. 
Linz (1975) himself also specified sub-types of authoritarian regimes by just looking at three 
out of the four dimensions of his first definition: the degree of political pluralism, 
mobilisation of the population and mentality (lack of ideology) (Linz, 2000: 173-4). Thus, he 
proposed to differentiate: 1) organic statist systems, 2) bureaucratic military regimes, 3) 
"defective" and "pretotalitarian" situations, 4) post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes, 5) post- 
independence mobilizational authoritarian regimes, 6) mobilizational authoritarian regimes 
in post-democratic societies, 7) racial and ethnic democracies. 
Perlmutter9 offered a different classification. For him, the simple division between 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism had been superseded with the disappearance of the 
Perlmutter, A. (1981), Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, New Ilaven: 
Yale University Press. 
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former and the evolution of the latter into what he called "modern authoritarianism". This 
new form would embrace the following sub-types: 1) the party state, 2) the police state, 3) 
the corporatist state, 4) the praetorian state, (which would also admit further classifications 
- 
personal, oligarchic and bureaucratic-authoritarian). 
And the list of regime types goes on and on, so one wonders whether such 
classifications are necessary or reveal anything of the way in which these regimes perform. 
In fact, when reviewing all this literature, the conclusion one comes to is that the most 
crucial aspect that should differentiate these regimes, their policy process, is the only thing 
that has not been looked at into. 
Excursus: the Debate on the Nature of Francoism 
At this stage, we need to call a halt to review how this debate turned its focus almost 
exclusively on the Spanish case. The fact that this was Linz' s case study implies that the 
first reactions came from those historians and social scientists working on Francoism. At the 
heart of the debate lie some comparative questions. How similar was Francoism to other 
non-democratic experiences of the twenties and thirties? Was Franco a dictator like 
Mussolini and Hitler? Was it a military-type or a party-type dictatorship? How was power 
distributed within the regime? Were the aims of the Francoist regime the same as the Nazi or 
Fascist regimes' objectives? To what extent was ideology embedded in Spanish society? Into 
how many stages can we divide the Francoist regime? Is there such a thing as "First" 
Francoism, substantially different in its nature and features from a "Second" Francoism? 
From the perspective of those defending the authoritarian nature of the Francoist 
regime, comparisons with other non-democratic regimes of the inter-war years have been 
carried out. Francoism resembled more those authoritarian systems of Eastern Europe (such 
as Ilorthy's dictatorship in Hungary and those of Pats, Smetona, Ulmanis in the Baltic 
countries) or Southern Europe (like Metaxas' in Greece or Salazar's in Portugal) than 
Nazism or Italian Fascism. Malefakis, for example, affirms that `the Francoist dictatorship 
was not fascist in the strict sense of the word; it did not take anything from Nazism and only 
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adopted some of the less fascist characteristics of the Italy of Mussolini, that was less fascist 
than the Germany of Hitler' (Malefakis, 2000: 38). 
Salazarism is undoubtedly the most similar case for comparison (Malefakis, 200010). 
Linz (1970) specifically quoted, as other examples of authoritarian dictators, Dollfuss in 
Austria, Perön in Argentina, Salazar in Portugal and Vargas in Brazil, the latter another case 
study to which Linz devoted special interest (Linz, 1974b). 
From the other side of the debate, the regime seemed to suit the ideal type of 
totalitarian state. Francoism was seen as a fascist movement, totalitarian in its political aims 
and the structure of the state. Therefore, Linz's description sounded benevolent towards 
Francoism, forgetting the permanent use of repression" as a political tool. Fontana (1986), 
Ramirez (1978), Molinero e Ysäs (1999) and others insisted that Francoism was, by looking 
at its mission, aims and main features, not better than and not so different from Mussolini's 
fascism or Hitler's nazism. Thus, Fontana (1986) saw the totalitarian profile of the regime in 
its plan to `shape totally the Spanish society, with a totally retrograde orientation in its spirit, 
that had to be translated into some political institutions which were thought to advise the 
"Caudillo", himself providential and infallible, and into cultural and ideological beliefs that 
sought to bring back a tradition of three or four centuries old. In order to support this 
transformation, modem repressive methods were used, the new Spanish state happened to 
take after the Fascist Italy and the Nazi Germany most' (1986: 25). 
The "Fascist-totalitarian approach" sees Francoism joining the totalitarian wave that 
shook Europe from the twenties and onwards into the two following decades. It has been 
named the "Fascist epoch", `in which all the reactionary authoritarian experiences are 
magnetically attracted by a new political formula, in particular from the moment when the 
10 However, Malefakis feels more comfortable if we talk about the singularity of the Spanish case. 
That is, if we have to compare Franco with other dictators, it seems more appropriate to look at cases 
such as Metaxas, Horthy or Salazar. However, Franco and his dictatorship would constitute, for 
Malefakis, an exception to all of them, a type on its own. 
11 For an analysis of the Francoist repression, see Richard, M. (1999), Un Tiempo de Silencio. La 
Guerra Civil y la Cultura de la Represiön en la Espana de Franco, 1936-1945, Barcelona: Critica. 
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two big fascist powers managed to heavily determine the international relations' (Loff, 2000: 
129). Francoism would not have escaped this attraction and soon became the Spanish version 
of the European Fascism cluster of the inter-war period (Preston, 1997). It would only differ 
from the rest of the Fascist regimes in one aspect, which was the extent of Catholicism 
embedded in the Spanish society and state and the power of the Spanish Catholic Church 
within the regime. 
Alternatively to these entrenched positions, new ways of defining the nature of 
Francoism have been proposed. Francoism has thus been described as a "reactionary 
coalition", to stress the social and political basis of the regime and its ideological orientation, 
where the military were the main group bolstered by a strong leadership (Sanchez Recio, 
1993). Julia dismisses the identification of Francoism as neither a common type of 
traditional ecclesiastical and military dictatorship nor a fascist totalitarian state, but a 
`national movement sustained by a fascist bureaucracy' (2000: 93). Saz Campos stresses the 
idea of process and change within the regime by using the concept of fascistizaciön to refer 
to the process of copying from fascist countries during the first years of the regime although 
later abandoning this trend in favour of a conservative-traditional model of authoritarianism 
(Saz Campos, 1993). 
Current Trends in the Debate 
Let us close this long excursus on Francoism and come back to our discussion on 
concepts and types of non-democratic regimes. How relevant is this to the theoretical model 
presented in this thesis? Not much, I will argue. My study does not attempt to explain the 
different social welfare systems of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Our concern here is 
between "democratic" and "non-democratic" regimes and their social welfare systems. In 
fact, the German Nazi regime and the Italian Fascist regime did not set up models of social 
welfare very different from the social insurance schemes established in Argentina under 
Peron, Brazil under Vargas or Spain under Franco. The sub-division between totalitarian and 
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authoritarian regimes, however valuable it might be for other explanations, does not seem to 
be so for the analysis of their social welfare systems. 
A second reason to limit my analysis to this level of abstraction, without seeking 
further divisions within the non-democratic category, is due to the lack of similar studies of 
how other totalitarian and authoritarian cases set up their welfare systems. Such approach 
needs at least two case-studies, each of them requiring a patient reconstruction of the 
historical and political processes and the institutions in charge of the social insurance and 
social security systems, a time-consuming identification of the policy-makers and their ideas 
regarding social policy, with the added difficulty of locating and getting primary sources that 
show up the policy-making process. Understandably, this goes far beyond what I can 
possibly do in this doctoral research project. Thus, the absence of similar research and the 
limits of extension and time imposed by a doctoral thesis force me to choose a higher level 
of abstraction which only differentiates between democratic and non-democratic welfare 
regimes. 
A third reason is that the debate on the authoritarian or totalitarian nature of political 
regimes has reached a point of stalemate and is driving researchers to new approaches which 
emphasise instead the process of government. Paul Brooker (2000) is more interested in 
answering the question of "how" non-democratic governments rule rather than in the focus 
of previous theories on "who" rules in non-democratic regimes. In a previous work (Brooker, 
1995), he identified the "ideological one-party dictatorship" as the modem form of 
dictatorship which is characteristic of the twentieth century. Its two defining features are the 
existence of just one single party and a strong ideology. This "one-party ideological 
dictatorship" can be classified in two subtypes, the military-party type and the party-state 
type, which themselves also admit further classifications regarding the way leadership is 
organised. Thus, in the military-party dictatorship, power can be exercised by a single 
individual or by a military junta, while in the party-state dictatorship it can be exercised 
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again by a single individual or by a party committee' 2. IIowever, I must confess my 
disappointment with the way he studied the way non-democratic governments rule. Chapter 
Seven, entitled "Policies and Performance" is a mere overall assessment of policy content 
(key programmes) and economic performance, but not a description of the way in which 
policy process occurs. There are no explanations as to how ideas, actors and institutions (the 
three components of the policy process) interact. However, the attempt to singularise 
"personalist" and "non-personalist" policy-making styles and the basic difference between 
the policy-making and the implementation stage give us some hope for the future direction 
of this kind of research (see Brooker, 2000: 154-87). 
3.2.2. The Policy Process in Non-Democratic Regimes 
Linz himself recognised that the challenge in justifying his distinction between 
authoritarian, democratic and totalitarian regimes lies in proving that each of these regime 
types addresses the basic problems that affect political systems in different ways. In other 
words, if there exists such a thing as an authoritarian regime, it would have to have a 
distinctive way of `maintaining control and gaining legitimacy, recruiting elites, articulating 
interests and aggregating there, making decisions and relating to various institutional 
spheres like the armed forces, religious bodies, the economy, etc' (Linz, 1970: 254, my own 
emphasis) 
-thus, a distinctive policy process. `If we can find that they (authoritarian 
regimes) handle such problems differently from both democratic and totalitarian regimes, 
and furthermore if quite different regimes, classified as authoritarian, handle them in ways 
that turn out to be similar, the distinction will have been justified'(Linz, 1970: 254). 
12 Linz has counter-argued that the distinction between military and non-military authoritarian regimes (Brooker's perspective) is not useful: 'A category of military authoritarian regimes would include too 
many, quite different regimes, as the mention of the names of Ataturk, Petain, Franco, Nasser, Peron, 
Odira, Medici and Cardenas suggests. Military regimes, with some significant and interesting 
exceptions, undergo a process of civilisation, if they are stable, and the military origin or military 
background of the head of the state does not tell us enough about their nature' (Linz, 2000: 172). 
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I believe this should have been the most productive way of approaching the debate 
on the nature of different political regimes. Ilowever, it is precisely the analysis of the non- 
democratic policy processes which still requires better and more research. Susan Kaufman 
(1973) analysed the Mexican policy process and researched the way the law regulating the 
distribution of a portion of industrial profits among workers was passed in 1962 during the 
Presidency of Adolfo Lopez Mateos. 
Medhurst's work (1973) was quite an exhaustive description of actors and formal 
institutions of the Francoist policy process from the legal and administrative point of view. 
He paid attention to the structure of the executive, the ministerial division, the bureaucratic 
organisation and the local administration. Ile found that the centralised character of Francoist 
decision-making was a consequence of the authoritarian nature of the regime. The ultimate 
decision-making power was in Franco's and in the minister's hands, the latter had wide 
powers to pass legislation via decree-laws and set up policies. It was the government which 
was almost always the initiator of new policies or laws. Medhurst also put effort into 
explaining the role of the Council of Ministers. This, although it was the formal centre for 
decision-making, lacked a collective government's project or a sense of common political 
plan: `Franco's system of coalition rule has left his governments without a well-developed 
sense of common purpose. Ministers have tended to be held individually rather than 
collectively responsible for their conduct of affairs' (Medhurst, 1973: 76). 
Anderson's (1970) and Gunther's (1980; 1997) studies focused on policy-making 
with regard to the economic policy sector. Whereas Anderson studied the Stabilisation and 
Development Plans of 1959 and onwards, Gunther looked at the budgetary policy-making. 
Anderson's theoretical question was to what extent the institutional configuration of the 
authoritarian regime determined the capacity of policy-makers to implement the appropriate 
economic development policies. In his words, his attempt was to explain `how the 
environment of choice of an authoritarian regime affects the capacity of policy-makers to 
identify problems, formulate strategies, choose, implement programs and evaluate policies' 
(Anderson, 1970: 8). 
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Thus, while many European countries in the 1950s were applying new monetary and 
fiscal techniques, Spain continued to directly control the economy, following the disruptive 
model of economic autarky. The turning point came in 1956 when the former policy 
community (largely monopolised by the Vertical Syndicates) was replaced by a new one 
formed by bureaucrats and financial experts. So, taking as a case study the Spanish political 
system and its economic policies from 1957 to 1967, he observed that the authoritarian 
nature of the regime bore much of the responsibility for the way economic policies were 
decided. 
Anderson made two very interesting contributions that, given the year he wrote the 
book, I would dare to say were ground-breaking. First, Anderson looked at the impact of 
economic ideas and ideology, differentiating between "policy instrumentation" (ideas, 
among other resources) and "procedural instrumentation" (such as committees, surveys, 
referenda or the role of the parliament). lie even pointed to processes of policy learning with 
regard to the Stabilisation Plan. Second, he distinguished cycles in the policy process, 
differentiating the stages of initiation, formulation, consultation, aggregation, co-ordination, 
implementation and feedback (Anderson, 1970: 111). It is not easy, however, to grasp the 
theoretical framework that embodies Anderson's work nor the ultimate independent 
variables. Ile opened the preface stating that the book `is a commentary on the role of 
experts in modem government' (Anderson, 1970: xi), and that the change in the economic 
policy community seems to be what sparked a change in economic policies. But policy 
instrumentation and the role of ideas also seem to be crucial. Finally, the regime's 
institutions play a massive role as well, in particular, the absence of mechanisms of policy 
co-ordination, the power of ministers and the role of the Council of Ministers. 
Gunther pointed to `certain macro-political characteristics of the Francoist regime 
itself' s producing the following features of economic decision-making: `A highly 
personalistic style; undue importance of personalistic criteria in setting higher-order 
spending priorities; a high degree of spending-ministry autonomy in setting intra- 
departmental priorities; the absence of any institutionalised or systematic aggregation of 
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interests; highly particularistic modes and the basic character of interest articulation; the 
dominance of clientelistic criteria in the recruitment of political elites' (Gunther, 1980: 260). 
The macro-political characteristics of the regime were the lack of universal suffrage 
and electoral competition, the jurisdictional fragmentation of policy areas in different 
departments and the hierarchical (ministerial) structure of power. 
For Gunther (1980; 1997), as for Anderson and Medhurst before him, ministers had 
great power within their own spheres of competence. With regard to the budget of each 
ministry, this was decided in bilateral negotiations with the Ministry of Finance. Franco was 
the ultimate decision-making power but he only got involved when an specific issue could 
threaten the stability of the regime or affect its international relations. Out of these, the rest 
of policies fell within his "zone of indifference" and therefore were left in the hands of 
ministers. Neither the Cortes, the National Movement nor the Syndical Organisation played 
a dominant role in the policy process. The same holds true for interest groups and the 
masses. 
The works of these three actors (Medhurst, 1973; Anderson, 1970; Gunther, 1980) 
constitute the only three studies which have attempted to shed light on the Francoist policy 
process. However, the three of them only took into account the later decades of the 
dictatorship, from 1957 onwards. Nevertheless, I still consider these contributions very 
valuable, as they all emphasised the way institutions (especially the role of Francoist 
ministers and the Council of Ministers) shaped the policy process. However, the 
developments within the sub-discipline of public policy since these works were published 
provide us with more elaborate theoretical frameworks and better tools for analysing the 
policy process. Although drawing many insights from their works, I will attempt to provide a 
more integrated explanation of the way the policy making process took place during the first 
decades of the Francoist regime (Chapter Six). 
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3.2.3. Welfare Systems in Non-Democratic Regimes 
I will now examine some of the hypotheses offered by scholars within the literature 
of non-democratic regimes of why and how non-democratic regimes created social policies. 
Basically, these authors were concerned with the motivations of dictators in creating social 
welfare systems, which are basically three: 1) the need for gaining legitimacy, 2) the 
corporate interest of those in power and 3) the strategic use of social policy as a mean to 
achieve other goals. 
The so-far-unchallenged opinion of scholars is that dictators have perceived social 
insurance policies as a tool for de-activating the risk of social conflicts and popular 
upheavals, and gaining legitimisation (Laclau, 1977; Mesa-Lago, 1977; Malloy, 1979; 
Spalding, 1980; Flora and Alber, 1981). Malloy (1979) found that the "patrimonial- 
bureaucratic" Vargas' regime in Brazil sought to promote economic development and to 
avoid popular uprisings. Thus, social insurance policies were set up by dictatorships for 
achieving legitimisation, in order to become acceptable to classes and groups that in 
principle did not support them. For Malloy, `most authoritarian regimes, however, like other 
regimes, seek to legitimate themselves and control the populace by at least quasi-voluntary 
means. The main voluntary mechanism is co-optation in which individuals and groups in 
return for particularized substantive privileges (contract concessions, favourable wages, 
social security benefits) give to the regime generalized political support and/or acquiescence' 
(Malloy, 1979: 240; my emphasis). 
Mesa-Lago's (1977) elitist approach has already been presented in Chapter Two. 
Now, more specifically, I would like to observe how he linked the development of social 
insurance systems in authoritarian regimes with their need to gain legitimacy. Researching 
the development of Latin American welfare states, he discovered a historic and political 
sequence of development, since the nineteenth century onwards. Thus, in the first stage 
(which he names "patrimonial-oligarchic"), military and civil servants were the first social 
groups to obtain their own social insurance schemes. In a second stage, already in the 
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twentieth century, with the establishment of populist democracies, social insurance schemes 
(generally the working injuries scheme) were also extended to working classes. Finally, in 
the later stage, social insurance was extended to protect workers from more social risks and 
to cover other social groups, such as the urban middle classes. This third phase took place 
under the ruler of authoritarian regimes, and the social insurance improvements can be 
explained due to their need to gain support from the workers and the middle classes. 
For Mesa-Lago, dictators might have different priorities and use different strategies 
when establishing social insurance policies to gain legitimacy: `The leader might have 
promised to grant social security as part of his political program and, in the context of a 
national crisis, deploy it as a means to restore order (as in the case of Alessandri in Chile). 
lie may have organised workers in syndicates and have granted them social security 
coverage (as in the case of Peron in Argentina). Or he may have tried to pacify the masses 
after a period of dangerous national turmoil by promulgating social security legislation as a 
palliative (it is the case of Benavides in Peru). Or he may have introduced social security as a 
non-inflationary concession to divert pressure from workers to satisfy their more immediate 
needs (as in the case of Avila Camacho in Mexico). In all these cases, the State, via the 
executive power and functioning in an authoritarian more than a liberal-pluralist way, seems 
to use social security as an instrument to co-opt the labour movement and generate political 
support and stability' (Mesa-Lago, 1977: 143). 
In general terms, I agree that non-democratic regimes seek to enhance the legitimacy 
of their ruler when establishing insurance policies. Most probably, social insurance has 
appeared as a fabulous political tool to gain legitimacy before the masses and one of the 
dictatorships' assets worthy of showing off. However, I would like to point to some issues 
that, in my view, are not satisfactorily explained by these theories. 
First, this approach is only capable of explaining why dictators are prone to pass 
social laws. When it comes to deciding what social laws, or more specifically, why social 
insurance polices and not social security policies, this approach becomes less useful. 
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Secondly, if the purpose of establishing social welfare policies were to gain 
legitimacy and de-activate the risk of workers' revolt, these measures should have been 
aimed at protecting the larger group of workers or the most mobilised of them. In Spain, for 
example, this group would be rural workers of Andalucia and Castilla, just as politically 
active as industrial workers and miners from other regions. 
Perhaps we should not over-emphasise the need non-democratic regimes have to 
legitimise their own existence. Przeworksi did not believe that the most serious need a 
dictatorship has is to appear as somehow legitimate: `some authoritarian regimes have been 
illegitimate since their inception, and they have been around for forty years' (Przeworksi, 
1991: 54). Przeworksi's point is useful in that it dilutes the emphasis on legitimacy as the 
driving force of dictator's political behaviour. Instead of a single force, dictators might have 
quite a wide array of different political motivations 
- 
among which the search for legitimacy 
would be but one. 
A second motivation for dictators to introduce social welfare institutions points to 
the self-interest of those holding power. Regarding military dictatorships, scholars have 
hypothesised that the military take power to defend or enhance their corporate interests. 
Thus, military seek to expand their social insurance systems and welfare benefits during their 
seizure of power. However, Thompson challenged this hypothesis, as he did not find 
`evidence indicating a corporate-interest motive for military seizures of power; evidence was 
emerging that military governments actually did not seem to be more committed to the 
military's corporate welfare, in terms of size and expenditure, than were non-military 
governments' 
13 
. 
In any case, this hypothesis about the military's corporate motives to introduce 
social insurance polices might explain the establishment of their own schemes, but does not 
answer a far more important question: why non-democratic regimes introduce social welfare 
13 See the reference in Brooker (2000: 64) taken from Thompson, W. R. (1980), `Corporate Coup- 
Maker Grievances and Types of Regime Targets', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 12, p. 4. 
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for a broader sector of the population than merely those who hold power (military, 
bureaucrats or other privileged groups)? 
A third approach emphasises that social welfare policies in non-democratic regimes 
are created to support other policies of the regime for meeting economic, political, 
demographic or simply repressive ends. Spalding (1980) ` links the launching of Mexican 
social security in the 1940s to the state's industrialization strategy' (Skocpol and Amenta, 
1986: 145). Referring specifically to Soviet totalitarianism, Mishra said that `in totalitarian 
conditions, welfare becomes a direct instrument of social and political control 
-indeed an 
instrument which can be employed by the regime for any purpose it sees fit, e. g. economic, 
demographic- in a way that it is not (and cannot be) in a plural society (not necessarily a 
capitalist one)' (Mishra, 1981: 156). 
To summarise, the literature on non-democratic regimes has been interested 
primarily in the motivations of dictators to create social welfare policies. However, the 
question that presides this thesis 
-why have they established social insurance schemes 
instead of social security systems- cannot be answered from this approach. 
3.3. Methodology and Plan of Research: the Choice of Case 
Study 
In the decades of the 1930s and 1940s, different models of social welfare were at the 
disposal of politicians and policy-makers of non-democratic countries. however, although 
other alternatives were considered and social security models were being debated by experts 
and policy-makers, non-democratic regimes only set up limited social insurance schemes, 
aimed at protecting particular groups of people, which resulted in very fragmented 
management systems. 
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How can this be explained? The best approach to explain the politics of non- 
democratic welfare systems is by looking at the policy process, to discover how institutions 
of the non-democratic regimes determined the way these welfare systems were set up. I 
argue that the institutional design of the non-democratic regime shaped the distribution of 
power between political actors, their capacity to manoeuvre and the way ideas fuelled the 
policy process, 
- 
in other words, shaped the policy-making process. 
My choice has been to focus on a historical-detailed, one case study approach. There 
are two reasons for this. The first reason is the lack of in-depth studies of different countries 
which would allow me to extract hypotheses for comparative purposes. The second reason is 
that this topic has not received enough academic attention to be able to use a set of concepts 
or theories that could be widely applied. Thus, the effort of both data-collection and theory- 
building justifies the cautious choice of only one case study. 
However, I recognise the limits of the use of a single case study in order to develop 
theoretical explanations for comparative purposes. It is not my aim to create a fully- 
developed theory of the origin and development of non-democratic welfare systems, but to 
advance some generalisations on this topic. What this thesis tries to do is to contribute to the 
evolution of scientific knowledge on this subject. My study would fit into what Eckstein 
(1975) called "heuristic case-studies", which try to clarify important general problems and to 
provide possible theoretical solutions, therefore helping to build theories. Malloy explained 
this rationale as follows: `My theoretical goals might best be understood as a form of pre- 
theory. By this I mean a study which, through a conceptually informed analysis of the 
available historical records, seeks to formulate plausible explanations of the major aspects of 
a specific case and to present findings that will be theoretically suggestive for future 
comparative analysis' (Malloy, 1979: 4). 
My investigation presents the case of the Spanish social insurance schemes 
established during the period of the Francoist dictatorship from 1936 to 1950. The reason for 
starting in 1936 is quite straightforward 
- 
the outbreak of the Civil War and the 
establishment of the Francoist regime. The choice of 1950 as the end of my study is basically 
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due to the absence of any important social insurance policies during the 1950s, which was 
the "lost" (or "boring") decade of the Spanish welfare state. The struggle for the control of 
the Francoist welfare system which characterised the 1940s eased during the 1950s and this 
policy area became less confrontational. 
At the more general economic and social levels, 1951 has been called the "hinge 
year" (Garcia Delgado, 2000). The level of population growth started to rise up to the levels 
of the thirties. The same holds true for the levels of industrialisation. This depicts an image 
of Spain quite different to the one we have seen in the forties 
- 
now with the resurgence of 
the labour movement, therefore introducing new dynamics of social conflict. At the political 
level, the government crisis of 1951 provoked the even further weakening of Falange and the 
rising of a new political family 
- 
the Opus Del. In fact, the literature has pointed to 1951 as 
the starting point of a new phase in the history and development of the regime (Arango, 
1995; Tusell, 1999; Garcia Delgado, 2000). 
The Francoist social welfare system established between those years included a 
Family Subsidy, an Old Age Subsidy Scheme, an Sickness Insurance Scheme and an Old 
Age and Disability Insurance Scheme. Tracking the policy-making route of these social 
laws, both the importance of the institutional arrangements that channelled policy decisions 
and the political struggle between the two main "families of the regime" (political and social 
groups that supported the dictatorship), Falangists and Social Catholics, to gain control of the 
INP will be reviewed. 
The research has been carried out by using a number of primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources are of extreme importance, and have been accessed at the Archive 
of the Instituto Nacional de Prevision (INP) in Madrid (Spain). The INP was the institution 
which drafted most of all the insurance policies and which produced most of the studies on 
social welfare done at that time. I have also researched primary sources at the Archive of the 
Spanish Ministry of Labour, the National Library, the Royal Academy of Moral and Political 
Sciences and the private library of the Jesuit Fathers 
- 
all of them in Madrid. The Archive of 
the Public Administration (AGA) of Alcalä de Ilenares, although visited, has not been of 
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much use for this research. I have also undertaken several interviews with relatives of the 
members of the Governing Body of the INP, top echelon Catholics of the time and several 
experts on Spanish history and politics. Information on the development of Latin American 
social welfare systems was also enhanced by interviews with key policy-makers from that 
time. 
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Chapter 4 
The Development of the Spanish 
Social Insurance System 
The aim of this chapter is to present the development of the Spanish social welfare 
system, from when the first social insurance scheme was established in 1900 until the 
outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. The Institutional approach that will be used to analyse the 
Francoist social insurance system concentrates on the institutional variables that have shaped 
the system throughout its history. Therefore, this chapter will show the patterns of the 
evolution of the social welfare system, the continuity in the policies introduced and the 
mechanisms of "path-dependence". Thus, when Francoism started setting up its social 
insurance schemes, it did not do it from scratch but continued constructing alongside what 
was being put in place since 1900. Many of the people who were appointed to run the 
Francoist INP had been doing it since the 1920s. The organisation of the whole system 
remained broadly the same after the Civil War. All the social insurance schemes established 
by the Francoist regime had been researched and designed by INP elite groups years before. 
This is why the study of social policies during the first three decades of the twentieth century 
becomes important for explaining the development of the Francoist social insurance system 
during the 1940s. 
4.1. The Social Insurance System from its Origins until 1936 
The remote origins of the Spanish social welfare system can be traced in the 
medieval institutions of Cofradlas and in the later development of the Hermandades de 
Socorros Mütuos dependent upon the guilds (Rumeu de Armas, 1943). Thus, already in the 
XIIth century, the Cofradia de Tudela provided its members with economic support in case 
of illness and paid for burial expenses in the event of death. The Hermandades were much 
more institutionalised than the Cofradias, being linked to parishes and monasteries. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, Liberalism brought about the appearance of non-religious 
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institutions for social protection, the Rfonteplos or Sociedades dc Socorros Milos (Montcro, 
1988). 
But it is with the coming of the twentieth century, on 30 January 1900, that it can be 
properly said that the Spanish social welfare system started. Under the government of the 
liberal-conservative Silvela, the then Minister Eduardo Dato introduced the Working Injuries 
Law. 
The origins of the Spanish social insurance system have to be understood by 
considering the debates about the new interventionist role of the state in social and labour 
issues. This debate was in full swing in Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. From 
Socialists to Social Catholics, from the UK to Germany, politicians, influential groups and 
an emergent labour movement realised that "progress" had provoked new dimensions of 
poverty (Montero, 1988: 17) that could not be just resolved by market mechanisms alone. 
These debates hit Spain around 1890, the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences 
being one of the most influential arenas in which this issue of the state intervention was 
debated (Montero, 1988). 
The political system of Spain at the time was that established in 1874 when the 
Bourbon monarchy (in the person of Alfonso XII) was restored by General Martinez Campos 
after the short experience of the First Republic (1873-1874). This period, from 1875 to 1923, 
is called "the Restoration". The system rested on the institutionalised alternation of two 
political parties, the Conservative (under the leadership of Cänovas del Castillo) and the 
Liberal (led by Sagasta), with the exclusion of left-wing parties. Although a period of 
political stability, the Restoration proved incapable of achieving the modernisation of Spain. 
The country was unable to follow the example of other European countries which at the time 
were fully involved in a process of industrial revolution. 
It is worth noting that the Spanish state has showed a high degree of weakness and 
incapability to articulate a common political plan during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. This might be one of the reasons why the development of the Spanish social welfare 
system took a bit more time than its European neighbours. As early as 1942, the architect of 
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the Francoist social insurance system between 1936 and 1963, Luis Jordana dc Pozas, 
pointed to this as the reason for the delay in the development of a comprehensive social 
insurance system. Reasoning why it had not been possible to introduce a Sickness Social 
Insurance Scheme before 1942, he argued that `the desire to put an end to this source of 
suffering clashed with the Liberal horror of compulsion, the weakness of the state to impose 
public interest before private interests and the clearly diabolic design of provoking hate and 
keeping injustice, so the anger of the people would eventually be transformed into the energy 
that might have brought about the Communist revolution''. 
However, even though socio-economic and political conditions were not favourable 
and differed from those of the more developed European countries, Spain managed to put at 
least the foundations of the social welfare system. The commitment of intellectuals (from the 
Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences and the Academy of Judicial Law and 
Legislation (Montero, 1988) and political elites to the new interventionist paradigm proved 
to be powerful enough to overcome the difficulties. Within the Catholic movement, a move 
towards social insurance as preferable to more charitable methods took place, to the extent 
that Social Catholics were among the founders of the Spanish social welfare system 
(Montero, 1988). At the same time, processes of policy diffusion were at work via 
participation in different international congresses of social insurance (specially in the 
Congress of Rome of 1908) and of actuaries. 
Inspired, as the rest of the world, by Bismarck's social insurance laws of the 1880s, 
the Spanish Working Injuries Law2 of 1900 was based on the principle of the employer's 
responsibility for the industrial accidents suffered by his employees. In the beginning, it was 
not a compulsory insurance scheme, although many people at the moment were advocating 
that. The draft presented by the government was later transformed in the committees and 
plenary sessions of the Senate and Congress (Montero, 1988). Interest groups and the labour 
Jordana de Pozas, L., 'La Nueva Ley de Seguro Obligatorio dc Enfermedad', Ecclesia, December 
1942, pp. 12-6. 
2 For the study of the law and how it was created, see Montero (1988). 
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movement did not take part in the early stages of the policy process, but later on, when the 
policy was in the implementation stage. Therefore, the very first Spanish social insurance 
law was not created as a result of pressure from workers or social groups, but through a 
government initiative (Montero, 1988: 147). 
The law had been drawn up by a pioneer institution, the Commission of Social 
Reforms, established in December 1883, attached to the Ministry of Home Affairs (De la 
Calle Velasco, 1997: 18-21). The person responsible for this creation was mainly 
Segismundo Moret, at that time Minister in the Cabinet of Posada Herrera, a Liberal. The 
function of the Commission of Social Reforms was to study the so-called Social Question 
- 
that is, the conditions of life of the working classes, and its best contribution was to hold a 
poll on the situation of the Spanish workers. The Commission of Social Reforms, compared 
to other European experiences, was not set up late, more likely the contrary (De la Calle 
Velasco, 1997b: 132). 
As a result of the Commission of Social Reforms' activity, the Institute of Social 
Reforms was created in 1903 (Palacio Morena, 1988; Gomez Molleda, 1984; De la Calle, 
1984)3. It was the second landmark in the path of the development of the Spanish social 
welfare system and showed the increasing recognition of the duty of the state to care for the 
welfare of the population. For De la Calle Velasco (1997b: 136), the Institute of Social 
Reforms reflects how social reform happened to become institutionalised. This was truly `a 
unique organisation in Europe' (Guillen, 1990: 3). However, it is perhaps more important to 
see this Institute as the platform for later establishing the specific institution that would 
assume the organisation of the social welfare system. The Institute of Social Reforms was 
not yet the sort of complex, extended and bureaucratised institution that was required to be in 
charge of the social insurance system. But it did provide an open space for discussion and 
3 Prior to this institution, in 1902 the establishment of the Labour Institute (Instituto de Trabajo) was 
projected but never became reality (see De la Calle Velasco, 1997b: 136-7). 
To trace the development of how the Spanish state felt compelled to intervene in the economy and 
the social welfare, see Palomeque Lopez, M. C. (1997), "La Intervencidn Normativa del Estado en la 
"Cuestidn Social" en la Espafta del Siglo XIX', Ayer, No. 25, pp. 103-26. 
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dialogue between social forces and issued several studies and reports, which prepared the 
way for the coming of the definitive institution in charge of the social prevision system 
-the 
INP. The Institute of Social Reforms continued to remain a space for interaction between 
employers associations and trade unions on labour matters, although its role diminished and 
it was finally suppressed by Primo de Rivera's dictatorship in 1924. 
The need to create an institution in charge of the social insurance schemes had been 
felt for a long time (Montero, 1988: 212-3). In 1904, the conference on Prevision Popular, 
held in Madrid inflamed the reformist desires of many, spreading the idea of the need to 
create such an institution. As a result, several plans were drafted. The Institute of Social 
Reforms offered its plan in November 1905. This was then presented by the government to 
the Parliament in November 1906, failing to be passed because the Parliament was dissolved 
and new elections were called. A second plan was presented in February 1908, during the 
government of the conservative Antonio Maura (1907-1909). This was much more 
successful and was passed without problems (Montero, 1988: 248), becoming thus the Law 
of 27 February 1908, by which the INP was created. 
The INFS was created to encourage the practice of social insurance and to co- 
ordinate the organisation of the voluntary insurance schemes that were functioning. In a 
leaflet published by the INP in 1910, two years after its creation, the purpose of the institute 
was said to be the establishment, diffusion and promotion of old age pensions (INP, 1910: 
3). It was created as an autonomous institution, with its own resources and legal and 
administrative right to determine and fulfil its own objectives and to organise its own 
structure (Martinez Quinteiro, 1988). 
The INP was run by a Board of Trustees formed by a President (namcd by the 
government) and a variable number of members itting on the board (Martinez Quintciro, 
1988: 276). Among them, there were founder members, and government's, workers' and 
employers' representatives, plus representatives of the Associated Funds. The Board of 
s See Diaz Fanjul, R. (1954), La Ruta del Instituto Nacional de Previsidn, Madrid: Publicaciones del 
INP. 
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Trustees was the highest collective authority of the INP, in charge of regulating its 
organisation, orientating its activity, organising its finances and controlling the Executive 
Committee. The latter was the executive body of the INP in charge of implementing the 
decisions of the Board of Trustees. It was formed by the INP President, three members of the 
Board of Trustees and the Council Delegate. The Council Delegate was in charge of the day- 
to-day life and the staff of the INP, and represented the Executive Committee and the Board 
of Trustees when required. 
The main model for creating the INP was the Belgian institution for social insurance. 
In fact, the actuary of the Belgium Institute, Mr. Edmond Lefrancq advised the INP 
authorities on how to establish the Spanish system. It also followed the example of the 
Italian Workers Insurance Fund against Disability and Old Age. 
The first INP President was Eduardo Dato e Iradier, being replaced in 1913 by the 
military Jose Marva. But the leader of the INP was Jose Maluquer, a Social-Catholic who 
became its first Council Delegate until his death. With them, an eclectic group of social 
reformers with different ideological traditions (Social Catholicism, Krausism and Socialism) 
6 gathered. 
In the development of the Spanish welfare system, the creation of a specific 
institution such as the INP to be in charge of the emerging system of insurance schemes 
reflects that at this point the state felt that it was its responsibility to look after the welfare of 
its population. It was perceived at that time that ` the state recognises that workers, at the end 
of their lives, should not be left to misery or to the aid of public charity' (INP, 1910: 3). This 
process went hand to hand with the softening of the anti-interventionist liberal tenets on 
economic doctrine that was taking place everywhere during the first decades of the twentieth 
century. However, at this moment, the system was still organised under the principle of 
"subsidised freedom": insurance was voluntary although the government promoted it with 
subsidies (Guillen, 1990: 3). 
6 For an analysis of the people that formed the first generation of the INP see Martinez Quinteiro 
(1988). 
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The task of social reform proved to be difficult and provoked many opponents along 
the way. As the main figure in the INP of the 1940s, Jordana de Pozas wrote, referring to 
these early days, that the establishment of social insurance schemes had twenty years to fight 
on several different battlefronts at the same time: 'the attacks came from both the employers' 
and the workers' side, from the Catholic sphere, the private insurance companies and the 
mutual aid societies, from the liberal parties and the extremist ones''. 
As a result of this fierce opposition, the development of the system was slow. It 
would not be until 1917, when in the Conference on People's Social Insurance an agreement 
to gradually establish compulsory social insurance schemes was reached (although 
employers' associations were reluctant to accept the principle of compulsion). The first 
scheme was created in 1919, the Old Age Compulsory Retirement Scheme'. The very first 
draft was done by the INP and profusely debated by public opinion. When the draft came to 
Parliament, it had the support of most of political groups, thus leading to its passing very 
quickly (Cuesta, 1988). However, the passing of the regulations took more time, primarily 
due to the active role played by interest groups. 
Social insurance registration was compulsory for all industrial workers between 16 
and 65 years of age, whose perceived income per year did not exceed a maximum amount 
(4,000 pesetas). The funding structure of the scheme was based on capitalisation (following 
the example of most of the countries which had this kind of old age scheme) (Cuesta, 1988), 
in a first phase financed by the state and the employers, and later by contributions from 
employers and workers (Guillen, 1990). Agricultural workers were excluded from the 
scheme, due to the lobbying of big landowners. 
The creation of the Ministry of Labour in 1920 was another major development in 
the process of state intervention in economic, labour and social matters, in line with what 
was happening elsewhere in Europe (Cuesta, 1988). 
7 Jordana de Pozas, L. (1961), Estudios Sociales y de Prevision, Vol. 2, Madrid: INP, p. 250. $ For an in-depth analysis, see Cuesta (1988). 
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The last governments of the Restoration supported and encouraged the development 
of social insurance (Cuesta, 1988). In fact, this period between 1917 and 1923 were good 
years for the INP, which was consolidated (Cuesta, 1988). A major development was the 
reform of its regulations in March 1922, that, among other things, resulted in the creation of 
the National Advisory Commission of Employers and Workers, an advisory body that acted 
as an arena for the exchange of opinions between employers and employees. 
Closely linked to developments in social insurance policy were the fiscal policy 
reforms which took place at that moment, in particular the Tax on Inheritance was passed on 
26 July 1922. The resources extracted from this tax would fund pensions for the old who had 
not been able to contribute to their own pension (Cuesta, 1988). The importance of the 
structure of the tax system for the development of the social welfare system can hardly be 
overestimated and it shows how institutions already in place might permit, shape or even 
block further institutional developments. When studying the establishment of the Francoist 
social insurance system, I will suggest that the tax system impeded its expansion, thus 
causing a path-dependent effect. 
As important as the 1917 Social Insurance Conference, the Assembly of Barcelona 
of 1922 became a landmark in the collective desire for a fully developed social insurance 
system. In this congress, compulsory and integrated health insurance schemes were 
discussed and proposed (Cuesta, 1988). The three schemes were maternity, disability and 
sickness. The INP was clearly in favour of co-ordinating the three of them in a single health 
insurance scheme. However, the INP's plan was diluted by the Ministry of Labour, which 
detached the maternity scheme from the other two. This was justified by reasons of urgency 
(Cuesta, 1988). In any case, political developments impeded the passing of even this reduced 
plan of maternity insurance scheme9. 
The political system of the Restoration was suddenly destroyed in 1923 with the 
coup d'etat of General Miguel Primo dc Rivera, supported by King Alfonso XIII. Primo dc 
9 For an analysis of what happened during the 1920s to the other two projected schemes, disability and 
illness, see Cuesta (1988: 623-38). 
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Rivera implanted a conservative dictatorship with a high level of economic interventionism 
which resulted in the creation of several monopolistic public companies in strategic 
economic sectors (Gomez Navarro, 1991) and a corporatist model of social relations. 
The major innovations carried out by the dictatorship took place in the realm of 
labour relations. The dictatorship created a system of corporatist organisations for structuring 
the economy and the labour force, inspired by the examples of Fascist Italy and Belgium 
(Aunbs, 1944: 63). As a result, there was a hierarchy of institutions which embraced all 
workers of a single profession or type of industry (similar to the medieval guilds). At the 
company level, Company Committees of Employers and Employees (Comites Parilarios) 
were set up. The Mixed Committees (Cornisiones Mtixtas) were formed by representatives of 
the Company Committees of all local industries. These were also set up at the regional level 
-the Mixed Provincial Committees of Labour (Comisiones Atixtas Provinciales de Trabajo). 
The Council of the Corporation (Consejo de Corporaciön) was the highest institution within 
that particular type of profession or industry, which was entitled to take part in the 
Committee of Councils of Corporations (Comisidn Delegada de Consejos). This was the 
institution which reported directly to the Ministry of Labour (Aun6s, 1944: 65). 
The Company Committees of Employers and Employees, although conservative- 
corporatist institutions, helped to institutionalise the mechanism of representation of the 
different social groups in the policy-making arenas and to ease labour conflicts. This is why 
they persisted during the Second Republic (Dc la Calle Velasco, 1997b: 146-8). 
Regarding social policy, few reforms were carried out by Primo de Rivera's 
dictatorship, apart from an attempt to rationalise the Working Injury Insurance Scheme and 
the planning of a Maternity Insurance Scheme. The Working Injuries Scheme was reformed 
in 1922,1926 and 1931, also as a result of the establishment in July 1926 of the Labour 
Code. I have already mentioned that the Maternity Insurance Scheme had been planned in 
the Assembly of Barcelona of 1922. The scheme finally established by the Royal Decree of 
22 March 1929 (but not implemented until the Second Republic on 16 May 1931) was quite 
different to the one that had been initially projected. First, it was detached from the other two 
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health risks (disability and illness). Secondly, it was a subsidy scheme instead of an 
insurance scheme. Finally, it had a very limited scope of population coverage as it only 
protected working women affiliated to the Old Age Compulsory Retirement Scheme, 
therefore excluding most of the female working population. 
If the INP had done quite well between 1917 and 1927, after that it came under 
suspicion by Primo dc Rivera's dictatorship and was immobilised by the lack of economic 
resources, as the state refused to concede any more public funding (Cuesta, 1988; Guillen, 
1996). Most probably, the INP hierarchies became very concerned about their future when 
the Minister of Labour of the dictatorship Eduardo Aunds decided to abolish the IR. Sl°, a 
decision which was not welcomed by many in Spain. 
The difficulties Primo dc Rivera gave the INP and the few social policies set up by 
that regime explain why Francoist policy makers did not turn to the social policy model of 
the Primo's dictatorship as their first source of imitation. Actually, when remembering the 
origins of the Spanish welfare system and when accounting for the history of the INP, the 
hierarchies of the Institute during the Francoist dictatorship did not put special effort into 
highlighting achievements or events happened during the Primo dc Rivera's period. For 
example, Luis Jordana de Pozas (even though he had been heavily involved in drafting the 
1924 Local Administration Act and the 1926 Civil Service Act) did not refer to any special 
contribution of the dictatorship to the development of the Spanish Welfare State". Carlos G. 
Posada12 jumped from the end of the Restoration period (1919) to the coming of the 
Francoist State (1938) in his review of the evolution of the Spanish compulsory social 
insurance schemes. 
The only work published during the 1940s dedicated to the analysis of the social 
policy of Primo dc Rivera's dictatorship was that of Eduardo Aunbs, entitled La Politica 
10 Although very politely, Pedro Sangro y Ros de Olano denounced the abolition of the IRS in his 
reply to Eduardo Aunts' conference when the latter entered the Royal Academy of Moral and 
Political Sciences (Aunts, 1944: 138). This reflects that the Aunbs period had not been the most 
friendly one for the INP as it could be thought. 
1' See Jordana de Pozas, L. (1961), 'Pasado, Presente y Futuro dc la Seguridad Social Espanola', 
Estudios Sociales y de Prevision, Vol. 1, Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo and INP, pp. 477-94. 
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Social de la Dictadura (The Social Policy of the Dictatorship) (Aunbs, 1944). Having 
himself been Labour Minister of the Primo dc Rivera's dictatorship, it is understandable that 
he produced a highly apologist piece. But what Aunds reflected in that book was what had 
been the real interest of the dictatorship and of himself as Minister of Labour: the 
organisation of a corporatist system of labour relations. The references to social insurance 
and to the work of the INP are scarce and, actually, the INP is only quoted a couple of times. 
The importance of this book lies mainly in the purpose for which it was written - the 
inclusion of Aunbs in the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1944. In my 
opinion, if there was an influence of former social policies and ideas on the Francoist model, 
it was through this institution. However, elder members (such as Sangro y Ros dc Olano") 
would have been more influenced than younger ones (such as Jordana dc Pozas) who were 
much more attracted by social insurance innovations and new debates taking place during the 
1930s and 1940s in Europe and elsewhere. Arguably, these shaped the development of the 
Francoist social insurance system much more than the policies and corporatist institutions of 
the Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. 
The political turmoil of these years produced a new change of political regime. With 
the end of the Primo de Rivera's dictatorship came the end of the monarchic system itself 
(after the short dictatorship of the General I3erenguer), King Alfonso XIII being forced to 
leave for exile. The new political regime adopted the form of a Republic on 14 April 1931. 
With regard to social policy, the Second Republic was innovative, brought stability to the 
system and continued along the lines previously marked, but failed to implement many of its 
planned reforms (due to the outbreak of the Civil War)14. 
12 Posada, C. G. (undated), Los Seguros Sociales Obligatorios en Espana, Madrid: Revista de Derecho 
Privado. 
" Actually, Pedro Sangro y Ros de Olano collaborated with Aunds in the department and replaced 
him as Minister of Labour, continuing the corporatist system of labour organisation. 
14 There is a debate about the extent to which the Second Republic was innovative with regard to 
social policy. On the one hand, authors such as Samaniego I3oneu (1988) and Ana Rico (year 
unknwon) believe that the Second Republic made real contributions to the development of the Spanish 
welfare state. On the other hand, there are those who believed that the Second Republic did more in 
projecting social policies than in implementing them (Fuentes Quintana, E. et al. (1982), ` Estrategia 
pars un Tratamiento dc los Problemas de la Seguridad Social', Papeles de Economla Espai7ola, Nos. 
12-13, p. 31, quoted in Samaniego (1988: 17). 
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It can be said that it was at that moment that the idea of the nontransferable 
responsibility of the state to care for the welfare of the citizens was fully accepted. The 
introduction of this idea in the Republican Constitution shows how innovative the Republic 
was in this respect. Thus, Article 46 of the Republican Constitution of 1931 stated the right 
to work as a social right and conceded the state the role of protecting the worker against any 
misfortunes that could deprive him of working (such as illnesses, unemployment, accident or 
old age). Another article of the same charter, Article 65, obliged the Spanish State to ratify 
all the international treaties on social and labour matters. Thus, Spain ratified the 
International Labour Organisation treaties which encouraged signatory countries to establish 
sickness insurance schemes for the working population. 
During the first period of the Republic (1931-1933), the socialist Labour Minister 
Francisco Largo Caballero promoted the major social reform initiatives of the Second 
Republic. Largo established the Workers' Charter, stimulated the work of the National 
Advisory Commission of Employers and Workers, set up the Mixed Juries, extended social 
welfare policies to rural workers and, as a result of this push, a few social insurance 
measures were introduced. 
First, the Working Injuries Scheme was extended to peasants and agricultural 
workers by the Decree of 25 August 1931. The rewritten law introducing the Working 
Injuries Scheme of 8 October 1932 established the National Working Injuries Scheme Fund 
within the INP (Samaniego, 1988). The affiliation of workers either to this Fund or to the 
different insurance companies that were allowed to take part, in collaboration with the INP, 
was made compulsory to employers. Secondly, the Maternity Insurance Scheme, which we 
know was legislated by Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, was implemented then by the Decree 
of 26 May 1931 (afterwards becoming the Law of 9 September 1931). Thirdly, the National 
Fund against Unemployment was also created within the INP, by the Decree of 25 May 
1931 15. The draft of the decree had been done by the INP during the Restoration, but it had 
15 For an analysis of how this unemployment scheme came into being, see Cuesta (1988: 723-801). 
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been impossible to pass it. The regulations of this Fund were approved in February 1933. 
Due to the persistence of unemployment levels, an unemployment law was passed on July 
1934 
- 
the Law against Unemployment. However, it was explicitly recognised as a 
temporary measure. In 1935, a new law was passed, the Law Against Non-Voluntary 
Unemployment, slightly reformed in July 1936, which, in any case, did not add anything 
substantially innovative nor effective to ameliorate the social problem of unemployment. 
In addition, the Second Republic promoted the development of voluntary insurance 
schemes and of some more charitable measures for specific groups (such as the Old Age 
Homage Prize, which were subsidies for old people who were not entitled to old age 
pensions). 
But the Republic did more for the development of the Spanish social insurance 
system in investigating and planning policies than in promulgating laws. The focus was on 
creating a unified insurance scheme. 
At the time, the unification of the different insurance schemes in a so-called Seguro 
Total (Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme) was a fashionable idea which was being 
studied in several countries and encouraged by various international experts and 
organisations. Minister Largo Caballero, as early as by 30 April 1931, stated his willingness 
to create such a unified scheme". The International Labour Organisation expert, Oswald 
Stein, came to Spain on 22 October 1932 to lecture on the Functions and Organisation of the 
Social Insurance Scheme. In his speech, he insisted on the aim of creating inter-professional 
and nationally-based schemes, unifying them all and giving the affiliates the opportunity to 
have a say in the management of the institutions that controlled the system (Stein, 1933: 12). 
Thus, by the Ministerial Order of 10 May 1932, the INP was held responsible for the drafting 
of the plans for a sickness insurance scheme and a disability and death insurance scheme and 
also for the study of the way to unify all the social insurance schemes into one'7. The INP 
drafted a complete plan, in accordance with the models that were being proposed by the 
16 El Socialista, 30 April 1931. 
17 For a description of the policy-making process, see Samaniego (1988: 344-69). 
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International Labour Organisation. Once the draft was approved by the Board of Trustees of 
the INP, it was presented to the government. But the change of the Minister of Labour 
delayed the submission of the draft bill to public consultation until 28 May 1936 (Rico, year 
unknown: 24), and the outbreak of the Civil War, however, put a final end to this process. 
Although during the Second Republic there was not a remarkable development in 
the number and structure of the insurance schemes, there was however a consolidation of the 
institute in charge of them, the INP, which became dependent upon the Ministry of Labour 
through the General Directorate of Labour. The INP did not suffer from the internal 
convulsions that one might have expected in such an unstable political environment. New 
regulations for the INP were passed in December 1931, which adapted the INP's aims to 
those declared in the Republican Constitution and, from the organisational point of view, 
increased the Board of Trustees up to 40 members (Samaniego, 1988). The INP President 
remained Jose Marva, until he was replaced by Juan Usabiaga Lasquibar in 1934. Adolfo 
Gonzalez Posada replaced Usabiaga in October 1935. However, the Council Delegate was, 
during the whole Republican period, Inocencio Jimenez Vicente, a Social Catholic who had 
been in the post since 1930 (officially in that year, although as deputy Council Delegate 
since Maluquer had become ill in 1923) and who occupied it until his death in 1941 ". 
Thus, there was clear continuity from previous stages. This fact seemed obvious 
even to Largo Caballero himself, who, in an article in the El Socialista on 30 April 1931 
wrote: `The Spanish Republic, in which government three of our colleagues are present, 
comes in good time to consolidate the work of social insurance initiated by the Monarchy'. 
Thus, Socialists perceived that the social insurance system already in place was a good 
starting point from which to continue introducing more schemes. Even later, when a 
conservative government was in place between 1934 and 1936 (the phase known as the 
Black Two Years), there was continuity of social policies introduced by Largo Caballero 
before. 
1° For an analysis of the elite groups of the INP, see Samaniego (1984), reproduced in Samaniego (1988). 
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The general consensus with regard to social insurance policies that dominated during 
the first two stages of the Second Republic, even though different political coalitions were in 
power, disappeared in the early months of 1936. Political conflict thus blocked any chance of 
developing social policies, which require broad political consensus for their establishment 
and implementation. The political atmosphere between February and July 1936 did not 
permit the passing of any bold policies (Samaniego, 1988). Thus, when the military rose up 
in the Spanish territories of North Africa on 18 July 1936, the opportunity for the Second 
Republic to catch up with the most advanced European welfare systems was definitely lost19. 
From this overview of the history of the Spanish social insurance system since its 
origins up to the outbreak of the Civil War, several conclusions can be proposed. First, social 
policies have to be understood within more general ideological debates. Thus, the debate at 
the beginning of the twentieth century on the degree of state intervention in the economy and 
society set the framework for debating the kind of welfare system that was to be established, 
and contentious ideologies such as Socialism, Krausism or Social Catholicism provided the 
ideological references from which social welfare systems were born. 
Secondly, social policies were affected by political conflicts and were shaped by 
Spanish political events. The development of the Spanish welfare state followed the 
development of other European welfare states quite closely (De la Calle Velasco, 1997: 129) 
at the very early stages, during the period of the Restoration. It was Primo de Rivera's 
dictatorship which really put Spain behind in comparison to its European neighbours, even 
though the INP struggled hard not to lose pace. The Second Republic tried to catch up, but 
the outbreak of the Civil War put a halt to this recovery. 
Thirdly, there were processes of policy diffusion and learning taking place. Spain 
learned from and was encouraged to set up social insurance policies by experiences and 
policy innovations taking place outside. The role of international conferences such as those 
19 'The beginning of the Civil War finally frustrated the enactment of a law' (for the unification of all 
insurance schemes) 'which, if fully implemented, could have meant the starting point of the Spanish 
welfare state, as distinct from the set of isolated and fragmented welfare policies enacted until that date' (Rico, year unknown: 24). 
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on Social Insurance Schemes and of Actuaries, and international organisations such as the 
International Labour Organisation helped in widespreading ideas and policies among 
Spanish elite groups. 
Fourthly, continuity is the best description of the evolution of the Spanish social 
welfare system. Following Samaniego (1988: 513), continuity can be seen at three different 
levels. First, in the gradual and progressive development of the institution most directly 
responsible for social insurance schemes, the INP, which kept the same basic organisation 
from when it was established in 1908. Second, in the continuity of the men in charge of the 
INP, and especially in the posts of INP President and Council Delegate. Third, although new 
social insurance schemes and institutions were established, they all followed the same model 
of social welfare, thus resulting in a system which was fragmented, with very limited 
coverage of people and social risks, unequal, institutionally weak, with an uneasy mixture of 
public and private institutions providing insurance. 
Fifthly, the institutional path-dependence xerted by those institutions already in 
place, which limited the extent of the later reforms, was significant. The development of the 
welfare system was subject to the limitations of a weak state and a regressive tax system. 
The public welfare system had to fight its way against powerful and numerous private 
welfare institutions such as the Sociedades dc Socorros AM: ituos or private insurance 
companies. 
Sixthly and finally, variables such as the socio-cconomic situation, the Catholic 
culture or the role of labour movements do not seem to fully explain the final shape of the 
Spanish welfare system. The passing of the Working Injuries Act, the law that established 
the INP or the other social policy developments were not directly affected by the state of the 
economy nor shaped by the demands of an emergent but still very weak labour movement. 
Elite groups were not involved in the policy-making process of the different laws, but in the 
later stages of their implementation, and only the medical profession managed to threaten a 
little the introduction of social policies. However, the strategy followed by policy-makers 
was to co-opt doctors onto the different decision-making bodies (Rico, year unknown) at 
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different stages of the process. What really shaped the development of the Spanish welfare 
system seemed to be the pro-active role of key policy-makers performing within institutions 
of the Spanish state. 
4.2. Review of Literature on the Spanish Welfare State 
The analysis of the birth and growth of the Spanish social welfare system is still very 
much underdeveloped. Two reasons might explain why. First, Spain has been (and in many 
aspects still is) a laggard in the development of its welfare state among its wealthier 
European neighbours. Thus, this situation might not have encouraged research on the topic. 
Secondly, the slow development of the disciplines of Sociology and Political Science in 
Spain and, therefore, the existence of a small community of scholars dedicated to them, have 
limited the research. Researching such a complex institution as the welfare state involves the 
joint efforts of many scholars from many disciplines and a lengthy process of accumulation 
of knowledge. 
Let us start then by reviewing the literature on the origins and development of the 
Spanish welfare state. Historians have studied this topic, although quite unevenly. The three 
works published by the Spanish Ministry of Labour as a trilogy (Los Seguros Sociales ell la 
Espana del Siglo XX) (Montero Garcia, 1988; Cuesta, 1988; Samaniego, 1988) were in-depth 
historical accounts of the insurance schemes established from the Restoration to the Second 
Republic. Gonzalez Murillo's (1998) unpublished doctoral thesis was on the labour and 
social policies of the Labour Minister Jose Antonio Girön dc Velasco. Although from a 
different academic discipline (therefore with different questions and using different literature 
and method), my own work would be a continuation of these valuable works. 
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Economists such as Manuel Alonso Olea (1982), Francisco Comin (1999) and Juan 
Velarde Fuertes (1990) have also studied the evolution of the Spanish welfare state. While 
Comin's perspective links the evolution of the Spanish Treasury and fiscal policy with the 
development of the welfare state, Velarde's best contribution is a three-fold division of the 
history of the system marked by several turning points. The first, as the starting point, would 
be the creation of the Commission of Social Reforms in 1883 and would go up to 1963. The 
second stage would run from 1963 to the reforms of the 1990s, precisely at the time when 
Velarde was writing his book, as a new change was taking place, therefore resulting in a new 
phase. 
The more specific sociological literature on the development of the Spanish welfare 
state reflects the influence of the Schools identified in Chapter Two. Thus, some scholars 
pay attention to the socio-economic variables which might have shaped this development 
and the system finally established (Campos Egozcue, 1996) while others stressed the role of 
cultural factors such as the presence and influence of Catholicism (Vila, 1995). Historian Dc 
la Calle Velasco (1997b) believed that three sets of variables shaped the policy 
developments, being 1) the force of ideas which promoted policy change, 2) socio-economic 
factors together with 3) interactions between political actors. 
For Moreno and Sarasa (1993), very little can be achieved by referring to the 
variables that have been used in explaining the development of other European welfare 
states. Thus, in Spain it was not possible to rely on the power of the labour movement to 
explain this, nor on a broad reformist coalition between the middle, the rural and the working 
classes which would permit a bottom-up push for social reforms. Welfare state institutions 
were created as a top-down decision made by elite groups, influenced by their own 
ideologies. Thus, the ideological roots of the Spanish welfare state arc located in elite 
movements such as Social Catholicism or the Krausist version of Liberalism, and mass 
movements such as Socialism and Fascism. Thus, fuelled by the influence of these 
competing ideologies, an array of social institutions developed. In this process, a key social 
institution in Spain, the Catholic Church, played a two-fold role of both promoting the 
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setting up of new welfare institutions and imposing a conservative imprint on it which 
slowed down its development. 
Guillen (1996) studied the evolution of the health policies since the Restoration 
(1875) to the establishment of democracy (1982). She brought to the fore the different 
variables that shaped the birth and growth of the welfare state. Guillcn's choice of 
explanatory variables was that of the role of institutions, over other variables. For her, socio- 
economic factors and the mobilisation of the working class do not provide a convincing 
account of the timing and results of the process of welfare development. Thus, taking into 
account the political-institutional variables, she analysed the policy-making processes that 
led to the emergence of the social policies established in Spain. 
Guillen's account of the origins of the social insurance system started with the 
Working Injuries Law of 1900. Although Spain copied, as did other European countries, the 
model of social insurance schemes introduced by Bismarck in Germany, historical, socio- 
economic and political reasons affected the normal development of the system and produced 
a slow-down with regard to the political initiatives taken by other countries. The historical 
reasons were the slow process of development of the liberal state, the loss of colonies during 
the nineteenth century and the internal wars suffered in the country. Socio-economic factors 
would be the late onset industrial revolution, the lack of a strong bourgeoisie class that could 
have modernised the country, the insufficient development of the communication system and 
the fact that the Spanish economy was primary-sector-orientated. Finally, the political 
reasons that account for the different developmental path of the Spanish welfare state would 
be the persistence of Absolutism during the nineteenth century (therefore the weakness of 
Liberalism) and the political instability experienced throughout the period. Nineteenth and 
twentieth century Spanish history was rich in political constitutions, coups d'etat (revolts of 
the military to depose governments) and a wide variety of political regimes (an absolute 
monarchy, a Liberal monarchy, the First Republic, a Liberal monarchy with a two-party 
system, a conservative dictatorship and the Second Republic). 
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In a working paper published by the Institute Juan March, Guillcn (1990) analysed 
the role of ideology in the emergence of the Spanish welfare state between 1876 and 1923. 
Three ideologies were involved: Social Catholicism, Krausism and Regenerationism20. De la 
Calle Velasco (1997b) showed that the first ideological move from within the Commission 
of Social Reforms came from Krausist people, while Social Catholics and Rcgenerationists 
joined later. During the Restoration, new ideas about the need for the state to intervene in the 
economic system came from all these ideologies, modifying the attitudes of both socialist 
and conservative groups (Guillen, 1997). Krausist figures such as Azcärate and Gonzalez 
Posada were heavily involved in welfare institutions, mainly in the Institute of Social 
Reforms. Thus, by the time the Second Republic started discussing social reforms, a 
fundamental agreement on the need to expand the existing social protection system was 
already present among the various factions of the political elite. 
Let us now focus on how the literature has researched the Francoist period, as it 
constitutes the point of departure of my own research. The first impression is that scholars, 
when analysing the Francoist years, have acted more on assumptions and generalities than on 
evidences and data. References to primary sources (such as letters, minutes, documents, 
articles or books of those years) are scarce in the specialised literature. The originals and 
documents filed in the Archives of the INP had never been studied before. 
The period in which Francoism established its social insurance system, between 
1936 and 1963 is the least researched of all the phases of the history of the Spanish welfare 
state. Academics might find it difficult to concede the Francoist dictatorship the privilege of 
being the founder of many schemes of the Spanish social insurance system. That might be 
the reason why many researchers, ignoring what happened before the coming of democracy, 
20-The Krausismo was a philosophical system that perceived the world as an organic whole in which it 
was possible to achieve the conciliation of opposites. Thus, society and individual could be reconciled 
through education and appropriate public intervention. This philosophical movement got its name 
from its founder, the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1823). It was 
introduced in Spain by Francisco Giner de los Rios and the lnstitucidn Libre dc Enseilanza. On the 
other hand, the Regeneracionismo (Regeneration) was an intellectual movement that appeared in 
Spain after the national crisis of 1898 with the loss of the colonies of Cuba and the Philippines. It 
proclaimed the need to regenerate the country, morally and politically, and to promote its economic 
modernisation. The most prominent representative of the movement was the politician Joaquin Costa. 
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tend to start their research with the social policy developments that took place during the 
transition and afterwards. In a few cases, the analysis goes back to the social policy reforms 
of the 1960s (Rodriguez Cabrero, 1998: 135; Campos Egozcuc, 1996: 261), finding that the 
starting moment of the Spanish social security system, but keeping in shadow the crucial 
stage of the 1940s. And those who attempt to report the whole history of the social welfare 
system since 1900 are inclined to dedicate more time to the (failed) initiatives of the Second 
Republic than to the reforms occurring during the 1940s and 1950s. 
Gonzalez Murillo's (1998) has researched in depth the period that I consider here. 
The 900 pages-strong thesis is structured around very different themes such as the concept of 
work, salary, family policies, labour policies (unemployment, industrial action or co- 
operatives) or the Labour Universities. However, Gonzalez Murillo's work is more a 
compilation of data on these policies than an analysis of the political evolution of Girön dc 
Velasco's Ministry or the actors, their motives, the political interactions or the reasons that 
led to the establishment of such insurance system. It does, however, highlight the power 
struggles within the regime, as he insists on the rivalry between the Ministry of Labour and 
the Syndical Organisation. But, from my point of view, this was far less important than the 
struggle between Falangists in those two institutions against other families of the regime who 
controlled the INP or other public bodies, as I will explore in subsequent chapters. 
Moreno and Sarasa (1993) focus on the actors involved in the making of the 
Francoist social welfare system 
-the Catholic Church and the Falange. Thus, for Moreno 
and Sarasa (1993), Francoist social ideology received both influences from Catholic 
traditional-corporativism and Falangist totalitarian-corporativism, resulting in a "Catholic- 
Fascist hybrid" that shaped political institutions, policies and social relations. The Francoist 
social insurance system established in the 1940s reflected the accommodation of both 
ideological traditions. Even when the result of the Second World War forced the regime to 
adopt political reforms acceptable to the triumphant western democracies and get rid of its 
fascist elements, the hybrid character of the social welfare system remained. Although 
Falangists were in bitter retreat, they managed to keep control over the ministry in charge of 
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labour relations and social welfare. Only in the late 1950s would Social Catholics assume 
full control of the organisation of the Spanish economy, therefore allowing them to reform 
social policies and institutions along Catholic lines. 
Guillen (1992) extended her hypothesis on the role of ideologies in shaping the 
Spanish welfare state to the Francoist regime. With the change of the regime after the Civil 
War, one would have expected a profound change in the social insurance system. On the 
contrary, the persistence of one of the founding ideologies of the welfare system, Social 
Catholicism, `permitted the preservation of the previously existing institutional design' 
(Guillen, 1992: 119). It is not true then, that with the dictatorship came the disappearance of 
those reformist figures that had supported social reforms during the Republic (Campos 
Egozcue, 1996: 240). This might be the case for the left-wing and republican politicians and 
civil administrators, but not for the Social-Catholic leaders of the INP such as Inocencio 
Jimenez Vicente, Severino Aznar or Luis Jordana de Pozas. 
For Guillen (1997: 168), three factors explain the legislative activity occurred 
between 1936 and 195721: the Falangist control over social policy, the need of the 
dictatorship to gain legitimacy and the admiration of the German model (Guillen, 1997: 
168). The admiration for the German model would lead to excite the "imperial aspirations of 
the regime" as a better social welfare system (mainly a health system) would increase the 
"quality" of the Spanish race. For Guillen, this last reason would explain in particular the 
rapid introduction of the Sickness Insurance Scheme in 1942. 
Social policy was controlled by Falangists, in charge of the social image of the 
dictatorship (Guillen, 1996: 211), although some of the most prominent posts of the INP 
remained in the hands of the Social Catholics (Guillen, 1996: 145-6). The Falangists, says 
Guillen (1996: 231), had an `all-embracing presence, especially in the forties, without 
opposition of any kind', at least not from the sectors of society outside the families of the 
21 Guillen (1997) identified the period between 1936 and 1957 as the first of two phases into which the Francoist social welfare system can be divided. The second phase would comprise from 1957 to the 
end of the dictatorship. 
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regime. The key political actor at that moment was Falangist Jose Antonio Giron dc Velasco, 
Minister of Labour between 1941 and 1957. With a strong personality and with Franco's full 
support and confidence, Giron dc Velasco had the sole power to decide the composition of 
the commissions and committees which would eventually draft the different social policies 
(Guillen, 1996: 164). It was in these commissions where the political debate took place. 
Thus, the analysis of the perceptions, interests and ideological orientations of the members of 
these commissions is of great relevance to the understanding of the social policies which 
were finally established (Guillen, 1996: 165). 
4.3. Contentious Hypotheses 
The review of the literature on the Francoist social insurance schemes reveals some 
issues which had already come to the fore when the evolution of the Spanish welfare state 
since its origins till 1936 was studied. The literature has pointed to the fact that the Francoist 
system continued what had been put in place from 1900, in terms of programs, people, 
ideology and institutions. However, new actors (Falangists, Girdn de Velasco) and the 
Falangist ideology introduced elements of change. 
Having played down in previous chapters the importance of socio-economic 
variables or cultural factors and having set up the theoretical framework of this thesis within 
the Institutionalist approach to the policy process, I now single out the elements of the 
policy-making process put forward by the literature on the Francoist social welfare system in 
order to assess how they shaped policy outputs. Let us remember that we were looking at 
three main elements of the policy process: ideas, actors and institutions. 
Regarding ideas, foreign social insurance solutions and policies attracted and 
inspired Spanish policy-makers. I will argue that this truly happened, but the importance of 
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policy diffusion processes should not be overemphasised. Secondly, regarding actors, the 
masses did not play a pro-active role in this process. The Francoist regime was not forced to 
create its social insurance system, but did it motivated by its need to gain legitimisation. In 
addition, different policy actors held conflicting agendas of interests. For the literature, the 
Falange appears to have been the catalyst of change and policy innovation. But if one actor 
can be named, that is the Falangist Labour Minister Jose Antonio Girön de Velasco. By 
contrast, the Catholic Church appears in this literature to have attempted to block the passing 
of comprehensive and advanced social policies, while the role of Social Catholics within the 
INP is acknowledged but not emphasised. I will challenge this view and will argue that, 
when looking in detail at what happened with regard to the passing of each social insurance 
scheme, a very different picture comes up. It is then that the third and final element, the role 
of political institutions of the non-democratic Francoist regime comes to the fore to 
constitute the basis of my argument. 
Policy Diffusion 
Although Francoist policy-makers always emphasised the unique character of the 
Spanish social insurance system22, they did borrow ideas and imitate policies from other 
countries and political regimes. The question is to what extent they were influenced by those 
experiences, especially by those other very similar non-democratic regimes such as Fascist 
Italy and Nazi Germany. 
Given the close similarities between the Fascist and Francoist regimes, we would 
expect the latter to imitate the former considerably in social insurance policies. Undoubtedly, 
the Francoist regime looked closely at the Fascist experience with regard to labour relations. 
The Spanish Labour Charter 
- 
the Fuero del Trabajo 
- 
openly drew on the Italian Carta di 
Lavoro. But what happened in the related area of labour policy did not happen in social 
22 See, for example, Jordana de Pozas' remarks on the Spanish Sickness Insuranche Scheme as being 
the most perfect in the world and path-breaking: Jordana de Pozas, L., `Orientaciones Mundiales del 
Seguro de Enfermedad', Boletin de Informacion del INP, October 1944, No. 10, pp. 1263-70. Other 
examples can be seen in Jordan de Pozas (1944: 2) and Leal Ramos (1950: 46-56). 
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insurance. Actually, Spanish social insurance policy-makers did not recognise the influence 
of the Carta di Lavoro on the Fuero del Trabajo as highly positive. The social insurance 
expert Carlos G. Posada explained the absence of any reference to insurance schemes against 
sickness and death in the Fuero del Trabajo because they did not appear in the Carla di 
Lavoro either? '. 
It was difficult for Francoist social insurance policy-makers within the INP to get 
many social insurance ideas and policies from Italy, because, as Jordana dc Pozas wrote, the 
Fascist regime did not have a specific and developed octrine on social insurance (Jordana 
de Pozas, 1954: 12). In addition, both social insurance systems were quite different and the 
Spanish system was more developed and integrated than the Italian. Therefore, Spanish 
policy-makers in the INP could hardly have borrowed from it substantially. 
If anything, the Fascist system influenced Falangist politicians, especially in their 
attempt to insure agricultural workers. Most probably, the involvement of the Fascist party in 
the running of the social insurance schemes in the agricultural sector provided FET de las 
DONS with the model they were looking for. 
Guill6n (1996) and Cousins (1995) point to the German example as the one which 
inspired most Spanish policy-makers. Again, the German model was, in fact, not of much 
attraction to Aznar Embid, Jimenez Vicente, Jordans de Pozas and the majority of the social 
insurance experts and academics of the time. Only a few Falangists may have been 
impressed by it, and only temporarily. 
Spanish policy-makers had a more practical approach to social insurance and wert 
not pre-determined by fixed ideological commitments. If the Boletin de Informacidn de la 
Caja Nacional de Seguros de Accidentes del Trabajo dedicated its issues of April and June 
1940 to the study of the Italian social insurance system, its replacement, the Boletin de 
Informacidn del Instituto Nacional de Prevision, did so with the Russian (June 1941), the 
2' Posada, C. G., `Formacibn del Regimen Legal de Seguros Sociales en Esparta', Boletfn de 
Informacidn del INP, September 1945, No. 9, p. 1695. 
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Nazi (July-August 1941) and the Belgium and French ones (April 1942), finally focusing by 
the end of 1942 and through 1943 almost exclusively on the British reforms. 
Actually, Spanish policy-makers were keen to learn from different countries, on the 
basis of specific solutions for specific challenges on this area of social insurance. Thus 
France's and Belgium's examples helped to set up the Family Subsidies Scheme; Germany, 
Hungary and other Central European countries were visited prior to establish the Regulations 
of the SOE; and, later on, the Beveridge model inspired policy-makers wishing to create a 
Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme". 
Thus, although recognising the importance of ideas in the policy process, policy 
learning and policy diffusion cannot explain more than certain similarities between countries 
and have therefore very modest explanatory value. Meil (1995: 51) and Iglesias and Meil 
(2001) reach the same conclusion in their studies of the Francoist family policies. 
Legitimisation of the Dictatorship 
There is a broad agreement in the literature about the dictatorship's need to gain 
legitimacy (before both internal public opinion and the international community) and the 
social insurance policies created as a tool to obtain the former (Tamames, 1988: 198; Garcia 
Padilla, 1990; Guillr n, 1996; Campos Egozcue, 1996; De la Calle Velasco, 1997; Gonzalez 
Murillo, 1998). 
Most probably Francoist welfare measures were designed to grant some sort of 
legitimacy to the regime. On the one hand, they might have improved its image before 
foreign democracies. Franco said in October 1943 that the regime could announce to the 
world in a very short period of time that the Spanish worker was protected against all 
possible social risks and all his needs had been met. He ended with the following irony: 
21 Jordana de Pozas was in January 1946 in England, learning from the British experience and 
organising Beveridge's going to Spain a few months later. Velarde (1990: 86) also refers to Castro 
Rial's (a Falangist) and Ucelay Repolles' trip to Britain during the Second World war to learn on the 
field about Beveridge's proposals. 
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`This is where the tyranny of our regime lies'2S. On the other hand, social welfare policies 
might have been intended to send a positive message to Spanish workers and disarm 
criticisms about the regime. Jose Luis de Arrese said in the Second Syndical Council in June 
1941: `We have to show the industrial and the agricultural workers that we are not the mould 
into which we compulsory force them, but we are the hand always open in generosity and 
help through which they get all the benefits from the state s26 
. 
However, this does not say much about why some types of social insurance schemes 
were introduced and not others or why some workers were more protected than others. As I 
have discussed in Chapter Three, Francoism should have sought support and legitimacy first 
of all from rural workers, who amounted to more than 60 per cent of the working population 
of Spain and had demonstrated high levels of political activism during the 1930s. Industrial 
workers and miners from Asturias were also highly mobilised, but not necessarily more than 
the rural workers of the huge fields of Andalucia and Castilla, heavily influenced by 
Anarchism and Communism. Why, then, were Francoist social insurance schemes first 
designed to protect industrial workers and much later, and less generously, agricultural 
workers? Why did Francoism set up social insurance schemes instead of an integrated social 
security system? 
I believe that the Francoist need to legitimise its own existence should not be over- 
emphasised. Apart from the two quotes provided above, I have not found other evidence in 
the public and private documents I consulted which could possibly show that policy-makers 
had consciously established these policies as a result of their strategy for gaining legitimacy. 
It is true that the Spanish INP translated and published leaflets in English and French relating 
the social welfare developments accomplished by the Francoist regime. But this task of 
marketing the achievements came much later, during the 1950s, when the social insurance 
schemes had been in place for more than ten years and Francoism was solidly established on 
Spanish soil. 
25 Boletin de Informaciön del INP, October 1943, No. 10, p. 2. 26 Boletin de Informacion del INP, June 1941, No. 6, p. 58. 
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My understanding of the role of social insurance as a tool to provide legitimacy in 
Francoism matches the explanation provided by Taloma Aguilar (2002) of how the regime 
used two strategies for claiming legitimacy. She has shown how an "origin-based" 
legitimacy (sustained in having won the Civil War) dominated the Francoist discourse during 
the 1940s and 1950s. It was in the 1960s and 1970s when the regime switched to 
"performance-based" legitimacy arguments, in praising Spain's social, political and 
economic achievements. Obviously, social insurance would fall into this second type, as a 
policy for producing "performance-based" legitimacy, therefore indicating that during the 
period studied in this thesis, Francoism did not rely on social welfare achievements as its 
first source of legitimacy. 
The kind of motivations which are most interesting and much stronger in shaping 
policy outputs are those which motivated particular key policy-makers. My hypothesis is that 
families of the regime and key policy actors pursued specific goals when putting in place 
social insurance institutions. 
A State-led Process and the Absence of the Labour Movement 
As had happened before, the Spanish welfare system during the Francoist period was 
established as a result of decisions made by key political actors, in a top-down process of 
policy-making, as the Francoist state was relatively autonomous with regard to civil society 
(Moreno and Sarasa, 1993: 36). To put it simply, the labour movement was not involved in 
the creation of the Francoist social insurance system (De Miguel, 1979). My own research 
will support this hypothesis. 
Social Insurance Policies as an Arena of Conflicting Interests 
Some authors (Rull Sabater, 1971; Garcia Padilla, 1990; Moreno and Sarasa, 1993; 
Campos Egozcue, 1996) have drawn our attention to the struggle between two of the main 
families supporting the Francoist dictatorship, namely Falangists and Catholics to control 
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social policy. However, what is lacking in the literature is an explanation of what is Catholic 
and what Falangist in each social insurance scheme or how and why each ideology managed 
to shape specific outputs of each scheme (or failed to do so). 
The Role of the Catholic Church 
Campos Egozcue (1996: 241), pointing to the political struggle between the Catholic 
Church and Falange, affirmed that the former wanted a dual system, in which the Church 
could also provide social insurance alongside public institutions, but based on state funding. 
The Falange rejected this freedom of the Church and demanded a public system in which 
services were only provided by state institutions. However, as I will try to prove in this 
thesis, the reasons were quite different. The Falange tried to exert complete control over the 
welfare system, therefore making the welfare institutions party-dependent, while the 
Catholic Church supported the work of the INP as the main institution in charge of Spanish 
social insurance. It is worth noting that compulsory social insurance schemes did not 
interfere at all with the charitable action of the Catholic Church, as they had very different 
aims. 
Guillen (1996: 238) saw the Catholic contribution in the type of "professional or 
mixed" insurance schemes but did not tell us what the Falangist contribution was. If the 
Catholic programme was a "mixed model of social provision", one might infer that the 
Falangist model might have been a fully-public and integrated one. There arc no reasons to 
sustain such a hypothesis. Moreover, this thesis will show that proposals for a unified system 
of social insurance schemes, inspired by the Beveridge model, were advocated by Social 
Catholics and the Catholic Hierarchy. 
The Role of Falange 
The leading role played by the Falangists in the construction of the Francoist social 
welfare system is widely highlighted by the specialised literature (De Miguel, 1979; Garcia 
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Padilla, 1990; Moreno and Sarasa, 1993; Guillen, 1996; Dc la Ca11e Vclasco, 1997; Thomas 
I Andreu, 1999)27. Thus, Guillen remarks how important it is to see "the Falangist stamp" 
(impronta Falangista) on it. 
The coherence of the Falangist ideology with regard to social insurance might be 
overestimated. As I will show later, Falangism did not have a theory of social insurance, and 
lacked the experts who could formulate one. In my opinion, Falangists (especially Minister 
Girön dc Velasco) adopted a more pragmatic and problem-solving approach. 
I will argue that Francoist social insurance schemes system was not introduced as a 
result of the Falange's single ambition, but as a result of the struggle of power between 
different families of the regimes which occupied different public bodies and ministerial 
departments. And more than the ambition of the Falange, it reflects the Falange's weakness, 
its failure to conquer the Francoist state and impose its totalitarian political model. All it 
managed to do was to duplicate state institutions with their own party-dependent ones. 
My argument is therefore similar to the one made by Iglesias and Meil (2001: 55), 
who point to the Falangist's attempt to extend their power among the working class as the 
main reason for introducing the Family Plus, while the Family Subsidies scheme, run by the 
INP, got into financial problems. Although Iglesias and Meil's research does not cover other 
social policy areas apart from family policies, they suggest that their hypothesis might also 
be applicable to the analysis of social insurance. 
The Role of Girön de Velasco, Minister of Labour 
The literature has identified Jose Antonio Girdn dc Velasco as the key actor in the 
development of the Francoist social welfare system, while he was Minister of Labour 
between 1941 and 1957 (Guillen, 1996; Mangen, 2001). Ilowever, as my research will later 
27 The role of Franco himself as personally involved in the development of social policies has been 
suggested by Medhurst, who says that 'after the war Franco did not rely wholly upon force for 
disciplining the working classes but took a personal interest in the development of social security 
provisions' (Medhurst 1973: 62). However, my own conclusion is that Franco did not play any 
important role in the development of the regime's social policy. 
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show, Girön was not the sole actor and his role might not have been as relevant and crucial 
as it is generally perceived. Together with Giron dc Velasco, the other crucial actor was the 
Director-General and Commissary of the INP, Luis Jordana de I'ozas. In fact, Jordana 
drafted most of the Francoist social insurance policies of that time, dominating the first 
stages of the policy process. 
Giron de Velasco intervened to veto policies or to shape outputs, but never 
participated in the drafting of policies or contributed to their content. In any case, his actions 
were framed by the institutions of the regime. What determined Girön's power was the non- 
democratic characteristics of his ministerial post and the non-democratic elements that 
shaped the policy process. The power of ministers to dictate regulations, the absence of 
formal regulations for the Ministry of Labour or the ability to by-pass the Council of State 
were all institutional resources in his hands that permitted him to shape policies and pursue 
his and the Falange's objectives. 
Thus, the struggle between families of the regime for the control of Francoist social 
policy and the role of policy-makers, especially Girön de Velasco, have to be explained in 
the institutional framework provided by the non-democratic regime. Therefore, our most 
important variable will be the role of the institutions of the Francoist political system. 
124 
Chapter 5 
The Francoist Regime (I) 
Actors and Ideas 
This chapter analyses two of the three components of the policy process: the actors 
and the ideas. First, it presents the disparate actors of the Francoist coalition, their interests 
and motivations, and their capability to influence the policy-making process and the overall 
development of the regime. Secondly, it analyses the approaches to social insurance of the 
two contenders for control of the Francoist social insurance system, Social Catholics and 
Falangists. 
5.1. Actors within the Regime 
The non-democratic regime established in Spain in the summer of 1936 after a 
bloody three-year civil war (that broke out due to the failure of a military coup d'etat) and 
lasted until the death of its leader Francisco Franco in 1975 is commonly described by the 
surname of the dictator, Francoism. Francoism was a coalition of social groups which held 
different and in many cases opposing interests. These groups are commonly known as the 
"families" of the regime. Each family battled for power and control of different policy 
sectors at different moments, motivated by changing interests. The social policy sector was 
the battleground for the power struggle between Falangists and Social Catholics, each one 
controlling different institutions of the regime. 
The military were the central pillar of the regime. The coup was organised and 
carried out by the military, who became the backbone of the dictatorship. llowever, together 
with the military, other families such as the Catholics, Falangists, Monarchists, or Carlists 
constituted the coalition against the Republic. Francoism was, to put it simply, a coalition of 
forces unified around a leader and sustained by a common feeling of fear 
-basically, fear of 
social agitation of the masses and of political developments that might eventually lead to 
public turmoil and the disintegration of Spain. Thus, although Francoism embraced different 
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and even contradictory political movements, they all centred around a single aim: to avoid 
the triumph and future re-emergence of "Red Spain" (Communist, Socialist and Anarchist). 
5.1.1. The Military 
To all intents and purposes, the Francoist regime was a military dictatorship. 
Traditionally, the Spanish military had felt themselves compelled to get involved in the 
political life of the country. The military revolts and the prominence of the military were 
common practices in the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, General Primo dc 
Rivera established a military dictatorship that preceded that of Franco both in time and in its 
practices. Later, many of the policies of the Second Republic governments towards the 
military provoked much bitterness from top officers, who felt impelled to bring about its end. 
However, not all military officers revolted against the democratic system; whether it was 
because of truly democratic beliefs or because of the vow of loyalty to the constitutionally- 
based political system that they had once made, the fact is that some military officers did not 
join the coup against the Second Republic. 
Is it possible to talk about a coherent ideology within the Francoist military? It might 
be possible to agree on some basic beliefs that Spanish officers shared. To start with, they 
were conservatives, defenders of "law and order". Secondly, they were centralists, meaning 
that they believed in the unity of Spain as an incontestable dogma. Thus, the solution to the 
"problem of Spain" (the regional question and how to integrate different nations or regions 
in a single nation-state) was seen by military elites as a sin of apostasy. Thirdly, and linked 
to what it has just been said, they were nationalists who were witnessing the progressive 
decadence of what had once been an empire. The Desastre (disaster) of 1898, with the lost of 
the islands of Cuba and Philippines was a shock for the army. Fourthly, they ultimately 
blamed politicians and politics for Spain's ills. It is not, however, so easy to find a common 
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political project for Spain shared by the military as a collective. Among Franco's military 
comrades, there were Alfonsines, Carlists, Falangists, Conservatives, Social-Catholics and 
even those without an identifiable ideology. 
As I started saying, the Francoist Regime was a military dictatorship. The military 
occupied an outstanding position during its whole existence, particularly during the first 
twenty years. Out of Franco's 113 ministers, 33 were members of the military. The data 
show that the greatest numbers of military ministers in Franco's governments were during 
the first two decades. As Alvarez (1984) has shown, 25 per cent of the ministers in the first 
government (1938-1939) were military, 11.6 per cent in the two subsequent governments 
(between 1939 and 1945) and 22.4 per cent in the government that was created in 1945 and 
lasted until the crisis of 1951. In particular, the military were well placed in departments 
such as the Office of the Chief of Government, Industry, Public Works and Home Affairs. 
The military also occupied posts in key institutions such as the Council of State, Council of 
the Kingdom and the Cortes. Another sign of the military nature of the regime was their 
consumption of national economic resources. The military budget in the post-war years 
amounted to up to a third of the total public expenditure (Gonzalez Garcia, 1978). 
These data should be complemented with a qualitative addition, that is the prestige 
and personality of those who occupied the ministries during the first decade of Franco's 
regime. Indeed, the military who were appointed to such important positions were 
distinguished warriors of the so-called "crusade" who were greatly admired by their army 
comrades. The list encompasses names such as Juan Yagüe, Enrique Varela, Carlos Ascnsio, 
Juan Vigdn, Galarza or MufIoz Grandes (Gonzalez Garcia, 1978). Thus, their appointments 
were not due to their administrative knowledge, technocratic profile or because they were the 
most suited for the posts they occupied, but because of their military prestige and the fact 
that they were Franco's comrades in arms. Once the war was finished, many military officers 
found a place in the Public Administration or in public companies (such as the National 
Institute of Industry) or other institutions (such as the INP). 
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The persistence of repressive laws and the state of war until 1947 gave the Armed 
Forces a tool to be part of domestic policy. In fact, the military increasingly perceived 
themselves predominantly as defenders against possible internal enemies than foreign 
aggressors. The institutional design of Spain's defence system and the placement of 
garrisons were designed to quickly suppress any social revolt. A key figure was the Captain- 
General, appointed by Franco, who had a major political role. lie was in charge of reviewing 
'the sentences of military courts empowered to try civilians for acts of terrorism and similar 
offences of a political nature' (Medhurst, 1973: 48). 
But how influential was the Army in setting up the institutions of the regime, in 
determining the policies and in controlling Franco? 
The fact is that there was not a unique or single political solution, due to the variety 
of political ideologies that military officers had. As Gunther put it, 'since the Spanish 
military elite was heterogeneous in its political preferences at that time, the military was not 
in a position to dictate the adoption of specific institutional forms' (Gunther 1980: 21). It 
was also crucial, as Payne (2000: 279) says, that Franco avoided any risk of letting the 
military have a collective voice in opposition that could challenge his personal power or 
could interfere with his decisions or the policies of his governments. In Payne's words, 
`another characteristic of the institutional modernisation achieved by Franco was the relative 
"de-politicisation" of the military, even though when the regime was initiated as a military 
government and although Franco was also explicit about how confident he was in the ability 
of the Armed Forces to maintain the stability of the system. With the military hierarchy, he 
always had a special relationship; at the same time as he maintained it at a certain distance, 
he manipulated it, changing and rotating the principal posts, and, in general, avoiding any 
concentration of power among them. The fact that (the military) occupied individually so 
many posts as ministers and other important administrative positions 
-especially during the 
first half of the regime- tended to obscure the fact that Franco tried to prevent the 
interference of the military in the government and suppressed any possibility of its having an 
independent role, corporatist or institutional, for them, out of their own sphere of the Armed 
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Forces. The officers that occupied posts in the offices or governmental institutions, or that 
had a seat in the Parliament, did that as individual administrators which took part in the co- 
ordinated and integrated state institutions, not as independent corporatist representatives of 
the Armed Forces' (Payne, 2000: 279). 
The military demanded to be present in all the major decision-making bodies of the 
regime, even though they did not play the leading role (either because they lacked expertise, 
alternative policies and programs, or they lacked the willingness to do so). This role is bigger 
than a mere veto exercise, as Gunther (1980: 21) said. It implies more than the mere reactive 
capacity to obstruct policies and it can eventually become a pro-active policy-making 
resource. 
With regard to power struggles among families of the regime, the military firmly 
opposed the totalitarian ambitions of the Falangists. Moradiellos (2000) points out that the 
army particularly defended its domain on issues of public order and foreign policy. It was 
not difficult for the military elite, on the other hand, to collaborate with the Catholic Church, 
with whom they shared common political views. 
5.1.2. The Falange 
In the "Epoch of Fascism", a political movement identified with that ideology was 
founded in Spain. In 1931, a tiny group of activists in Madrid formed the Conquest of the 
State group, commanded by Ramiro dc Ledesma Ramos. At the same time, another pro- 
fascist group was created in the Castilian region, the Castilian Groups of Hispanic Action 
with Onesimo Redondo as its leader. In October 1931, both groups mcrgcd to form the 
Groups for the National Syndical Offensive (DONS). The objectives of this group were to 
establish in Spain a "anti-liberal, sindicalist and corporatist" socio-cconomic regime 
(Rodriguez Jimenez, 2000: 103). Another pro-fascist group, Falange Espai ola was created 
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in October 1933, under the charismatic leadership of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of 
the former dictator Miguel Primo dc Rivera. In the 1933 national election, in the Second 
Republic, Jose Antonio Primo dc Rivera became a member of Parliament. 
The political weakness of both JONS and Falange Espanola and their ideological 
similarities led them to merge in February 1934, adopting the name FE de las JONS. The 
Falange was clearly in the majority in the party resulted from the merge, although JONS 
made a fundamental contribution both to its manifesto and its symbols (Rodriguez Jimenez, 
2000). As a fascist party, FE de las JONS did not reject the use of violence as a political tool. 
In the turbulent years of the Second Republic, violent clashes between Falangists and leR- 
wing groups such as anarchists, communists or socialists were common. The ideology of the 
party was shaped at the First National Assembly of FE de las DONS in October 1934, 
expressed in the form of bullet-points, 27 in total, that ranged from the definition of Spain as 
"unity of destiny in the divine plan"(unidad de destino en to universal), to a proposal for the 
establishment of a totalitarian state and a criticism of the capitalist economic system 
(although defending private property). At that point, FE de las JONS modelled themselves 
on Italian Fascists, rather than German Nazis. As with its Italian counterpart, FE de las 
JONS's totalitarian political project sought to conquer the state and subsume all social, 
economic and political groups and institutions under the control of the party. 
However, in 1935, FE de las JONS was a very small organisation in terms of 
members and political salience. Its power was confined to a few regions and provinces, 
including Madrid, Castilla, parts of Andalucia and Santander. It did not have representation 
in the key industrial areas of Catalufla, Pais Vasco, Valencia or even such bastions of 
conservatism as Galicia (Rodriguez Jimenez, 2000: 193). The membership never rose above 
6000 people. Economically, the party had serious problems. And although their public 
presence was high, their political power was very low: they never gained more than 2 per 
cent of the votes in any national election. 
When the left-wing coalition, the Popular Front, won in the 1936 elections, FE de 
las JONS was banned. It would not be until the outbreak of the Civil War that the party got 
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its opportunity to gain more political salience, immediately supporting the military coup and 
joining the "nationalist side". In those places where the party was well established, party 
volunteers joined the "militias" assembled to fight alongside the military rebels. however, 
despite the enthusiasm of young Falangists for fighting and bringing about the "Falangist 
revolution", the war was directed by the military and, as later became clear, the peace too. 
The need for co-ordination and military control if the war was to be won forced the 
unification of the political groups of the Francoist coalition. Falangists and Carlists were 
starting to take their political differences to the streets. Thus, the Decree of 25 September 
1936 banned any partisan political activity. In December 1936, Falangists and Traditionalist 
militias were put under military command. These two decrees preceded the so-called Decree 
of Unification of 19 April 1937, creating a new political FET de las JONS as a result of the 
merge of FE de las DONS, the Carlists and the Alfonsines Monarchists. The institution that 
emerged from this unification was later called the National Movement, which Chueca (1986: 
65) defined as `a boxing ring for political struggle, a party of parties, more than a unified 
party'. Undoubtedly, Falange was the most influential political group within the National 
Movement, and even more after the massive withdrawal of Carlists from the party in 1939 
(Payne, 1986: 195). But let us not forget, above all factions and groups within the 
Movement, the incontestable leader of the party from then onwards was Francisco Franco. 
Once the war ended, FET de las JONS was allotted a salient role in the new State. 
But this role would bring about a very difficult and paradoxical situation for FET de las 
JONS, which led the party to a tumultuous political period. The party was dragged to the 
paradox of having the chance of achieving its highest ever political power and opportunity to 
set up a pure Falangist state, while, at the same time, being forced to get attached to a regime 
that would never allow the set up of the Falangist dream of social revolution. This 
schizophrenic situation (Marin, Molinero and Ysis, 2001: 46), clearly perceived by party 
members, led to a dramatic power struggle within the party. 
On the one hand, the power of the party seemed to be ubiquitous. Affiliation to the 
party was made compulsory to anyone wishing to have a position in politics or in the 
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administration. Falangists in key ministries shaped the policies of the Francoist governments. 
At the same time, after the war, Falangists massively joined the Public Administration at the 
local and regional levels (Payne, 1985: 203). The Francoist regime adopted the symbols and 
discourse of Falange. The propaganda and censorship machines were in their hands. FET de 
las JONS controlled the Syndical Organisation (thus in charge of labour relations and 
worker's control), the Youth Front and the Women's Section. Especially at the local level, 
the party was hugely powerful (Marin, Molinero and Ys3s, 2001: 35). 
But, on the other hand, FET de las JONS never achieved its dream of establishing a
totalitarian state in Spain. It was far from being able to make its "social revolution" even at 
the peak of its power, around 1940. Franco designed FETde las JONS as a party of the state 
and as nothing more than an instrument of keeping national cohesion (Payne, 1985: 202). 
Franco used the party to balance the power of other "families" and to recruit personnel for 
the administration. The party organisation and roles reflected the needs of the state and not 
the other way round (Chueca, 1986: 66). 
Falangists encountered firm opposition of both military and the Catholic Church to 
its Fascist project. In 1940, the Falangist militias were reorganised and their role reduced to 
providing military instruction to new soldiers. In that same year, the General Captaincy 
Administrations were re-introduced, gaining the military another tool to extend their power 
and control over the civilian population, without needing Falange. Finally, in September 
1942, the Falangist militias were suppressed (Gonzalez Garcia, 1978). Therefore, it seems 
obvious that the struggle between the military and Falangists was won by the former. In the 
case of the battle with the Church, the situation was similar. As Montcro (1986) pointed out, 
the Catholic Church was also much more prepared to exert the role of legitimatisation that 
the regime needed. 
In conclusion, FET de las JONS failed to conquer the state and to place individuals 
and the whole society under its totalitarian project. The failure of FET de las JONS was a 
personal failure of the most powerful individual of the first six years of the Francoist regime, 
after Franco himself, 
-his brother-in-law Ramon Serrano Suiler, who was appointed Foreign 
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Affairs Minister in August 1940. He commanded the faction within FETde las JONS known 
as the Serranistas. Serrano Suffer was pro-German and developments in the Second World 
War up to 1941 reinforced his power position within the regime. 
But FET de las JONS was far from being a harmonious and unified party and 
different groups were challenging the position of the Serranislas (Rodriguez Jimenez, 2000). 
Opposed to this group were those who had assisted in the birth of Spanish Fascism in the 
early 1930s and wanted to preserve Jose Antonio Primo dc Rivera's legacy. This group of 
disappointed old Falangists started conspiring, right at the beginning of the 1940s, against 
Franco's plan to fully integrate the Movement into the structure of the state. Finally, a third 
group, which became more influential after Serrano Surfer's decline in 1942 was formed by 
those young Falangists who considered themselves followers of Jose Antonio but had never 
been involved in politics before. 
In any case, the Falange, though internally divided, managed to exert a highly 
visible and arguably influential role during the first six years of the regime, under the 
leadership of Serrano Suer. But when it was realised that the long-waited social revolution 
led by the Falangist principles might, most probably, not occur within the Francoist regime 
and the Francoist state, feeling within Falange escalated. Surfer's faction took a step forward 
and moved on from prudential rhetoric to the presentation of explicit demands. On 12 
January of 1941, the Falangist newspaper Arriba demanded the acceleration of the 
establishment of the Falangist revolution (Rodriguez Jimenez, 2000). In the First Syndical 
Council in November 1940, the National Delegate of Syndicates Gerardo Salvador Merino 
denounced the hostility of all those conservative forces that impeded the setting up of the 
Falangist project (Salvador Merino, 1941: 11). On 27 April 1941, Dionisio Ridrucjo 
(perhaps the most important Falangist thinker and journalist at the moment) wroteYIt seems 
that, at the moment, there are not in Spain any other revolutionary people than us 
... 
However, 
there are "the others", those whom we call reactionary people, and, due to the fact that only 
Ridruejo, D., `Ser Revolucionarios', Arriba, 27 April 1941, p. 4. 
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they and us remain, it seems clear that it is them against whom we have to raise our 
(Falangist) flag'. 
In the Second Syndical Council in June 1941, Salvador Merino promised the 
Syndical Organisation sole monopoly over the organisation and control of the Spanish 
agricultural workforce2. 
With this gradual radicalisation of its position, the Falange faced the opposition of 
Catholics, military and the rest of the families, leading to the most important crisis faced by 
the regime since the end of the Civil War: `Those pro-Serrano Falangists kept complaining 
about the opposition they were finding against their attempt to occupy all areas of power and 
to proceed to modify the prevailing legislation, while the old Falangist guard was 
progressively feeling itself less and less represented by Serrano and saw that Franco had 
marginalised the accomplishment of the pending revolution 
... 
There has to be added to this 
situation the struggle between the Party (symbolised in Serrano's team) and the Armed 
Forces' (Rodriguez Jimenez, 2000: 351) 
Franco, perhaps fearing the radicalisation of Serrano's Falange, sought to 
counterbalance its perhaps excessive power, handing over more leverage to the military and 
promoting other factions within the party. The government crisis of June 1941 might have 
had this purpose. He appointed Colonel Valentin Galarza as Home Affairs Minister and 
Generals Kindelän and Orgaz, bitterly opposed to Serrano, to the General Captain 
Administration of Cataluna and the High Commissariat of Morocco. To replace Galarza at 
his former post of Under-Secretary of the Office of the Chief of Government, Franco 
appointed who would since then become the most influential man in the regime, Captain 
Luis Carrero Blanco. At the same time, to diminish Serrano's power, Franco appointed 
young Falangists who did not belong to Serrano's party faction, to ministries such as 
Agriculture (Miguel Primo de Rivera), Labour (Girön dc Velasco) and the General Secretary 
of FET de las JONS (Jose Luis de Arrese). Primo de Rivera and Arrese were opposed to 
2 Re%'ista de Trabajo, July-August 1941, Nos. 21-22, pp. 177-84. 
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Serrano, and although Girdn was not, he neither belonged to Scrrano's faction (Rodriguez 
Jim6nez, 2000: 359). 
Arrese became the most important man in charge of the process of stripping Falange 
of its fascist elements (desfascistfzaciön), making it more bureaucratic and giving its final 
subordination to the state. In this process, the National Delegate of Syndicates, Gerardo 
Salvador Merino was dismissed in July 1941 and replaced by Valdes Larrafiaga and later by 
Fermin Sanz Orrio. However, Jose Luis de Arrese, Sanz Orrio and Girdn dc Velasco were 
not only in charge of transforming FETde las JONS and making it fit the requirements of the 
regime, but also to find and secure for it a role and an unchallenged sphere of influence 
within the state. It was their aim to secure for FET de las JONS a place within the new state. 
Cazorla (2000: 36) refers to this effort led by Arrese and others as an attempt to reinvigorate 
Falange. The means of doing this was by duplicating the state institutions and public bodies 
with its party parallels. The simile of the "shadow state" can be used here to refer to this 
process of creating institutions within the party or dependent upon the party with identical 
functions and roles to those of the state, with the purpose of taking them over at some point. 
This crucial aspect of Falange seeking to duplicate within its own organisation those 
institutions of the state or public bodies that badly wanted to take over control has passed 
much unnoticed in the specialist literature'. However, it seemed to have been quite clear at 
that time. Carrero Blanco, in the First Report on Spain's Internal Situation, issued on 25 
August 1941 (quoted in Cazorla, 2000: 24), criticised the party for having complicated the 
organisation of the state by duplicating state institutions. On 4 March 1943, the Falangist 
Minister of Labour Jose Antonio Girbn dc Velasco stated: `Our immediate task is to conquer 
the State, within which we already have fantastic positions, but in which we still need to take 
over many important pockets of resistance. Old entrenched conceptions have blocked our 
advance. However, how should we understand the conquest of the state? To conquer the 
state does not mean to fill the state departments with our own men, nor to put chains on the 
Baena (2002: 326) refers to this in passing. Cazorla (2000: 24) puts a bit more emphasis on it. 
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state with a network of parallel organisms of the party. In themselves, these two facts do not 
mean the slightest improvement, because, in the first case, our men could be more conquered 
than conquerors, while, in the second case, we could just be making twice as much 
bureaucracy'4. 
So, that was in fact the casel Falange, so far, had not been able to do anything else 
than stuff the state with their own party members and duplicate state institutions with their 
own ones. But for Girdn de Velasco, neither of these two strategies were succeeding in 
achieving the ultimate goal, 
-the conquest of the Francoist state. For him, conquering the 
state meant `achieving that an organism of a liberal state becomes a National-Syndicate state 
body, with its style, its spirit, paying obedience to the theoretical commands and following 
exactly the concrete orders issued by the superiors of the party's. To put it in less poetic 
words, it meant taking over existing state bodies. 
It is one of the hypotheses of this thesis that, from the spring of 1941 onwards, one 
of the spheres of influence coveted by the Falange was social welfare, in particular social 
insurance. I will come back this point later in this chapter, when studying the different 
approaches to social insurance. At this point, however, I want to highlight the way in which 
the new Falange's interest for social welfare led to the duplication of many of the social 
welfare institutions which were already in place. For example, Syndical Foundation for 
Social Insurance duplicated the INP. When the National Office of Syndicates set up the 
Syndical Foundation for Social Insurance, it justified the move in the following terms: ` The 
National Office of Syndicates believes that the moment to create the Syndical Foundation for 
Social Insurance has arrived, whose mission is to collaborate, with Falangist spirit and from 
the syndicate sphere, with the INP in carrying out its broad responsibilities'6. 
4 Revista de Trabajo, February-March 1943, Nos. 40-41, p. 249. 3 Revista de Trabajo, February-March 1943, Nos. 40-41, p. 250. 
a Boletin de Informaciön de la Caja Nacional del Seguro de Accidentes del Trabajo, July-August 
1941, Nos. 7-8, p. 108. 
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It is worth noting that the INP never required this collaboration and, in fact, fiercely 
opposed it7. But this was not the only case. The Syndical Foundation for IIousing paralleled 
the National Institute for Housing. The Syndical Foundation for Settlement-Building also 
interfered with the National Institute of Settlement-Building of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Cazorla, 2000). The Syndical Foundation of 18 July entered into competition with the 
General Directorate of Health, a department which reported to the non-Falangist Ministry of 
Home Affairs. In March 1943, the guilds of the Social Institute of Fishermen were taken 
over by the Syndical Organisation. 
With regard to policies, we will see in the following chapters how most of the social 
insurance schemes run by the INP were duplicated by the party with their own schemes or 
the party attempted to gain full control of the already existing ones. Thus, Family Subsidies 
had to compete with Family Plus. The Old Age and Disability Scheme was threatened by the 
Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions. The Syndical Organisation fought very hard to 
monopolise the provision of the Sickness Insurance Scheme, partially succeeding. In 1944, 
the Subsidy against Forced Unemployment was eliminated (without much explanation and 
when unemployment was quite high) precisely to give way to the newly created Syndical 
Foundation for Fighting Unemployment. And finally, the reason why it was not possible to 
create a Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme was because, if the Falangist project had 
succeeded, the whole management of the social insurance system would have been in the 
hands of the Falangist Syndical Organisation, leaving the INP no more than a social welfare 
research institute. 
Obviously, there are no clear-cut changes in these political processes nor in the 
development of the different political strategies pursued by Falangists. It is not possible to 
point to a concrete date for the process of stripping Falange of its most fascist elements nor 
to say that Falange had never been interested in welfare issues before 1941. Nevertheless, I 
believe that the suggested spring and summer of 1941 arc very useful signposts to locate a 
7 Girbn acknowledged that for the INP, the acceptance of the Syndical Organisation's collaboration 
was a huge sacrifice. See Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 26 October 1944, No. 75. 
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crucial crossroads for Falange and the regime. Things changed substantially from then on. If 
the impressive military triumphs of Nazism had catalysed the influence of the most pro-Nazi 
members of the Francoist regime, the defeats of the Axis powers from November 1942 
onwards compromised their political fates. Those groups within FET de las JONS opposed 
to Serrano Suffer took off, especially Jose Luis de Arrese, Serrano's former disciple 
(Cazorla, 2000). Serrano Suffer was replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 
1942 by the Count of Jordana. Before, in the summer of 1942, serious incidents between 
Falangists and Carlists (the most well-known the attack made by a group of Falangists with 
grenades against the Carlist meeting in the Sanctuary of Begonia in the Basque Country while 
the traditionalist General Varela was present) led to a major crisis that also involved the 
military. 
With Serrano out of place and the turn in the progress of the war, Jose Luis de 
Arrese speeded up the process of desfalangistacidn. When the Second World War ended in 
1945, the Francoist Regime was forced to introduce changes to show how different it was 
from the defeated totalitarian regimes. The setting up of the Cortes in March 1943, the 
Spanish People's Charter in 1945 or the take-over of key ministerial posts by Catholics 
(reinforcing the Catholic and anti-Communist discourse) meant the definitive 
marginalisation of FET de las JONS. In 1945, the party was definitively demoted to a 
secondary role (Cazorla, 2000: 39). 
Girön de Velasco 
It is now worth referring to the man in charge of the Ministry of Labour between 
1941 and 1957, the Falangist Jose Antonio Girön dc Velasco. He started his Falangist career 
in the Castilian Groups of Hispanic Action in the city of Valladolid. During the Civil War, 
he actively took part in the Northern Front and was decorated for his bravery. In the summer 
of 1939, with the support of the Falangist General Agustin Munoz Grandes (at that moment 
General Secretary of the Movement) he was appointed National Delegate of Ex-Combatants. 
In those years, his relationship with Serrano Suffer deteriorated and the political decline of 
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the latter came at the same time as Girön's promotion as Labour Minister (a position in 
which he stayed until 1957). 
His speeches were full of invective against bureaucracy, Liberalism and 
Communism and of promises of a social revolution which was permanently delayed. In his 
account, the recent Spanish history had been characterised by the chaos brought by 
Liberalism and Marxism and the solution was to reconstruct the country from its very 
foundations (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998: 14) with a programme resulting from blending Ultra- 
Conservative Catholic principles with the Falange's doctrine8. For Girön dc Velasco the 
Falange was the only group which could deliver such a promising future for Spain. This 
explains his permanent references to the negative aspects of past Spanish history and the 
positive results brought about by the new Francoist regime (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998: 216). 
As we will see, this led him to completely ignore the achievements of the INP since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
Girön de Velasco, together with Jose Luis de Arrese and other Falangists, played the 
role of adapting FET de las JONS to the structures and needs of the state (Gonzalez Murillo, 
1998: 16). In this sense, his idealism, demagogy and pro-Nazi stand were just words which 
never interfered with his most important commitment: to Franco. His loyalty to the dictator 
was reflected in his active opposition to any attempt by others to conspire against Franco9, 
who, in return, kept him as Labour Minister for seventeen years. 
a This revelation of Girdn de Velasco having been influenced by Catholic Social Doctrine came from 
Florentino del Valle, a Jesuit priest whom I interviewed in Villagarcia de Campos (Valladolid, Spain), 
on 25 August 2000. 
9 GirSn de Velasco sacked his Under-Secretary of Labour, Bias Perez, for conspiring against Franco (Girdn, 1994). 
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5.1.3. The Catholic Church 
Right in the middle of the Civil War, in 1937, all Spanish bishops but two signed the 
Carta Colectiva del Episcopado Espaiiol, a letter to the Catholic community over the world 
in which they explained their reasons to support Franco's faction in the war (that they 
believed was a "crusade"). After that, the Catholic Church was officially linked to the 
Francoist regime and, thanks to this, it would benefit from its triumph in the war. The 
Catholic Church in 1939 was a victorious and triumphant church. 
As with everyone else in Spain, the Civil War polarised the political attitudes of the 
Catholic Church and the Catholic population. However, there were different sensitivities, 
mentalities and groups within Spanish Catholicism. A Social-Catholic movement had 
coexisted with an ultra-reactionary Catholicism and it became as influential in politics as the 
other ultra-traditional Catholic movement. 
Social Catholicism `refers heuristically to Catholic responses to economic 
modernisation in particular, hence to the industrialisation process and its consequences in the 
social classes' (Misner, 1991: 3). Social changes taking place in Western Liberal 
Democracies since the eighteenth century 
-starting in Great Britain and expanding with the 
outset of the nineteenth century into Belgium, France and a bit later Germany- produced in 
these latter countries a Catholic response. Müller in Germany in the 1910s, Lamennais in 
France in the 1830s, bishop Ketteler in Germany by the mid of the century discussing with 
the emergent Socialist ideology, Albert du Mum and Rene de la Tour du Pin, they all are 
names that theorised about the role of Catholicism and the Catholic Church in the Public 
sphere of a changing society. Pope Leo XIllth's encyclical Rerum Novarum, published in 
1891, became the first authoritative declaration on what was then called the "Social 
Question", which meant the living conditions of the working classes. The Rerum Novarum 
set the theological framework to address social issues and exerted a huge impact on the 
Social Catholic movement. 
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Social Catholicism also arrived in Spain. Although its collective identity was not too 
consolidated, there were quite influential people that ascribed themselves to this Catholic 
body of thought and who had very deep social concerns. Luis Lopez-Dbriga Mcreguer, 
Jeronimo Garcia Gallego and Angel Carbonell were among those who promoted social 
reforms to answer the problems of the workers. Moreover, Angel Carbonell even argued for 
the compatibility of collective solutions with Catholicism. The Dominican Priest Pedro 
Gerard raised his voice asking for the right of adequate wages and rejecting the ineffective 
means of charity. But among them all, Severino Aznar Embid stood out as the best 
representative of the Spanish Social Catholicism of the first half of the twentieth century. 
Together with Aznar, other crucial names as Cardenal Guisasola, Gallegos Rocafull, 
Maximiliano Arboleya, Inoncencio Jimenez Vicente must also be quoted as representatives 
of the Spanish Social Catholicism. 
Since its very beginning, the INP was a place for influential Social Catholics to meet 
and work on social issues. Even during the period of the Second Republic, Social Catholics 
such as Severino Aznar, Inocencio Jimenez and Jordana de Pozas were involved in the 
drafting of social insurance laws and in the running of the Institute. 
But, despite this, to the most part of Spanish Catholics, the Second Republic 
appeared to be deeply anticlerical. This is not the place to clarify whether the Church just 
reacted against attacks from the Republican government (in the form of anticlerical 
legislation) and mass violence against the Church, and therefore fell into Franco's arms or 
whether it had been conspiring against the Republic independently of what the latter would 
do in religious matters. What is important here is to understand that the Church soon backed 
up the military uprising and when the war was over, it claimed its portion of power in the 
new state. 
The Church started asserting its control over education and morality. Republican 
legislation that harmed the Church's privileges was suppressed: divorce was prohibited, only 
ecclesiastical marriages were allowed, cemeteries were returned to Church's control and 
state funding to Church's activities returned. Bishops were granted seats on the main 
141 
political institutions of the regime such as the National Movement, the Cortes and the 
Council of the Kingdom. By the Law of 25 November 1944, the Cardinal of Toledo obtained 
a seat in the Council of State. Catholicism became again the official religion of the Spanish 
State. In return, the Church played a crucial role in legitimising the regime. Franco was 
named Leader of the Crusade by God's grace, entering the Churches under a canopy. 
The most powerful Catholic group was the ACNdeP (Catholic National Association 
of Propagandists). The ACNdeP became an influential group in the Second Republic through 
its journal El Debate. Its leader during those years, Angel Herrera, developed a more 
conservative attitude. When he decided to become a priest, he passed the responsibility to an 
obscure but powerful man, Martin Sanchez-Julia. The ACNdeP was 'organised territorially 
and conformed by groups of intellectuals, academics, businessmen and aristocrats that met 
together to discuss about a set of topics previously agreed. In these years, the ACNdeP, in 
close collaboration with the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy designed the strategy for Catholic 
political support to help in consolidating the dictatorship (Montero, 1986: 102). 
This task involved competing with the Falange, and opposing the Falange's 
totalitarian project of taking over the state and the society, which ultimately meant shaping 
and conquering the Francoist regime. However, for this battle the Church was much better 
equipped (in ideological terms). The Catholic Church was better prepared than the Falangists 
to provide the regime with resources for its legitimisation (Montcro, 1986: 105), among 
other reasons because Falangists had lost their leaders in war. In any case, a struggle 
developed for the control of many policy areas: the Catholic syndicates, the youth and 
university organisations, the press and the social welfare system. Ultimately, National- 
Catholicism won and the process of adopting a more fascist and totalitarian profile was 
stopped and abandoned. It was then that the ACNdeP saw its long-awaited moment. In 1945, 
one of his most salient young members, Alberto Martin Artajo, was appointed Foreign 
Affairs Minister. The composition of the new government of 1945 reflected the change of 
image of the regime and the shift of power to the Catholic side. 
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There were many ways Social Catholicism and the Catholic Church had to leverage 
Francoist social policy was. Of course, the ultimate decision-making power was the Minister 
of Labour, thus, lobbying him and his acolytes would be the first most successful way of 
influencing the policy-making process. Second, the INP was the place to be for leveraging 
the design of social insurance policies, as this was the institute in charge of this area during 
Francoism. Social Catholics were well present (however unevenly throughout the period) in 
the Governing Body of the INP (its highest authority) and key Social Catholics occupied key 
executive posts in the Institute. 
Third, Social Catholics (and the Catholic Church in general) sought to influence 
social policy by providing material for discussion, drafting policies and spreading ideas via 
its different publications and other resources. Articles on social justice, social welfare or 
labour relations were everywhere in Catholic magazines such as La Ilustracidn del Clero, 
Razön y Fe and Ecclesia. 
Fourth, it was perhaps the activism of Social Catholic academics within the Royal 
Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, who were at the same time in the INP or in other 
public bodies, which constituted the most influential lobbying in Francoist Social Policy. 
People such as Severino Aznar, Luis Jordana de Pozas, Inocencio Jimenez, Zumalacirrcgui 
Prat, Pedro Sangro y Ros de Olano (and later Primitivo de la Quintana) were members of the 
INP and the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences at the same time, and they all 
were well-known Social Catholics. The Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences was 
divided into four sections: "Philosophical Sciences", "Political Sciences and Law", 
"Economic Sciences" and "Social Sciences". The last was formed in 1945 by the following 
academics: Luis Redonet, the Viscount of Eza, Jose Gascon y Marin, Severino Aznar Embid, 
Leopoldo Palacios dc Morini, Pedro Sangro y Ros de Olano, Count de Altea, Luis Jordana 
dc Pozas and Eduardo Aunbs Perez10. The sections held frequent sessions during which one 
member presented a paper on a previously agreed topic, which was later discussed. Thus, the 
1° Real Academics de Cicncias Morales y Politicas (1945), Anuario 1945, Madrid, Ilijos de 1:, 
Minuesa, p. 32. 
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fact that the President (in 1945, Sangro y Ros de Olano, but previously Jimenez Vicente) and 
Director of the INP (Jordans dc Pozas) were in the same section of the Royal Academy of 
Moral and Political Sciences, together with the highest Spanish experts on social insurance 
(Aznar, Gascön y Marin) leads us to imagine that, on many occasions, from the debates held 
at the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, they would eventually come up with 
common points of view regarding the INP, social insurance schemes or any other Francoist 
social policy". 
5.1.4. The Monarchists and Traditionalists 
On 14 April 1931, the Second Republic was bom, which meant that the Spanish 
state was no longer a Monarchy, with King Alfonso XIII departing for exile. Thus, the 
military coup d'etat against the Republic was welcomed by all monarchic factions (since the 
Carlist wars of the nineteenth century, two main groups aspired to restore the Monarchy, -the 
Alfonsines and the Carlists) who then saw their window of opportunity. 
The Comunion Tradicionalista was integrated into the Movement by the Unification 
Decree of 1937, and, as we have already seen, relations with FE de las JONS were not easy. 
Their leverage within the National Movement was very limited and within the state, they 
could only exert their control over the Ministry of Justice. 
Well-known Monarchist officers such as General Aranda and General Galarza had 
always claimed for the restoration of the Spanish Monarchy. But it would be the 
developments in the Second World War around 1943 and the internal progressive weakness 
of Falange what encouraged Monarchists to demand it from Franco. Thus, in March 1943, 
King Alfonso XIII's son, Juan de Borbbn, sent a letter to Franco asking to return to the 
" The issue of how the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences participated in the Francoist 
regime has not been studied yet. Although I looked at annual reports and checked the biographies and 
activities of some Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences members, my conclusions still 
require more research. 
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Spanish throne. Franco rejected his claim. In June 1943, a group of members of the newly 
created Cones sent a letter to the dictator asking for the restoration of the Monarchy. They 
all were removed from their posts and their alleged leader, the Count of the Andes, sent into 
exile. A new monarchist challenge for Franco came later that year when some top generals 
demanded, once more, the restoration of the monarchy. Franco met each one of them to force 
their change of opinion and those with whom he did not succeed were removed from their 
posts. 
In March 1945, when the triumph of the Western democracies in the Second World 
War had left Francoism in a very dangerous situation, Juan dc IIorbbn wrote the Afanifiesto 
de Lausana in which he denounced the totalitarian nature of the Francoist regime and 
demanded the immediate restoration of the Monarchy as the legitimate form of the state. 
However, at this stage, very few of those supporting the Francoist regime, even Monarchists, 
would risk changing to a different political regime and state (Marin, Molincro and Ysss, 
2001: 55). 
To neutralise the Monarchic threat, the Succession Law was passed and presented in 
referendum on 6 July 1947. This Law depicted Spain as a kingdom without a king until 
Franco died. And it was Franco who had the power to nominate the future king of Spain. 
Juan dc Borbbn, the exiled pretender to the kingdom, rejected the Law, but his case against 
Francoism lost much of its power. Institutionally, the Spanish State appeared not to be a 
totalitarian state of the kind set up by the Fascists, the Nazis or the communist Russia. 
Neither was it a liberal democracy, that is also right but, at least institutionally, it was a "yes 
but not yet" kingdom with some kind of representative institutions. To many, it was 
preferable to the unpredictable plan of Monarchy proposed by Juan dc Borbön, which also 
brought bad memories of political chaos and violence of the last monarchic period and its 
republican successor. Juan dc Borbön's momentum had passed, so in August 1948, he 
agreed with Franco to send his son Juan Carlos to be educated in Spain, so he could one day 
become King of Spain (Cazorla, 2000: 63). 
145 
5.1.5. The Bureaucracy 
Spanish Bureaucracy has suffered from the chronic weakness of the Spanish State 
since its origins as a modern nation-state in the nineteenth century. Bravo Murillo's Royal 
Decree of 1852 established a civil service and a career structure in which promotions to 
higher levels in the hierarchy was based on merit were created. This organisation remained 
until the reforms of 1963. 
Later, with the Law of 22 July 1918 (further developed in the two Royal Decrees of 
7 September 1918), administrative corps were established in each ministry, with a broad 
division between "general" and "special" corps. In both, a strong sense of corporate identity 
developed (Medhurst, 1973). Within these groups, there was another division between 
technical posts and auxiliary posts. To enter into the public service, an exam was required, 
and for some posts, a university degree was also required. The Law provided the civil 
servant with a very stable job, due to the fact that it was not easy to remove someone from its 
post unless for disciplinary measures. The Council of Ministers could remove from their 
posts those most senior civil servants, but procedure demanded presentation of the case to 
the Parliament, the hearing of the individual affected by the measure and the publication in 
the official bulletin. However, the civil servant removed from his post had the right to appeal 
against it. 
Republican governments attempted to reform the civil service but the political 
turmoil that shook the system did not permit this. Thus, for the period studied in this thesis, 
the legal framework that regulated the civil service was that established by the Law of 1918 
and that was the norm for the previous political regime of the Republic. In any case, despite 
the continuity of the legal framework, we have to take into account that the Civil War and 
the dramatic repression that came afterwards deeply altered the composition of the Spanish 
public service. Through an array of norms 
- 
the Decree of November 1936, the Order of 
August 1937, the Order of February 1939, the Ministerial Order of March 1939 (that applicd 
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the same repressive procedures to local administrations) and the 1940 Law of Repression of 
Masonry and Communism 
- 
the regime wiped out of the public administration anybody 
suspected of collaboration with the Second Republic. The vacancies caused by this and by 
those civil servants dead in the war were occupied by ex-combatants, military and Falangists, 
as a means of rewarding their services to the Francoist cause. 
Julian Alvarez (1984) has studied the role of bureaucrats in the Francoist regime. 
Although he admits that his study is incomplete for the period 1936 to 1945, we can, 
however, follow him here in drawing some conclusions about the presence and role of 
bureaucrats in Francoism12. Francoism was a "bureaucratic regime" in the sense that ` it was 
a political system not only administered, but also led by professional civil servants, from 
whose superior strata the members of the political class would be preferably recruited' 
(Alvarez, 1984: 8). 
Between 1938 and 1939,89,3 per cent of the ministers were bureaucrats (military or 
civil servants). This figure dropped to 62,1 per cent from 1939 to 1945, being the lowest 
score of bureaucratic presence of the whole dictatorship. Between 1945 and 1951, the degree 
of bureaucratisation (measured as levels of military or civil servant presence) in the 
government rose again to 88,8 per cent (Alvarez, 1984). 
These data are better explained when a distinction between groups of bureaucrats i
drawn. Among all the groups of state servants, the military, the university academics and the 
state lawyers are the most influential and better represented. Precisely, the military reached 
the highest levels between 1938 and 1939 (25 per cent) and between 1945 and 1951 (22,4 
per cent), while falling to 11,6 per cent from 1939 to 1945. There seems to be an obvious 
reason for the high level of military in the first government: the war was not over until 1939. 
However, the real power of the bureaucrats started in the fifties, For Bacna del 
Alcizar (1993: 189), the rise of the bureaucrats, due to the increase in the recognition of the 
value of technical knowledge over political issues, happened between 1951 and 1957. 
12 For a comparison between Francoism and the later democratic period, see Baena (2002). 
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An explanation of the role of the bureaucrats in the Francoist State, especially during 
the first years, has to take into account how they were incorporated in the New State. Some 
of them joined the military uprising right from the beginning, finding their way to escape 
from the Republican side and passing over to the rebel zone. This was the case, in particular, 
of members of the special bureaucratic corps, such as the diplomats, who were more 
sympathetic to the cause of the rebels (Medhurst, 1973; Was, 1980). 
Bureaucrats found it difficult to be accepted by the non-bureaucratic newcomers 
who were seeking access to power. Falangists were their most ferocious opponents. The 
Falangist Labour Minister since 1941, Jose Antonio Girbn dc Velasco, hated and openly 
criticised the figure of the civil servant lacking passion for the social revolution. lie used to 
say that Spain did not need "civil servant gentlemen" (senores funcionarios) but "Falangist 
comrades"(camaradas Falangistas) 
- 
even more, "squadron members" (escuadristas) 
(Girbn, 1943). In the atmosphere of social revolution pursued by the Falangists, the figure of 
the rational, non-passionate and civil servant did not fit in easily. 
Therefore, civil servants during the first decade of Francoism were not as relevant 
and influential as they would be in the following years. The purges on former civil servants, 
the appointment of new people without skills as a way of rewarding (and securing) loyalty to 
the regime, the outdated organisation of the civil service, the uncertainty about the future of 
the new political institutions, the ferocious opposition of the powerful family of the 
Falangists, 
- 
these are all factors that explained the scarce collective power of the civil 
servants during the first decade of the Francoist Regime. The situation in 1964, when a Law 
on Public Servants was passed, was very different to that of the period studied here. 
However, by the 1960s, access to the Public Administration was not so dependent upon 
personal links, regime loyalty, rewards and so on as it had been during the post-war years. 
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5.1.6. The Interest Groups 
Linz (1981) traced the development of interest politics since the Restoration period 
up to the emergence of democracy in Spain. He concluded that never has the Spanish system 
of interest groups achieved the position, stability and importance of other European systems. 
Only during the Second Republic (1931-1936) did the system come close to the level of 
other democracies, but this development was abruptly interrupted by Francoism which 
established a model of "exclusionary state corporatism", in which labour movements were 
repressed and excluded from politics. The Decree of 13 September 1936 banned any political 
and interest group activity. Only later, in the 1950s and 1960s, due to the economic and 
social changes occurred, the patterns of interest aggregation that had characterised the 
autarkic period of the 1940s were transformed. 
Thus, as the Labour Movement was being excluded from the political process, in the 
period we are studying, only the large landowners, the financial groups and the industrial 
oligarchy had a chance to exercise the defence of their interests. The employers were 
allowed a certain degree of freedom within the structure of the Syndical Organisation in 
order to form staff associations for each sector of the economy (such as the steel, electricity 
and automotive industries). Tamames (1988: 183) called it `the real maintaining power' 
(poder mantenedor) of the whole structure of the Francoist system. Carlos Moya used the 
term "financial aristocracy" to mean the network of family contacts and social interactions 
between the aristocracy and the industrial and finance groups (quoted in Julia, 2000: 88). 
How influential were interest politics in Francoist policy making process? Well, 
although industrial and financial elite groups and landowners could potentially influence the 
policy making process, there were no institutionalised mechanisms for this to happen. In 
addition, interest groups would be more involved in the later stages of the policy process 
than in the early stages of agenda-setting or policy-formulation. As we will see in the 
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following chapters, interest groups were not at all involved in the process of social insurance 
policy-making, a point also made by Guillen (1996). 
In any case, they were not organised in a "social corporatist model" that 
characterised interest-aggregation in other European countries. Linz argued that the power of 
landowners and industrial and financial elite groups `was reduced with the greater 
institutionalisation of the regime at the end of the Civil War and the entry of old and new 
Falangists into the cabinet in the first period of Franco's regime' (Linz 1981: 387). Victor 
Perez Diaz (1985) referred to this model of interest aggregation as "half corporatism" 
(corporatismo a medias). Moreno Fonseret (1999) argued that, although apparently it was a 
corporatist system (due to the participation of interest groups in the Cones and the workers 
and employers co-operation via the Syndical Organisation), it never worked like that. The 
Syndical Organisation never attempted to represent the workers, but to control them, while 
granting freedom to the employers' organisations. And there was never the aim of seeking 
common interests by joining up forces and reaching agreements that would later be raised up 
to the hierarchies of the Syndical Organisation or the government, because the initiatives run 
in a top-down direction within the "command and control" policy-making model. Thus, a 
"corporatist approach" cannot explain the emergence of the Francoist social welfare system 
between 1936 and 1950. 
5.2. Approaches to Social Insurance within the Francoist 
Regime 
In this final section, I systematise the different approaches to social insurance that 
existed in the 1940s in Spain. The spectrum of ideas was quite broad, from those advocating 
the withdrawal of the state from legislating on this issue (and leaving it to be sorted by the 
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workers and their companies) to those supporting extensive mechanisms of social protection 
such as the Beveridge's plan. 
Due to the fact that the struggle for the control of the Francoist social insurance 
system took place between Falangists and Social Catholics, my main concern will be the 
approaches assumed by these two families. No other Francoist families than Falangism and 
Catholicism attempted to control the social insurance system and, moreover, none even put 
pen to paper in order to provide its own model of social protection. The only reference I have 
found, the Traditionalist author of the 1937 book Corporativismo Gremia/, did no more than 
describe the already existing insurance schemes (working injuries, old age and maternity) 
within the framework of corporatist labour relations. But neither did it tackle any of the hot 
issues which were being discussed at the moment (such as the unification of schemes, their 
management and the extent of the coverage of risks and population) nor did he propose to 
create any new schemes (such as sickness, unemployment)". 
The first conclusion is that there were many people advocating a social security 
model and the number of those supporting Beveridge's views grew over the 1940s. But it 
was also rejected by many on the basis of the financial incapacity of the Spanish economy to 
set up such a system (Bufill, 1947: 164). Among the critics, the economist German 
Bernacer14 argued that Beveridge's plan would not be viable in Spain because it would 
increase inflation and encourage labour absenteeism and laziness. However, he was aware 
that he was among the very few who were not completely convinced by Beveridge's model 
when he quoted, in passing, that he did `not want to spoil the fun by criticising Beveridge's 
plan'. In addition, other people rejected Beveridge's model for cultural reasons. Falangist 
Manuel Tena Ibarra, for example, claimed that a social security system such as was being 
implemented in the UK at that time would go against the long-standing Spanish tradition of 
charitable assistance 
- 
the Beneficencia. 
13 J. V. C. (1937), Corporativismo Gremial. La Organizacidn Social de la Espana Nueva, Burgos: 
Editorial Requete. 
14 Bernacer, G., El Espanol. Semanario de la Politica y del Espiritu, 20 April 1946, No. 182. 
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Elite groups were open to accept a universal, comprehensive and integrated model of 
social security. Most of these people were members of the INP or were indirectly linked to 
the Institute. And among them, there were many Social Catholics. Thus, the second 
conclusion is that there are no grounds for maintaining cultural arguments about Catholic 
rejection of the development of a comprehensive and modem welfare state. There were no 
elements of Catholic Theology that prevented its development nor pro-active resistance put 
up by Catholics. The third conclusion points to the need to revisit the hypothesis of 
Falangism as the ideology that inspired Francoist social insurance policies. The Falange did 
not contribute a coherent and systematised model of social insurance to the development of 
the Spanish welfare state. 
5.2.1. Catholic Approach to Social Insurance 
As we have already shown, Spanish Catholicism had been committed to the 
development of a social insurance system since the very early ideas of protection against 
social risks started to be considered by Spanish elite groups. It always held a cautious 
attitude towards the intervention of the state in the society and the economy, evolving 
towards a more interventionist approach as the decades of the twentieth century passed. 
Ilowever, the principle of Subsidiarity, as theorised by Catholic Social Doctrine, acted as a 
limit for state intervention. This principle stated that the state should intervene whenever 
society could no longer act by itself, although never eliminating the freedom and initiative of 
individuals. 
Social Catholic elite groups in the INP were aware of international social policy 
developments. These people had been advocating the establishment of social insurance 
schemes and were at that time demanding the creation of more unified, comprehensive and 
universal mechanisms of social insurance, such as the Comprehensive Social Insurance 
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Scheme. The rest of the Catholics and Catholic elite groups who were not involved in social 
policy moved during the 1940s towards the acceptance of a more direct, public, universal 
and comprehensive model of social welfare. 
By the time the Francoist regime started to establish its social welfare system, the 
first object of Catholic interest was the Family Subsidies and they went on to demand the 
protection against other social risks (sickness, unemployment, disability and death) plus the 
granting of more benefits to an increasing number of people. In the 1940s, their energies 
focused on the passing of an integrated insurance system 
-the Comprehensive Social 
Insurance Scheme. They were clearly opposed to corporate insurance schemes (organised by 
each company for its own employees) (Aznar, 1952: 6) and supported national insurance 
schemes, which were much more effective than mutual aid insurance schemes (Aznar, 1942). 
Eugenio Perez Botija'5, professor of Administrative Law and indirectly linked to the 
INP16, argued that social insurance schemes should be managed either directly by the state or 
indirectly via non-departmental public bodies. In any case, these institutions should include 
representatives of the affiliated workers and their employers to ensure that the system was 
responsive to their demands. What he openly rejected was the syndicate management of the 
insurance schemes and he argued his position based on two reasons: 1) the schemes would 
be subject to political struggles, while in the INP would not and 2) the syndicates did not 
have the knowledge or capabilities to organise schemes which demand actuary, economic 
and statistical analysis. 
With regard to the management of the insurance system, Social Catholics in the INP 
obviously defended the role of the INP as the sole institution in charge of it and fought 
against any take-over from the Syndical Organisation or any other institution. 
Carlos Mart! 13ufill (1947) became, during the 1940s, one of the most influential 
social insurance experts. In his book Presente y Futuro del Seguro Social, he acknowledged 
13 Boletin de Informacidn del INP, November 1942, No. 11. 
16 Perez I3otija used to collaborate with the INP by writing for the Boletin de Informacfön or 
participating in conferences organised by the Institute, but never was part of the organisation of the INP. 
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being inspired by Catholic Social Doctrine. Although the economic situation of Spain did not 
permit, in his view, the introduction of a social security system of the type proposed 
by 
Beveridge, he nevertheless advocated the establishment of a comprehensive package of 
social insurance schemes in the form of the Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme (Marti 
Bufill, 1947: 160-1). Thus, he completely rejected the system of the Labour Mutual Aid 
Insurance Institutions, because this was a step back towards the old model of fragmented 
occupation-based insurance schemes (1947: 168-9). 
As references to social welfare ideas of the Social Catholics in the INP will be 
appearing all over the thesis, it is not necessary to insist on them here any more. The point 
now worth emphasising is just that there was a clear determination among this elite group to 
pursue a more comprehensive, integrated and universal welfare system with unified 
management. 
On the other hand, Catholic elite groups not so directly involved in social policy 
evolved their thinking from the idea of creating insurance schemes for each sector of the 
economy, occupation or region, managed independently by different institutions (both 
private and public) to the idea of universal, comprehensive and integrated insurance schemes 
with unified management in a single institution. In the beginning, regional funds were 
preferred to national (Montero, 1988: 159-50). Thus, at the early stages of the regime, the 
prevailing view within the Spanish Catholic hierarchy was still for a system of social 
insurance via mutual aid's. 
In the evolution of ideas, the next step was to advocate first a public insurance 
scheme that replaced the mutual insurance system, and later, a more integrated way of 
providing social protection, either by unifying the social benefits" of the different schemes 
17 See Episcopado Espafiol (1937), Ha Hablado la Iglesia. Documentos de Roma y del Episcopado 
Espanol a propösito del Movimiento Nacional Salvador de Espana, Madrid: Editorial Espanola. 
1$ The young economist Manuel Alonso Olea, later the highest authority in Spanish social security 
issues, proposed at that time the equalisation of social benefits. Family Subsidies benefits should rise 
to the levels provided by Family Plus. See Alonso Olea, M. (1961), `Salarios y Subsidios Familiares 
en la Mater et Magistra', Revista de Politica Social, Vol. 52, October-December, pp. 131-48. 
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or by creating a single scheme by which all social risks were protected19. In 1939 the priest 
Francisco Gonzalez Cordero wrote in the Catholic magazine Ilustraciön del Clero that a 
Family Subsidies national fund was much more effective in spreading equitably the loss of 
income, as the risk was shared among the entire Spanish population instead of among a small 
group of workers20. Therefore, ten years later, by the end of the 1940s Beveridge's model of 
social security was more than welcomed by the Catholic Church. The priest Pedro Cantero, 
in an article in the Catholic newspaper Ya welcoming Beveridge to Spain, depicted 
Beveridge's plan as essentially "Christian" and an insuperable way of achieving social 
justice2l. 
A good example of the Catholic evolution of ideas with regard to social insurance 
and social welfare can be seen in the writings of the Catholic Theologian and Sociologist 
Joaquin Azpiazu. In his 1939 book Orientaciones Cristianas del Fuero del Trabajo, Azpiazu 
claimed that a unified insurance schemes system was a dream impossible to achieve. 
Therefore, the best way to protect workers was by promoting mutual aid occupational 
schemes and private insurance, although heavily supervised and controlled by the state 
(Azpiazu, 1939: 151-2)22. However, by the end of the 1940s, his approach to social welfare 
was radically different: as his prior reluctance to accept public social insurance was dropped, 
the state was supposed to contribute with employers and employees in the funding of social 
insurance schemes (Azpiazu, 1948: 1021). Moreover, Azpiazu was keen to interpret the 
phenomenon of social security within the framework of the Catholic Social Doctrine 
(Azpiazu 1947; 1948; 1950). 
19 In 1945, Jesuit priest Martin Brugarola advocated the establishment of the Comprehensive Social 
Insurance Scheme in the Catholic magazine Razdn y Fe: Brugarola, M. (1945), 'Realizaciones 
Sociales en Espana', Razdn y Fe, November, Vol. 132, pp. 52. 20 Gonzalez Cordero, F. (1939), 'En torno al Subsidio Familiar', llustracidn del Clero, Vol. 3, pp. 
290-301. 
21 Cantero, P., 'Beveridge y su Doctrina', Ya, 2 April 1946. 
u See also Azpiazu (1939b) for his choice of free and company-based Family Subsidies Funds instead 
of compulsory and public. 
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5.2.2. Falangist Approach to Social Insurance 
The Falange lacked the expertise and knowledge to design the Francoist social 
insurance system. In fact, Falange never achieved to develop a theory of social welfare23 and 
the absence of any reference to social insurance in Jose Luis dc Arrese's La Revolucion 
Social del Nacional-Sindicalismo (Arrese, 1942) is a good proof of this. The book, aimed at 
putting forward the economic and social model which the Falange was going to establish, 
only referred to the unemployment benefit scheme, which was meant to be abolished once 
the National-Syndicate state managed to sort unemployment out (Arrese, 1942: 98-105). 
Rather than a system of social welfare, the Falange came up with partial solutions 
and temporary policies. Before 1941, the Falangist presence in the INP was reduced and 
marginal and Falange's welfare policy ideas were copied from Nazi Germany (for example, 
Auxilio de Invierno). The watershed, by which social insurance came into the Falange's 
agenda, was around the spring and summer of 194124. In March 1941, in the First Syndical 
Council, Gerardo Salvador Merino, National Delegate of Syndicates said that Falangists 
should direct their attention to social issues (Aparicio, 1986). In June 1941, in the Second 
Syndical Council wholly dedicated to the agrarian problem, Jose Luis Arrese, just appointed 
Minister-General Secretary of the Party told the participants that it was urgent to study the 
applicability of social insurance schemes to agricultural workers. Ile said: `You should claim 
as your duty this task of establishing a social insurance systemi '. 
In the closing ceremony of that Second Council, Gerardo Salvador Merino put 
forward a number of reforms which would take place in the near future on issues uch as the 
23 Gerardo Salvador Merino recognised in the Revista de Trabajo (October 1940, No. 12, p. 893) that 
Falangists lacked theorists and theories, therefore were force to improvise and "come up" with 
solutions out of the blue and along the way. If he meant this regarding any policy sector or political or 
social areas, it was particularly true regarding social policy. 24 In April 1941, one of the leading Falangist theorist, Dionisio Ridruejo, demanded a more radical 
social programme: 'Where will we go with progressive reforms and with the bourgeois social justice? 
... 
The true Falangist cannot promote any but radical and comprehensive solutions: the Syndical Organisation, the nationalisation or syndication of credit, the reform of the bourgeoisie property 
s 'stem, etc., etc'. See Ridruejo, D., 'Ser revolucionarios', Arriba, 27 April 1941, p. 4. 2 Boletin de Informacidn del INP, June 1941, No. 6, p. 58. 
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organisation of the state or labour relations26. Although the Council primarily dealt with 
agricultural policies, some references in his speech were of a general character, not only 
limited to agriculture. For example, one was that membership to the Syndical Organisation 
was to be made compulsory and another foresaw the abolition of all the Commerce and 
Industry Chambers. Among these references to changes not only in agriculture but at every 
state-level, one stated that the Falange was called on to intensify its social activities and to 
monopolise the management of the social insurance schemes. In his own words: 'It will be 
decreed that the administration and implementation of social insurance schemes will be 
transferred to the Syndical Organisation. The benefits that are provided by the social 
insurance system will be administered and offered by the Syndical Organisation, and only 
through the Syndical Organisation'27 
. 
On 14 June 1941 (during the ceremony of transferring the tomb of the founder of the 
Castilian Groups of Hispanic Action, Onesimo Redondo to Valladolid) Jose Luis de Arrese 
confirmed this new responsibility granted to the Falange: `Precisely in these days 
-and here 
are the Ministers of Labour and Agriculture to confirm it! 
- 
we (Falangists) have assumed 
responsibility for social and agricultural matters 928. 
Once in control of the Ministry of Labour with the appointment of Girdn, the 
Falange developed eclectic and "ad hoc" policies, revealing a lack of theorising and an 
absence of a coherent social welfare plan. For example, Falange's option for organising the 
"family salary" was by creating occupation-based funds instead of a comprehensive national 
fund (as otherwise proposed by Social Catholics and the INP) (Iglesias and Meil, 2001: 33). 
26 Arriba, 21 June 1941, p. 4. Salvador Merino explicitly said that he was authorised by Arrese to say 
that. 
27Boletin de Informacidn del INP, June 1941, No. 6, p. 63. In Arriba, 21 June 1941, p. 4, the wording 
changed slightly: 'It will be decreed that the administration and implementation of social insurance 
schemes will be transferred to the Syndical Organisation 
. 
We assume the responsibility to achieve 
better efficiency for those schemes and we will not admit the slightest interference in its 
administrative organisation'. Of course, such a criticism of the former management of the system was 
hardly acceptable to the INP staff, which perhaps explains why that it was not included in the article 
of the Boletin de Informacion del INP. Note also how, once having taken over the management of the 
scheme, Falangists would not permit the splitting of the running of the system with any other public or 
private institution. 
"Arriba, 14 June 1941, p. 4. 
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On the other hand, Minister Giron de Velasco defended compulsory and nationally- 
based insurance schemes, but organised separately and funded independently (Girbn, 1943: 
20). At the same time, the National Office of Syndicates' proposal for creating a Sickness 
Insurance Scheme was based on making it compulsory for only wage-taming workers, 
sustained only by workers' contributions (not employers') and run jointly by public and 
private institutions. 
Iliginio Paris Eguilaz was, to my knowledge, the only Falangist who attempted to 
draft a social insurance plan29. But his theories on social welfare changed profoundly over 
the decade of 1940. The way his approach to social insurance evolved was, surprisingly, the 
opposite to that of other elite groups such as the Catholics. Thus, in 1939, Paris Eguilaz 
argued that social insurance should be fully public and directly managed by the state (Paris, 
1939). He criticised what he called the "classist social insurance schemes", as they were not 
instruments for protecting workers but tools for encouraging social struggles. Thus, he 
openly criticised the Spanish social insurance system created so far, in particular the Old Age 
Compulsory Retirement Scheme, the Working Injuries Insurance Scheme and the Plan to 
Unify the Social Insurance Schemes of May 1936, ignoring the other two compulsory 
insurance schemes 
-the Maternity Insurance Scheme and the Family Subsidies. He proposed 
to abolish the INP. Instead, Paris Eguilaz proposed to nationalise all insurance schemes and 
extend them to the entire population. In this, his proposal was innovative, as in structuring 
the schemes as pay-as-you-go. However, only workers would directly contribute to the 
scheme, while employers would pay the state an amount proportional to the number of 
employees they had in their companies. The state would only support the system via 
subsidies and funds. The social risks planned to be covered were only old age, working 
injuries, death, sickness and unemployment, leaving out disability and maternity. Instcad of 
an independent institution, such as the INP, running the system, he proposed to manage it 
29 At the same time, the most distant of the Spanish economists to the theories of Keynes (and 
Beveridge). See Gonz5lez (1996) who defines Paris Eguilaz's economic theory of central planning 
with private property as "squaring the circle". 
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centrally from a ministerial department 
-such as the Department of Social Insurance 
Schemes within the Ministry of Finance or a newly-created Ministry of Social Insurance 
Schemes. 
However, eight years later (Paris, 1947), Paris Eguilaz rejected the expansion of the 
benefits of the existing social insurance schemes and the introduction of new ones due to the 
economic situation of the country. In addition, he preferred the capitalisation of all schemes, 
instead of a pay-as-you-go funding system. He argued that the latter was harmful for the 
economy because: 1) it reduced employer's benefits, 2) it reduced the volume of savings, 3) 
it reduced investment incentives, 4) it encouraged inflation (because workers demanded 
higher salaries), and 5) it was an obstacle to the recovery of the economy. 
In conclusion, Higinio Paris' thought changed drastically from proposing a system 
of national social insurance schemes, centrally run by the state, to the capitalisation of all the 
existing schemes and the blocking of their further expansion. In fact, the path that Falange 
followed during the 1940s resembled more the model of independent and fragmented 
schemes of the Bismarckian type than a comprehensive system of social security. The 
Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions exemplified this. It can therefore be concluded 
that, with regard to social insurance, Falangist policy-makers did not possess any clear vision 
of what to create. 
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Chapter 6 
The Francoist Regime (II) 
Institutions 
In Chapter Three, I suggested an analytical model of the policy process centred on 
the role played by non-democratic political institutions in framing the power struggles 
between the different actors of regimes and in filtering policy ideas. These institutions 
therefore determined the evolution and shape of the social insurance system. In this chapter, 
I will apply that analytical model to our particular case study. 
The Francoist regime was shaped in its very early stages by the developments of the 
Civil War. In fact, there was no previously designed plan for constructing the regime, and 
this was done out of the blue (Payne, 2000; Ellwood, 1986; Thomas i Andreu, 1999). In the 
final years of the war and in the immediate post-war period, the design of the main 
institutions of the Francoist administration was in the hands of the most powerful figures of 
the regime (Serrano Surfer, Arrese, Carrero Blanco) but also involved some well known 
university professors of Administrative Law who had supported the Nationalist cause. 
People like Luis Jordana de Pozas', Eduardo Perez Botija, Jose Gascbn y Marine and 
Antonio Royo Villanova3 were at the time either highly involved in drafting laws and 
policies or writing in support of the administration and political system set up by the new 
state. It is worth noting, in passing, that most of these men were, at the same time, members 
of the INP and of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. The books and 
articles written by these people will constitute a valuable resource for what will be said in 
this section. 
In the first section I describe the historical process of state-building, which was 
highly spasmodic and chaotic (Thomas I Andreu, 1999), evolving as a result of the power 
struggles among the families and public bodies of the regime and the developments at 
1 Among Jordana de Pozas' publications, the following books and articles in administrative law can be 
quoted: El Estatuto Municipal de Cairo Sotelo, Las Corporaciones Profesionales en el Derecho 
Administrativo Espanol anterior a la Dictadura, Tendencias Europeas Actuales del Regimen Local, 
and La Administraciön Püblica en los Veinticinco Allos Ultimos. 
2 Gascdn y Marin published the manual in administrative law Tratado de Derecho Administrativo 
Espanol, which already in 1945 was in its eigth edition. In 1941he wrote El Poder Legislativo y el 
Ejecutivo en las Nuevas Constituciones, a comparative analysis of legislative and executive powers in 
Europe. 
Royo Villanova's manual Elementos de Derecho Administrativo was in the 17'h edition in 1942. 
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international level. In the second section, I will look into the main political institutions of the 
regime to identify which ones have been crucial in shaping the policy process. 
As in other non-democratic regimes, power was centralised in the executive, 
specially in the Chief of State and Government and in the ministers. The latter had 
extraordinary legislative powers and were accountable only to the dictator. The existence of 
party institutions (the National Movement) which paralleled those of the state led to 
struggles for power and fragmentation, duplication and inefficiency. Formal mechanisms for 
resolving jurisdictional conflicts were totally absent. 
As a result, the principal actor of the policy process was the minister and the very 
small number of people involved in the policy-making process. They provided the policy 
ideas and solutions, which were not specially bound by strong ideological commitments. 
Indeed, in the Francoist regime, the lack of a strong and articulated ideology left room for 
the existence of several ideas on social insurance that could potentially be selected by policy- 
makers. 
6.1. The Sequence of Governments' 
The aim of this first section is to describe the historical process through which these 
institutions developed between the outbreak of the Civil War and the government crisis of 
1951; its ultimate goal is to show how the institutions of the Francoist state evolved. Many of 
the changes occurred in social insurance and to the INP were a reflection of government 
crisis and changes at the more general political level. For example, the reconstitution of the 
INP had to wait for the first Francoist government to exist. The major changes occurring 
4 The number of Cabinets during the Franco Regime is still a matter of debate (Linz, Jerez and Corzo, 
2002: 76). In my opinion, there were the following political Cabinets between 1936 and 1951: the 
National Defence Committee, the State Technical Committee, the first government of February 1938 
and the governments of August 1939, May 1941, September 1942, July 1945 and July 1951. 
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a 
within the INP from June 1941 onwards reflected the government crisis of 20 May 1941, 
while the new political situation of 1945, which brought about a new government in July, 
favoured the taking over of the Institute again by Social Catholics. Thus, this section aims to 
provide the context of the evolution of the INP. 
The National Defence Committee 
The needs of the Civil War led to the construction of basic military and 
administrative structures. Thus, when the leader of the coup, General Sanjurjo, died in an air 
crash two days after the outbreak of the revolt, it appeared necessary to find a new leader. On 
24 July 1936, the leading generals of the military subversion established the National 
Defence Committeee under the presidency of General Cabanellas (Moradiellos, 2000). At 
this stage, it was still not a fully-formed dictatorship or a political regime. The aim of this 
first institution was to co-ordinate the military actions of those who had rebelled against the 
Republic, but not exactly to order the war operations because they were decided 
independently by generals Mola, Franco and Queipo de Llano (Moradiellos, 2000). 
This Committee dictated on 28 July 1936 a legal norm which expanded the 
"situation of war" to the whole Spanish territory (and that lasted up to April 1948). The 
political parties of the Republican Popular Front were banned on 16 September 1936. On 28 
September 1936, any political or syndical activity was declared prohibited. 
Therefore, the administrative and political structure built up to the end of September 
and beginning of October of 1936 was clearly a military organisation intended to achieve the 
necessary degree of co-ordination that eventually guaranteed triumph in the war. Soon, it 
was required not only to co-ordinate the war operations but also unify them in a single war 
effort. Thus, the generals elected Franco as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 
Together with the unification of the military leadership came the single political leadership 
and the first political structures. By the Decree 138 of 29 September 1936, Franco was 
nominated as Chief of Government of the Spanish state. And by the Law of 1 October 1936 
he finally became Chief of State. 
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The First Political Institution: 1 October 1936 
From then on, the state institutions established sought to concentrate all power in 
Franco's hands (Thomas I Andreu, 1999). Ile controlled the military and the military actions 
on the war because of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The 
position of Chief of State and Chief of Government required the establishment of institutions 
such as the General Secretary of the Chief of State, the Diplomatic Cabinet Office, the War 
Secretary and the Foreign Affairs Office. 
As the war was still on, Franco opted to concentrate on the military operations and 
political developments, delegating the administration to a new institution 
-the State 
Technical Committee. This body, created on 1 October 1936, was presided over by General 
Davila, and was divided into different commissions (Finance, Justice, Industry, Commerce, 
Agriculture and Labour, Culture and Education, Public Works and Communications) 
(Guaita, 1959: 21). A crucial landmark in the process of accumulating power for Franco was 
the Decree of Unification of the National Movement of 19 April 1937. 
The First Government: 1 February 1938 
The Law of the Central Administration of 30 January 1938 suppressed the State 
Technical Committee and designed the political structure that would be imposed in the New 
State. By Article 17 of the law, Franco retained the power to legislate. The public 
administration copied the traditional departmental division of ministries. The ministers, 
when meeting with the Chief of State constituted the government. By this law, a Vice- 
presidency was also constituted, although it would be suppressed one year later. 
Thus, the first Francoist government was established on 1 February 1938. Eleven 
people formed the 1938 government, four being representatives of the military (in the 
Ministries of Defence, Public Order, Industry and Foreign Affairs), three Falangists 
(Ministries of Agriculture, Syndical Organisation and Action, Home Affairs), a Carlist (in 
Justice), two monarchist Alfonsines (in Education and Finance) and a technocrat (in Public 
Works) (Moradiellos, 2000). The Home Affairs Minister was Franco's brother in law, 
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Serrano Suffer, also appointed as National Chief of Law and Propaganda of FET de las 
DONS. 
Quite a few acts and decrees of relevance were passed at that moment. First, the 
Labour Charter, passed on 9 March 1938, was the first of the later called Fundamental Laws. 
Inspired in the Fascist Italian example, the Labour Charter designed the general framework 
for Spanish labour relations and social welfare. The family, the local community (municiplo) 
and the syndicate were identified as the natural entities and foundations of social life. The 
principles that were to organise the latter, the Syndical Organisation, were declared in Article 
13. Under this law, each Spaniard had the right to education, social assistance and social 
insurance or private property. Work was considered to be a right as well as a duty and an 
honour for all and the law secured the right to a fair salary, non-excessive hours of work and 
annual paid leave. It also created the Labour Tribunal. Regarding social insurance, the 
Labour Charter promised to improve ` social insurance against old age, disability, maternity, 
working injuries, professional illnesses, tuberculosis and unemployment, and to advance 
towards the creation of a Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme' (Article 10). 
Secondly, the Press Law was passed in April 1938. Thirdly, an important repressive 
Law was passed on 9 February 1939, the Law of Political Responsibilities. Fourthly, the Law 
of Modification of the General Administration of the State of 8 August 1939 abolished the 
Vice-Presidency, concentrating the power even further in Franco's hands. The former 
functions and departments of the Vice-Presidency were then assumed by the Office of the 
Chief of Government. 
With the war over and the starting of a new phase for the regime, it was the moment 
for major transformations of the Spanish state and the Spanish economy. The state 
intervened massively in the economy with the clear and explicit intention of achieving the 
ideal of a self-sufficient economic model 
- 
the autarky. The institutions created to provide a 
legal framework in which the economy could develop were the Law of Industries of National 
Interest, the Law Organisation and Defence of Industry, both of 1939, but mainly the 
National Institute of Industry, set up in 1941. In the agricultural sector, the regime set up two 
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bodies: the General Commissariat of Resources and Transport and the National Service for 
Wheat Production (Barciela, 1986; Molinero and Ysäs, 1999). The Republican Institute for 
Agrarian Reform was replaced in 1940 by the National Institute of Settlement-Building in 
charge of establishing plans for irrigation and for expanding cultivatable land (Medhurst, 
1973). 
The first years of the regime's existence were, economically speaking, tough times. 
The three years of war had worsened the economic conditions of Spanish society and left the 
state bankrupt. The level of GDP per capita also dropped abruptly, not recovering the 1935 
level until 1952. In 1930, it amounted to 789 US dollars (of the 1970 equivalent), falling to 
746 US dollars in 1940 and to 649 US dollars in 1950 (Moradiellos, 2000). Electricity use 
was restricted and so were other products like paper. Spaniards got used to queuing for food 
and basic goods, keeping the record of what they were allowed to consume in the (in)famous 
cartilla de racionamiento (ration book). The critical situation and direct price controls 
fostered the rise of black-marketeering. The price of some products on the black market 
could be two or three times as much as the official price, as Barciela (1986) has shown. 
The ten years between 1939 to 1949 have been called `the night of Spanish 
industrialisation' (Garcia Delgado, 1986). The level of industrial production was below the 
pre-war level until 1945 and recovered slightly after this year, but to a much lesser extent 
than other south European countries that had also gone through the war (such as Italy, 
Greece and Yugoslavia). In 1935, the industrial production index reached 97.9, falling to 
83.9 in 1940,86.9 in 1945 and recovering slowly to 97.7 in 1949. 
In 1940, Spain had a population of 25,87 million (Moradiellos, 2000). In 1930, the 
Spanish population had grown by 11.4 per cent from the year before, while in 1941 it had 
increased only by 0.9 per cent. The rapid trend towards the urbanisation of Spanish society 
slowed down during this decade of the 1940s. In 1930,31 per cent of the population lived in 
cities, out of which 14.9 per cent lived in urban settlements of more than 100,000 people. In 
1940, the figures were 36 per cent and 19.1 per cent respectively. Tamames (1988: 184) 
165 
calculated the size of Spain's middle class in 1939 as around 17 per cent of the total 
population. 
Due to the economic situation, the labour force moved back towards the agricultural 
sector. The agrarian labour force grew again to 50 per cent (Julia, 2000: 85). In 1939, Spain 
had 2 million peasants (Tamames, 1988: 185), 52 per cent of the total active population, 
from 46 per cent in 1930 (Moradiellos, 2000). In 1950, there was a slight reduction to 49 per 
cent of the total active population. The figures for the industrial labour force show the 
opposite trend, moving from the 30.5 per cent in 1930, to 24 per cent in 1940 and 25 per cent 
in 1950. The service sector, which accounted for 21 per cent of the Spanish active population 
in 1930, rose slightly to 24 per cent in 1940 and 24.5 per cent in 1950. 
The Second Government: 9 August 1939 
On 9 August 1939, Franco reorganised the government. It was formed of five 
ministers from the military (occupying the Ministries of Army, Navy, Air Force, Industry 
and Commerce, Foreign Affairs), two Falangists (one in the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
another Minister without portfolio), two Catholics (the Ministries of Education and Finance), 
a Carlist (the Ministry of Justice), a Monarchist (the Ministry of Agriculture), a technocrat 
(the Ministry of Public Works). 
Serrano Surfer was the most influential minister in the government (Moradiellos, 
2000) and the strongest man of the regime, after Franco. In fact, this was the period of 
greatest power of FET de las JONS and the moment when Spain came closest to having a 
totalitarian regime. Some of the laws passed within this period reflect the Falangist stamp: 
The repressive profile of the regime was institutionalised in two laws: the Law of 
Repression of Masonry and Communism of 1 March 1940 and the Law of State Security of 
29 March 1941. Together with the Decree of 5 November 1936 and the Ministerial Orders of 
1937 and May 1938 issued by the Ministry of Syndical Organisation, these repressive laws 
forced many people to be subjected to scrutiny and lose their posts in public administration. 
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The Third Government: 20111ay 1941 
This was a hectic period for FETde las JONS and for the regime itself. There was a 
growing discomfort among Falangists with the way things were going and with the kind of 
political regime that Francoism was becoming. At this moment, the toughest opposition to 
the Falangist plan came from the military. The political tension between both families led to 
the government crisis of May 1941. 
Colonel Valentin Galarza, openly opposed to Falangists, was appointed Home 
Affairs Minister, but to compensate, they got quite a few ministerial posts. Jose Luis dc 
Arrese was appointed as General Secretary of the Movement, Miguel Primo de Rivera, 
became Minister of Agriculture and Demetrio Carceller Minister of Industry (appointed in 
October 1940). Serrano Suner retained the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Labour was occupied by Jose Antonio Girbn de Velasco. 
Arrese undertook the task of integrating the party within the state. For that purpose, 
Gerardo Salvador Merino, having shown "too much" political ambition, was replaced as 
National Delegate of Syndicates in July 1941 by Fermin Sanz Orrio. The retreat of the most 
radical and autonomous members of FET de las JONS was on the way. 
The Fourth Government: 3 September 1942 
The disputes between Falangists and other families of the regime, namely the 
military and the Traditionalists, went one step further in the summer of 1942. On 16 August, 
the Falangist attack on the Carlist meeting in the sanctuary of the Virgin of Begot a, led to a 
furious reaction of the Traditionalist family and some military like General Varela, who 
himself was present at the meeting. This risky situation, together with the developments in 
the battlefields of Europe (with signs of a possible change of luck for the Axis nations) and 
the challenge put by the Monarchists who were demanding the restoration of the monarchy 
in Spain (Marin, Molinero and Ysas, 2001: 48) 
- 
all these forced Franco to take the political 
initiative. In the cabinet reshuffle of September 1942, Bias Perez Gonzalez became Home 
Affairs Minister, Varela was replaced as Minister of the Army by General Carlos Asensio, 
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and, by far the most important change, was Serrano Surcr's abandonment of the 
government, being replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Count of Jordana. 
The American and British invasion of northern parts of Africa in November 1942 
and the German surrender in Stalingrad in February 1943 was seen by the Francoist regime 
as a sign of the change in the fortunes of the Axis nations. The strategy of the regime was to 
make minor adjustments to its core institutions and to downplay its most totalitarian features 
in order to make the dictatorship more acceptable to the democratic allies. For this purpose, 
on 17 January 1943, the pseudo-Parliament called Las Cortes was reconstituted, although, as 
we will see below, it was neither the legislative body in Spain nor a democratically-elected 
and representative chamber. 
Tue Fifth Government: 18 July 1945 
The victory of the Allies in the Second World War obliged the regime to present a 
less fascist face, or even more, a pseudo-democratic structure. This required the elimination 
of some of the most "fascist" elements of the regime, the renunciation of the territories 
occupied while Europe was under Nazi rule (retreat from Tanger on 22 October 1945) and 
the passing of pseudo-democratic laws (Moradiellos, 2000). It implied that FETde las DONS 
could no longer be the face of the regime. In September 1945, it was decreed that the 
Falangist salute was prohibited. Within the structures of the state, the General Secretary of 
the Movement lost its ministerial status and was left vacant, therefore causing the party to 
lose much of its power in the government and losing ability to shape policies too. However, 
Franco would never have allowed the complete defeat of FET de las DONS, as it would 
meant the abandonment of the politics of power equilibrium in which the regime was based. 
Without the Falange, Franco might no be able to reject the demands of the Monarchists for 
an inmediate restoration of the monarchy. Thus, it was quite clear that Franco needed the 
party as badly as the FET de las JONS needed Franco (Marin, Molinero e Ysds, 2001: 62). 
At the institutional level, the regime made some minor changes but that had quite a 
big propaganda impact. On 17 July 1945, the Spanish People's Charter was passed. It was a 
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declaration of rights which granted freedom of expression, freedom of association and legal 
equality. Of course, there was no guarantee for these rights and they all were highly 
restricted. In the very same month of July 1945, the Law of Local Authorities organised the 
local administrations formed of representatives of the three sections in which the population 
was divided: families, vertical syndicates and interest groups. The idea of political 
representation held by the regime was that of "organic democracy" as opposed to the 
citizen's representation in liberal democracies (in which political parties compete for votes in 
free and regular elections). On 22 October 1945, a Law for Regulating the Referendum was 
passed, by which the Chief of State had the power to hold a referendum on whatever laws he 
wanted. The obvious purpose of this law was to show the international community that the 
citizen participated in the policy process in Spain and to give the impression of democratic 
normality. 
The composition of the government of July 1945 reflects the changes within the 
regime motivated by the changing situation at the international level. The majority of the 
government were military ministers: Fidel Davila in the Ministry of the Army; Francisco 
Regalado in the Navy; Gonzalez Gallarza in the Ministry of Air Force; Fernandez Ladrcda in 
the Ministry of Public Works; Jose Antonio Suanzes in the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce. There were three Falangists in the government: Raimundo Fernandez Cucsta in 
the Ministry of Justice; Carlos Rein in the Ministry of Agriculture; Girdn de Velasco 
remained as Minister of Labour. But the most crucial post at that time (due to the fact that 
the biggest danger for the regime came from outside the country), the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, was handed over to the Catholics, to the young figure of Alberto Martin Artajo. 
Alberto Martin Artajo's primary aim was to obtain for the regime the support and 
acquiescence of the Catholic international community. The regime thus intensified its 
Catholic and anti-Communist stance. The democratic countries, however, were not 
impressed by these moves. In February 1946, France closed its border with Spain and in 
March, a joint declaration between France, Britain and the US condemned the Francoist 
regime and wished for the restoration of democracy in Spain. The General Assembly of 
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United Nations, in its resolution of 12 December 1946, condemned the regime and 
recommended countries to withdraw their ambassadors from Spain. The Vatican, Portugal, 
Ireland, Argentina and Switzerland were the only ones that did not implement the measure 
(Cazorla, 2000). 
The regime fought hard to win the propaganda battle, precisely in the year that was, 
most probably, the most difficult one for the regime. Undoubtedly, this was one of the 
reasons for organising Sir William Beveridge's visit to Spain between March and April 
1946, precisely when the international community was discussing what should be done with 
Franco. The threat from outside was far more serious than the one coming from inside the 
country or from within the regime, which was posed by the Monarchists. I have already 
referred to how their aspirations, with the Law of Succession of 1947 and the new 
international situation, had been watered down. 
That was the picture in 1946. But by mid-1947, however, the fate of the regime had 
changed. Developments in the international context, fuelled by the outbreak of the Cold War, 
made Western democracies rethink their foreign policy towards Franco's Spain. The fear of 
Communism spreading across Europe and taking over Spain if Franco's regime was to be 
replaced forced a halt in the policy of international pressure on the regime. In November 
1947, the United Nations General Assembly failed to pass a resolution against the Francoist 
Regime as it had done the previous year. In February 1948, the French-Spanish border was 
re-opened. Thus, by 1948, the international community had already dropped their idea of 
deposing Franco. A new era for Francoism opened up. 
The Sixth Government: 18 July 1951 
Francoism was "forgiven" (Marin, Molinero and Ysas, 2001: 87) by the General 
Assembly of United Nations in November 1950, when the condemnation of 1946 was 
revoked. The pacts with the United States and the Concordat with the Vatican later in the 
decade followed this new international perception of the regime. Military and Catholics 
within the regime sought to take the credit for these diplomatic triumphs, reinforcing their 
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positions vis a vis against Falangists. however, the cabinet reshuffle on 18 July 1951 did not 
mean either defeat or triumph for any of the political families. Six military ministers stood in 
the Ministries of the Army, Air Forces, Navy, Industry, Home Affairs and the Minister- 
Undersecretary of Presidency (for Carrero Blanco), three Catholics in the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Education and Tourism and Information, the Carlists kept control on the 
Ministry of Justice, a Monarchist for the Ministry of Public Works and three Falangists in 
Labour, Agriculture and Minister-General Secretary of the Movement. Finally, two 
technocrats in the Ministries of Commerce and Finance. 
6.2. Institutions of the Regime 
The New Francoist State was highly centralised, both politically and 
administratively, and power remained in the hands of the Chief of State and the ministers. 
With regard to the distribution of power between local and central institutions, it was also 
highly centralised in the central public administration. 
The most fundamental political institution was the Chief of State. Franco occupied 
this post until his death in 1975, making extensive use of the huge powers provided for this 
post in the Fundamental Laws. In addition to being Chief of State, Franco also was Chief of 
Government. 
The executive power was, by far, the most important of the three powers, for the 
legislature lacked capacity and leverage to determine policies and lead politics during the 
years that we are studying. However, decisions at the executive level were not made by the 
Council of Ministers acting collectively, but by the Chief of Government (in regard to the 
overall policy) and by each minister (within his particular domain of competence). These 
were the two actors who had the resources to initiate the policy-making process, commission 
their drafting, approve drafts of laws and decrees or exert veto power. 
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In the Francoist policy process, other consultative institutions such as the Council of 
State or Council of the Kingdom were also important. In this institutional framework, the 
National Movement played its role, although not great enough to shape policies, 
. 
not at least 
in the policy sector studied here, social welfare. The National Council of the Movement, the 
highest political body of the party, was a state institution, but not so the party-dependent 
Syndical Organisation. Finally, there were other ad-hoc institutions such as the Council of 
Regency. 
Territorially, the Francoist state was highly centralised in the Central Public 
Administration. At the local level, the public administration was divided into two. In the 
province, the Civil Governors, who were the highest political and administrative authority in 
the province and who later became Chiefs of FETde las JONS, had the power to appoint the 
management committees of the provincial administrations. In the cities and villages, also 
management committees appointed by the civil governors were in charge of running local 
affairs, with the exception of the big cities, whose mayors and presidents were appointed 
directly by the Home Affairs Minister. 
The Chief of State and the Chief of Government 
After the Decrees of 30 September 1936 (issued by the National Defence Council), 
30 January 1938 and 8 August 1939, Franco became Chief of State, Chief of Government, 
Leader of the National Movement and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. As Chief 
of Government, Franco was also in charge of the Spanish Public Administration. 
As Chief of State, Franco had the most important prerogative: the power to issue 
laws at his discretion. The Law of 30 January 1938, in Article 17, granted the Chief of State 
the `supreme authority to dictate legal norms of general character'. All laws and decrees 
were approved and signed by Franco. When the laws were initiated and drafted by the 
Parliament (this was not frequent during the period studied here), Franco retained the power 
to return them to this body if he was not happy with them. Obviously, this constituted a 
powerful veto. 
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The Chief of State was clearly above the Spanish Parliament, in that he was the one 
who called for its assembly and designated its president. The Chief of State was also above 
the government, as it was his duty to appoint the Chief of Government. Finally, being above 
all the institutions of the state such as ministerial departments, the judiciary or the party, the 
Chief of State had the ultimate power to decide when disputes arose among them (Montoro, 
1992). 
As Chief of Government, Franco was, in general terms, responsible for the 
coordination of the ministers and the political leadership. He was the one who appointed and 
sacked ministers and other senior civil servants and senior military. The Chief of 
Government issued the decrees of the Office of the Chief of Government. Between 1938 and 
1973, Franco occupied this post himself, although from 1951, Luis Carrero Blanco, as 
Minister-Undersecretary of the Office of the Chief of Government, was in practice doing 
much of the required co-ordination work among the ministers. 
Thus, Franco concentrated both the legislative and executive powers in his hands, in 
clear contradiction of the democratic principle of division of powers. However, Francoist 
commentators still claimed that the Francoist political system outstripped the liberal system 
of division of powerss. 
The Ministers and the Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers under Francoism lacked three characteristics that are 
essential to the organisation and functioning of the Council of Ministers in liberal- 
parliamentary states: political autonomy, a common political project and collective 
responsibility to Parliament (Lopez Garrido, 1992: 167). 
The Council was formed by the Chief of Government when sitting with his 
ministers6. But, as the ministerial posts were dependent upon Franeo's ultimate willingness, 
See for example, Royo Villanova (1942) or Gascdn y Marin (1945). 6 For us, as for the public administration doctrine and policy-makers at that time, government and 
council of ministers were synonymous terms. See Guaita (1959: 11). 
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the Council of Ministers lacked the first of the characteristics, 
-political autonomy with 
regard to the supreme power of the state. 
There was a sort of established practice under Francoism for the families of the 
regime to monopolise ministerial departments. Thus, the Ministry of Labour was occupied 
largely by Falangists, the Ministry of Education by Catholics, Justice by Traditionalists and 
the Ministries of the Armed Forces and Home Affairs by the military. It was a way of 
achieving equilibrium among all those groups who sustained the regime. With such political 
arrangements, it was very difficult for the Council of Ministers to build up a coherent 
political plan from which policies could originate in a more or less coherent way. The 
Council of Ministers was more than anything a council of individuals, each one representing 
a family or group. However, ministers were not mere spokesmen of the different families 
neither had they an imperative mandate from their groups of origin. The ultimate source of 
their positions was Franco, not the families to which they belonged. So, in Franco's Spain, 
the Council of Ministers did not possess the second characteristic that can be found in 
democratic governments: the minimum political plan that holds it together, giving it a 
minimum political coherence. 
The absence of the third characteristic of collective accountability of the government 
to the Parliament or any other body arose from both previous characteristics. Due to the fact 
that each minister was appointed by Franco and was not bound by a common political 
programme, he was not responsible for his actions to anyone other than the dictator, and 
obviously, he was not responsible for the actions of his peers. 
What was the role of the Francoist Council of Ministers between 1938 and 1950? 
Lopez Garrido (1992) pointed to the "technical-administrative" role, without any political 
function. In his account, the Council of Ministers, right after the war and up to 1950, was just 
a set of monologues by which each minister presented the drafts he wanted to get approved, 
with no further role. The big issues were never presented and debated in the Council of 
Ministers (Lopez Garrido, 1992: 175). Basically, the Council played a consultative role 
(Guaita, 1959) and served as the place to share and contrast non-conflictual opinions. The 
174 
Council was not able to dictate legal norms, as this power was only granted to the Chief of 
State in the case of laws and decrees, and to the ministers when dictating decrees (with 
Franco's signature) and ministerial orders. But the Council of Ministers itself did not have 
this capacity to issue norms nor the power to issue regulations. The "orders agreed at the 
Council of Ministers" were discussed at the Council of Ministers but passed by the Office of 
the Chief of Government, therefore decided and signed by Franco. This legal institution was 
not stipulated anywhere in the Spanish legal system. So, this institution of the "orders agreed 
at the Council of Ministers" was only an arbitrary tool in the hands of the Under-Secretary of 
the Office of the Chief of Government and ultimately, Franco himself. The experts on 
Administrative Law were openly against it and called for its abandonment (Guaita, 1959: 53). 
In addition, there was no regulation of the roles, composition or functioning of the 
Council of Ministers (Guaita, 1959: 9; Gascön y Marin, 1956: 49). In fact, until the Law of 
the Legal System of the State Administration of July 1957, the only norm that referred to the 
Council was the one of 30 January 1938 that established the first Francoist government. 
However, this Law of 1938 only stipulated in Article 16 that `the ministers, when meeting 
the Chief of State, constitute the government of the nation'. 
There was not even the practice of taking minutes of the weekly meetings, as, in 
fact, we do not have records of them until 1957. It was the Law of the Legal System of the 
State Administration which established the requirement of taking minutes. In the absence of 
any written proof, it was difficult to be sure that what had been first approved in the Council 
was later published and promulgated without alteration (Lopez Garrido, 1992: 173). This 
issue was important, as the "orders agreed at the Council of Ministers" were a very arbitrary 
procedure that lacked any legal regulation. The order would be passed after an alleged 
discussion and alleged consensus among the ministers, but this was imposible to prove in the 
absence of written transcriptions of the debates at the Council. 
These weaknesses of the Council were noticed by the political commentators and 
experts on Administrative Law and Public Administration at that very same time. In 1942, 
Royo Villanova (1942: 59) demanded that, `when the announced political laws will be 
175 
promulgated and the organs of the state that will collaborate with the Leader in the different 
functions of the state, especially in the legislative role, will be constituted, the issues and 
matters about which the government can spontaneously dictate norms should be determined, 
following the example of the Italian Law of 31 January 1926'. 
This, however, did not happen during the first twelve years of the regime and not 
until the 1950s would the Council of Ministers play a more political role in the Francoist 
policy process. The crucial actor of this process, after Franco, was each individual minister 
when shaping policies in their own sphere of responsibility. 
Each minister owed his post only to Franco, so he was responsible only to him. This 
did not pass unnoticed at the time: `In contrast to what happens in a Parliamentary regime, in 
which ministers must count on the support of the majority of the Parliament, in the New 
State, ministers, as collaborators of the Chief of State, only need to have his trust, as it is him 
who appoints them and sacks them' (Royo Villanova, 1942: 163). 
Francoist Ministers had the following prerogatives and roles (Garcia Oviedo, 1953): 
1. They had the power to organise, lead and inspect their departments. 
2. They had the power to issue regulations (potestad reglamentaria) to augment 
existing laws. 
3. They had executive power (potestad ejecutiva o de gestiön). 
4. They appointed or dismissed their subordinates. In some cases, ministers could 
only propose the appointment or dismissal to the Chief of State. 
5. They could command and penalise their subordinates. 
6. They had jurisdictional power over issues of their competence. 
7. They had the right to create and administer their departmental budgets. 
8. They created the drafts of the laws on issues of their competence. 
The doctrine at the time conceded the need to pass a law regarding the appointment 
of ministers, because this was a serious gap in the Spanish legal framework (Guaita, 1959: 
31). The practice of Franco appointing ministers at his will was not based on any legal 
grounds. 
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With regard to his own affairs, the minister had absolute freedom, `although this was 
perhaps less true in certain strategic ministries, such as Defence and Foreign Affairs' (Linz, 
Jerez, Corzo, 2002: 74). There were several reasons for this freedom. First, the minister was 
not limited to a political program or lines of action dictated by the Council of Ministers. 
Secondly, most of the ministries lacked regulations on the departmental organisation, the 
roles and functions of the minister and top civil servants or the processes setting up in detail 
how to draft policies or issue norms such as ministerial decrees, resolutions or other minor 
norms. Regarding the internal regulations of the ministries, there was complete chaos. The 
Ministry of Justice had given itself regulations in 1890 while the Ministry of Industry did not 
pass its until 19547. Thirdly, a crucial departure from the traditional Spanish system of 
Administrative Law introduced by the Francoist regime was a concession to the ministers of 
the power to dictate regulations (potestad reglamentaria). By the Law of 30 January 1938, 
the ministers had the power to dictate norms in the form of ministerial orders. Finally, the 
ministers were not obliged to ask for the report of the Council of State with regard to the 
norm they were seeking to pass. As we will see when talking about the Council of State, 
Francoism stripped this institution of its most influential prerrogative, enhancing the 
ministers' freedoms in the policy process. 
All these features granted ministers huge discretionary power. If this also holds true 
for later periods of Francoism (Gunther 1980), it was however more evident in the first 12 
years of the regime. One of the key regime men of the 1960s and 1970s, Laureano Lopez 
Rodb said in his autobiography that ` it was not the same being minister in 1945 
... 
or even 
1951, before the legal state was in place, that entering the government in 1957 when the Law 
of Forced Expropriation of 1954 had recognised the principle of responsibility of the Public 
Administration and the Law of Litigious-Administrative Jurisdiction of 1956 allowed appeal 
against general norms issued by the government or the ministers' (quoted by Beltran 
Villalba, 1994). 
Santamaria Pastor, J. A. (2002), Principios de Derecho Administrativo, Vol. I, Madrid: Centro de 
Estudios Ram6n Areces, p. 61. 
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With regard to the number and type of ministerial departments, they changed 
substantially during the years studied in this thesis. The following table summarises the list 
of ministries: 
1-2-38 
10-8-39 
10-8-39 
20-5-41 
20-5-41 
3-9-42 
3-9-42 
18-7-45 
18-7-45 
19-7-51 
Office of the 
Government of 
State 
Office of the 
Government of 
State 
Office of the 
Government of 
State 
Office of the 
Government of 
State 
Office of the 
Government of 
State 
Vice-Presidency 
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs 
Justice Justice Justice Justice Justice 
Army Army Army Army 
Defence Navy Navy Navy Navy 
Air Force Air Force Air Force Air Force 
Home Affairs Home Affairs Home Affairs Home Affairs Home Affairs 
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance 
Commerce and 
Industry 
Commerce and 
Industry 
Commerce and 
Industry 
Commerce and 
Industry 
Commerce and 
Industry 
Agriculture Agriculture and Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture 
Labour Labour Labour Labour 
Education Education Education Education Education 
Public Works Public Works Public Works Public Works Public Works 
Syndical 
Organisation 
Secretary of the 
Party 
Secretary of the 
Party 
Minister without 
portfolio 
Minister without 
portfolio 
There were ministers with portfolio and ministers without portfolio. The latter were 
not in charge of a department but had a purely political role and for this purpose had a seat in 
the Council of Ministers. 
Although for our study the most relevant ministry is the Ministry of Labour, the 
most salient one was the Office of the Government of State which had the task of political 
leadership, co-ordination, control and mediation and resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction 
among departments. But due to the fact that Franco was at the same time Chief of State and 
Chief of Government, the major administrative activity of the Office was done by the Under- 
Secretary, a therefore highly important political figure. Since the Decree-Law of 19 July 
1951, the Under-Secretary of the Office of the Government of State had also the category of 
minister. 
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Finally, a quick word on the current crucial issue of achieving policy co-ordination. 
Nowadays, governments have placed the need to co-ordinate efficiently their departments, 
agencies and public bodies at the top of the reform agenda. however, in the Francoist State 
at the beginning of the 1940s, policy co-ordination was not an issue. Only with the reforms 
of 1957, inter-departmental committees and other institutions were set up. Before that year, 
there were only informal meetings and sub-committees for ad-hoc policies. Hierarchy and 
unity, more than horizontal co-ordination, was the style of public management. 
Tue Parliament 
The law constituiting the Cones was passed on 17 July 1942, although the first 
session took place on 17 March 1943. A single chamber formed the Francoist Parliament. Its 
appointed members were called procuradores, some of them having been directly elected by 
male heads of families and married women, some others appointed by the Chief of State, 
some were made procuradores due to their other posts in the Francoist regime and state (the 
case of ministers, the president of the Council of State, members of the National Council of 
the Movement and finally a portion of them were elected from the syndicates, local 
authorities, families, economic groups, institutions of culture (the university or the Royal 
Academies) (Ramon Arango, 1976). 
The most powerful post in the chamber was that of the President. He was appointed 
and removed by the Chief of State. Ramon Arango (1976: 169) affirmed that, although a 
member of the legislature, he was not the agent of the Cortes but of the government and the 
Chief of State. 
The Cones had a very limited role in the structure of the state and in the policy 
process. During the period studied, this institution hardly passed any legislation. For the 
Spanish People's Charter, the role of the Cones was merely to discuss and eventually make 
amendments to the drafts submitted by the Chief of State. So, ultimately, its role was to 
"rubber stamp" the decisions of the government. 
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The Council of State 
The Council of State before the Second Republic was an extremely important 
consultative body, as it was a compulsory requirement for the government and the 
Parliament to previously consult with the Council of State before the passing of any law or 
decree. The Second Republic, by the Decree-Law of 22 April 1931, abolished the plenary 
meeting of the Council, although it maintained the consultation to the Permanent 
Commission (Royo Villanova, 1942: 191). 
Francoism reconstituted the plenary meeting by the Law of 10 February 1940 but 
dispossessed it of most of the power and leverage that it used to have in the past. On the one 
hand, it was kept in a very provisional situation from its reconstitution to 1945. It was then, 
by the Law of 25 November 1944 and the Regulations of 13 April 1945, when it acquired its 
definitive organisation. On the other hand, the report from the Council of State became 
optional for ministers and the Chief of State, instead of compulsory as it was before. This 
reinforced even further the position of the ministers in the policy process, as they were not 
obliged to be confronted by the opinion of the Council. 
Therefore, the Council of State became a consultative body but with very limited 
capacity to provide an expert opinion, unless explicitly required, in matters such as conflicts 
of jurisdiction, interpretation of norms, contents of laws, decrees and ministerial orders, 
organisation of the state or legal and technical matters. Otherwise, the Council would have 
played a major role in this first period of institutionalisation of the regime, when the role of 
clarifying the newly-created norms or the competencies of each department was so badly 
needed. As we have seen, this role was the absolute and exclusive prerogative of the Chief of 
State. With regard to the design of the Francoist social welfare, if the Council of State had 
had this prerogative, its consultation would have been compulsory in order to resolve the 
conflicts that arose between the INP, the Syndical Organisation, the General Directorate of 
Social Insurance and the General Directorate of Health. 
The Council was formed by the President and six councillors (later, by the norms of 
1945 there would be fifteen), all appointed by the Chief of State, chosen from former 
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ministers, former members of the National Council of FET de las JONS, attorneys of state, 
former councillors before the Second Republic, top civil servants and members of the Royal 
Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. 
Other Consultative and ad-hoc Bodies 
Only when the Francoist regime defined itself as a kingdom (despite having no 
king), could it have such institutions as the Council of the Kingdom and the Council of 
Regency. They were both established by the Law of Succession of March 1947 which was 
passed in the referendum of 6 July of that same year. 
The Council of Regency was set up to take over power in case Franco died without 
having appointed his successor. It was formed by the President of the Cortes, the most senior 
Catholic bishop that occupied a seat in the Cortes and the most senior General Captain in 
service (by order, the Army first, the Navy and the Air Force). 
The Council of the Kingdom was formed by the highest Catholic bishop who was 
also procurador in the Cortes, the highest general captain in service (again by order), the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the three military forces, the President of the Council 
of State, the President of the Hispanic Institute, and one or two councillors elected from each 
of the sections of the Cones (the party, the syndicates, the local councils and the families, the 
university chancellors and the professional associations). Regarding its functions, Jordana 
(1963) pointed out that it was a consultative body with quite a limited political role. 
In addition, there were other consultative bodies for specific policy sectors, such as 
the Council of National Education, the Council of Public Works and the Council of the 
Hispanic Identity. By the Law of 4 June 1940, the Council of National Economy was 
established. A president, a secretary and a variable number of members appointed directly by 
the Chief of State formed it. The Council of Health was established within the Ministry of 
Home Affairs by the Decree of 6 February 1939. However, none of these councils exerted 
any major influence in the Francoist policy-making process. 
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6.3. The National Movement and the Syndical Organisation 
As we already know, the Decree of 19 April 1937 unified the Comanion 
Tradicionalista Espanola with Falange Espanola de las DONS in what it became the unique 
party FET de las DONS, also called the National Movement. On 19 October of that same 
year, the National Council of the Movement was established and the Party Regulations were 
passed on 31 July 1939. 
Franco was the National Chief of Movement. Below him, there was the National 
Council, whose members were all appointed by Franco. In the annual meeting on 17 July, 
the National Council was presided over by Franco as National Chief of the Movement and 
included the President and Vice-President of the Political Committee, the General Secretary 
of the party, the Chief of the Movement's Militias, the National Delegate of Syndicates and 
other members of the party. It was both Franco's consultative body and the highest authority 
of the party, in charge of discussing high political issues brought before it by the Chief of the 
National Movement. 
The executive authority of the party was the Political Committee, which met 
monthly and was chaired by a president appointed by Franco. Its mission was to orientate the 
actions of the Movement and to produce initiatives to be presented to the Chief of the 
National Movement, Franco. But the day-to-day running was in the hands of the General 
Secretary of the Movement. 
The party occupied a special position within the Francoist state, due to the fact that it 
was not a private association set up by its members in a deliberate and free act, but an 
institution set up by the state by a norm (the Decree of April 1937). Thus, it was 'a decree of 
the Caudillo... (which gave) the party its legal existence, and above all, which has 
incorporated it in the state's political management' (Royo Villanova 1942: 161). However, it 
was not a ministerial department, although the General Secretary of the party had a scat at 
the Council of Ministers. At that moment, the debate among Francoist commentators on 
Public Administration Law was whether the party was or was not part of the state. Royo 
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Villanova (1942) pointed out that the National Council of the Party was considered to be, in 
the legal system, a state body, but the party itself was not a part of it, but an institution set up 
to serve and support the state. On the contrary, Gascbn y Marin (1945: 56-7) argued that the 
administrative activity of the party in matters of public interest suggested that the party was 
somehow involved in the activity of the state, being therefore a part of it. However, Guaita 
(1959: 32-4) saw the administrative activity of the party as a mere concession from the state, 
therefore implying that its actions did not make it a state body. 
Dependent upon the party was the Syndical Organisation. The Decree of 4 August 
1937 that passed the regulations of FET de las JONS said that the syndicates were a 
necessary service to the party (Article 23), which were controlled by the leaders of the party 
to make sure that they served the national interest (Article 29). In fact, the leaders of the 
Syndical Organisation were appointed by the General Secretary of the Movement and only 
members of FET de las JONS could hold senior posts within the syndicates. 
While still at war, on 21 April 1938, Francoism created by decree the National 
Central Syndicates (Aparicio, 1986). However, the definitive organisation called the 
Syndical Organisation came later. The structure of the Syndical Organisation was regulated 
by the Law of Syndical Unity of 26 January 1940 and the Law of Bases of the Syndical 
Organisation of 6 December 1940. 
The highest authority of the Syndical Organisation was the National Delegate of 
Syndicates. The first National Delegate was the charismatic Gerardo Salvador Merino, 
whose alleged political ambitions forced him into exile in July 1941. He was denounced as a 
Freemason, one of the most serious political offences at the time. He was temporarily 
replaced by Manuel Valdes Larrafiaga until December 1941, when Fermin Sanz Orrio took 
over, performing until 1951 the role of shaping the Syndical Organisation to fit into the 
mould of the Francoist state. Salvador Merino had been the one who had organised the 
Syndical Organisation and who had sought to create an ideological corpus on which to base 
it. In fact, that was one of the purposes of the First Syndical Council. however, Sanz Orrio's 
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purpose was to bring the Syndical Organisation in line with the new state by suppressing any 
attempt to intervene in the economy (Aparicio, 1986). 
Institutionally, the Syndical Organisation was divided into three different 
institutions: 
a) The National Central Syndicates aimed at controlling workers and employers 
(who both were collectively called producers, 
-produclores). Therefore, they were tools for 
controlling the labour force and for this purpose it was made compulsory since 1942 the 
registration of all employers and employees in the National Central Syndicates. These bodies 
were public law corporations, territorially organised, with regulations approved by the 
National Delegate of Syndicates. In each province, it was presided over by the Provincial 
Delegate of Syndicates. 
b) The National Syndicates were established to advise the government on labour 
issues such as how to improve economic performance, price regulation or labour discipline. 
(Thomas I Andreu, 1999). Instead of territorially, they were organised according to different 
areas of economic production. They were public law corporations that brought together all 
the participants in a single sector of production such as cereals, fruits, beer and drinks, 
fishery, chemical industries, paper and press, transports and communications or banking and 
finance. The number and type of Syndicates were established by the Law of 23 June 1941. 
As public law corporations, they were not proper institutions of the state as the 
ministries and other departments were, but institutions with their own legal status for the 
service of the state (Royo Villanova, 1942: 493). Their roles and functions were established 
in their own status, which was approved by the National Council of the Movement. The 
authority of each syndicate was held by a Syndical Central Committee chaired by a Chief, all 
appointed by the General Secretary of the Movement. 
c) The Syndical Foundations were aimed at articulating a social role for the Syndical 
Organisation (Cazorla, 2000: 132). They were all created between 1939 and 1942, although 
their real development came after the Regulations of Activities of Assistance of March 1946. 
Let us quote a few of them. The Syndical Foundation for Settlement-Building, set up in 
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March 1941, sought to transform the agricultural situation, colliding inevitably with the 
Institute of Settlement-Building of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Syndical Foundation for 
Fighting Unemployment of 1944 put in place schemes for fighting unemployment. The 
Syndical Foundation for Education set up in 1939, organised after-hours outdoor and indoor 
activities for workers, in a clear attempt to keep the workforce under control all the time. The 
Syndical Foundation for Housing, of December 1939, was concerned with the dramatic 
housing problem, for which a solution was already in place 
- 
the National Institute of 
Housing. The Syndical Foundation of 18 July, created in 1940, was dedicated to provide 
healthcare to workers, while the Syndical Foundation for Social Insurance, of 1941, was 
dedicated to social insurance. Both of them were obviously interfering with the INP's work. 
The Maternity and Infant Foundation, of November 1940, provided medical assistance and 
run educational programmes for mothers and workers' wives. 
The Syndical Organisation never managed to play an influential role in the 
elaboration and implementation of economic and social policies, becoming most of the time 
a mere auxiliary instrument of other state public bodies, primarily the Ministry of Labour 
(Marin, Molinero and Ysäs, 2001: 37). Cazorla (1999: 180) has also referred to how the 
Syndical Organisation was left dependent on the Ministry of Labour from 1941 onwards. 
This explains one of the findings of this thesis which will be studied in detail in the 
following chapters. In my account, the control of the Syndical Organisation exerted by the 
Ministry of Labour explains that the struggle of the Syndical Organisation against the INP 
for the control of the social insurance system was supported from inside the Ministry of 
Labour, mainly from Girön de Velasco himself. We could have expected the Ministry of 
Labour to be defending one of its dependent institutions, the INP, from the attack of a non- 
state body, the Syndical Organisation. However, the opposite was the case. The Ministry of 
Labour permitted the attack on the INP and even forced it to accept the take-over of many of 
its roles by the Syndical Organisation. 
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6.4. The Ministry of Labour 
In the first stages of the Francoist regime, still at war, there was no Ministry of 
Labour. In the first government, established on 1 February 1938, the department responsible 
for labour relations was the Ministry of Syndical Organisation and Action, presided over by 
Pedro Gonzalez Bueno. This Ministry was organised by the Ministerial Order of 9 July 1938 
into five sections: Syndicates, Labour and Housing Jurisdiction, Social Insurance, 
Emigration and Statistics (Payne, 1985: 190). The Chief of the National Service of Social 
Insurance, the department within the Ministry of Organisation and Syndical Action in which 
the INP was included, was Severino Aznar Embid. 
Later, with the government crisis of 9 August 1939, the Ministry of Syndical 
Organisation and Action was suppressed and all labour issues were transferred to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, presided by Joaquin Benjumea Burin. Pablo Martinez Almeida 
replaced Severino Aznar as Chief of the National Service of Social Insurance. In September 
1939, this post of Chief of the National Service of Social Insurance changed its name to 
General Director of Social Insurance and Martinez Almeida was replaced by Fernando 
Camacho Banos. 
The creation of the Ministry of Labour took place with the re-organisation of the 
government on 20 May 1941. Jose Antonio Girön de Velasco was appointed Minister. Girön 
occupied the post of Minister of Labour until 1957, being thus one of the Francoist ministers 
that remained longest in his post. However, during Girön's mandate, changes of personnel at 
the levels of Under-Secretary and General Directors were frequent, in particular the role of 
General Director of Social Insurance. The first Under-Secretary was an old Falangist, 
Manuel Valdes Larrariaga. Girön said in his autobiography that they did not get on well 
(Girön: 1994: 95), so he was replaced in 1941 by Esteban Perez Gonzalez, Girön's right 
hand man until his fall in desgrace in April 1945. Carlos Pinilla, also a young Falangist who 
went to fight with the Division Azul in Russia, became the Under-Secretary. 
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The first General Director of Social Insurance appointed by Minister Girön dc 
Velasco was Francisco Grefo Pozurama. In February 1943, Buenaventura Josh Castro Rial 
took over and in May 1948, Camilo Menendez Tolosa, a military friend of Franco, was 
briefly appointed to the post. 
It is worth referring to the basic institutions which, depending upon the Ministry of 
Labour, aimed at structuring the Spanish labour relations. One was the Industrial Tribunals, 
established by the Decree of 13 May 1938, which until 1962 could only rule on cases 
concerning individuals (employers and their employees) (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). Another 
institution was the Labour Regulations of 1942 which regulated quite broadly things such as 
ways of organising labour, job classification, salaries, promotions within the company or 
sanctions (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998: 52). A much later innovation was the Decree of 18 
August 1947, which drafted the Company Juries, which were finally implemented by the 
Decree of 11 September 1953 (therefore falling outside the period of time covered by this 
research). They were committees formed within each company by the managers and 
representatives of the workers (thus reflecting the Francoist idealised view of a harmonised 
labour relationship between workers and employers) and they were intended to reduce labour 
conflicts, which started in the early 1950s. 
The Ministry of Labour lacked proper internal regulations for many years, as the old 
Republican Regulation of Services of the Ministry of Labour of May 1932 was never 
modified to accommodate the changes that came later. So, during the period that we are 
studying in this thesis, from 1936 to 1950, the Ministry of Labour did not have a formal 
regulation that specified the internal organisation of the department, the role of the minister, 
senior civil servants and the rest of the staff or the administrative procedures'. It was up to 
the minister to decide who he wanted to include in a committee or the number of committees 
required for drafting a law. 
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6.5. Resolving Jurisdictional Conflicts between Institutions 
Understandably, the institutional complexity of the regime that I have just described 
might have led to quite a few jurisdictional conflicts among ministerial departments, 
autonomous public corporations, councils and the Movement. How were these conflicts 
tackled and resolved? In addition, which institution was in charge of clarifying any legal 
norm whose interpretation might be open to discussion? If we are to believe the official 
argument, Francoism did not have jurisdictional conflicts, but 'only different interpretations 
of what constitutes the powers of institutions' (Garcia Oviedo, 1953: 317, footnote 5). 
However, this was a self-serving way of putting it, because, in reality, serious disputes 
among institutions occurred. 
Francoism did not pass any law for resolving jurisdictional conflicts until the Law of 
Jurisdictional Conflicts of 17 July 1948. Therefore, during almost the entire period studied in 
this thesis (1936-1950), the regime did not have an established regulation or a legal 
framework to resolve conflicts regarding administrative and political competences, because 
the Royal Decree of 8 September 1887 was obviously obsolete, overtaken by the political 
events of the intervening years. Thus, the power to decide when jursidictional conflicts arose 
was in Franco's hands (Garcia Oviedo, 1953: 317). He had absolute freedom to determine 
the outcome of the conflict and his decision could very well be based on political reasons or 
any circumstantial motives. For example, it was Franco who decided whether the Law of 5 
November 1940 
-which granted the Ministry of Finance the right to evaluate and determine 
the viability and future of all state-dependent or autonomous bodies- also applied to the INP. 
By the Decree of 3 December 1942 the INP was excluded from this law applying to it. 
To some extent, jurisdictional conflict resolution became more institutionalised, at 
least formally, when the Law of Jurisdictional Conflicts was passed in July 1948. This law 
regulated three kinds of conflicts: jurisdiction (coinpetencias) between ordinary tribunals and 
8 Medina, L. and Maranon, M. (1945), Leyes Administrativas de Espana, edition of Gascön y Marin, Ubierna y Eusa, Fäbregas del Pilar and Perez Botija, Madrid: Instituto Editorial Reus. 
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contentious-administrative tribunals; "issues" of jurisdiction (cuestiones de cwnpetencia) 
between the Public Administration and tribunals; and roles (atribuciones) (Gomez Montoro, 
1992: 227). In this latter case, the law established that when conflicts occurred within the 
same administrative body (for example, a ministry), it was the most senior person in that 
department who should resolve them. However, if the conflict was between ministerial 
departments, it was the Chief of Government (therefore, Franco himself) who should resolve 
it (Royo Villanova, 1942: 167). Article I of the 1948 Law just formalised existing practice, 
stating that any problem arising between institutions or any clarification regarding the 
interpretation of any particular legal norm had to be resolved by Franco. 
6.6. The Policy Process in the Francoist Regime 
Research on the Francoist policy-making process (Anderson, 1970; Medhurst, 1973; 
Gunther, 1980) has centred almost exclusively on the later stages of the regime, mainly since 
1957. In his seminal study on authoritarianism, Linz provided valuable insights into the 
policy process of the Francoist regime, although never attempted to describe it 
systematically. First, limited political pluralism among families, bureaucracies and other 
social actors was tolerated, therefore limiting access to policy-making to a few influential 
actors. Secondly, the absence of political mobilisation led by a strong totalitarian party kept 
the policy process within the state. Decision-making occured within state departments and 
other state bodies. Thirdly, ideology did not shape policies and the policy process as in 
totalitarian regimes, and the latter could be exposed to quite a wide-ranging set of ideas. 
Fourthly, the whole policy process was ill-defined in legal and formal terms, leaving room 
for informal and personalistic elements, but whose outcomes were largely well expected and 
predictable. 
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How was the policy-making process in the Francoist regime conducted? In order to 
systematise our understanding of it, it will be useful to apply the theoretical framework 
suggested in Chapter Three and disentangle the three components of the policy process 
commonly identified by Public Policy literature: ideas, actors and institutions. 
Actors 
In contrast to democratic regimes, the balance of power among different departments 
and "families" of the regime was determined by the dictator Franco in order not to allow any 
group to stand above the others. FET de las DONS failed to take over the state because of the 
opposition of the military and the Catholic Church, basically but, at the same time, Franco 
did not allow the suppression of the party even when this could have been done. 
The principal actor of the policy process being the minister, the influence of each 
family was determined by the ministries that they controlled. A very small number of people 
exercised political power in Francoism. They constituted what elite theories have called the 
"core" 
-more specifically defined as the group of people who manage to occupy several 
posts in any given political regime (Baena, 2002). Thus, policy communities in specific 
policy areas tended to be very reduced and limited and the number of people involved in the 
policy-making process very small. For example, the Francoist Labour Charter was drafted by 
two teams of just two or three people (Payne, 1985). The Press Law of 1938 was also 
prepared by a small number of Falangists (Chulia, 1999). Only two people, Severino Aznar 
and Jordana de Pozas drafted the Law of Official Property Chambers. The latter people 
prepared many of the social insurance laws established by the Francoist regime. In such 
small communities, variables such as the importance of interests and preferences of the 
reduced number of actors involved, their ideologies and their personal relationships acquire 
crucial importance (Guillr n, 1996). 
The masses never shaped the timing nor the process of policy making. At the other 
end of the spectrum, interest groups were not influential, at least with regard to social policy 
making. In fact, interest groups were more influential in other stages of the policy process 
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(mainly at the time of implementation) than at the time of agenda setting or sclcction of a 
policy. 
Ideas 
Lacking a strong and articulated ideology, the system was open to different and even 
contradictory policy solutions. Therefore there was room for what Kingdon (1984) called the 
"primeval soup". He meant that ideas float around at the disposal of policy-makers, waiting 
to become policies. 
That is why it was common among policy-makers to search for policy alternatives 
and ideas abroad. Francoist policy makers sought for innovations and solutions elsewhere 
and, at least in the social welfare policy sector, they kept up to date with the latest policy 
developments around the world. 
However, there were limitations and institutional vetos to the entry of ideas and 
policies of any possible type. Only those with a "ideologically neutral" profile, which could 
not put in risk the stability of the regime, were accepted. Franco himself exerted that role of 
being the watchdog of assessing the validity of the policies adopted and implemented. 
Institutions: the Legislative Process 
I have already pointed out that the legislative process was centred on the 
government, in particular on the ministers and their senior officials within each ministry. The 
absolute freedom of the minister was enhanced by a number of elements that were 
characteristic of this non-democratic regime: 
1. Absence of regulations within ministries. This was particularly important 
when it came to deciding the number of committees that were required to draft a policy 
and the composition of these committees. 
2. The previous report of the Council of State was not compulsory for passing 
legislation, therefore avoiding an otherwise formidable veto point. In fact, there was no 
veto point for legislation between the minister and Franco's final approval. 
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3. The Council of Ministers did not govern and only performed a tcchnical- 
administrative function. Very rarely were policies and laws vetoed in the Council of 
Ministers. 
4. Use and abuse of the decree and the ministerial order, by which the minister 
could pass legislation which had been previously accepted by Franco, therefore 
bypassing the Council of Ministers. The so-called ministerial decrees had the only 
signatures of Franco and the minister who proposed the draft. When reasons of urgency 
required, Franco could legislate by decree without previously informing the Council of 
Ministers. 
5. When jurisdictional conflicts among departments and public bodies arose, 
there was no formal procedure to resolve them. The ultimate decision was in Franco's 
hands. 
6. Ministers were granted the prerogative of passing regulations (potestad 
reglamentaria), and they could do this by issuing ministerial orders. This was unknown 
in the Spanish administrative tradition. Using this fabulous tool, ministers were capable 
of transforming any legal norm that had been previously approved, altering completely 
its purpose or content. 
Agenda-Setting and Policy-Drafting 
The absence of public discussion meant that the role of setting the agenda and 
defining the problem to tackle was fulfilled within the ministry or the non-departmental 
public body in charge of a specific policy sector. Interest groups and the media did not play 
an influential role at this stage, although some relevant "think-tanks" such as the Royal 
Academies could join in the discussion. 
Due to the fact that there was no ministerial regulation, the whole process was open 
to the discretion of the minister. He was absolutely free to decide how to organise the 
decision-making process, the number of the committees, their composition or the time period 
for these committees to work on the policy drafts. 
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Decisions taken by the Minister 
The draft, once written, was passed to the minister, who decided what to do with it. 
He had several options. First, he could agree the draft and present it straightaway to Franco 
and afterwards to the Council of Ministers. Secondly, he could reject it and call up another 
committee to draft a different project. Thirdly, he could abandon the idea completely or file 
the project until another political circumstances would make it viable again. In both cases, 
the process was blocked and paralysed. It is highly improbable that the draft was circulated 
among other ministries or departments to get comments on it. 
Legitimisation of the Chiosei: Policy 
Once the minister had decided on what policy to carry out, it was his responsibility 
to pass it through to the government to grant its approval. The first thing to do for each 
incumbent minister was to see Franco personally in order to secure his approval. As we have 
already seen, the Council of Ministers was more than anything a deliberative body and did 
not perform any role of blocking legislation that had already been agreed by Franco. Once 
Franco had approved the policy, the chances of passing it through the legislative process 
successfully were almost a hundred per cent. Neither the Cortes nor the Council of State 
were any major veto point for ministers' aspirations. 
The final stage of this process was the promulgation of the legal norm. The Francoist 
hierarchy of norms differentiated among laws, decrees, orders and resolutions (resoluciones), 
decisions (decisiones) and providences (providencias) with regard to the author of each one. 
Both laws and decrees were signed and promulgated by Franco. Those decrees that regulated 
issues of the Chief of State exclusive competence (such as the appointment or sacking of 
ministers) or affected different ministerial departments (decrees of the Office of the Chief of 
Government) were signed only by Franco, while others also carried the signature of the 
minister that proposed it (Royo Villanova, 1942: 163). In the following table, this hierarchy 
of legal norms is shown: 
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Type of norm Author 
Law Chief of State 
Decree Chief of State 
*Exclusive signature of the Chief of State 
-Decrees of the Chief of State 
-Decrees of the Office of the Chief of 
Government 
*Signed by the Chief of State and by the Minister 
-Ministerial Decree 
Ministerial Order Minister 
Resolution 
Decision Under-Secretary, General-Directors or others (delegated by 
Providence the Minister) 
This shows that legitimisation was given by Franco as his acceptance and signature 
was required in all laws and decrees. By the Law of 8 August 1939, the Chief of State could 
dictate laws and decrees without previous discussion at the Council of Ministers when 
reasons of urgency required. Thus, Franco could very well legislate bypassing the Council of 
Ministers. 
In the case of the ministers, their task was to convince Franco of the urgency or need 
to introduce certain policies and pass them as decretos (decrees), with just a very general 
debate at the Council of Ministers or even without any discussion at all. Obviously, if debate 
on specific policies at the Council of Ministers was avoided, the risk of facing vetoes from 
other families of the regime vanished almost automatically and nothing could impede the 
implementation of policies. Once Franco had backed the policy, the rest of the Council knew 
that there was very little benefit in opposing it. 
An example of the abuse of the institution of decree by Minister Girdn was the 
raising of salaries in 1944 which he decreed quite unexpectedly (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). In 
fact, Girbn's practices were criticised at the time. Raimundo Fernandez Cuesta, General 
Minister of the Movement, said in the early 1950s that GirGn de Velasco had a tendency to 
`develop legal norms, which, although very relevant to the national economy, were not 
previously notified to the Council of Ministers' (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998: 853). 
In addition to this, due to the prerogative given to ministers to issue regulations 
using the procedure of the ministerial order, the minister could modify any law or decree to 
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better serve his own interests or introduce important policies. Labour Minister Girön dc 
Velasco, perhaps the Francoist minister who made most use of this mechanism, revcaled 
how this practice was approved by Franco: 
`-My General.. 
.1 want your Excellency to know their (the miners of Asturias) most 
urgent demands, because later, in the Council of Ministers, things get much more 
complicated. 
Franco studied those demands. Then he said: 
-Listen, Girön: Forget about the Council of Ministers except for the most important 
laws that you might draft! For the urgent things, which are many, pass them via 
ministerial order. You will always get my support' (Girön de Velasco, 1994: 114, 
the emphasis is mine). 
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Chapter 7 
The Social Insurance System under the Franco 
Regime between 1936 and 1950 
The description of the social welfare system and, as part of it, the social insurance 
system established during the first decade of the Francoist dictatorship is the concern of this 
chapter. It also presents the developments within the INP as a consequence of the power 
struggles between actors within the non-democratic institutional framework. 
The chapter is thus divided into two sections. In the first section, I describe the 
Francoist social welfare system and more specifically, the social insurance system, with a 
brief review of the tax system. The whole social welfare system was complex, with multiple 
institutions which increased its inefficiency. It was a worker's protection system, lacking 
universal coverage of the whole population. The organisation and administrative procedures 
were not unified, but rather each insurance scheme was administratively independent. 
Falangist duplication of welfare institutions brought even more confusion and inefficiency to 
the system. As a result, the whole system lacked co-ordination and suffered duplication, 
futile bureaucratic procedures and a waste of economic and human resources. 
In the second section, I reconstruct the evolution of the INP and the power struggles 
for its control between 1936 and 1950.1 believe that these dramatic changes occurring within 
the INP can be explained as outputs of the power-struggles between families of the regime 
operating within the non-democratic political institutions. 
7.1. The Francoist Social Welfare System 
The social welfare system of the Francoist regime relied on two pillars: the insurance 
system and the social assistance system. The latter continued to be the same as the old- 
fashioned system of charity, remaining in the private hands of Catholic institutions and of the 
new Falangist organisation of the Auxilio Social. The second pillar, the insurance system, 
was in the hands of the INP, although the emergence of the alternative insurance schemes 
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provided by the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions fragmented a system that 
otherwise was marching ahead on the correct path towards its unified administration. 
Following on, a brief description of the social assistance system will be provided. 
But, as the analysis of the institutional configuration of the social insurance system is the aim 
of this thesis, the next section will be primarily devoted to the description of the insurance 
schemes established and in draft. For this purpose, it seems more appropriate to analyse the 
insurance schemes one by one, instead of providing a chronological list of the years when 
the laws and decrees were passed and the institutions established. Thus, a first thematic 
division can distinguish between voluntary and compulsory insurance schemes. 
7.1.1. The Social Assistance System 
The Auxilio Social, a Falangist institution created during the Civil War', was the 
most visible institution providing social assistance (Rodriguez Jimenez, 2000; Garcia 
Padilla, 1990: 431-42). Created by Mercedes Sanz 13achiller, the widow of the Falangist 
leader Onesimo Redondo, and by Javier Martinez de Bedoya, the Auxilio Social organised 
Free School Meals, Pregnant Women's Shelters, Mother and Toddler Clubs and Brotherhood 
Kitchens. In the beginning, the Auxilio Social was not a state-institution. Neither the 
organisation, its funding nor its composition were purely public or state-dependent, but 
party-dependent. In January 1938, it fell under the supervision of the General Directorate of 
Charity of the Ministry of Home Affairs, thus becoming an autonomous institution under 
state supervision. The state partially funded the provision of social assistance through the 
Charity Protection Fund, set up in December 1936, and took an active part in the 
organisation of social assistance by creating a Council of Charity on 28 May 1938, reporting 
to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Campos Egozcue, 1996: 241-2). 
'It resembled the German Winter Help (Winterhilfe) and actually carried the same name as in Germany at the beginning (Auxilio de Invierno) until it was replaced by Autilio Social. 
198 
As I have said in Chapter Six, the Syndical Foundations were aimed at articulating a 
social role for the Syndical Organisation, thus playing a two-fold role as institutions for 
labour relations and also providers of social assistance. The Syndical Foundation for 
Fighting Unemployment launched employment programmes, the Syndical Foundation of 
Education organised after-work-hours outdoor and indoor activities for workers and the 
Syndical Foundation for Housing built affordable houses for workers. The Syndical 
Foundation of 18 July was dedicated to provide healthcare to workers, while the Syndical 
Foundation for Social Insurance was dedicated to social insurance schemes. Assistance to 
women was given by the Maternity Foundation. 
The Anti-tuberculosis National Fund was a public institution, established by the Law 
of 5 August 1939 and the Law of 13 December 1943, reporting to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and run by a Central Committee and a President. As we will see, it became one of the 
big contenders in the race to gain control of the Francoist social insurance system, due to its 
desire to create and run a tuberculosis insurance scheme, paid by the INP but managed by the 
Anti-tuberculosis National Fund. By narrowly focusing on just this single illness, the Anti- 
tuberculosis National Fund failed to understand the benefits of a comprehensive insurance 
scheme covering all health problems. 
The Catholic Church maintained its role as provider of charity and social assistance 
during the Francoist regime. Apart from the constellation of religious organisations, parishes 
and catholic laic groups granting food, shelter and primary needs to those in need, and 
precisely to co-ordinate their efforts, a new institution was established in 1942, the National 
Secretariat of Charity, a part of Catholic Action, later developing into Caritas (Garcia 
Padilla, 1990: 442). Finally, for blind people, the ONCE was funded in 1938. 
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7.1.2. The Social Insurance System 
A) Compulsory Insurance Schemes 
Family Subsidies 
An essential component of the Francoist ideology was the idea of the family as a 
basic cell of society, and to "defend" it the regime dedicated big efforts: `It is a rigorous 
command of our Revolution to promote and strengthen the family in its Christian tradition, 
as a perfect natural society and foundation of the Nation'2. The Labour Charter stated its aim 
was to create a family subsidy scheme. 
Thus, still in war, the Francoist regime created a compulsory system of family 
subsidies. The Law of 18 July 1938 established a compulsory insurance system, nationally- 
extended, progressive as for its benefits, financed by the contributions of employers and 
insured and with a foundational capital provided by the State, and with a funding pay-as- 
you-go system3. It was applied to workers without limit of salary or type of job. The 
administration was held by the INP through the National Fund of Family Subsidies'. The 
regulation for implementing the Law of Family Subsidies was passed on 20 October 1938. It 
specifically stated that the Family Subsidy was only for wage-earning workers. However, the 
scheme was later applied to civil servants (local, provincial and central state officials) and 
the military, although for all of them it was not compulsorys. 
2 See the Preamble of the 1938 Law of Family Subsidies: INP (1938), Subsidios Familiares, Bilbao: 
Editora Nacional, Publicaciones INP No. 500; INP (1939), La Ley de Subsidios Familiares. Su 
Doctrina. Normas para su Implantacidn, Madrid: Publicaciones INP No. 506. 3 Iglesias and Meil (2001: 35), quoting C. del Peso Calvo (1967), De la Proteccidn Gremial al Vigente 
Sistema de Seguridad Social, Madrid, explain why it was given the name "Family Subsidies" instead 
of "Family Insurance Scheme". Although it was a compulsory insurance scheme, it was funded as a 
pay-as-you-go, not capitalised as was common at the time. To mark that difference, it was wrongly 
called "subsidy". 
4 INP (1940), Caja Nacional de Subsidios Familiares. Caracteres, Organizacidn, Realizacidn, 
Madrid: Publicaciones INP No. 513. 
s For a more extended analysis of the characteristics of the scheme, see Gonzalez Murillo (1998), 
especially pp. 250-67. 
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By 1939, the number of workers registered in the scheme was 250,000, peaking in 
1942 around 555,000 and then averaging around 456,000 people between 1944 and 1950. 
The number of people potentially protected by the scheme (the families of the workers) were 
800,000 in 1939,1,600,000 in 1942,1,300,000 in 1944 and 1,150,000 in 1950 (Gonza1ez 
Murillo, 1998: 277). 
Although policy makers within the INP got inspiration from the Italian, French and 
Belgian schemes, Francoist propaganda presented the Family Subsidies Scheme as far more 
advanced that other similar systems established around the world". This assertion sought 
obviously to gain legitimacy for the regime before its internal audience, although it found 
support from William Beveridge, who, when visiting Spain at the end of April and beginning 
of March 1946, commented that the Spanish Family Subsidies Scheme was very developed 
in comparison with other countries7. However, the Belgian scheme covered a bigger pool of 
workers (in Belgium it was compulsory for all employers and for non wage-earning workers) 
and the French scheme was financed by bigger contributions (by 1946, workers contributed 
with 12 per cent of their salary in France, while in Spain it was only 5 per cent) (Gonzalez 
Murillo, 1998: 255-7). In addition, both the Belgian and the French states participated in the 
finance of the scheme, while the Francoist state did not, even though the Law of 10 
December 1940 promised the National Fund of Family Subsidies an annual subsidy of 8 
million pesetas (Gonzalez Murillo, 1988: 264). 
As the war went on and Francoist troops advanced their positions, the scheme was 
introduced in the newly conquered territories. Later, the aim was to expand the coverage to 
more people and also to promote those families with more difficulties. Thus, by the Law of 
the 23 September 1939, widows and orphans were granted the Family Subsidy Scheme, and 
complementary provisions such as the Orphans' Subsidy and the Schooling Subsidy were 
6 Leal Ramos, L. (1938), El Regimen Obligatorio Espanol de Subsidios Familiares, Madrid: 
Publicaciones INP No. 505, p. 5. 
7 My research of Beveridge's trip to Spain will be soon published in the international Journal of 
Iberian Studies. I have consulted the "Beveridge Papers" hold at the LSE Archives. This comment 
appears in section XI, folder 41. Also Beveridge's comments on the Spanish family subsidies system 
appeared in the Falangist Diario Arriba, on 31 March 1946. 
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created. Other groups (such as domestic workers, agricultural workers and fishermen) also 
got their family insurance schemes, although, as I point out below, these developed into 
special systems which integrated different insurance schemes in single packages. Military 
staff also received family benefits by the Decree of 2 March 1943, although their insurance 
system differed from the one granted to the civilian population. 
Very popular were the Nuptial Loans, established on 22 February 19418 and later 
transformed to the Nuptial Prizes by the Decree of 29 December 1948. They were granted to 
bachelors of less than thirty years old (twenty five years old if women) who did not earn 
more than 10.000 pesetas per year, to encourage them to get married. But above all, the 
regime was keen to promote big families. The Birth Prizes, also created by the Decree of 22 
February 1941, were granted to the biggest families of every province. 
By the Law of 1 August 1941 (and the regulations of the same day), protection was 
given to big families, formed by five or more children smaller than eighteen years or adults 
prevented from working by disability. They benefited by reductions in the school and 
university fees, getting scholarships and other educational privileges. Fiscal benefits were 
granted, together with discounts in public transport, preference in getting positions in the 
public administration or state housing. In order for workers to be eligible, their annual 
income should not exceed 5,000 pesetas. The Law of 13 December 1943, with its 
Regulations of 31 March 1944, abolished the previous one and lowered to four the number 
of children needed to be counted as a big family. The Regulations established a new category 
for those families with twelve or more children 
-the Honour Category. With regard to 
benefits, the new Law of 1943 improved specific things over that of 1941, such as fiscal 
benefits, and maintained others such as reductions in school fees or discounts for public 
transport. In 1942, there were around 55,000 families benefiting from this scheme, rising to 
147,063 in 1948 (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). 
s BOE, 7 March 1941. 
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The Decree of 28 November 1941 ordered that workers' and employer's 
contributions to the Syndical Organisation would be collected, together with the 
contributions to the Family Subsidies Scheme, by the INP. It might be that, this way, the INP 
got all the blame, appearing as the money collector while the Syndical Organisation would 
got the money without any come-back. 
'Family Plus' 
In 1942, ` Family Plus' was established (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). For Iglesias and 
Meil (2001: 38) this is the major diversion of the Spanish Family policies from the European 
model of family protection in the 1940s. This scheme aimed to distribute additional income 
to workers with family needs, given the prevalence of very low salaries. It was funded by a 
company-based deposit, administered almost completely by employers. The deposit was 
calculated as a percentage of the sum of the salaries paid in each company. That deposit was 
then divided by the number of workers in order to calculate the so-called point (punto). Now, 
regarding family size and responsibilities, each individual worker accumulated points to 
form his Family Plus. For example, a married worker obtained five points, a father of two 
seven while a father of ten children received 15 points (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998: 338). The 
scheme did not require affiliation, contributions or special administrative structures (as it was 
organised on a company basis). Obviously, the scheme only covered wage-earning workers 
(excluding agricultural workers, self-employed, top echelon civil servants and domestic 
workers). And, being a company-based scheme, there were huge differences in the value of 
the point (therefore in the amount of the benefits received) depending on the generosity of 
the salaries and the number of employees of the company. 
This scheme resembled the idea of "family salary" of the Falangists, while the 
Family Subsidies Scheme followed the Social Catholic view. Girdn dc Velasco presented 
`Family Plus' as an example of the new relationship between employers and employees, 
therefore an instrument for achieving social cohesion and the harmony in labour relations so 
badly sought by the regime (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). In fact, the real purpose of the scheme 
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was to block or limit further wage increases. While the family subsidy was 5 per cent of the 
total salary, `Family Plus' was 20 per cent (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998: 327), thus being 
perceived by workers as a real increase in their wages, although actually coming as a result 
of a wage restriction. 
It was first established in the private banking sector, on 28 April 1942, and from 
here, it was extended via the Labour Regulations issued by the Ministry of Labour for each 
sector of the economy. It was generalised to all sectors of the economy in a single legal norm 
by the Ministerial Order of 19 June 1945 and unified by the Order of 29 March 1946. By the 
Order of 15 December 1950, the benefits were improved. 
Old Age and Disability 
The old Compulsory Workers' Retirement Scheme, created in 1919, was replaced by 
the Subsidy of Old Age established by the Law of 1 September 1939 and regulated by the 
Ministerial Order of 6 October 1939 and 2 February 1940. The Scheme was of a funded pay- 
as-you-go system (a novelty with respect to the old workers' retirement scheme), sustained 
with the contributions of workers and employees and run by the National Fund of the Old 
Age and Disability Insurance Scheme. The Scheme was applied to workers under contract 
with annual incomes that did not exceed a specified amount. By 1941, there were 1,902,495 
people registered in the scheme and 167,269 people getting an old age pension. In 1945, the 
figures were 2,524,896 registered and 276,174 benefiting from the scheme (Gonzalez 
Murillo, 1998). 
The Subsidy of Age was transformed on 18 April 1947 into the Old Age and 
Disability Insurance Scheme (SOVI). The main innovation of the latter was the upgrading of 
disability pensions to the level of old age pensions. In that year of 1947,2,079,287 people 
were registered in the new SOVI and 303,551 were receiving a pension, while in 1950, these 
figures were 2,043,318 and 519,909 (Gonzalez Murillo: 1998). 
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Working Injuries 
The previous Working Injuries Scheme was reformed slightly by the Dccrcc of 13 
October 1938. The wage calculation base rose, therefore increasing the amount of money got 
on compensations, and some administrative improvements were made, although the funding 
model system, fully funded (the so-called "capitalisation" as opposed to the "pay-as-you-go" 
model) remained. The management of the system was in the hands of the National Fund of 
Working Injuries Insurance Schemes. 
In the previous system, there was no compulsory injuries scheme for agricultural 
workers and, in the industrial and commerce sectors, insurance was compulsory in regards to 
permanent disability but voluntary in regards to temporal disability. By the Decree of 4 June 
1940 (and the Ministerial Order of 30 August), the working injuries insurance scheme was 
made compulsory for fishermen in regards to permanent disability and death. 
For the treatment of the contributing workers who had suffered accidents while in 
work, there was inaugurated in Madrid on 7 June 1940 the Working Injuries Clinic9. 
Sickness 
But among all the schemes created at this moment, it is without doubt the 
Compulsory Sickness Insurance Scheme, the SOE10 which was the summit of the social 
building of the regime. This insurance scheme had been sought by the agents of the INP 
since 1910 (Jordana de Pozas, 1953: 31). During the Second Republic, a sickness insurance 
scheme was drafted and published by the INP (in 1936). 
Although a Plan of Unified Social Insurance Schemes that included this scheme was 
proposed in December 1939 to the Ministry of Syndical Organisation and Action, it was not 
9I have not been able to identify whether this clinic set up in 1940 had something to do with the one 
created in 1933. (See Samaniego, 1988: 334). Both depended upon the National Fund of Working 
Injuries Insurance Schemes to care for those affiliated injured while at work. 10 As this thesis focus is on the social insurance system, it will not study the organisation of the health 
system as such, but only as it was linked to the social insurance system via the SOE. Other authors 
such as Benjumea Pino (1990) and Guillen (1996) have researched the health system in depth. 
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until 1942 that it was finally established, by the Law of 14 December and the passing of the 
Regulations on 11 November 1943. 
Insurance was declared compulsory for all workers of more than fourteen years of 
age, with low rents, who had fixed contracts (and also builders and workers of the 
construction, although they were eventual). Insurance was voluntary for workers without 
contract or fixed work, for the port sector, self-employed workers and also parents who were 
not included in the previous compulsory categories. In the event of sickness, complete health 
attendance (general practitioner and specialists supervision and pharmacological, hospital 
and orthopaedic treatments) and economic benefits of less than 50 per cent of the wage were 
provided. The insurance also covered the expenses of the funeral of a deceased member. 
The system was financed by the contributions of workers and employers, and, 
theoretically, by state grants, although these were never distributed. The scheme was 
organised on a pay-as-you-go basis. The INP was in charge of its technical and economic 
organisation via the National Fund of the Sickness Insurance Scheme. However, the 
Syndical Foundation of 18 July was in charge of the provision of medical services. In 
addition, agreements were signed with different institutions such as the Social Institute for 
Fishermen, the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions and other authorised private 
companies for providing medical assistance, as regulated by the Decree of 2 March 1944. 
The scheme started functioning in September 1944. By 1947, there were 3,034,106 
people affiliated to it and 8,320,504 people entitled to use the benefits provided. According 
to official figures, by 1950, there were 3,064,641 people affiliated and 8,180,636 people 
benefiting (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). As the scheme required a network of hospitals and 
clinics, it was necessary to draft a National Plan of Installations for the SOE, which was 
finally approved by the Ministerial Order of 19 January 1945. By 1948, the National Fund of 
the Sickness Insurance Scheme had established 235 general practice clinics (Ambulatorios), 
62 specialist clinics, 282 maternity clinics and 24 Residencias Sanitarias (hospitals funded 
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by the Sickness Insurance Scheme)". The military were excluded from compulsory 
affiliation to this scheme by Order of the Office of the Chief of Government on 29 April 
194612. 
In comparison with other insurance schemes established around the world, the SOE 
was not as revolutionary and advanced as Francoist politicians claimed. At that moment, the 
most advanced scheme was the New Zealand's one, established in 1938, which provided 
coverage to all nationals. The rest of the countries followed what it was called at the time the 
labour thesis model, which meant that coverage was provided to all workers, as in Costa 
Rica (which introduced its scheme in 1941) or Czechoslovakia. Spanish SOE did not even 
reached that level of coverage of the population as it was only applied to workers with low 
salaries (Diaz Martin, 1949). 
Professional Illnesses 
Workers were also insured against those illnesses associated with a specific labour 
activity. These were called "professional" illnesses. Thus, by the Ministerial Order of 7 
March 1941, miners were insured against the risk of suffering from silicosis. This scheme 
became compulsory by the Decree of 3 September 1941 for the miners of companies 
extracting highly risky materials such as lead, gold, ceramic and coal. The funding model 
was "pay-as-you-go" based on the contributions of the companies alone, but by the Decree 
of 23 December 1944 there was introduced a sort of "mutual aid insurance system". In this, 
companies with the obligation to insure their workers against silicosis contributed to a 
common fund from which the pensions were later obtained. The benefits obtained by an 
insured miner were pensions as well as health assistance. The whole system was under the 
supervision and management of the National Fund of Working Injuries Insurance Schemes. 
11 Jordana de Pozas, L. (1948), Informe sobre los Seguros Sociales Obligatorios y su brgano Gestor 
en Espana, report presented to the Governing Body of the INP on 27 September 1948, p. 27. 12 BOE, 2 May 1946. The Law established that the military were granted health care 'at least to the 
same extent as the one established in the general regime' and placed the system under the supervision 
of the Health Services of the Armed Forces, not under the Syndical Foundation of 18 July or the INP, 
as in the general regime. 
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If the insurance against the silicosis was the first scheme, later, in 1947, the 
compulsory insurance scheme was extended to protect workers against any so-called 
"professional" illness. The definitive organisation of the system came with the Decree of the 
10 January 1949 by which the Professional Illnesses Insurance Scheme was finally 
established, run by the INP via its newly created National Fund of Professional Illnesses 
Insurance Scheme. 
Maternity 
Finally, the Francoist system protected salaried women in the event of maternity by 
the Law of July 1948, integrating the former scheme of 1929 in SOE. It covered all wage- 
earning women between 16 and 50 and the wives of the workers affiliated to the SOE. To 
provide clinical assistance, Maternity and Childhood Clinics were opened all throughout the 
country, Barcelona being the first city to have it, by October 1941. 
It must be however noted that this protection to working mothers must not We the 
fact that Francoism discouraged (married) women to take on employment. By the Law of 17 
November 1939, only legally separated or unmarried women without economic resources, 
unmarried women with studies or titles or married women whose husbands could not work 
were allowed to sign on in the employment offices". 
Unemployment 
Although the Unemployment Subsidy established in 1931 was in place and although 
the economic situation did not foresee the ending of the unemployment situation, this 
scheme was abolished by the Law of 25 November 1944. In 1941, official records showed 
that there were 447,090 unemployed people, 216,201 by December 1943,153,522 by 
December 1944 and 163,459 in 1945 (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). 
13 `El Paro Femenino en Madrid: Datos y Orientaciones', Revista de Trabajo, February 1940, No. 4, p. 
117. 
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However, at the same time as the subsidy was being abolished, the Syndical 
Foundation for Fighting Unemployment was established by the Law of 3 July 1943! 4 within 
the Syndical Organisation to run programmes by which unemployed workers were employed 
temporarily in public works. Previously, the Law of 13 February 19431s had established the 
National Service of Employment and Labour Force Organisation. Its aim was to "enlist" the 
labour force and keep statistical records of employment, training and labour mobility, 
therefore providing technical support to the Syndical Foundation. The Syndical Foundation 
for Fighting Unemployment and the National Service of Employment and Labour Force 
Organisation were both chaired by the same person, Jose Redondo Gomez (Gonzalez 
Murillo, 1998: 393). The chaos and mismanagement was such that the National Service 
made hardly any contribution to resolve unemployment (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). 
Unemployment in 1946 increased to 189,024 people and then decreased steadily to 
105,870 by 1948. However, in 1949, it increased dramatically to 175,407, although more 
reliable figures point to 282,940 unemployed people in industry and agriculture alone 
(Gonzalez Murillo, 1998). In the absence of proper mechanisms of social protection against 
unemployment, the possibility of resolving this problem in the following years depended on 
the success of the new economic model that was due to replace the autarky in the 1950s. 
Special Schemes 
Three special schemes for specific social groups were created: for the agricultural 
workers, the fishermen and the household workers. 
The Special Scheme of Subsidies and Insurance for the Agricultural Sector, 
established by the Law of 1 September 1939, only insured for an old Age Pension and 
granted a Family Subsidy. Sickness, Maternity or Disability Schemes, to quote just the most 
important ones, were not included. By the Decree of 10 February 1943, it was first granted to 
'4 BOE, 26 July 1943. 
15 BOE, 2 March 1943. The Decree of the Regulations were approved on 9 July 1959 - sixteen years 
later!. 
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the wage-earning agricultural workers, but later extended to the self-employed peasants 
(with their own land). The INP and the National Office of Syndicates ran the system 
together. 
The Special Scheme of Social Insurance for Fishermen was created by the Law of 29 
September 1943 and later adjusted by the Decrees of 11 March 1944 and 20 January 1948. 
With regard to the social risks against which fishermen were insured, the benefits obtained 
and the organisation of the schemes, they all were the same as those granted to industrial 
workers. The INP and the Social Institute for Fishermen shared the management of the 
system. 
On 19 July 1944, a Special Scheme for Household Workers was created, granting 
them old age, sickness and working injuries schemes, together with a Family Subsidy. 
However, its organisation was a major advancement as it was established as a single and 
unified scheme, the first of this kind introduced in Spain and the only one for a few years. 
B) Voluntary Insurance Schemes 
Besides these compulsory insurance schemes, there existed voluntary and 
complementary mechanisms to achieve the aim of protecting the individual from social risks. 
They were designed to cover those groups not included in the welfare system just described 
such as the children insurance schemes or to complement the insurance schemes granted by 
the INP, such as the old age and disability pensions. 
First, the Old Age and Disability Pensions were, as the name reflects it, pensions 
obtained by the members affiliated to the Social Insurance Reservoirs. Established uring the 
1920s, the Social Insurance Reservoirs were defined as `economic exploitations benefits, 
organised by groups of workers with the aim of obtaining resources collectively in order to 
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secure pensions in the event of old age or any other risk that might challenge the ability to 
work' (Jimenez, 1930: 39). 
For the children, the Children Mutual Insurance Institutions aimed to promote the 
practice of self-protection against future risks. The scheme was channelled through the 
institutions of Schooling Mutual Insurance and the Social Insurance Reservoirs, under the 
supervision of the INP and the Ministry of Education. By the Law of 17 July 1945, the 
existence of at least one of these school mutuality organisations was made compulsory in 
each school. 
C) The Mutual Aid Insurance System 
The practice of social insurance by labour categories had a long-standing tradition in 
the Spanish welfare system. However, since Bismarck's reforms in Germany, the nationally- 
based and cross-working-categories social insurance schemes have been perceived by 
Spanish social welfare experts as the most effective way of protection against social risks, 
the idea that every single labour or professional group had its own specificity, was exposed 
to a particular set of risks and should be protected quite distinctively from other groups had 
not been completely abandoned. From the technical point of view, nationally-based and 
cross-professional insurance schemes are preferred to mutual insurance schemes. Certainly, 
the fewer the number of independent schemes and the bigger the population concentrated in 
them, the simpler the administration of the system, the better the re-distribution of risks 
among the insured and the sounder its economic basis 
- 
in short, the stronger the safety net. 
Thus, although technical reasons were presented in order to maintain particular insurance 
schemes, the most probable explanation for maintaining such mutual insurance schemes 
(and, as a result, disparities in the way groups were protected) was not technical. 
211 
Quite strikingly, at the time when the creation of a comprehensive and uniticd 
insurance scheme was being debated within the INP and was catching the eye of social 
policy experts and policy-makers, the Francoist regime developed a system of occupation- 
based insurance schemes, the Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions and the Labour Mutual Aid 
Insurance Institutions, openly in opposition to the former. On 4 December 1940, the already 
existing Mutual Aid Institutions were put under the supervision of the General Directorate of 
Social Insurance of the Ministry of Syndical Organisation and Action. But it was one year 
later, by the Law of 6 December 1941, that both the existing and the new Labour Mutual Aid 
Insurance Institutions were incorporated within the public social welfare system. 
There were some institutions that insured mainly civil servants that otherwise would 
not have been protected. Thus, the criticism made above is just partially applicable to them, 
in the sense that although they fragmented the welfare system even more, these mutuality 
institutions also extended the coverage to new sectors of the population. 
The Alutualidad de la Prevision aimed to insure "the middle classes" (Jordans dc 
Pozas, 1953: 54) was perhaps the most important one. It was compulsory for all the officials 
of the INP to enrol in this mutuality and it was left voluntary for other semi-public 
institutions and workers in private companies. The public officials in local administration 
had their own mutuality established by Decree of 7 July 1944 and reformed by the Decree of 
10 May 1946. The civil servants of the Ministry of Agriculture were insured by the Decree 
of 18 December 1943 and those of the Ministry of Labour got their mutuality by the Dccrcc 
of 21 December 194316. 
In addition to voluntary insurance, Francoism created a parallel system of 
compulsory insurance schemes called Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions. They were 
created by the Decree of the Ministry of Labour of 26 May 1946'7, which granted the 
Syndical Organisation, companies and individuals the right to create these institutions. They 
were designed as `institutions of labour insurance of professional scope, created by the 
'6 BOE, 2 January 1944. 
17 BOE, 10 June 1946. 
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Ministry of Labour, whose aim is to protect all wage-earner workers and their families 
against any future and foreseeable risks, as well as protect the self-employed workers' (INP, 
1961: 3). 
Therefore, these insurance institutions applied to workers that might already be 
insured by the INP schemes. This unnecessary multiplicity of institutions posed some 
challenges to the efficient functioning of the overall system and consumed resources that 
were already limited. 
The emergence of the system of Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions under the 
direct supervision of the Vertical Syndicates side-lined the Spanish welfare system away 
from the most advanced European counterparts, at the precise moment when the fashionable 
advice given by social security experts around the world was to progress to the unification of 
all the insurance schemes in one single system run by a single Institution. 
By the Decree of 24 September 1949, the Ministry of Labour in charge of the 
Mutual Aid Insurance system established a new department, the Central Service of Labour 
Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions. This was the public body in charge of organising the 
Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions and controlling their activities. 
D) Conclusions 
The Francoist system of social welfare was formed by a series of compulsory 
insurance schemes which covered most of the possible risks for the worker and his/her 
family: old age, disability, death, professional accident, sickness, the birth of children and 
the maintenance of the family. The compulsory insurance schemes were complemented by 
free insurance and the Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions, but resulted in a very complex, 
fragmented, unco-ordinated and inefficient system. On the other hand, it was a worker's 
protection system, not a citizen's protection system. It lacked universal coverage of the 
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whole population, because it was envisaged to protect only those workers participating in the 
formal labour market and because the benefits were obtained on the basis of being a worker 
or dependent upon someone who was a worker (as husband or father). 
Public expenditure on social insurance was very low. In 1948, Jordana dc Pozas 
admitted that, among the states which had set up modern social insurance and social security 
systems, it was the lowest18. The figures are shown in the following table19: 
Public Expenditure on Social Insurance Schemes 1943-1950 
In millions of pesetas of the time 
Type of Social 
Insurance Scheme 
1943 1945 1948 1950 
so vi 178,6 197,7 431,7 1007,7 
Labour Mutual Aid 
Insurance Institutions 
-- -- 
95,7 204,4 
SOE 
-- 
198,7 544,4 962 
Family Subsidies 318,5 1101,9 1113,9 1035 
Total 497,1 1498,3 2090 3104,7 
Taken from Afeil (1995: 64) 
A senior officer of the INP, Victor Fernandez Gonzalez, estimated that the total 
expenditure of the state on social insurance schemes (including the `Family Plus' scheme 
and the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions) in 1951 had been five per cent of the 
Gross Domestic Product20. 
The INP was the main agent responsible for the social insurance schemes, although 
for certain schemes the administration was shared by different institutions. The organisation 
18 Revista Espanola de Seguridad Social, January 1948, No. 1, p. 46. 19 There is no data about the Working Injuries Insurance Scheme. In addition, it is impossible to make 
comparisons with other European countries as data is not available. Meil (1995: 67) is only able to 
offer figures (and therefore compare with other countries) on public expenditure in Family Subsidies from 1958 onwards. 
20 Fernandez Gonzalez, V. and Marti Bufill, C. (1953), La Politica de Seguridad Social Espanola y 
sus Realizaciones, Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo and INP. 
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and administrative procedures were not unified, but rather each insurance scheme was 
administratively independent. As a result, the whole system lacked co-ordination and 
suffered duplication, useless bureaucratic procedures and waste of economic and human 
resources. 
7.1.3. The Tax System 
We can hardly overestimate the function of the tax system in shaping the social 
welfare system of any country. By extracting resources from certain social groups and 
transferring them to others, taxes influence income distribution. Thus, tax systems can be 
evaluated with regard to their progressiveness, 
-this is the extent to which they redistribute 
resources from the wealthiest social groups to the poorest. At the same time, tax systems 
differ to the extent to which they are capable of generating high or low revenue (which can 
be measured as the total amount of GDP collected by the tax system). The more a tax system 
can collect, thus the more efficient it is, the more economic resources the state might have to 
fund social programmes. 
The Francoist tax system in the forties was not really a "system" (see Steinmo, 2003: 
209). It was highly inefficient and easy to avoid and evade by those better-off. Garcia 
Delgado (2000: 137) affirms that during the 1940s, the Spanish Treasury only managed to 
collect a third of the total amount that it should have. The most important tax was on private 
consumption (Meil, 1995; Carreras, 1989), therefore relying on indirect taxation and, as it 
affected everyone the same way (instead of penalising more those who were better-off), it 
was highly unequal. The tax on income only applied to a very small number of people (Mcil, 
1995: 60-1). 
By the 1940s, the majority of economists around the world had turned to progressive 
taxes as the best tool for redistributing income (Steinmo, 2003). However, powerful interests 
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blocked any chance of reforming the Francoist tax system. The Finance Minister between 9 
August 1939 and 19 May 1941 was Jose Larraz Lopez, who pursued a radical transformation 
of the Spanish tax system. In the end, all he could do was pass the Law of Tax Reform of 
1940, and this failure provoked his own resignation (Bull Sabatcr, 1991: 118). His successor, 
Joaquin Benjumea Burin, a wealthy aristocrat and Labour Minister (and Agriculture) before 
Girön dc Velasco, managed to last ten years in the post by not attempting any radical 
reforms, but implemented minor policy changes such as the Law of Extraordinary Benefits 
and reorganised the Ministry. 
The Francoist tax system that was in place during the period studied in this thesis 
was one of the factors which impeded the development of a modem and completed system of 
social security. This resulted in a dependent path for social welfare policy-makers, who had 
to pursue an alternative social welfare model based solely on contributions. The fiscal 
constraints of the social insurance schemes created were also provoked by the failure of the 
state to pay its own contributions. The inadequacies of the system were also possible 
partially as a result of the inefficiency to collect enough revenue and also because it was not 
difficult enough to evade payment of contributions. 
7.2. The Evolution of the INP between 1936 and 1950 
In Chapter 4 we looked at the evolution of the INP from its origins in 1908 up to the 
outbreak of the Civil War. What happened during and after the war? As will be shown, the 
INP was reintroduced in 1938 by those who had been in charge of it during the Second 
Republic and was later taken over by a new generation of social reformers. Whilst having 
entered the Institute during the 1920s, this young group had learned from the old generation 
of INP figures and remained very much in line with the intentions and orientations of the 
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founders of the Institute. But the political turmoil of 1941 within the regime and the arrival 
of a new group of Falangists at the Ministry of Labour changed things, even threatening its 
continuance. The crucial moment was in the summer of 1941, when Falangist Jose Antonio 
Girön de Velasco was appointed Labour Minister, permitting the Falange to launch a 
campaign to monopolise Francoist Social Policy and the INP. With the government crisis of 
1945, the INP would enter a new and different phase, up to 1950. 
In accordance with the hypothesis established in previous chapters, I believe that 
these dramatic changes occurring within the INP can be explained as outputs of the power- 
struggles between families of the regime operating within the political institutions of the 
regime. Actors' decisions and actions were shaped by the effect of institutions. Minister 
Gir6n de Velasco benefited from the absence of regulations within his Ministry, procedures 
to resolve jurisdictional conflicts and the fact that the previous report of the Council of State 
was not compulsory. But more directly, he made extensive use of the procedure of the decree 
to implement policies bypassing the Council of Ministers, therefore avoiding more-than-sure 
opportunities for vetoes. Other institutions such as the procedure of electing the INP General 
Director also shaped the way things evolved over this period, between 1936 and 1950. 
Since the INP was the place from which social policies were first drafted and 
designed, and was the institution in charge of implementing and running the social insurance 
schemes, it is necessary to analyse its internal evolution over the years. Thus, it is very 
important to see the way power was distributed within it and how this affected its structure 
and functions. This is the aim of this section. 
The criteria for dividing the whole period into phases is based on institutional 
reforms affecting the top echelon posts of the INP and substantial changes in the 
composition of the Governing Body of the INP. Both factors reflect the struggle between 
families of the regime for the control of the INP and monopolising Francoist's social 
insurance policy. 
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7.2.1. Reconstitution of the INP 
During the Civil War, the old INP kept functioning on the republican side, although 
it did not seem to perform efficiently, if the report presented before the Governing Body of 
the Francoist INP in March 1939 is to be believed21. 
On the Francoist side, the Social Catholics who belonged to the former hierarchy of 
the INP, who had survived the war and escaped from the Republican area were given the 
responsibility of restoring the functioning of the INP. Severino Aznar, Inocencio Jimenez 
Vicente and Luis Jordana de Pozas were the three men in charge of this task. 
In Burgos, the capital city of Franco's zone, the National Commission for Social 
Insurance (CNPS) was formed, by the Decree of 19 September 1936, as a body responsible 
to the government. The directors of the INP Funds of the Spanish regions of Castilla la 
Vieja, Aragon and Navarra, chaired by the Sub-Director of the INP, Jordana dc Pozas, 
formed the Commission, which worked from September 1936 to August 1938, when it was 
dissolved (Rull Sabater, 1971). Jordana de Pozas wrote with regard to the creation of the 
CNPS: ` it only took someone to suggest it to the National Defence Council and the National 
Commission for Social Insurance (which met in Burgos and replaced the Governing Body of 
the INP) was created' (Jordana de Pozas, 1958: 487-8). 
Obviously, at this very early stage of the war (August and September of 1936), 
military leaders (and Franco himself) might not have had the time and willingness to focus 
on many things other than purely military ones. Thus, this situation and the still embryonic 
design of the Francoist regime permitted anyone who could contribute proposals and to 
construct state institutions to carry them out. It could even be argued that Jordana, Aznar and 
Jimenez Vicente realised that the sooner they recovered the control of the INP, the more 
chances they would have to secure its survival and avoid a take over from other families of 
21 The report noted the performance of the INP in Barcelona, whose office did not keep accountancy books, payments were delayed and it lacked human and financial resources (See Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 7 March 1939, No. 7, p. 56. 
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the regime. We can imagine how important might have been for the different political actors, 
at that moment when the regime and the Francoist state was starting to be build up, to 
outstrip other groups in the attempt to secure their spheres of influence over policy domains. 
It might have not been mere coincidence that Jordana dc Pozas rushed to propose the 
creation of the CNPS when the Falangists were establishing Auxilio de Invierno (later 
Auxilio Social), and that the INP was reconstructed two months after the creation of the 
Falangist National Central Syndicates in April 1938. Arguably, had the INP not been 
reconstructed at this very early moments, future Falangist attempts to monopolise the 
Francoist social welfare system might have been much easier. 
One of the main tasks of the CNPS was to reconstitute the INP. The passing of the 
Labour Charter provided the momentum and the legal framework in which to define the 
organisation and functions of the Institute. This was done by the Decree of 15 June 193822, 
which set up a Governing Body as the highest collective authority. It was chaired by a 
President, who acted as the link with the Ministry of Syndical Organisation and Action. The 
President had the prerogative to suspend any decision taken by the Governing Body which 
he considered to be `harmful for the general interest of the nation' or contrary to the 
government's objectives in matters of social insurance23. 
The day-to-day running of the INP was in the hands of a General Director. This 
organisation differed quite markedly with that of the INP of the 1930s, which, as we already 
know from Chapter 4, was directed by a Board of Trustees, a President, a Executive 
Committee and a Council Delegate. The INP established in 1938 lacked the Executive 
Committee. The Governing Body was much more directly involved in the day-to-day 
running of the INP than the former Board of Trustees had been. 
In the first session of the Governing Body of the INP once the war was over, 
Severino Aznar affirmed that all the merit for keeping the social insurance schemes working 
u BOE, 24 June 1938. 
23 This crucial power granted to the Presidency would be the may reason why Minister Girbn dc 
Velasco wanted to become the INP President in the following years. 
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in the "national side" had to be given to Luis Jordana dc I'ozas24. Thus, with his cffort, the 
INP was formally reconstituted on 22 August 1938 in Santander, the total of members of the 
Governing Body being sixteen. The composition of this Governing Body rcflccts a clear 
continuity with the period prior to the Civil War: 
The First Governinr Rodr.. l crust 1938 
Social Falangists Military Technocrats 
Catholics 
President of Pedro Gonzalez 
the Governing 
Body 
INP President Severino Aznar 
INP Director Inocencio 
Jimdnez 
CNPS Luis Jordana 
President 
Vicente Madera Jesüs Rivcro Camilo Carlos 
Elected Mcntndez Gonzalez 
Members Manuel Tcna 
Enrique 
Jose M. Francisco Ocharin 
Zumalacdrregui Greºio 
Rufinn Garcia 
Isaac Galccrän 
Servulo Martin 
Rafael 
Cavcstany 
As can be seen, out of sixteen members, five were Social Catholics, one member 
was military, six were Falangists and another four members were not ideologically 
committed to any group in particular, but had a more technocratic profile. In any case, the 
three key posts of the INP (the President, Director and the President of the National 
Commission of Social Insurance) were in the hands of Social Catholics. 
Therefore, those men responsible for the INP during the Second Republic took 
charge over the Francoist INP again. They all had a true commitment o the work of the INP 
and to the line established by its founders, Maluquer and Marva, and they all shared a 
common link to Social Catholicism. 
24 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 22 August 1938, No. 1. 
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At the official act of reconstituting the INP, on 22 August 1938, the Minister of 
Syndical Organisation and Action, Pedro Gonzalez Buena, pointed to the program ahead to 
be accomplished: the creation of the Family Subsidies Scheme, the reformation of the Old 
Age Insurance Scheme and the design of the Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme. What 
was required to deliver this ambitious program? First of all, it was necessary to provide the 
INP with funds. Thus, it was decided to maintain for 1938 the same budget as in 1936, 
although there was added a clause which said that `this should not mean that it shared the 
orientation and the content of the 1936 budget'25 
. 
The first consequence of the reconstitution of the INP was the quick drafting and 
passing of the Family Subsidies Schemes. To run the scheme, a National Fund of Family 
Subsidies was created, dependent upon the INP, and for the post of Director of the Fund, 
there was appointed in October 1938 Jose Murioz Rodriguez Laborda, a close collaborator of 
Inocencio Jimenez Vicente. 
A few months later, in December 1938, there was a change in the presidency of the 
INP. Instead of the Minister of Syndical Organisation and Action, the Chief of the National 
Service of Social Insurance, at that moment Pablo Martinez Almeida, was appointed. It did 
not involve, however, a major transformation of the work nor ideological orientation of the 
INP, because the vast majority of members of the Governing Body remained in their posts 
and because Martinez Almeida himself had previously been one of its members. A new 
member joined the Governing Body, Primitivo dc la Quintana, a fervent Catholic, and 
Severino Aznar stepped down, thus making the total number of members 17: 
25 This was said by the representative of the Ministry of Finance in the Governing Body of the INP, 
Carlos Gonzalez Bueno: Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 23 August 1938, No. 32, p. 13. 
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T/rn. Cnrnwl Gnvrrnlnnn Rndº'_ ni'crniher 1938 
Social Falangists Military Technocrats 
Catholics 
INP President Pablo Martinez 
INP Director lnoccncio 
Jimenez 
CNPS Luis Jordana 
President 
Vicente Madera Jesüs Rivero Camilo Carlos J. 
Elected Menendez Gonzalez 
Members Jose M. Francisco 
Zumalacarregui Grc o Miguel Quijano 
Primitivo de la Isaac Galcerin Rußno Garcia 
Quintana 
Rafael SFrvulo Martin 
Cavestany 
Enrique 
Ocharän 
Manuel Tena 
As can be seen, although numerically Social Catholics did not fully dominate the 
Governing Body, the key post of INP Director, the most powerful post, remained in the 
hands of the Catholic Inocencio Jimenez. In addition, Jordana dc Pozas remained as 
President of the CNPS. However, the situation of the INP and its Governing Body in 
December was uncertain. 
With the end of the Civil War, the members of the Governing Body of the INP put 
their posts in the hands of the Minister of Syndical Organisation and Action, for him to 
decide whether they should continue or not. They did this on the meeting of the Governing 
Body of 22 April 1939, but never got a response, therefore generating among the members 
an uncomfortable feeling of being temporary and with a very unpredictable perspective for 
their future. 
In that same meeting, the Falangist representative Jesüs Rivero Menescs expressed 
in writing his criticism of the way the Governing Body was performing26. Other members of 
the Governing Body such as Camilo Menendez, Quijano, Gonzalez Bucno and Martinez 
Almeida angrily replied to Rivero's remarks. After long discussions and apologies from 
26 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 22 April 1939, No. 8, p. 34. 
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Rivero, things calmed down again. However, this incident shows several things. First, two 
broad factions within the Board were being formed 
-Falangists against Social Catholics (and 
other independent members). Secondly, Falangists were not happy with the way the INP was 
being run. Thirdly, the Falangists might have started to think that social insurance policy 
should be an area of exclusive Falangist monopoly, and perhaps the INP was no longer 
necessary within their labour and social relations model 
-the one of the Syndical 
Organisation. Fourthly, a sense of uncertainty was starting to spread within the INP. Due to 
this uncertainty about the future of the INP, Vicente Madera Pefla, one of the members, 
raised his voice on 5 September 1939 for the termination of such an anxiety-provoking 
situation27. 
7.2.2. The Social-Catholic Phase 
With the end of the war, the central office of the INP was transferred to Madrid, 
holding the first session in the capital of Spain on 22 May 1939. A crucial landmark for the 
INP in its process of institutionalising took place on 1 September 1939, when the Associated 
Funds were converted into the Provincial Offices of the INP. In that same month, Fernando 
Camacho Bafios replaced Pablo Martinez Almeida as INP President. Camacho Batlos was a 
committed Social Catholic. Martinez Almeida stepped down from the Governing Body and 
did not return until June 1941, when a new Governing Body, with identifiably different 
ideological orientation, was formed. 
But still in September 1939, the Governing Body of the INP was overwhelmingly 
controlled by Social Catholics: 
27 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 5 September 1939, No. 11. 
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The Third Governing Body: September 1939 
Social Catholics Falangists Military Technocrats 
INP President Fernando 
Camacho 
Director Inocencio 
Jimenez 
Director of the Luis Jordana 
National Fund 
of the Working 
Injuries 
Insurance 
Scheme 
Director of the Josh Munoz 
National Fund 
of Family 
Subsidies 
Member Jose M. Francisco Camilo 
proposed by Zumalacärregui Grc o Menendez 
the Syndical 
Organisation 
Minist 
Member Carlos Jose 
proposed by Gonzalez 
the Ministry of 
Finance 
Member Primitivo de la 
proposed by Quintana 
Ministry of 
home Affairs 
Member Jesüs Rivero 
proposed by 
the General 
Secretary of 
the FET y 
JONS 
Members Vicente Madera Rafael Miguel Quijano 
proposed by Cavestany 
the Syndical Enrique 
Organisation Ocharin 
Servulo Martin 
Rufino M. 
Garcia 
Members Isaac Galcerin 
proposed by 
the CNPS Manuel Tena 
The four key posts 
-the President and the Director of the INP and the directors of the 
two National Funds- were in the hands of Social Catholics. By 1940, the INP showed signs 
of coming back to normality, such as the re-publishing of the Boletin de Informacidn de la 
Caja Nacional de Seguros de Accidentes del Trabajo. The first edition appeared in January 
1940, although still very limited in its extension and number of printings, due to the lack of 
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paper in the post-war period. Another sign was the approval of the Regulations for the 
Organisation of Central Services and Regulations of the Personnel, both on 12 June 1940. 
In that year, in September, Luis Jordana dc Pozas was appointed as Sub-Director of 
the INP and Jose Maria Lopez Valencia, a military officer, assumed the then vacant position 
as Director Delegate of the National Fund of Working Injuries Insurance Schemes. In my 
view, this reflects the promotion of Jordana de Pozas within the INP, undoubtedly the natural 
candidate to replace Jimenez Vicente. 
Inocencio Jimenez Vicente died on 27 April 1941. In the session of 23 May 1941, 
the Governing Body of the INP met to elect Jimenez Vicente's successor as INP General 
Director. A shortlist, comprising three people, was drawn up and put forward to the Minister 
of Syndical Organisation and Action. This system of election acted as an institution that 
shaped the decisions of actors. As we will see, the Falangist Labour Minister Girbn de 
Velasco, who, in the end, had to elect the INP General Director, was left with limited space 
to manoeuvre. His choice was limited to those three people in the list. 
In the words of Fernando Camacho Barios, INP President, it was necessary to 
include on the shortlist `the Sub-Director, Luis Jordana de Pozas... (In addition), the other 
two people who might complete the shortlist should be members of the Governing Body, in 
order to guarantee the continuity of the social insurance work'28. Camacho Barios then 
proposed, apart from Jordana de Pozas, the names of Menendez Tolosa and Rivcro Meneses, 
being accepted by the Governing Body by unanimity. It is worth noting that the shortlist was 
composed of a Social Catholic (Jordana), a military (Menendez) and a Falangist (Rivcro). 
However, it seemed pretty cleared that Jordana was going to be appointed as INP Director, 
which is what finally happened. I will come back to this point below. 
In conclusion, from September 1939 to May 1941, the INP remained under the 
control of Social Catholics, by occupying the key posts of President and Director of the INP 
and of Director of the two National Insurance Funds. The key figure during this phase of the 
28 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 23 May 1941, No. 33, p. 278. 
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Francoist INP was Inocencio Jimenez Vicente. The continuity with the traditional orientation 
of the Institute was guaranteed... if only a new generation of Falangists had not arrived at the 
newly created Minister of Labour. 
7.2.3. The Falangist Stage 
As explained in previous chapters, the political turmoil within the regime led to the 
government crisis of May 1941. The political struggle within the regime at that time was 
dramatic. New Falangists came to power, among them Jose Antonio Girbn de Velasco who 
was appointed Minister of Labour by the Decree of 19 May 1941 and, being such an 
energetic person and enthusiast Falangist, it was quite clear that he was going to introduce 
big reforms. Girbn's aim, as has already been explained, was to secure for Falange an area 
of influence 
-the Francoist social welfare system. It was then, by the spring and summer of 
1941, when social insurance came to the top of Falange's agenda, as Salvador Merino's 
words in the Second Syndical Council show: `It will decree that the administration and 
execution of social insurance schemes will be transferred to the Syndical Organisation'29. 
Members of the INP felt their future was in trouble. That is why, four days after 
Girön was appointed Minister, in the meeting of the Governing Body to elect Jim6nez 
Vicente's successor on 23 May, they felt the need to secure the continuity of the INP by 
including in the shortlist people with strong bonds to the Institute. Jordana had most chance 
of being appointed INP General Director. Mainly, because the other strong candidate for the 
post, Rivero Meneses was said in those days of May to be about to be appointed for the 
position of Minister of Labour (Girbn de Velasco, 1995: 76). It is known that the post of 
Labour Minister went, in the end, to Girdn, instead of Rivero. Thus, Rivero and Girän might 
have had, at that very moment, some sort of rivalry. It was highly improbable that Rivera 
29 Boletin de Informacidn del INP, June 1941, No. 6, p. 63. 
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would be appointed INP General Director, a post from which he could interfere with Giron's 
own political agenda. On the other hand, Menendez Tolosa, although later General Director 
of Social Insurance in 1949 did not have by 1941 the profile and expertise needed for the 
post. Thus, Jordana was, by far, the better candidate of that shortlist, or, put it in another 
way, the less bad for Girön's plans. 
The following nine days saw frenetic activity both in the new Ministry and in the 
INP, as Girön's collaborators were taking over kcy posts. On 28 May, Fernando Camacho 
Banos was replaced as General Director of Social Insurance by Francisco Grerio Pozuramaso 
And by the Decree of 31 May 1941, the Labour Minister appointed a new governing body': 
The Fourth Governinn Body. Jure 1941 
Social Falangists Military Technocrats 
Catholics 
INP President Francisco Greilo 
Commissary Luis Jordana de 
Pozas 
Sub- Jests Rivero 
Commissary 
Free Elected Mercedes Sanz Camilo 
Members Mckndcz 
Pablo Martinez 
Sebastian Criado 
Carlos Ruiz Garcia 
Member Primitivo de la 
proposed by Quintana 
the Ministry of 
Home Affairs 
Members Alfonso de la Rodrigo Urfa 
proposed by Fuente 
the National 
Office of Carlos Romero 
Syndicates (replaced by Ramon 
Azaola) 
Jose Luis Palao 
German Alvarez 
(replaced by 
Antonio Duran and 
later by Ricardo 
Martinez) 
Antonio Rodriguez 
Member Carlos Jose 
proposed by Gonzalez 
the Ministry of 
Finance 
30 BOE, 8 June 1941. 
31 BOE, 8 June 1941. 
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Member Agustin Aznar 
proposed by Gcrncr 
the General 
Secretary of 
the FETde las 
JONS 
So, of 17 people, there were 12 Falangists, 1 military, 2 technocrats and people from 
the private sector or other professions but without an specific ideological adherence, and 
only 2 Social Catholics. We can no longer find well-known social reformists, who had been 
working in the INP for years and were committed to the principles upon which the INP had 
been founded, such as Vicente Madera Pefia, Zumalacirregui Prat or Fernando Camacho 
Barios. Only Jordana de Pozas and Primitivo de la Quintana remained on the Governing 
Body. 
Therefore, by June 1941, the Falangists had taken over the INP. Minister Girbn 
made clear that the INP could no longer continued to be ` a closed sphere to the Falangist 
revolution'32. This remark revived the Falangist plan with regard to the INP and opened the 
way to an escalation of criticisms of the Institute and its staff. Thus, in February 1943, Girön 
declared that he did not consider `the Governing Body of the INP, which is somehow the 
headquarters of our social struggle, to be a simple meeting of civil servants, but as the place 
to form Falangist comrades... Therefore, among you, there cannot be bureaucrats, but 
squadron membersi33 
A new style was imposed on the INP, by which the model of the civil servant and 
bureaucrat was openly rejected. With its criticism came the discredit and oblivion of the 
previous achievements in social insurance. In his speeches, Girbn deliberately avoided 
mentioning the history of the INP or highlighting what others had done in social policy 
before the Francoist uprising. In Franco's first visit to the INP in March 1942, which was 
also Girön's first visit since his appointment as Labour Minister'°, Girön dc Velasco said: 
32 For the discourse given by Girbn to the new Governing Body, see Boletln de Informacldn del INP, 
June 1941, No. 6, p. 15. 33 Boletin de Informaci6n del INP, February 1943, No. 2, pp. 1-7. 34 The first visit Girbn paid to any institution after being appointed Labour Minister was to the National Office of Syndicates. At the beginning of June 1941, Gir6n visited the National Institute of 
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'The National Movement found in the social insurance system much discussion and few 
achievements, too much politics without action. Instead of long comparative studies, we 
prefer the clear and laconic language of numbers 03 
. 
In addition to changes in personnel and style, institutional reforms occurred, 
introduced by the Decree of the Labour Ministry of 31 May 194136. First, it is worth noting 
the change of words when naming the key posts. Instead of the former description of 
"Director" or "Sub-Director" of the INP, the terms "Commissary" and "Sub-Commissary" 
were now used. Secondly, the Decree stated that the Commissary would no longer be elected 
by the Labour Minister from a list of three people provided by the Governing Body of the 
INP. The appointment of the Commissary would be independently decided by the Minister. 
Thirdly, the directors of the National Funds of Family Subsidies and the National 
Fund of Working Injuries Insurance Schemes were no longer members of the Governing 
Body. This is quite striking, as it would imply a big loss in policy co-ordination. Fourthly, 
the members proposed by the now extinguished Ministry of Syndical Organisation and 
Action were suppressed, which meant that the Associated Funds could no longer be present 
at the Governing Body. The same held true for the members proposed by the CNPS. The 
Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the General Secretary of the 
Movement remained with representatives in the Governing Body. The National Office of 
Syndicates replaced the Ministry of Syndical Organisation and Action and maintained the 
same number of representatives. But the greatest change happened regarding the introduction 
of members of "free designation", which basically meant that they were elected by the 
Minister of Labour. It is not therefore surprising that most of the Governing Body members 
elected this way, four out of five, were Falangists and very prominent Falangists indeed, 
such as Sanz Bachiller and Sebastian Criado del Rey. 
Housing (see Arriba, 4 June 1941, p. 3). however, he did not visit to the INP until 27 June 1941, to 
preside the constitution of the new Governing Body: see the Boletin de Informacion del INP, June 
1941, No. 6, p. 14. 35 Boletin de tnformacidn del INP, March 1942, No. 3, p. 5. A completely different approach to that of 
Jordana de Pozas (1961: 490-1): `Against the arrogance of "I did everything", we have to recognise 
ourselves as sons, heirs and followers'. 36 BOE, 8 June 1941. 
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Together with the attempt to control it from inside, the INP was also surrendering 
autonomy to the Ministry of Labour. If once the INP had been created as an autonomous 
institution, or "non-political" (meaning by this not being involved in the political struggle 
between parties), with the arrival of Girdn dc Velasco and his team, things changed. So in 
January 1942, by a Decree of the Ministry of Labour, the Governing Body was constituted to 
work in permanent sub-committees, hollowing out the roles and activity of the whole 
Governing Body. In fact, these sub-committees acted as advisory bodies for the Ministry of 
Labour, making them more independent (in this advisory role) of the Governing Body of the 
INP". It was the Labour Minister who decided which committees were to be created and 
which members would serve on each one of them, while the Governing Body had no right to 
decide anything. This way, the Ministry could prevent any possible corporate opposition 
from the Governing Body, although it was not probable, due to the massive presence of 
Falangists on it. 
On 16 October 194238, an important institutional reform was introduced regarding 
the presidency of the INP. Instead of the General Director of Social Insurance, at that time 
Grerio Pozurama, the presidency was transferred to the Under-Secretary of Labour, Esteban 
Perez Gonzalez, the highest authority in the Ministry of Labour after the Minister. This way, 
the INP became more co-ordinated with the Ministry (or, in fact, falling under its control). 
But the culmination of this process happened two months later, when the Minister himself 
decided that he was going to occupy the presidency of the INP, although with the right to 
delegate to a subordinate39. I have already pointed out that, by the Decree of 1938, the INP 
President had the power to block any decision taken by the Governing Body when he 
considered it detrimental to the national interest or going against the government's plans and 
aims. It is then understandable that Girdn badly desired to control this post which would 
37 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 28 January 1942. The justification for such new 
institutions appears to be the need for a closer relationship between the INP and the Ministry of 
Labour in order to carry out the instructions of the latter more fully. 38 BOE, 22 October 1942. 
39 Decree of 14 December 1942, BOE, 29 December 1942. 
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grant him an extremely important power of veto. Girbn delegated to the Under-Secretary of 
Labour, but the Minister himself had the right to take over again without previous notice. 
With the appointment of Buenaventura Jose Castro Rial as new General Director of Social 
Insurance in February 1943 and first Vice-President of the INP, the hierarchy of the institute 
was finally complete. At the top, there was the Minister of Labour, as INP President, 
delegating to the Under-Secretary of Labour, and below him, the General Director of 
Prevision as first Vice-President. 
In a speech to the Governing Body, in February 1943, Girbn de Velasco summarised 
what he expected the INP to be and do: `We have to transform the INP into the best tentacle 
of the National-Syndical State with regard to social policy. The spirit of the Movement has 
to preside its work completely, while the best harmony and co-ordination is achieved in all 
those common spheres with the Falange's organisations. Specifically, a unity of thought, 
action and style with the Syndical Organisation is needed, understanding each others as 
comrades with the same faith who fight for the same aim in different fields. The INP has to 
be more than a mere state body: it has to be an efficient element in the advancement of the 
social policy of the revolution. Its mission is to avoid, by replacing the current managers, this 
situation whereby 
-profits which resulted from the collective effort only benefit private 
interests'ao 
Girbn's remarks of the need for the INP to work shoulder to shoulder with the 
Syndical Organisation revealed that, during this phase, not only did the INP lose autonomy, 
giving it up to the Ministry of Labour, but also lost its exclusive hold over the management 
of social insurance. The involvement of the Syndical Organisation was imposed and 
duplications tolerated. The INP was ordered to collaborate. Previously, Jordana de Pozas, 
though having no other choice than to accept things as they were, had defended at least the 
primacy of the INP in the organisation of social insurance: ` It is advisable to concentrate in 
the INP the preparation and execution of the legal norms adopted by the Government 
40 Boletin de Informaciön del INP, February 1944, No. 2, p. 3. 
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through the Ministry of Labour. It is important, however, to highlight that this unification is 
not meant to be an all-absorbent monopoly, nor does it exclude the possibility of co- 
ordinating with other public bodies and allied services or collaboration with social 
institutions such as the Syndicates' (Jordana dc Pozas, 1941: 16). 
Thus, from June 1941 to January 1943, the INP was in state of internal turmoil. All 
these organisational changes, added to the task of expanding existing social insurance 
schemes and building new ones, putting the Institute at risk. Jordana dc Pozas, in January 
1943, recognised the dramatic situation: `The fair impatience of the state has put the INP in 
such jeopardy that sometimes we have feared its break down 
... 
The risk has not completely 
gone away.. 
. 
But indeed, the moment of highest risk has passed'". 
In the following months, new changes were introduced. Sebastian Criado del Rey, 
who at that time was a member of the Governing Body, was appointed as Director of the 
newly created National Fund of the Sickness Insurance Scheme and Mariano Fuentes 
Cascajares replaced Jose Mufioz Rodriguez as Director of the National Fund of Family 
Subsidies. A new regulation in January 1944 allowed the directors of the three Funds to 
participate in the Governing Body but without the right to vote. This limited facility of 
taking a seat on the Governing Body but not being able to vote was also granted in February 
1943 to the Chief of the National Service of Old Age and Maternity. So, by April 1944, the 
Governing Body of the INP was constituted of 18 members: 
41 Boletin de Informacidn del INP, January 1943, No. 1, p. 110. 
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Th Filth GnvnrnLnn Rode. Anril 1944 
Social Falangists Military Technocrats 
Catholics 
President of Estcban Perez 
the Governing 
Bod 
Vice-President Buenaventura J. 
and INP Castro 
President 
Commissa Luis Jordana 
Sub- 
Commissary Jesüs Rivero 
Free Elected Jose Muhoz Mercedes Sanz Camilo 
Members (replaced by MenCndez 
Constantino Pablo Martinez 
Lobo) 
Carlos Ruiz 
Member Francisco 
proposed by Astigarraga 
the Ministry of 
Home Affairs 
Members Alfonso dc la Rodrigo Urfa 
proposed by Fuente 
the National 
Office of Jose Luis Palao 
Syndicates (replaced by 
Joaquin Cardenas) 
Antonio Rodriguez 
Ricardo Martinez 
Ramon Azaola 
(replaced by 
Francisco Norte) I 
Member Carlos lose 
proposed by Gonzalez 
the Ministry of 
Finance 
Member Agustin Aznar 
proposed by 
FET de las 
JONS 
As can be seen, the Social Catholic Primitivo de la Quintana left the Governing 
Body, although the former Director of the Family Subsidies Fund joined in. The Falangists 
remained, by far, the most represented family. 
How could Girön carry out such profound changes? This can be answered by 
pointing to the institutions of the non-democratic Francoist regime that granted the minister 
with broad decision-making powers. All these reforms were passed in the form of decrees 
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and ministerial orders, by which the minister only required Franco's approval, being thus 
able to bypass the Council of Ministers. 
The reader might be asking why Girön did not get rid of Jordana dc I'ozas and 
appoint a Falangist as Commissary of the INP, therefore completing the total control of the 
Institute. Moreover, we know that Girön and Jordana had very different styles (and 
motivations), as Giron himself said in his biography: `(Jordana) had a brilliant curriculum 
vitae which put him at the front of the INP, and liked doing things calmly, too calmly for 
me... Jordana did not like my urgency' (Girön de Velasco, 1994: 170). There might be 
different reasons why Jordana remained as Commissary. First, Jordana dc Pozas was at that 
moment one of the most respected experts on social insurance in Spain. Secondly, Jordana 
himself was not a mere civil servant, but a permanent member of the Council of State, 
therefore a top politician within the Francoist regime. And thirdly, there was an institution 
that acted as veto point, impeding the removal of Jordana without very serious reasons. By 
the INP regulations, the General Director (or Commissary) was appointed by the Labour 
Minister, but could only be removed by a decision of the Council of Ministers and after a 
formal procedure in which the removed person was entitled to defend himself 
- 
in a legal 
hearing. 
Although the INP was growing fast and social insurance schemes were being 
created, reformed and set in motion, or perhaps because of this, the financial situation of the 
Institute started crumbling. The first shout of alarm was given by the member of the 
Governing Body Martinez Almeida in the session of 26 October 1944`2, who foresaw the 
collapse of the INP in four years if the situation was not appropriately tackled. He blamed 
the Ministry of Finance for not having paid the compulsory state's contribution, which he 
claimed it was `a right of the Institute and an obligation of the Treasury'. In July 1945, the 
deficit amounted up to 45 millions of pesetas, caused by the already-mentioned failure of the 
Ministry of Finance to pay and the hefty price of introducing the Family Subsidy Scheme in 
the agricultural sector. 
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It has been suggested that another power struggle took place between the Ministry of 
Finance and the Labour Ministry (Gonzalez Murillo, 1998) for the control of the funds of the 
INP. The Laws of 5 November 1940 and 13 March 1943, drafted by the Minister of Finance, 
Joaquin Benjumea Burin, stipulated how and where public bodies should invest their funds 
and how tax exemptions should apply to them. By the Law of 29 June 1943,60 per cent of 
the INP's funds had to be invested in national debt bonds, 10 per cent in buildings and 30 per 
cent in social enterprises such as housing, colonisation and reforestation. 
Obviously, the INP was at risk with these measures because it was obliged to make 
investments with no return, while the whole financial architecture of the Institute relied on 
the revenues obtained via contributions and these investments. Girbn de Velasco allegedly 
wrote to Franco threatening to resign if the Finance Minister was allowed to go on with those 
measures. Most probably, Girön de Velasco and Benjumea Burin had, in addition to different 
corporate (ministerial) interests, a personal rivalry, as Girbn had replaced him at the Ministry 
of Labour. However, the result of this struggle was not, as Gonzalez Murillo (1998) 
suggests, with Girön and the INP as losers, because, by the Decree of 3 November 1943, the 
INP was exempted from the 1940 and 1943 Laws (Jordana de Pozas, 1953: 68). 
I do not know how the conflict was resolved, but my guess is that (in the absence of 
regulations for resolving departmental conflicts) it was Franco who finally decided. In these 
circumstances, the end of the Second World War placed Francoist regime in a difficult 
situation and a new balance of power within the regime arose. The government crisis of 20 
July 1945 brought changes to the regime and also to the INP. 
42 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 26 October 1944, No. 75. 
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7.2.4. The Stage of Equilibrium and Sclerosis 
As explained in Chapter Six, the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945 acted as an 
external determinant of the political evolution of Francoism, which had as a consequence the 
government crisis of July 1945. The composition of the new cabinet was altered by reducing 
the number of Falangist ministers to three, while the military were given six posts. Ilowever, 
the most crucial ministry at that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was handed over to 
the young Catholic figure Alberto Martin Artajo. This meant that the Catholic Church was 
given the task of obtaining for the regime international support and, mainly, the acquiescence 
of the Catholic international community. 
The reasserted power of the Catholic Church within the regime43 was also reflected 
in the INP, which experienced changes in its top echelon. Social Catholics took over 
command of the Institute again. 
By the Decree of 2 November 1945, Pedro Sangro y Ros dc Olano, Social Catholic 
and member of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, was appointed as 
President of the Governing Body and the Permanent Commission of the INP. In addition, the 
Decree introduced two huge institutional developments with regard to the way the 
presidency had been organised so far. First, it meant that the Labour Minister was no longer 
the INP President. Secondly, in contrast to former appointments to this position of INP 
President which were the solely responsibility of the Labour Minister, Sangro y Ros de 
Olano was appointed by the Council of Ministers after having been proposed by the Labour 
Minister. By these reforms, the position of the INP President gained a certain degree of 
autonomy with regard to the Ministry of Labour. In any case, the autonomy was limited to 
the ability of the Minister of Labour to suspend any agreement made by the Governing Body 
43 That a window of opportunity was opening for the Catholic Church was something that had already been felt in October 1944 by the General Secretary of the ACNdeP, Martin Sanchez Julia: We, 
Propagandistas, have already studied enough.. 
. 
we can now put forward (a plan) that has so far been in 
abeyance', Boletin de la Asociacidn Catdlica Nacional de Propagandistas, 20 October 1944, No. 338, 
p. 11. 
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which he might consider harmful to the general interest of the Nation or not in line with the 
government's criteria on social insurance schcmes44. Other changes in the INP also show that 
a new stage was starting. To the prevailing title of "Commissary", closer to Falangist 
language, the former title of "Director" was added, resulting in the long-winded 
"Commissary-Director". 
These changes were explained by the Under-Secretary of Labour, Carlos Pinilla 
Turii3o, as a "gesture of magnanimity" by the Minister of Labour Girbn dc Velasco. The new 
INP President, Pedro Sangro y Ros de Olano, also praised the Minister for such an 
"unselfish" act of handing over the presidency. But, more than a simple functional dc- 
concentration of roles and responsibilities, what explain the changes was the struggle for 
power within the regime. A bit naively, or perhaps totally on purpose, Sangro y Ros dc 
Olano said: `I must share with you that some people have come to me these days with quite 
odd intentions. Some people have told me: "Thank God that you go to that house (the INP), 
where you will represent this or that"... Other people have told me: "Now this will be 
orientated in this or that way". And I have answered them that the orientations on social 
policy are strictly in the hands of the government, and specifically in those of the Minister of 
Labour"'. 
So, clearly, there were people who rejected the INP policies, attitudes or styles of the 
Falangist phase, and saw then the so-long-waited moment of change. There was, then, a 
feeling that things were going to progress in a different way from that moment onwards. For 
sure, Sangro y Ros de Olano's style had nothing to do with Girbn dc Velasco's rcvolutionary 
populism. On the contrary, Sangro, an aristocrat, represented the coming back of the "old" 
hierarchies of the INP, those who had been in charge of it during the 1920s and the 1930s - 
indeed, in the Republican period. Most surely, for the staff of the INP, he would represent a 
sort of guarantee of the future of the Institute and a symbol that it was then entering a new 
44 The Decree of 2 November 1945 appeared in the BOE, 10 November 1945 and in the Boletin de 
Informacidn del INP, November 1945, No. 11, pp. 2147-50. 
43 Boletin de Informacidn del INP, December 1945, No. 12, p. 2403. 
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phase of much more stability. The change in the name of the journal published by the INI' 
was perhaps a sign of the new stage that the institute was just starting. Since January 1947, 
the former Boletin de Informaciön del INP was rcplaccd by the Reti'ista Espanola de 
Seguridad Social, adopting the fashionable term at the time, social security. 
The new Governing Body of November 1945 amounted to up to thirty people: 
The Sixth Governing Bode, November 1945 
Social Falangists Military Technocrats 
Catholics 
/NP President Pedro Sangro 
Vice-President Jose Luis 
Corral 
Commissary- Luis Jordana (replaced by 
Director Ilcrmenegildo 
ßaylos) 
Sub-Commissary Jesüs Rivero 
General Director of Jost Alberto 
Health Palanca 
Sub-Director of the Alfonso de la 
Institute of Fucnte 
Medicine, hygiene 
and Safety at Work 
Director of the Sebastian 
National Fund of Criado 
the SOE 
Director of the Isaac Galcerän 
National Fund of 
Working Injuries 
Insurance Scheme 
Director of the Mariano 
National Fund of Fucntcs 
Family Subsidies 
Member proposed Carlos Jose 
by the Ministry of Gonzalez 
Finance 
Member Antonio 
representing the Fcrratgcs 
National College of 
Doctors 
Member Isidro dc 
representing the Grcgorio 
Institutions which 
collaborate in the 
Working Injuries 
Scheme 
Member Victor 
representing Gaminde 
Institutions which 
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collaborate in the 
SOE 
Member 
representinf PAI 
com anies4 
Member 
representing 
companies with 
higher risk of 
47 working injuries 
Member 
representing 
"model" 
companies 48 
Members 
representing the 
Syndical 
O anisation 
Members freely 
appointed by the 
Labour Minister 
Members 
representing 
workers 
Secretary of the 
Governing Body 
Mercedes Sanz 
Agustin Aznar 
Agustin 
Miranda Pablo Martinez 
Carlos Ruiz 
Dcmctrio 
Mcstrcs 
Rafael Rubio 
Silvcstrc 
Scgarra 
Francisco 
Norte 
Camilo Jose MuAiz 
Menendez 
Joaquin 
Cardenas 
Constantino 
Lobo 
Ram6n 
Fernandez 
Jose 
Rodriguez 
Manuel 
Sanchez 
Valentin 
Fernandez 
A great variety of interests were represented on this Governing Body, from different 
government departments and public bodies to representatives of workers, industries or 
private insurance institutions which ran schemes in partnership with the INP. As a result, the 
number of the people sitting on the Governing Body increased. But this was not intended to 
involve all interests in the decision-making centre of the INP, as there were big differences 
in the representation. As can be seen, workers held only three seats in the Govcming Body, 
46 PAI stands for Pago Autorizado o Impuesto, referring to those companies which operated with 
special financing regulations. 
4 Such as mines and chemical and steel companies. 
49 It was an honorific title given to companies, based on political (support for the regime, collaboration 
with political authorities of the party and the Syndical Organisation, political position during the Civil 
War), social (initiatives with workers, political and syndicate atmosphere within the company) and 
economic criteria (importance of the company for the economy of the country, policies of the 
company for improving production and technology). Each Provincial Office of Syndicates proposed 
three companies to be elected as Empresas Modelo. 
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while industries, private insurance companies and doctors, potential opponents to further 
expansions of social insurance schemes, held six seats. The Syndical Organisation, with 
three representatives, retained much of its power for vetoing policies that might harm the 
development of its own social insurance schemes. 
It was, however, clear from the beginning that such a huge Governing Body was not 
going to be effective. Perhaps it was one of the aims of the drafters of the Dccrcc of 2 
November 1945 to set up an apparently interests-inclusive institution, which, at the end of 
the day, would be ineffectual. Actual decision-making power was transferred to a newly 
created institution within the Governing Body, the Permanent Commission. By the same 
Decree of 2 November 1945 the members of this Commission were: 
The Permanent Commi. ccinu_ Notenher 1945 
Social Falangists Military Technocrats 
Catholics 
President of Pedro Sangro 
the 
Commission 
Vice- Jose Luis 
President Corral 
Commissary Luis Jordana 
Sub- Jesbs Rivero 
Commissary Mencscs 
Secretary 
Free Elected Constantino Francisco Norte 
Members Lobo 
Carlos J. 
Joaquin Gonz3lcz 
CArdcnas 
Silvestre Segarra 
Isidro dc Grc orio 
The establishment of the Permanent Commission was a rctum to the old days in 
which the INP was run by a Board of Trustees and Executive Committee. The Permanent 
Commission would be the equivalent of the latter. Most probably, the title of Executive 
Committee was avoided on purpose so as not to show, too openly, that it was a return to 
previous times. Otherwise, there would have been a strong opposition from the Falangist 
faction. 
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It is extremely interesting to see how none of the worker's representatives or even 
the doctors, were in that Permanent Commission. Only the top echelon members of the INP, 
together with two appointees by the Ministry of Labour, and one representative each of the 
Ministry of Finance, the Syndical Organisation, the "model enterprises" and the private 
insurance companies. As can be seen, this group was fairly balanced in ideological terms. 
The Governing Body was expanded on 28 December 1945 to incorporate 
representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and the General Council of Official 
Pharmaceutical Colleges. Representing the former, Carlos Rodriguez Spiteri was appointed, 
and representing the latter Ramon Turrientes Miguel. In November 1946, the Social Catholic 
Hermenegildo Baylos Corroza replaced Jose Luis Corral SSiz as Vice-President of the INP, 
thus reinforcing the power of the Catholics in the INP. One month later, Falangist Pedro Lain 
Entralgo took his seat as representative of the National Council of Medical Colleges, 
replacing Antonio Ferratges Tarrida. On 17 January 1947, the Governing Body grew even 
more with the addition of the representative from the Social Institute of Fishermen. It was 
also decreed that the member representing the National Institute of Medicine, hygiene and 
Security at Work be its Director, instead of the Sub-Director. Also in December, a new 
member, Martin Merino Charro, joined the Governing Body as member appointed by the 
Labour Minister. Daniel Zarzuelo Polo did not last in the Governing Body more than seven 
months, from 9 March to 28 October 1948. In May 1949, Salvador M6gica Buhigas replaced 
Camilo Menendez Tolosa in the Governing Body, due to the fact that the latter had been 
appointed as General Director of Social Insurance. In December 1950, the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce placed a representative on the Governing Body49. 
Although the most difficult moments for the INP had already passed, still in 1948 
conflicts arose and the Institute had to face serious criticism from the Falangists. On 27 
September 1948, the Falangist member of the Governing Body Daniel Zarzuclo Polo 
presented before the Governing Body a motion of censure against the executive authorities 
49 By the Decree of 10 November 1950. 
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of the Institute, mainly Jordana dc PozasSO. Jordana rcplicd promptly and the Governing 
Body dismissed Zarzuelo's accusations, but the incident rcflcctcd that, although less visible. 
Falangist opposition within the INP had not disappcarcd. Jordana's reply is extremely 
interesting because it exposed, crystal-clear, the political struggles that were occurring at the 
time between Falangists organisation and the INP. Zarzuclo's criticisms could be 
summarised as follows: 
9 The INP was a bureaucratic institution swamped by red tape. 
9 The social insurance schemes run by the INP had failed. 
0 The person responsible for the failure was the Commissary-Director. 
" The Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions were much better than the INP's 
social insurance schemes, and in particular, `Family Plus' outstripped the Family 
Subsidies easily. 
9 In consequence, the Family Subsidies should be abolished, the rest of social 
insurance schemes should be transferred to the Syndical Organisation and to 
private institutions such as Savings Banks, and the INP should be suppressed. 
Zarzuelo's motion of censure reflected political motives, which very well could have 
been originated by a feeling of frustration among the Falangists due to their failure to take 
over the INP. It also could have meant a last and desperate effort to dynamite the Institute 
from within, but, in any case, it did not produce anything else than a strong rejection from 
the Governing Body, which fully backed Jordana and his team up. Zarzuclo left the 
Governing Body one month later, on 28 October 1948. 
The pace of passing laws slowed down considerably. In five years (1945.1950) only 
the National Fund of the Old Age and Disability Insurance Scheme was cstablishcd. The 
implementation of the SOE met serious opposition from the doctors, which led to the 
so See Governing Body of the INP, 27 September 1948. Document titled Informe sobre los Seguros 
Sociales Obligatorios y su drgano Gestor en Espai a. Zarzuelo accused Jordana of mismanagement, 
'collaboration with previous governments and connivance with the enemy' (p. 44). 
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establishment of a Commission in October 1947 for ascertaining their demands and solving 
the problem. And finally, once again, the process of discussing the unification of the social 
insurance schemes was opened by the Decree of 29 December 1948. 
7.2.5. The Reorganisation of the INP in 1950 
In 1950, the INP suffered a major internal rcorganisation provoked by: 1) the new 
political situation, 2) the demands of an increasing complex system of social insurance and 
3) the search for new forms of public management. First, the new political situation resulted 
from the definitive abandonment of the economic strategy of the autarky and the chance to 
be gradually accepted by the democratic nations that the new international order was giving 
Francoism. Secondly, the implementation of the new SOVI and the consolidation of the rest 
of the existing schemes provoked changes at the organisational level. Finally, new public 
sector ideas (mainly the involvement of the users in the design and evaluation of services) 
encouraged the establishment of new mechanisms to channel demands. 
By the Decree of 3 February 1950, the Institute of Medicine and Security at Work 
fell under the INP with regard to its administration and a Special Office of the National Plan 
of Hospital Buildings of the Sickness Insurance Scheme was created. However, the biggest 
change within the INP came in the summer of 1950. The Decree of 14 July 1950 reorganised 
the administrative structure of the Institutes', granting the authorities of the INP with even 
further independence of the Minister of Labour. The President, the Vice-President and the 
General Director of the INP were to be appointed by the Council of Ministers, although the 
Labour Minister was to propose the candidates. 
But more important, this Decree put forward the principles of rationalisation and 
decentralisation of services and greater involvement of members (citizens in general and INP 
51 BOE, 18 July 1950. 
243 
staff), which inspired the consequent reforms introduced. Thus, the Dccrcc introduced four 
major changes. First, administrative procedures were unified and rationalised. In order to 
meet this aim, better co-ordination with the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions was 
attempted and a compilation and simplification of the diverse regulations on social insurance 
was carried out. Secondly, the creation of Provincial Advice Councils to involvc regional 
branches in the management and planning of the social insurance system. Thirdly, workers 
came to be represented on the Permanent Commission of the INP, as they had been left out 
of this body in the 1945 reforms. From now on, the Permanent Commission was to be 
formed by the President and the Vice-President of the INP, the General Director, the 
directors of the different National Funds of the Institute, plus six othcr mcmbcrs of the 
Governing Body: one representing the Ministry of Finance, one representing workers, 
another representing employers and three members chosen by the Labour Minister. 
Fourthly, the most important change was the establishment within the INP of 
General Assemblies, the first one occurring in 1951. These Assemblies were intended to 
review the work of the Institute every year and bring together the demands and proposals 
from the different provincial councils. Under the presidency of the Minister of Labour, they 
would include the General Director of Social Insurance, the highest authoritics of the INP 
and the presidents, workers' and employers' representatives of all the Provincial Advice 
Councils. The Assemblies were presented as an organisational revolution and, as one top 
echelon civil servant argued at the timeS2, as inspired by the newly fashionable public 
administration ideas of involving users of public services in the management of the system 
and schemes. The Decree itself pointed to the need of increasing 'the participation of the 
affiliated members in the administration and management of the INP'. This sudden need 
could have developed as a reaction to the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions, because 
the latter claimed that they were managed by their own affiliates, while they criticised the 
INP for being a hierarchical structure in which the users did not have a say. I lowcvcr, these 
52 See Hermenegildo Baylos Corroza's speech at the First General Assembly of the INP in 1953. 
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measures were not aimed at democratising nor incorporating users to the policy-making 
process, but at channelling demands from the party and the Administration in a wcll"planncd 
way. Not users of public services (apolitical citizens) but carefully-selected civil servants and 
Falangists comrades were the ones who were invited to take part in these Assemblies and 
Provincial Councils. 
In addition, the expansion of the SOE and the untenable situation of fragmented 
management resulted in the establishment, by the Decree of 21 July 195053, of a National 
Office of the SOE. This was responsible for co-ordinating all the institutions which were 
involved in the running of the scheme, such as the General Directorate of Social Insurance, 
the INP, the National Confederation of Institutions of Social Insurance or the Syndicates. 
The National Chief of the SOE reported to the General Director of Social Insurance, 
therefore detaching certain aspects of the running of the SOE from the INP. 
These changes marked the end of the period studied in this thesis. The political 
struggle between Falangists and Social Catholics which had shaped the evolution of the INP 
and the social insurance system diminished. What had been set up in the 1940s remained 
until the reforms of the 1960s. The decade of the 1950s did not sec any major change in 
regard to social insurance. The INP did not have proper regulations until 1958, when the 
Estatutos Orgänicos were passed54. It is thus worth calling a halt in 1950 for our research as 
that year marked the beginning of the lost decade of the Spanish welfare state, when Spain 
definitively lost sight of the social security reforms that were being undertaken elsewhere 
around the world. The Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme, which would have helped 
to catch up or even overtake the achievements of the neighbouring countries, was never 
established. It was a lost decade, or a boring decade, that between 1947 and 1957, from the 
33 BOE, 20 August 1950. 
sa See INP (1958), Estatutos Orgänicos del Instituto Nacional de Prevision, Madrid: Publicaciones del 
INP, No. 979. T1e regulations appeared in the BOE. 3 February 1958. It was definitively established 
that the people occupying the posts of President and General Director were to be appointed and 
removed by decree, after agreement at the Council of Ministers on the candidate proposed by the Labour Minister. 
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point of view of the institutional development of Francoim ('Thomas I Andrcu, 1999: 56) and 
of the Francoist social insurance system. 
7.2.6. Conclusion 
The INP was the institution which drafted all Francoist social insurance policies. 
Thus, the control of the INP was a much desired instrument of power for the contending 
families and policymakers of the regime. The Falangists and, especially Girdn dc Vclasco, 
clearly perceived the usefulness of controlling the INP from within. 
However, the INP being in the hands of the Social Catholic family, the take-over of 
the Institute required determination and the use of all the resources available to the Minister, 
in order to avoid the encountering of fierce opposition or more-than-probable vetoes. Thus, 
Minister Girön de Velasco made use of the institution of the decree as the legal norm by 
which all reforms were passed. Clearly, given the radical structural changes suffered by the 
INP, most of the reforms required legal norms of higher status than decrees. They should 
have been full laws, therefore subjected to the discussion by the Council of Ministers. 
The Council of Ministers was therefore bypassed, as also happened with the Council 
of State 
-the two institutions which would have eventually opposed Girbn's plans. I lowevcr, 
institutions also acted to limit the capacity of actors to manoeuvre, as happened when Girdn 
was faced with electing the INP General Director from a list of three people which was 
presented to him and which left him with almost no other choice but to appoint Jordana dc 
Pozas for that post. Girön appointed Jordana but, for the future, decided that the 
Commissary-Director would no longer be elected that way (from a list provided by the 
Governing Body of the INP) but only by a decision of the Labour Minister. 
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Due to the fact that ministers and, in this case, the Minister of Labour had extensive 
institutional resources and total monopoly over his policy areas, Gir6n succeeded in his plan. 
Only changes within the Francoist regime in 1945 forced a radical change in his strategy. 
Using the INP as a platform for policy change, policy actors engaged in the drafting 
and implementing of social insurance policies. Thus, the evolution of the INP does not only 
have interest in itself, but also because social insurance policies were originated from within 
the Institute. Therefore, having studied this evolution in Chapter Seven, we arc now in a 
better position to understand how and why social insurance policies developed as they did. 
This is what I will study in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
The Making of Francoist Social Policies 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the way the major social insurance laws created 
by Francoism between 1936 and 1950 were shaped by institutions of the regime. The power 
struggles between the families of the regime taking place within the non-democratic 
institutional framework explain the configuration of the social insurance system. 
All the laws created between 1938 and 1941 (the year when Girön dc Vclasco was 
appointed as Labour Minister) were presented to public opinion as a result of the Catholic 
impulse that ran inside the Francoist regime. The Labour Charter for example was defined as 
a `true manual of Christian sociology', inspired in the Catholic social doctrine of the 
Malinas Social Code and in Pope Pious XII's encyclical Quadragessimo Anno2. Alberto 
Martin Artajo affirmed in the journal Ecclesia on 15 May 1941 that those who had written 
the Labour Charter were Catholics, as well as those who had promulgated it'. The same 
happened to those insurance laws created by the INP before 1941, that they were presented 
as the direct legislative application of the Catholic Social Doctrine'. The Family Subsidies 
Scheme was the purpose of two well-known Social Catholics, Severino Aznar (Aznar, 1950) 
and Jose Munoz. At the same time, the INP monopolised the management of the social 
insurance system in Spain and became the single major think-tank in providing ideas and 
policy solutions regarding social policy. 
Things however changed in 1941, when the Falangists, under the command of Jose 
Antonio Girön de Velasco, took over the Ministry of Labour. A power struggle bctwccn the 
Social Catholics and Falangists for the control of the INP broke out and continued over the 
elaboration of policies such as Family Subsidies, `Family Plus', the SOE, Regulations of the 
SOE, the Subsidy of Forced Unemployment and the Comprehensive Social Insurance 
Boletin de Informacidn del INP, December 1944, No. 12, p. 1562. 2 Aznar, S., ` Para Quien se ha dado el Regimen de Subsidios Familiares', Boletln (le Informacidn dc! 
INP, April 1944, No. 4, p. 508. The process of constructing the Labour Charter is explained by Payne (1985: 189). 
3 See Anton Ortiz, B., `Sobre el Espiritu Social Cristiano de la Revolucibn Nacionalsindicalista', 
Revista de Trabajo, August 1941, Nos. 21-22, p. 82. 
4 Garcia Daybn, J., ` Sobre el Sentido Catölico del Subsidio a la Vejez', Revista Financiera, 5 August 
1941, pp. 4-5. 
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Scheme. As will be shown, the policy-making process of these laws reflects such a power 
struggle. 
The struggle took place through the institutions of the regime, as a battle between the 
General Directorate of Social Insurance (dependent on the Ministry of Labour) and the 
National Office of Syndicates on the one hand and the INP on the other, with the 
involvement of other departments such as the General Directorate of health (under the 
Ministry of Home Affairs). 
8.1. The Family Subsidies and `Family Plus' 
The Family Subsidies 
On 18 July 1938, the Francoist regime created a compulsory system of family 
subsidies, nationally-extended, progressive in its benefits, financed by the contributions of 
employers, with a set-up capital provided by the State, and with a funding pay-as-you-go 
system5. It was applied to workers without limit of salary or type of job, being later extended 
to civil servants and military officials. The administration was held by the INP through the 
National Fund of Family Subsidies6. 
The INP had been pursuing the establishment of this scheme for a few years, so a 
number of studies had been carried out prior to the Civil War. By the time it was decided to 
implement this policy, policy-makers within the INP searched for parallel examples from 
abroad, mainly from the Italian, the French and the Belgium schemes. The Belgium 
s Iglesias and Meil (2001: 35) explain why it was given the name "Family Subsidies" instead of 
"Family Insurance Scheme". Although it was a compulsory insurance scheme, it was funded as a pay. 
as-you-go, not capitalised as was common at the time. To mark that difference, it was wrongly called 
"subsidy". 
6 INP (1940), Caja Nacional de Subsidios Familiares. Caracleres, Organi: acidn, Reali: acian, 
Madrid: Publicaciones INP, No. 513. 
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Association des Caisses d'Allocations Fainiliales sent their registration forms to the IN! ' in 
October 1938 so that the Spanish policy-makers could have an idea of how to make theirs. 
Luis Jordana dc Pozas, then Sub-Director of the INP, travelled to France and Italy in 1938 to 
study the operation of the family social policies in those countries. Also, private Spanish 
insurance companies, such as the Caja Compensadora de Cargas Fanriliares of Salamanca, 
a Catholic-dependent institution created on 25 July 1937, gave appropriate advice to the INP 
on how to sort out technical things such as the registration documents or the structure of the 
scheme7. 
Social Catholics had long been interested in enacting social policies to protect 
families and prevent them falling into poverty (Iglesias and Meil, 2001). It was Severino 
Aznar who developed the Catholic theory of the family salary as the most effective way of 
protecting the stability and integrity of the family, thus preventing mothers from joining the 
labour market. For Aznar, mothers were forced to work outside the house because men could 
not bring home enough to support their families. Without the constant presence of the 
mother, family life weakened and children were not properly brought up. Thus, the family 
salary would act as the best way to stop this by paying according to family needs. The 
debates concentrated on how the family salary should be organised (Iglesias and Mcil, 2001). 
Aznar proposed the form of an insurance scheme as preferable to a direct payment transfer, 
organised by a national fund instead of by regional funds (Aznar, 1952: 13). 
As a result of these initiatives, a draft bill establishing a Family Subsidy scheme was 
drawn up in Santander on 30 June 1938, called Anteproyecto de Decreto-Ley en virtud del 
cual se crea en Espana un Regimen Obligatorio de Subsidios Familiares. It was not said 
who was in charge of writing it, but from different references it stems that it was Jose 
Mufloze. The draft was then sent to be reviewed by the CNPS, under the presidency of Luis 
See INP Archive [4.23. B2], Files 48 and 48-1 (both entitled Preparacidn del Regimen Obligatorio 
de Subsidios Familiares). 
The Governing Body of the INP acknowledges the effort put by Jose Munoz in the elaboration of the 
Family Subsidies Scheme by appointing him as first Director of the National Fund of Family 
Subsidies. See Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 22 April 1939, No. 8, p. 34. 
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Jordana de Pozas, which issued its report on 4 July 1938. In its report, the CNPS expressed 
its opinion that it was necessary to avoid the costs of having several insurance companics 
running the system and that the State should contribute to the finance of the scheme°, 
The CNPS report was then sent to the Minister of Syndical Organisation and Action 
on 9 July 1938, and later the definitive draft law was submitted to the Government. The 
name of the draft was Proyecto de Ley de Bases creando el Regimen Obligatorio de 
Subsidios Familiares, that became the Law of Family Subsidies on 18 July 1938. The final 
Law passed resembled the draft issued by the CNPS far more than the first draft written by 
Mufioz. Many sections were an exact copy of the work of the CNPS. A big difference, 
however, was that the workers' contribution proposal was eliminated from the CNPS' draft 
while in the Law it was finally included. 
The Regulations of the Family Subsidies Scheure 
The process of passing the Regulations of the Family Subsidies Scheme shows how 
Social Catholics and INP top echelons were the ones involved in its writing. A sub- 
committee within the Governing Body of the INP was appointed to draw up the draft. The 
members of this Sub-Committee were: 
f he Sub-Comm ittee, Re ulations o the Family Subsidies Scheme, Jul 1938 
Social Catholics Falangists Military Technocrats 
President of Inocencio Jimenez 
the Ponencia 
Secretary Jose Ayats 
Members Rafael Garcia 
Luis Jordans 
Nicols Rodriguez 
Leon Leal Jose SagQes 
Francisco Ipir a Josh Maria 
Zumalacärre ui 
9 
`Informe de la Comisiön Nacional de Prevision Social', INP Archive [4.23.132], File 48.1 (entitled 
Preparaciön del Regimen Obligatorio de Subsidios Familiares), p. 7. 
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The Sub-Committee worked in small groups to elaborate different sections, Jordana 
de Pozas and Jimenez Vicente being in the group that elaborated perhaps the most important 
part, the way the system was to be organised. They proposed that the National Fund of 
Family Subsidies was to be run by a director under the supervision of a Governing Body. 
The final Regulations did not establish a Governing Body, just the figure of the director of 
the Fund. Thus, starting their work in July 1938, the first draft was prepared by 16 August 
1938 and voted and approved by the Sub-Committee. 
The draft was then sent to different institutions with interests in the matter (such as 
the Caja de Prevision Social de Aragon, the Caja de Seguros Sociales y de Ahorros de 
Andalucia Orients or the Caja Provincial Leonesa de Prevision) and to the Governing Body 
of the INP, which approved it on 6 September 1938. The vote of the Governing Body 
together with the comments of these institutions and a personal vote from Falangist Jesüs 
Rivero Meneses were sent to the Ministry of Syndical Organisation and Action. Finally, the 
Decree approving the Regulations of the Family Subsidies Scheme was passed on 20 
September 1938. 
`Family Plus' 
If Social Catholics drafted the Law of Family Subsidies and the Decree passing its 
Regulations, the institution of `Family Plus' was a Falangist product. Iglesias and Meil 
(2001) and Meil (1995) showed how the final configuration of Francoist family policies was 
a result of the struggle between two models of social welfare: the two ways of providing the 
workers a "family salary". On the one hand, Social Catholics (Severino Aznar being the 
most prominent representative) sought to establish such an institution along the lines of a 
proper social insurance scheme. By the same token, Jordana de Pozas (1939) proposed a 
family subsidy based on the doctrine of the "fair salary" and not on arguments about the 
utility or convenience of protecting families with children. On the other hand, Falangists 
theorists proposed creating an additional salary to cater for the needs of the worker's family. 
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Not only were the aims and basis of the scheme a matter of difference, but also its 
organisation. While the INP and Social Catholics such as Aznar opted to create a national 
fund like the one of the Family Subsidies Scheme, Falangists preferred occupation-based 
funds, to which different categories of workers contributed and received their social benefits 
(Iglesias and Meil, 2001: 34). 
To summarise, the Family Subsidies scheme followed the path marked by Aznar and 
the INP. The Falange counter-attacked by establishing `Family Plus' (Iglesias and Meil, 
2001: 38-9; Meil, 1995: 57-9). It was an obvious duplication of efforts and resources. 
Although the Family Subsidies Scheme was already providing workers with a family salary, 
Falange justified `Family Plus' in those bases as well. 
Why was there this unnecessary duplication? Social Catholic Severino Aznar also 
suspected political motivations for this duplication of schemes, although without specifying 
which motivations these were: `some kind of reason there would had been to implement the 
second scheme ('Family Plus') instead of improving the first one (the Family Subsidy)' 
(Aznar, 1952: 6). Iglesias and Meil (2001: 55) explain it as both the need of Falange to 
extend their social bases of power to factory workers and their conviction that that was the 
way to calculate a fair salary. As the reader knows well by now, my explanation is that the 
Falange needed to secure areas of influence at a moment it was losing power within the 
regime. 
The way of doing it was by using the institution of the ministerial order, a legal 
procedure which permitted ministers to avoid the Council of Ministers. `Family Plus' was 
established in all sectors of the economy by the Order of 19 June 1945, but, being a policy 
with such a huge impact on the Spanish economy, it should have been subjected to 
discussion at the Council of Ministers. 
This duplication of institutions led to a serious financial problem. The institution 
most affected was the Family Subsidies scheme because the newly-created social insurancc 
scheme for agricultural workers required funds which were taken from the resources of the 
Family Subsidies. So the Family Subsidies scheme could not use its savings to raise its 
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payment transfers to families, which became ridiculous at the time inflation rose. On the 
contrary, `Family Plus' managed to increase its benefits, ending up monopolising financial 
protection to families (Iglesias and Meil, 2001). 
8.2. The SOE 
The SOE1° was without any doubt the most important social policy innovation 
introduced during the first Francoist period, because of its pre-eminent position in 
comparison to the other insurance schemes and the importance given to it by policy-makers 
at the time. Jordana de Pozas defined the SOE as `a social insurance scheme, compulsory, 
contributory and technical, original and Spanish, conceived ambitiously as a revolutionary 
political enterprise, based on national solidarity, unitary and flexible, of Christian inspiration, 
financially autonomous, prepared in calm but executed speedily' (Jordana dc Pozas, 1944: 
587). 
It is true that the SOE Law was ready to be passed years before. The INP had been 
calling for the need to introduce this scheme since 1910. During the Second Republic, and 
again in 1939, the Institute submitted to the Ministry of Labour a plan for the unification of 
social insurance schemes that included this one of sickness benefits. 
Among the public, there was a general feeling that this scheme was necessary and 
urgent. The ACNdeP the most important Catholic lay organisation at the time, was one of the 
proponents of the scheme. On 4 June 1936, in the Valencian city of Alcoy, the local group of 
the ACNdeP discussed the way such an sickness insurance scheme should be implemented". 
The atmosphere for the establishment of a SOE was ready. 
10 For a different perspective, see Guillen (1996), who put more emphasis on the pro-active (and 
positive) role played by Minister Girön de Velasco and his Falangist comrades. 1 Boletin de la Asociacidn Catölica Nacional de Propagandistas, 15 June 1936, No. 221. 
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The First Commission 
Minister Girön de Velasco was very determined to create this scheme, so two 
months after being appointed Minister, he set up the Commission in charge of drafting the 
first draft of the SOE12. The members of the Commission were13: 
The First Commission. SOE Law. July 1941 
Social Catholics Falangists Technocrats 
President Francisco Grefio 
Representing the Luis Jordana Rodrigo Urfa 
INP Pablo Martinez 
Primitivo de la 
Quintana 
Secretary Jose Ayats 
Representing the Fernando 
Ministry of Finance Camacho 
Representing the Francisco 
General Directorate Astigarraga 
of Health 
Representing the Bartolome Benitez 
National Board of 
Trustees for Fighting 
Tuberculosis 
Representing the Jose Femandez dc la 
General Council of Portilla 
the Colleges of 
Doctors 
Representing the Alfonso dc la Fuente 
Syndical Foundation 
of 18 July 
Chief Actuary of the Jose G. Alvarez 
INP Ude 
Doctor of the Jose Maria Sanchez 
National Fund of the 
Working Injuries 
Insurance Scheme 
Chief Doctor of the Jorge Juan Bosch 
Maternal and Infant 
Fund of the INP 
This Commission had a clear technical profile with some well-known INP 
collaborators and officials, mainly Social Catholics. One of them, Jordana de Pozas, had also 
been a member in the Commission which studied the Sickness Insurance Scheme during the 
12 Decree of the Ministry of Labour, ll July 1941, published in the BOE, 25 July 1941. 
" The names of these members also appear in the Boletin de Informacidn del INP, July-August 1941, 
Nos. 7-8, p. 37. 
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Second Republic14. Important Falangists were on it as well, such as Francisco Grcto 
Pozurama, who occupied the presidency. 
It started working in August 194115. Each member of the Commission received a 
questionnaire prepared by the General Directorate of Social Insurance for them to answer. 
As soon as in the second session, on 11 September 1941, the representative of the National 
Board of Trustees for Fighting Tuberculosis, Bartolome Benitez Franco claimed that it was 
more urgent and important to create first an insurance scheme to protect workers against 
tuberculosis. This was rejected by the Commission as it would imply a deviation from the 
original tasks. Not satisfied, Benitez Franco presented a particular vote later on 20 November 
1941. 
The Commission divided into six sub-committees, each one dedicated to different 
themes: "Risks and Population to Be Covered", "Health Services and Economic Payments", 
"Management of the System", "Economic Organisation and Finance", "Inspection", 
"Agriculture". It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the way members had been allocated to 
each one of these sub-committees is of the highest importance. In those groups which had to 
deal with more political issues or the way the system was to be organised and managed (such 
as coverage of population and risks and the management of the system), Jordana was 
present. 
Thus, the first Sub-Committee focused on the population and the risks against which 
the scheme covered. The team decided to protect all workers (either wage-earning, self- 
employed or in domestic service) with incomes lower than 12,000 pesetas in industry and 
commerce and 6,000 in agriculture. It was also decided that maternity and funeral expenses 
in the event of death of the affiliated be included. 
14 See INP, Notas Informativas para la Ponencia sobre la Unif cacidn de los Seguros Sociales, June 
1933, No. 4. This was a pamphlet aimed at informing the public about the work of the Commission. It 
is a good example of how different the Republican and Francoist policy styles were. The openness 
during the former contrasts sharply with the secrecy of the policy process during the Francoist dictatorship. 
15 For the data on the works of this commission, see INP Archive [4.23.112], Sub-file 49-1. 
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The second Sub-Committee, in charge of designing the kind of benefits, decided to 
provide medical assistance, pharmaceutical and hospital services and economic transfers of a 
maximum of 50 per cent of the wage. The hospital service should be provided by the SOE 
itself, although it could reach agreements with other institutions in the form of joint schemes. 
Quite important was the issue of how doctors were to be selected. The INP remained as the 
institution responsible for this and the full organisation of the human resources of the system. 
The third Sub-Committee dealt with the difficult issue of organising the management 
of the system. It was decided that the INP would be the only institution in charge of the 
scheme, ruling out the possibility of private insurance companies and private health 
institutions administering the SOE. Only the Syndical Organisation was allowed by the Sub- 
Committee to collaborate with the INP, but later the Commission rejected this possibility. 
The Sub-Committee in charge of organising the financial administration of the 
system established that it should be based on the contributions of employers and employees, 
with the state collaborating in the creation of a set-up capital to help establishing the scheme. 
It was due to be organised as a pay-as-you-go system. 
The work of the Sub-Committees ended at the beginning of November 1941, and the 
Commission came back to function in assembly again. One of the first things that the 
Commission had to discuss was the report sent by the Falangist-controlled National 
Syndicate of Insurance, a section of the National Office of Syndicates, on 5 November 1941, 
containing their proposal of creating a sickness insurance scheme. This proposal was 
substantially different to the first draft written by the different Sub-Committees. Thus, the 
scheme was proposed to be compulsory only for wage-earning workers and voluntary for the 
rest, to be run by different public and private institutions, each one of them able to select 
their own team of doctors and nurses and funded only by the contributions of the employcrs. 
Employees were not supposed to contribute and the state was responsible for backing up the 
scheme by subsidising the private insurance institutions. Last but not least, the National 
Syndicate of Insurance proposed to start applying the system to only one illness, 
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tuberculosis, three years later expanding it to all chronic diseases and finally to all kinds of 
illnesses. 
A big debate in the Commission arose when discussing whether the scheme should 
be applied all in once or whether it should otherwise be applied step-by-step, these gradual 
steps being by illnesses or by population sectors. While some members of the Commission 
thought that it was better to start by implementing the scheme in industry and later include 
rural workers, others such as Rodrigo Uria or Jordana de Pozas thought that it could be 
introduced in both sectors at the same time. Falangists such as De la Fuente Chao and 
Fernandez de la Portilla were very keen on protecting agricultural workers, the latter making 
his case that actually they should be the ones first benefiting from the SOE rather than the 
industrial workers16. In addition, some members (those representing the National Board of 
Trustees for Fighting Tuberculosis and the Council of Doctors and Clinicians) thought that it 
was better to start applying the scheme to some illnesses first, while others (representatives 
of the INP and the Syndical Foundation of 18 July) argued for implementation all at once. 
It was on 30 April 1942, at the last meeting of the Commission, when the struggle 
between departments and families of the regime came to the surface. As was offered the 
opportunity to members of the Commission to present their minority reports or comments on 
the definitive text, Falangist De La Fuente Chao made the case for the Syndical Foundation 
of 18 July to take over the organisation of the health aspects of the insurance scheme. De la 
Fuente Chao proposed to split the health section from the economic organisation, the latter to 
be left under control of the INP. In addition, the Syndical Foundation had to be entitled to 
designate the staff of the health services. Quite strangely, De La Fuente Chao withdrew this 
proposal when it came to discussion. 
The draft of this first Commission together with the minority reports of some 
dissenting members were all sent to the Ministry of Labour. In this draft", the scheme was 
16 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 26 November 1941. 
17 See the Anteproyecto de Ley de Seguro de Enfermedad, INP Archive [4.23.132], Sub-file 49-1, 
document 57. 
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available to all workers with low income, including wage-earners, domestic workers and 
self-employed people. But it was not supposed to cover those workers already benefiting 
from the Old Age Pension Scheme. It provided medical assistance, pharmaceutical and 
hospital services, together with cash payments of 50 per cent of the worker's salary. The 
scheme was to be funded by the contributions of workers and employers, plus subsidies and 
a special contribution from the state. 
In the draft, the INP was given responsibility to further specify different aspects 
which were not regulated in the Law. For example, the INP could expand the time the patient 
could receive medical assistance (Article 11) or could stay in hospital (Article 13). In 
addition, Articles 26,27 and 28 granted the INP the right to organise and run the scheme, 
freedom to sign agreements with other public or private institutions collaborating in the 
provision of services and instructed the INP to co-ordinate with the Health Authorities 
-that 
is, the General Directorate of Health. Article 27, about the collaboration with other 
institutions, had been rejected by De la Fuente Chao in his proposal, and, as we will see, 
would be suppressed in the second Commission. Article 29 declared that the Medical 
Services of the Scheme should be organised by the INP, and Article 30 gave it the right to 
agree the provision of services with different public bodies or private institutions. 
The Second Commission 
With no apparent reason, the Ministry of Labour set up18, by the Order of 28 October 
1942 a new Commission to review the work of the first Commission, comprising the 
following people: 
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Th Second Commission. SOE Law. October 1942 
Social Catholics Falangists 
President (Under- Esteban Perez 
Secretary of the Ministry 
of Labour) 
General Director of Social Buenaventura J. 
Insurance Castro Rial 
Commissary of the INP Luis Jordana 
Sub-Commissary of the Jesüs Rivero 
INP 
Chief of the Syndical Alfonso de la 
Foundation of 18 July Fucntc 
Chief Actuary of the INP Jose Alvarez Ude 
Health Inspector Primitivo dc la 
Quintana 
National Secretary of Ex- Sebastian Criado 
Combatants 
Chief of the Section of Jose Martinez 
Social Insurance Schemes 
of the Ministry of Labour 
In this second Commission, Falangists were in majority, although Criado del Rey 
never took part of it because he soon left to Russia to fight for Hitler in the Division Azul. 
Although the INP was still represented, all the representatives of other departments or 
interest groups that were in the first Commission, such as the representatives of the National 
Board of Trustees for Fighting Tuberculosis or the Council of Doctors and Clinicians 
(precisely the toughest opposition) were not in this one. 
As I say, there was no apparent need for the setting up of a new Commission. The 
first one had done its job and produced quite a reasonable result. Most probably, Falangists 
were not very pleased with the results of the first Commission and decided to start over again 
with a more "supportive" team of people. The reason why Girön de Velasco could do this 
was because of the absence of regulations within the Ministry of Labour. 
This second Commission started working even before it was officially established. 
The first session was on 26 October 1942. At this stage, the only minority reports were those 
of Fernandez de la Portilla, De la Fuente Chao'9 and Benitez Franco. The Commission 
rejected the idea of gradually establishing the SOE, starting from the "tuberculosis scheme" 
as appeared in the documents presented by Fernandez de la Portilla and Benitez Franco. 
18 Order of the Ministry of Labour, 28 October 1942, published in the BOE, 6 Novembcr 1942. 
19 1 cannot pinpoint when he re-introduced his document again. 
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In the second session, two days later, the Commission discussed be la Fucntc 
Chao's private vote. As we already know, he argued that the Syndical Foundation of 18 July 
should be in charge of the health services of the SOE, without interference 20. Another 
Falangist, Sebastian Criado del Rey was also in favour of allocating the medical services to 
the Syndical Foundation. The INP should be in charge of the economic transfers, again with 
sole control. Jordana de Pozas replied that such a clear-cut separation between monetary 
transfers and health services in a single insurance scheme was not possible and advised that 
the management of the system should not be fragmented. Obviously, Primitivo de la 
Quintana, as representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs, opposed Dc la Fuente's 
proposal, because the management of the health system would be fragmented under three 
authorities: the General Secretariat of the Movement (that is where the Syndical Foundation 
of 18 July was integrated), the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Labour. 
In the session of 4 November 1942, the Commission started reviewing the articles of 
the plan submitted by the previous team, introducing important changes. One of the 
improvements was the suppression of the clause which excluded from the Sickness Scheme 
those already receiving an Old Age Pension. However, this second Commission restricted 
the freedom to further regulate issues not considered by the Law, which the INP had been 
granted by the first Commission. Thus, now, the institution able to extend the time the 
patient could receive medical assistance was no longer the INP, but the Labour bsinistcr21. 
Also, the Commission suppressed Article 27 of the first draft relating to the co-operating 
institutions with which the INP could establish agreements to run the scheme, as Falangist 
De la Fuente Chao had desired in his proposal to the first Commission. The same happened 
to Article 28 in which the INP was instructed to co-ordinate services with the Health 
Authorities. All these changes show how Falangists managed to alter the shape of the 
scheme and wrest control of it from the INP into their own hands. 
20 His opinions were reinforced by the distribution among the members of the Commission of the 
document Breves Comentarios al Seguro de Enfermedad, issued by the National Office of health of 
FETde las JONS. See the document in INP Archive [4.23. B2], Sub-file 49-1. 
21 Article 11. 
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In the next session, on 9 November 1942, the Commission discussed again the De la 
Fuente's proposal of transferring the management of the medical services to the Syndical 
Foundation of 18 July, which would run the medical services exclusively. At this stage, 
having accepted with resignation that the Falangists were going to be involved in the running 
of the medical services, it was this "sole control" that the representatives of the INP and 
other public bodies explicitly rejected. A consensus was reached on 12 November, based on 
a new formula proposed by Jordana de Pozas. As Articles 26,27 and 28 stated: `Article 26: 
The SOE is established under the responsibility of the INP as the only insurance institution. 
Article 27: Medical services of the SOE will be provided by the Syndical Foundation of 18 
July, except when by virtue of direct joint schemes with the INP is carried out by institutions 
of the state, provincial or local authorities, or by other public or private institutions. In this 
latter case, a previous favourable report from the Syndical Foundation of 18 July is required. 
Article 28: Medical services of the SOE will be organised by the INP, in accordance with a 
national plan of installations and development and with the general plan developed by an 
interim commission presided by the Under-Secretary of Labour, who can delegate on the 
General Director of Social Insurance, and in which the General Directorate of Health, the 
National Office of Syndicates of FET de las JONS and the INP should be represented'. 
This was thus a big victory for the Syndical Foundation of 18 July, which was 
allowed to provide the medical services, although their organisation and the rest of the 
system remained in the hands of the INP. In return, the latter was responsible for employing 
and organising the doctors and the rest of the staff of the medical services, which was 
something badly wanted by the Syndical Foundation which finally failed to acquire it. And 
the reference to the "exclusive" right of the Syndical Foundation was dropped and other 
institutions could participate in running the medical service provided the INP established 
joint schemes with them and the Syndical Foundation agreed on it. But the point to highlight 
here is that the participation of the Syndical Foundation was not an issue for the first 
Commission but just a personal opinion of one of its members. Only when a second 
6 
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Commission was formed with an overwhelming majority of Falangists was it possible for the 
Syndical Foundation to succeed in its strategy. 
The battle for the control of the management of the SUE was not only between the 
INP and the Falangists of the Syndical Foundation of 18 July, but also bctwccn the laitcr and 
the General Directorate of Health of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was the public 
body traditionally responsible for the organisation of the public health system. Clearly, the 
General Directorate of Health was the real loser of this confrontation. In addition, the 
Council of Doctors and Clinicians and the National Board of Trustccs for righting 
Tuberculosis did not even have the chance of taking part in the second Commission. 
On 17 November 1942 this second Commission finished its work and sent all to the 
Ministry of Labour. The Law was finally passed on 14 December 1942 and published in the 
BOE on 27 December 1942. 
Falangists quickly sought to obtain political bencfits from the passing of the Law. 
On 12 January 1943, the National Chief of the Syndical Foundation of 18 July, Alfonso de 
La Fuente Chao gave a lecture in which he said that it was the Falange alone who had fought 
to set up the illness scheme. But suddenly, said Dc la Fucnte, when everything was ready, 
there appeared `by spontaneous offspring institutions and men that claim their right to run 
themi22. This was an obvious manipulation of reality, as it was the INP and not Falange 
which was the institution that had been most committed to the establishment of this Law. Dc 
la Fuente went on quoting the INP, the Colleges of Doctors and Clinicians the General 
Directorate of Health Ile specifically criticised the latter for not relying on the capacity of 
the Syndical Foundation to set up and run efficiently the medical scr%iccs of the SOE. 
How was justified the admission of the Syndical Foundation to the running of the 
medical services before the public opinion? Jose Antonio Gir6n said in an intcrricw in the 
newspaper Ya on 30 January 1943 that the split of the management of the SOE in two tos 
u De la Fuente, A. (1943), Comentarios a la Ley del Segura de Enfcrmcdad, Madrid: Dclcgaciön 
Nacional de Sanidad de FET de las DONS, p. 10. 
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based on "practical reasons", but he did not explain which these wcrcil. iliose "practical 
reasons" justified that the Syndical Foundation of 18 July took ovcr the medical scn"ices 
because it was the only institution that could 'offer, with the guarantee of its professional 
efficacy, its capacity and determination to proselytise workers... Wc expect from the work of 
the Syndical Foundation an splendid performance in both spheres- the technical and the 
political onei24. 
The Syndical Foundation could hardly provide a better service than the General 
Directorate of Health or the INP, having been created just a couple of years before. The true 
reason was explained a few lines below when Girdn said: 'So we offer all those critics of 
Falange the opportunity to see how well one of its organisations can work when it has the 
required economic support'. In fact, Alfonso de la Fuente Chao did not refer to practical or 
technical reasons when he first introduced his proposal of letting the Syndical Foundation of 
18 July run the medical services of the scheme, while the first Commission was still at work 
on 30 April 1942. At that moment, De la Fuente had justified this by the exclusive role the 
Syndical Foundation had to care for the welfare of Spanish workers as was stated in the Law 
of Syndical Unity of 1940. 
Therefore, more than technical reasons, what justified this transfer of services to the 
Syndical Foundation was the political motivation of proving how the Falange was able to 
implement policies and secure a place within the Francoist state. That is why Girdn kept 
insisting that the SOE was an institution of the Falange23. And secondly, it was the role of 
the Syndical Foundation to enlist all doctors within its organisation, therefore gaining the 
crucial role of controlling one of the most powerful Spanish workforcc sectors (Jordan de 
Pozas, 1944: 634). 
23 In an interview given many years later, Jose Antonio Gircn dc Vclasco said that the reason for 
letting the Syndical Foundation run the medical system was because members of the INP thcmxclvcs 
(Jordans included) doubted whether the INP was going to be able to run it. See Guillfn (1996: 180). 
4 The quote also appeared in Boletin de Infonnaciön del INP, January 1943, No. 1, p. 2. 
25 Girdn de Velasco, J. A., `La Colaboracidn en el Seguro de Enfermedad', Boletin ik InformacOn del 
INP, January 1944, No. 1, p. 11. 
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The Regulations of the SOE: the Sub-Committee 
Once the Law was passed, there was then the turn of writing the tcgulations that 
firmed up the practical aspects of the former. To this purpose, in January 1943. a Sub. 
Committee was appointed to write the first draft- the Regulations of the SO&``. It appears 
quite clearly that Girdn de Velasco manoeuvred to place Falangists in the team. In fact. rout 
out of the nine members were Falangists and, even more, they occupied the most important 
posts 
- 
President and Secretary". The members of the Sub-Committee were: 
The Sub-Committee. SOE Reeulations. January 1943 
Social Catholics Falangists Technocrats 
President Agustin Aznar 
(replaced by 
Buenaventura J. 
Castro Rial) 
Secretary Sebastian Criado 
Commissary Luis Jordana 
of the INP 
Members Primitivo de la Quintana Jose Maria Barccld Jose Gomez 
Sabugo 
Jose G. Alvarez Ude Alfonso dc la Fucntc 
Jorge Juan Bosh 
They started work on 22 January 1943 by answering a questionnaire prepared by 
Jordana de Pozas. Sebastian Criado del Rey compiled all the answers and from there the 
Sub-Committee went on working by writing article by article. The work was finished by 
May 1943 and presented to the Governing Body of the INP on 4 May 19432. Following that, 
a bigger Commission was appointed to write the definitive draft. 
26 See the names of the members in the Boletin de lnformacidn del 1NP, January 1943, No. 1, p. 90. 27 It also appears to be a reward for those Falangists that had fought in the Div*idn A: ul. Agustin 
Aznar and Sebastian Criado del Rey, who had enlisted in the Russian campaign, had just returned to 
Sain. 
2" Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 4 May 1943, No. 57. 
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Tue Regulations of the SOE: the Commission 
The Commission was formed by representatives of a larger numbcr of institutions 
than had taken part in the previous Sub-Committee. The General Council of Doctors asked 
the Ministry of Labour for the inclusion of its representative in the Commission, together 
with representatives of the Faculty of Medicine, the Royal Academy of Medicine, the 
General Council of Pharmacists, the College of Dentists and the College of Practitioncre°. 
Their petition was ignored. The final composition of the Commission was as follows'0: 
The Commission. SOE Refulations. June 1913 
Social Catholics Falangists Technocrat, 
President Esteban Perez 
Commissary Luis Jordana 
of the INP 
Sub- Jcsüs Rivcro 
Commissary 
of the INP 
Members Agustin Aznar 
representing 
the National Alfonso dc la Fucnte 
Office of 
Syndicates Mercedes Sanz 
Jose Maria Darcclb 
Rodolfo Reycs 
Members Francisco Astigarraga 
representing 
the General Dartolonx Dcnitcz 
Delegation of 
l h J Hea t uan Muhoz 
Paulin Borrallo 
Saturnino Garcia 
Members Joaquin Espinosa Buenaventura J. Castro 
representing 
the INP Primitivo de la Pablo Martinez Jose Gdmez 
Quintana 
Sebastian Criado Angel GSmcz Jim hu 
Jose Muº oz 
Isaac Galccrin ValdCs Francisco Martinez 
Jose Alvarez Ude 
Mariano Fucntcs 
Juan Bosch Marin 
29 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 4 February 1943, No. 54. 
30 Boletin de Informacidn del 1NP, June 1943, No. 6, p. 40. 
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In one month, the Commission managed to finish its work, scnding the draft to the 
Ministry of Labour in July 194331. The Regulations were finally passed as a Decree signed 
by Franco and Minister Giron on 11 November 194332. The contents of the Law were 
specified in the Regulations, obviously without major changes. However, there were minor 
things, which show how the Minister could change aspects of the Law by exercising the 
power to issue regulations. For example, the Law stated that the scheme should be 
implemented in three stages, while the Decree of the Regulations reduced them to (wo". Of 
more political importance were the additional provisions and the temporary provisions of the 
Decree of the Regulations, which granted the Labour Minister special powers. For example, 
he was entitled to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between the INP and the other private and 
public institutions involved in the running of the scheme34. 
In addition to the provision of medical services, the Falange also took over another 
role which originally belonged to the INP. The National Office of Syndicates managed to 
take charge of the process of registration of affiliates to the SOE, through the local offices of 
the Syndical Foundation of Social Insurance35. On 14 September 1944, the National Office 
and the INP signed the agreement that established the joint implementation of the SOE. 
Once the Law and the Regulations were passed, the officials in charge of the system 
travelled around the world seeking information and advice. A commission of four. presided 
over by Sebastian Criado del Rey36 went to Central Europe (Germany, Austria, Bohemia and 
Monrovia, Slovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria) between July and September 1943. 
They met top echelon officials and visited different public institutions and also private social 
insurance organisations such as the Sickness Fund of the firm Siemens in Germany, the 
" Boletin de Informacidn del INP, July-August 1943, Nos. 7-8, p. 154. 32 DOE, 28 November 1943. 
33 Compare the Fifth Temporary Provision of the Law of 14 December 1942, DOE, 27 Deccmbcr 1942 
and the First Temporary Provision of the Regulations of the Decree of 11 November 1913, HOE, 28 
November 1943. 
34 Second Additional Provision of the Regulations of the Decree of 11 November 1943, BO& 28 
November 1943. 
's Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 28 June 1944, No. 71. 
36 Together with Alvarez Ude, Maestro y Maestro, and Sacz de Miera. 
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Central Institute of Social Insurance in Prague or the Hungarian Institute of Sickncss 
Insurance for Private Employees. 
On the other hand, a second team" travelled to the Unitcd States with the same 
purpose in October 1945. If the trip to Central Europe sought to acquire knowlcdgc on how 
to organise the administrative functioning of the system, this one was looking for 
innovations in health supplies and hospital architectural designs. 
A final word is necessary on the health professionals' position to the SOE. It has to 
be said that they did not have the chance of contributing to the making of the Law or the 
Regulations and that their opposition started quite late, in fact, after 1945. By the Order of 
28 October 1947'6, a commission to study and resolve the demands raised by doctors was set 
up. So, although doctors resisted the implementation of the SOE", they were not influential 
in the early stages of the policy making process. 
8.3. The Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions 
The Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions wcrc a creation fully inspired by 
Falangism. In fact, the Syndical Organisation was heavily involved in the pinning of these 
institutions, as it was responsible for informing the General Directorate of Social Insurance 
of any irregularities in their management or exerting political control ovcr the people sitting 
in the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions' governing bodies (Gonziiez Murillo, 1998: 
844). In addition, the Syndical Organisation could create these institutions in those arras or 
37 Formed by Eduardo Garay y Garay and Eduardo Shaw Loring, 
3$ BOE, 29 October 1947. 
39 The fact that doctors did oppose the implementation of the SOE and presented a tough resistance is 
reflected in that Franco himself had to call for their change of attitude. It was in the speech given at 
the inauguration of the Hospital of the SOE in Ferrol. Iiis words appeared on the Rc%ista £naiTola Ile 
Seguridad Social, September 1949, No. 9. In that same volume, Severino Aznar referred to the need to 
overcome the opposition of doctors against the SOE. 
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companies in which it thought it was needed or, on the contrary, veto thcir creation 
(Gonzalez Murillo, 1998: 849). 
In his memoirs, Girön de Velasco claimed his authorship of them and pointed out 
that INP officials, mainly Jordana de Pozas, were opposed to the establishment of these 
institutions (Girbn 1994: 75). Alonso Olea confirms this: `Jordana could not cope with the 
Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions, which assumed the insurance of the old age and 
disability risks, leaving the old SOVI as a residual scheme' (Alonso Olca, 1997: 280). Girän 
presented the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions as a tool for promoting sclf" 
insurance among workers, reducing the bureaucracy of the state (thus, of the INP)40. lie 
believed in the political potential of these institutions. 
The Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions blocked the development of the S017 
(Guillen, 1997: 155; Campos Egozcue, 1996: 243; Alonso Olca, 1997: 280). Due to this, 
they were heavily criticised by INP officials. Marti IIufill (1947: 168-74) pointed out that 
they were diverting funds that should have gone to improve the old age insurance scheme. 
But most importantly, he believed that the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions were a 
departure from the trend in social welfare (which was developing throughout the world) of 
providing a citizen-based social insurance pool. Instead, the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance 
Institutions were based on the principle of insurance with regard to professional categories, 
therefore benefits were dependent on the type of job and professional status. If the world 
trend was towards broadening insurance against social risks to the entire (working) 
population, the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions were a step back in this process. 
Moreover, their introduction further fragmented the management of the system, clashing 
with the prevailing trend of unifying schemes into a single institution. 
Falangists claimed the paternity of the Labour Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions. 
Blanco (1954) defended them bitterly against critics such as social insurance experts Marti 
Bufill or Perez Botija. By doing this, he revealed the deep discussions which were taking 
`o Girdn de Velasco, J. A. (1951), 'Discurso', Primer Congreso lberoamcricano deSeguridad Social, 
Madrid: Ministeno de Trabajo. 
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place at the time, in which these authors and others such as Jordana dc i'oras wcre involvcJ, 
but more important, the strong differences and political conflicts. 
8.4. The Subsidy against Forced Unemployment and the 
Syndical Foundation for Fighting Unemployment 
Why the Subsidy against Forced Unemployment managed by the IN', was abolished 
in November 1944 at a moment when the economic situation did not forescc the ending of 
the unemployment situation? Why the Syndical Foundation for Fighting Unemployment had 
been established one year before, in July 1943? Was the latter the replacement of the former, 
therefore showing the power struggle between institutions? 
In truth, the aim of the Syndical Foundation for Fighting Unemployment was not so 
much to grant an economic subsidy to unemployed workers (as was the aim of the Subsidy 
against Forced Unemployment) but to give them, simply, the chance of working. But even 
accepting the different aims of these schemes, it may also be the case that the Subsidy 
against Forced Unemployment was eliminated to hand over this welfare policy 
(unemployment benefits) to the Syndical Foundation. 
Gonzalez Murillo, quoting Ritter, refers to how little effort totalitarian countries uch 
as Nazi Germany put into creating unemployment schemes (Gonz. i1cz Murillo, 1998: 442), 
replacing them with programmes of active employment creation. Therefore, it could be that 
Falangists at the Ministry of Labour were inspired by the Nazi example when abolishing the 
Subsidy against Forced Unemployment and involving the Syndical Foundation in the 
solution of Spanish unemployment. In fact, this seems to be the case. The reason for the 
abolition of the subsidy was given by Labour Minister Girdn dc Velasco in that such a 
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scheme discouraged workers from returning to work", and the Syndical foundation, instead 
of transferring money, run programmes by which unemployed workers Wcrc cmploycd 
temporarily in public works. 
As a result of the competition from parallel institutions which ultimately replaced it. 
the Subsidy against Forced Unemployment Scheme was left in a precarious financial 
situation. Funds were diverted from it to cover other needs. For example, in March 1941. 
before Girön's appointment, two million pesetas of the National Fund against 
Unemployment were given to workers affected by the fire in the city of Santander42. 
8.5. The Unification of Social Insurance Schemes 
The plan of unifying all social insurance schemes in one single schcmc had been, as 
we will see below, an old ambition of Spanish social reformers but it had nctvr bccn 
achieved. Francoist social policy makers also attempted to unify the schemes in a single 
coherent system but again, failed to do so. The reasons for this failure still remain 
unexplained. If the plan of unifying the schemes had succeeded in the 1940s, Spain would 
have become one of the most advanced countries providing social protection for (at least) the 
working population. As will be shown, political struggles within the regime impeded the 
passing of laws unifying social insurance schemes. 
Theories of Insurance Schemes Unification 
Before turning to the issue of how the policy process took place, it might be worthy 
to explain which were the positions at the time regarding this issue of unifying the social 
41 GirGn de Velasco, J. A. (1951), 'Discurso', Primer Congreso Ibcroamcricano Je Seguridad Social, 
Madrid: Ministeno de Trabajo. 
42 BOE, 7 March 1941. 
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insurance schemes. Following Gonzalez Posada (1948), three thconcs were at the disposal of 
policy makers at that time: 
1. "Co-ordination" of the schemes: this consisted of the mcrc administrative co. 
ordination but keeping the schemes eparate. For GonzAlcz Posada, this was the 
idea behind the Republican Plan of 1932 and of INP rcprescntativcs uch as 
Jimenez Vicente and Jordana de Pozas'3. Leal Ramos (1947) claimed for total 
unification as soon as the situation allowed it's. 
2. "Fusion": meaning the full unification of the schemes. But this was not, argued 
Gonzalez Posada, because there was just a single social risk, as thcsc are 
different, but because the right to receive social protection is just one. In 
Gonzalez Posada's opinion, the Labour Charter and the Decree of 23 December 
1944 would follow this theory. This position could also be found in Ilufill 
(1945) and Ucelay Ramos (1949). 
3. "Single Risk": it would meant that basically there is only one risk: the danger or 
losing the source of income. Gonzalez Posada said that only Ldpcz Nutlcz had 
argued for this at the beginning of the century but had ncrcr managed to 
convince anyone. 
Although Gonzalez Posada does not specifically address it, William Bcvcridbc's 
Plan of Social Security would be somewhere between the second and the third model. The 
individual has the right to receive social protection and the aim of any social welfare system 
is to avoid need. As I have already mentioned in Chapter Five, I3everidgc's proposal 
attracted the attention of Spanish social insurance experts and policymakcrs and generated 
supporters, but also critics of its viability for the Spanish economy. 
"I do not fully agree with Gonzalez Posada on where to place Jordana. It is true that, although fie 
brought Beveridge to Spain in 1946, he was however reluctant to establish a social security system in 
the country, because he doubted that the economy was going to be able to cope with it. But he slid not 
want a mere administrative co-ordination of the schemes already in place either. M Ponencia sobre la Unificacidn de los Seguros Sociales, Administrative Assembly of the IN! ', 
Barcelona, 30 January 1947: INP Archive [4.24. Al], File 53-1, Sub-file 3 entitled Unj/icackin de los 
Seguros Sociales, Ano 1946. Instead of the British example, Tena Ibarra proposed adopting the 
Rumanian model of 1938. 
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The Unification Plan during the Second Republic 
During the Second Republic, the INP took over the responsibility of making a drall 
of the law unifying social insurance schemes, the Anteproyyecto de Ley- de flaws part: l: 
Unificaciön de los Seguros Sociales's. The Minister of Labour Francisco Largo Caballcrn 
issued an Order on 10 May 1932 to create a Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme, based 
on a single contribution from the employer and the employee, with subsidies from the state 
and protecting the worker against all possible social risks. It was however said that it was not 
compulsory to include in this unified scheme the Working Injuries Insurance Scheme, 
because as it was then, it was based on the exclusive responsibility of the employer`. The 
risk of becoming redundant and unemployed was not considered to be included in the 
Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme either. Therefore, it was not aimed at protecting 
against all social risks but only disability, death, old age, maternity and illness. 
To start with, the INP translated studies and laws produced in other countries which 
had unified their insurance systems. Several publications on this topic were produced. In 
addition, INP officials travelled to other countries, as did Jose Maria Lopez Valcncia to Italy. 
Having gathered enough information, the National Advisory Commission of Employcrs and 
Workers drafted a document in December 1934. The Board of Trusters of the INP also 
offered its own document drafted by Inocencio Jimencz Vicente and approved on 13 
September 1935. Although both texts were very similar, they diverged in one fundamental 
point. The National Advisory Commission of Employers and Workers proposed creating a 
single scheme embracing the risks of old age, disability, death, maternity and illness, while 
the Board of Trustees of the INP preferred two schemes, one for the risks of old age, 
disability and death and another one for illness and maternity. 
Both documents were reviewed by a Sub-Committee set up in 1936, formal by 
people that a decade later would become the key Policy-makers during the Francoist period: 
Jordana de Pozas, Alvarez Ude, Lopez Valencia and Ayats. The fact that these people were 
's Boletin de Informacian del INP, June 1943, No. 6, p. 12. 
"Order of the Ministry of Labour, 10 May 1932, published in the Gaceta de Madrid 10 fay 1932. 
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designing social insurance laws both during the Second Republic and during the Francoi t 
regime reflects that in ideological terms, there was a continuum in the development or the 
Spanish social insurance system. 
On 28 May 1936, the Anteproyecto de Unificaciön dc los S'g uros Socialrs (draft of 
the Law of Unification of Social Insurance Schemes) was published in the Garcia tie 
Madrid, based on the proposal of the Board of Trustees of the INP of two separate schemes. 
A period of public consultations was opened, so institutions, groups or individuals had the 
chance to present their opinions in regard to the plan. From the documents presented, it can 
be seen that those most opposed to the plan were the private insurance companies such as the 
Mutualidad de Seguros Mutuos Anayena, which foresaw the collapse of the Spanish 
economy if the draft bill was finally passed 47. Other groups were opposed to the unification 
but not to the co-ordination of different schemes'. However, institutions such as the Official 
College of Pharmacists of Oviedo (Asturias) or the General Directorate of Health saw the 
plan as an urgent need. 
The draft was due to be discussed by Parliament, but it was postponed bccausc of the 
request made by the Members of Parliament Ortega and CAnovas (Rico, year unknown) to 
expand the period of public consultation for another three months, until October 1936. The 
outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936 blocked the further development of the plan and its 
chance of becoming law. 
The Unification Plan during Francoism 
As soon as the INP was re-constituted, at the very first session on 22 August 1938, 
the Governing Body of the INP expressed its concern regarding the unification of the social 
insurance schemes. In line with this concern, it can be understood why, when the INP 
47 INP Archive [4.24. A1], File 53 entitled Unifcacidn dc Seguros Soclales (Arco 1935). Document 
entitled 'Contestaciones recibidas de Mutualidades de Accidentcs de Trabajo'. 
48 See the letter sent by the Mutualidad Comercial Aragonesa de Accidcntes, INP Archive 14.24A I I. 
File 53 entitled Unfficacidn de Seguros Sociales (Agio 1935), Document entitled 'Contestuionci 
recibidas de Mutualidades de Accidentes de Trabajo'. 
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President Pablo Martinez Almeida set up regulations to organist the Institute and the 
National Fund of Family Subsidies, the General Director Jimenez Vicente opposed the 
measures arguing that they were a backwards step in the so-long awaited process of 
unification49. 
Particularly pro-active in unifying the system was one member of the Governing 
Body of the INP, Vicente Madera Pcfia, an Asturian very committed to Social Catholicism, 
in particular the groups of the Padre VicentSO. In response to his requests, the Governing 
Body accepted to set up a sub-committee to draft the plan of unification. Due to this, the old 
drafts of the Second Republic were recovered and, following that, Severino Aznar and 
Alvarez Ude produced a document discussing the main issues and problems involved in the 
unification of several insurance schemes. Under the title of Planteamiento de los Problemas 
mds Discutibles en una Unification de Seguros Sociales (Mapping Out the Most Important 
Problems for the Unification of Social Insurance Schemes)s', this document was published 
on 18 October 1939. 
All these documents were used by the Sub-Committee which passed its conclusions 
on to the Governing Body of the INP on 2 December 1939. The Governing Body discussed 
them and drafted a Bases para la Preparation de un Proyecto de Ley sobre Seguros Sociales 
Unificados o Coordinados (Notes for the Preparation of a Draft Law on a Package of Unified 
or Co-ordinated Social Insurance Schemes)52. This paper, sent to the Ministry of Labour a 
few days later, resembled very much the one drafted by the Board of Trustees of the INP in 
1935, in proposing two parallel unified schemes 53 
From this point onwards, several requests to set up the system as soon as 
possible, as designed in the Notes for the Preparation of a Draft Law, were made to the 
Ministry of Labour. Thus, Vicente Madera spoke before the Govcming Body on 20 
49 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 22 April 1939, No. 8, p. 60. so Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 22 April 1939, No. 8, p. 70. 51 INP Archive [4.24. A1], File 53-1, Sub-file 2, entitled Ponencia para el Estudio de un Proyccto Unificado de Seguros Sociales (Ano 1939). 
52 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 2 December 1939, No. 13, p. 76. 53 See INP Archive [4.24. A I], File 53, entitled Uniflcacidn de Seguros Sociales 01o 1935). 
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December 194054 and again on 11 June 194155. Jordana dc Pozas delivered a talk in the 
Second Syndical Council titled El Principio de Unidad y los Seguros Socialcs (Thc 
Unification Principle and the Social Insurance Schemes)36, in which he argued for the 
unification of the schemes. This shows that top echelon members of the INP were 
committed to the idea of unifying the system, even though they were aware of the 
financial difficulties that such an enterprise would entails. 
The arrival of Girön de Velasco and the Falangist team at the Ministry of Labour in 
May 1941 changed the composition of the Governing Body of the INP, as we have already 
seen. In the first session of the new Governing Body, Luis Jordana dc Pozas, one of the few 
who retained his post, explained the situation of the studies the INP had done regarding the 
unification of the different insurance schemes and asking for its quick implementation. The 
new INP President, Francisco Greflo Pozurama, answered that the Ministry of Labour was 
aware of such studies but was actually more committed to the creation of the SOE. 58. Thus, 
Minister Girdn de Velasco and his Falangist team decided to postpone any attempt to unify 
the insurance schemes. The reasons for this still remain unknown, but my guess is that the 
SOE was at the top of their agenda because it was easier and quicker to implement, therefore 
more profitable in political terms than the much more difficult Comprehensive Social 
Insurance Scheme. In any case, it reflects the extent of Minister Girbn's power to dccidc on 
the shape and timing for a policy to be successfully implemented. 
Sadly, this postponed the unification of the Spanish social insurance schemes for a 
few years. Although some members of the Governing Body kept pressing for it, as Jordana 
de Pozas did in March 194259 or an anonymous member in January 194460, literally nothing 
happened. At least not until the end of 1944. 
s' Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 20 December 1940, No. 27. In this session, the reform 
of the Family Subsidies Scheme was also discussed, but a decision was postponed until it was sorted 
out the issue of whether or not a Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme was to be created. ss Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 11 June 1941, No. 34, p. 284. 56 Boletin de Informacidn del INP, July-August 1941, Nos. 7-8, pp. 21-2. 57 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 2 December 1939, No. 13, p. 76. sa Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 16 July 1941, No. 36, p. 294. 59 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 23 March 1942, No. 43. 60 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 26 January 1944, No. 66. 
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In October 1944, Jordans de Pozas requested once again the rc-starting of the studies 
and action to establish a unified system of insurance schemes61. This time, the rcqucst 
seemed to cause the necessary impact to start things moving as a Decree of 23 December 
194462, which established a commission in charge of drafting the Law of the Comprehensive 
Social Insurance Scheme. In the preamble to the Decree, a universal Beveridge-style model 
of social security is specifically rejected, but also the mere administrative unification. As a 
result, the Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme should be somewhere between the 
models, although unspecified63. 
The Commission was formed by the Order of the Ministry of Labour on 23 January 
1945 and it was composed of the following members": 
The Commission. Unification of Social Insurance Schemes. January 19JS 
Social Catholics Falangists Technocrats 
President Jose Antonio Gird; 
Vice-President 
Buenaventura J.
Castro 
Commissary of the Luis Jordana 
INP 
Member Joaquin Ruiz 
representing the 
Minist of Finance Carlos J. Gonzalez 
Members Francisco Ruiz 
representing the 
Ministry of Labour Pablo Martinez 
Member Antonio Robert 
representing the 
Ministry of 
Industry 
Member Luis Estrada 
representing the 
Syndical 
Organisation 
Member Pedro Rodriguez 
representing the 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
61 Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 26 October 1944, No. 75. 62 BOE, 14 January 1945. 
63 In the end, the whole Plan would end up as a simple administrative co-ordination. See Gonzalez Posada (1948). 
64 BOE, 4 February 1945. 
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Compared with former commissions, such as the ones which drafted the SOE, the 
INP was very poorly represented on this Commission, as only one member of the Institute 
took part. It had been up to Minister Giron to decide who were to be its members, which 
explains the outstanding Falangist presence. 
There was formed a sub-committee in charge of writing the first draft. The members 
were mostly Falangists: 
The Sub-Committee, Unification of Social Insurance Schemes, January 1945 
Falangists Technocrats 
President Buenaventura J. Castro 
Members Francisco Ruiz Jose Gdmcz 
Pablo Martinez Francisco Ochoa 
Jose Luis Estrada 
Apart from Francisco Ochoa Luxan, who was the actuary of the General Directorate 
of Private Insurance, the rest of the members were all well-known and influential Falangists. 
What seems most odd was the fact that Luis Jordana de Pozas, the best expert on social 
insurance at the time, was left out of the Sub-Committee. Given this, the draft could not be 
anything else but of Falangist inspiration. 
The Sub-Committee worked from the middle of February to the beginning of May 
1945. It ignored the work and materials produced by previous committccs, cvcn the Bases 
para la Preparaciön de tin Proyecto de Ley sobre Scguros Sociales Unificados o 
Coordinados of 1939 and, instead, this Sub-Committcc wrote a document of 120 articles that 
did not resemble any of the previous plans. The document was ready on 12 May 1945. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this plan was the way the system was going to be 
managed. In a clear distortion of the trend (nationally and internationally) of unifying the 
management, the Sub-Committee fragmented it. Private insurance companies and different 
public institutions were allowed to take part in the scheme and, above all, the Syndical 
Organisation played the most prominent role. The Syndical Organisation Was granted the 
exclusive management of the system in those villages with less than 3,000 population, which 
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meant 7,578 out of 9,254 localities. In addition, in the rest of the cities that had more than 
that population, self-employed workers were also to affiliate via the Syndical Organisation. 
Thus, by far the largest part of the Spanish workforce would be affiliated to the 
Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme managed by the Syndical Organisation. 
In addition, although several organisations were allowed to organist the affiliations, 
the payment of cash benefits and the provision of services, the document of the Sub- 
Committee did not make any of these institutions responsible for insuring the affiliates. None 
of these institutions was taking the risk of backing the system with its own money. The draft 
set up a General Fund for doing this, but no public or private institution was directly 
responsible for it. In addition, the General Fund, whatever its organisation was, did not have 
the capacity to supervise, control or intervene in the institutions that actually ran the system, 
as they were only accountable to themselves. 
The document was sent to the Commission, but, unbelievably, an Order from the 
Ministry of Labour on 28 May 194565 prohibited its discussion. This was an incredible 
intervention by Minister Girön de Velasco to avoid any further debates in the Commission 
on the draft of the Sub-Committee and shows the almost absolute power of Minister Girbn 
de Velasco to actively veto. The members of the Commission and other groups with interests 
on this issue (such as the Entidades Aseguradoras" or the Mutualidades Industriales y 
Agricolas de Accidentes de Trabajo67) were only allowed to send in their written comments 
to the President of the Commission and it was up to the Labour Minister what changes 
should be done to the draft. It was an obvious trick played by Girdn and its team to avoid 
opposition and rejection from members of the Commission. Any process of public 
consultation was ruled out although, on 6 March 1945, Jordana himself presented to the 
65 BOE, 6 March 1945. 
66 See the report that the directors of the private insurance companies (Union y cl Fenix Espanol. 
Mutua CIA, Plus Ultra, Mutualidad General Agropecuaria, Mapfre and others) sent to the 
Commission on 10 March 1945 in INP Archive (4.24. A1], File 55 entitled Carpeta General de Segura 
Total, Sub-file 1, Section Anteproyecto de Seguro Total. Obviously, they praised the document. 67 See the report of these institutions issued on 11 April 1945, in INP Archive [4.24. A1J, File 55 
entitled Carpeta General de Seguro Total, Sub-f ile 1, Section Anteproyecto de Seguro Total. 
279 
Commission a list of experts who could be consulted68. As I said, the Commission ignored 
this proposal and avoided any process of public consultation. 
The issue at stake was such 
-basically the survival of the INP- that it demanded a 
rapid reaction from Luis Jordana dc Pozas and the top echelon members of the Institutc69. 
Jordana presented a long report7° in which he addressed all the INP's concerns and made a 
critique of the document of the Sub-Committee. Jordana started saying that the draft written 
by the Sub-Committee did not reflect the view of all its members, but just of the three who 
drafted it''. The text had fundamental errors, both in form and content, and lacked the 
necessary actuarial analysis. The plan was financially impossible to implement given the 
Spanish economic situation. In addition, Jordana accused the Sub-Committee of having 
ignored previous studies and even current Spanish legislation on social insurance, with the 
purpose of creating a completely new scheme which did not resemble even in the slightest 
form what had been the trend in the Spanish social welfare system. In Jordana's words: 'The 
system of managing the Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme envisaged by the Sub- 
Committee has no precedents either in Spain or abroad'72. 'The organisational system 
adopted in the Draft cannot be said to be systematic. It is an unfortunate mixture of all the 
previous systems'73 
. 
By granting permission to private insurance companies to run the Comprehensive 
Social Insurance Scheme, Jordana believed that the Sub-Committee failed to achieve the 
aims of the Decree of 23 December 1944. In his opinion, this Decree had only established 
68 Most of the people on the list were well-known INP experts, academics or professionals, such as 
Zumalacirregui, Paris Eguilaz, Gascdn y Marin, Severino Aznar, Grcilo Pozurama, Sangro y Ros, 
Lopez Valencia, Camacho Barios, Perez Botija, Gonzalez Bueno and Vicente Madera Pcda. 
69 In fact, it was such a serious situation that Jordana de Pozas wrote to each provincial INP 
representative to inform them of the latest developments, enclosing a copy of the Sub-Committee's 
draft In Jordana's words: 'Given the importance of this issue, I have considered necessary to transmit 
this information to you'. See document entitled A Todos los Delegados Provinciales, INP Archive [4.24. Al], File 55 entitled Carpeta General de Seguro Total, Sub-file 1, Section Anteproyecto de 
Seguro Total. 
70 Informe sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley de Seguro Total, por el Vocal de la Comisidn, Luis Jordana 
de Polas, INP Archive [4.24. Al], File 55 entitled Carpeta General de Segura Total, Sub-file 1, 
Section Anteproyecto de Seguro Total. 
71 I am afraid I have not been able to discover who these three men were. 72 Informe sobre el Anteproyecto... p. 24. 73 Informe sobre el Anteproyeeto... p. 26. 
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the possibility of letting private companies to collaborate with the INP under its supervision, 
but had never allowed for their role as independent providers as was now granted by the 
Sub-Committee. 
In addition, the Sub-Committee went on to regulate several issues which were not its 
responsibility, such as the organisation of the INP. Although not within its competence, 
Article 56 of the draft of the Sub-Committee established that a president and just six 
members would form the Governing Body of the INP. Also, instead of the prevailing 
situation by which the INP depended on the Ministry of Labour and its Commissary was 
acknowledged as a General Director, the draft of the Sub-Committee placed the INP under 
the presidency of a state appointee who was not more than a Chief of Administration. 
Therefore, the INP was to lose political power and relevance in the administrative 
organisation of the Spanish state. 
Quite understandable, Jordana fiercely opposed such an attack towards the institute 
and denounced the ` degradation and condemnation without previous trial of the INP and the 
social insurance system that it represents. The Draft means the abandonment of the policy 
trend followed in Spain since 1908 in regard to social insurance, but without giving reasons 
for justifying such a surprising change of direction, which cannot be based on the Decree 
which set up the Commission responsible for writing the draft nor in agreements made by 
it'74. 
Jordana de Pozas concluded that as such the draft of the Sub-Committcc was not 
acceptable and claimed for its withdrawal. In any case, he did not have a chance to vote it off 
in the Commission, because, as I have already explained, the Minister of Labour ruled out 
that possibility. 
We know that the draft never became law but its fate is still unknown, first within 
the Ministry of Labour and later in the Council of Ministers, if it ever reached that stage. 
Most probably, the plan was so fiercely rejected by the INP, the General Directorate of 
74 Informe sobre el Anteproyecto... p. 27. 
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Health of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance (because it clearly 
showed the Falangist desire to take over the whole insurance system) that it simply was 
blocked in the Council of Ministers. Because of the government crisis of 1945, the Falangist 
strategy to monopolise the social welfare system failed. 
It is my belief that this Falangist attempt to take over the public insurance system by 
drafting the Law of May 1945 also led to a deadlock in social policy innovations for more 
than a decade. The danger for the INP had been so real that none of its members wanted to 
re-open the Pandora's Box". At most, the only thing achieved was the setting up of a Sub- 
Committee within the Governing Body of the INP in January 1946 to study the 
administrative unification of the processes of affiliation and payment of the schemes, and the 
minimum age to be able to affiliate (14 years of age). In fact, when Jordana dc Pozas was 
interviewed on the Radio Nacional on 28 December 1947 about the new plans the INP had 
in mind, he replied that these were the new stage of the SOE and the implementation of the 
plan of its medical installations. That was all, not even a slightest reference to the 
Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme76. 
On the contrary, only Falangists kept pressing for the introduction of such a unified 
system. The Falange proposed to start by applying this scheme only to agricultural workers, 
arguing that it would be easier to expand it later to the entire working population". In 
February 1945, the Ministry of Agriculture presented the INP a plan to set up the 
Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme for the rural workforce. It was to be organised by 
the Rural Brotherhood Associations, which were groups of rural workers organised by 
districts. The system was fragmented, lacking a common financial fund, and its 
administrative and technical organisation were so bad7e that it was rejected by the INe. 
's I only found a brief reference to the Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme in the Minutes of the 
Governing Body of the INP, 20 December 1946, No. 105. 76 Revista Espanola de Seguridad Social, January 1948, No. 1, pp. 43-7. 
"See the letter sent by the National Delegate of Syndicates, Fermin Sanz Orrio on 16 January 1946 to 
the General Director of Social Insurance. INP Archive [4.24. A1], File 55 entitled Carpeta General de Seguro Total, Sub-file 2 entitled Seguro Total en la Agricultura. 78 See the report issued by the Director of the National Fund of Family Subsidies of the INP on 18 
May 1946: INP Archive [4.24. AI], File 55 entitled Carpeta General de Seguro Total, Sub-file 2 
entitled Seguro Total en la Agricultura. 
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In the First National Congress of Spanish Workers, held in November 1946, one of 
its commissions urged for the urgent implementation of the Comprehensive Social Insurance 
Scheme. In July 1948, the General Directorate of Social Insurance issued an order to push 
for again the study of the unification of the social insurance schemes. As a result, by the 
Decree of 29 December 1948 (later modified by the Decree of 17 June 1949), affiliation 
processes were simplified and a single contribution payment was set up for the SOVI, SOR 
and Family Subsidies. 
8.6. Conclusion 
The struggle between Falangism and Social Catholicism for the control of the 
Francoist social insurance system took the form of conflicts between institutions 
- 
the 
General Directorate of Social Insurance (reporting to the Ministry of Labour) and the 
Syndical Organisation on the one hand and the INP on the other. 
This struggle resulted in the Syndical Organisation taking over some of the functions 
which would initially have belonged to the INP. Thus, the Syndical Organisation obtained 
the responsibility for extending the Family Subsidies Scheme to the agricultural workforce, 
for running the maternity and paediatric services of the Maternity Insurance Scheme and for 
providing the healthcare services of the SOE. The Syndical Organisation managed to take 
charge of the process of registration of affiliates to the SOE, through the local offices of the 
Syndical Foundation of Social Insurance. 
In addition, the Syndical Foundation for Fighting Unemployment replaced the 
79 See Minutes of the Governing Body of the INP, 26 June 1946, No. 100. All the members of the 
Governing Body except Norte Ramon voted against the plan. 
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Subsidy against Forced Unemployment, which was abolished. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that the whole Francoist social insurance system ended up as highly fragmented. 
Actors used the institutional resources at their disposal. Above all policy-makers, 
Minister Giron benefited from the immense power that Francoist ministers had, thanks to 
certain non-democratic institutions. First, the lack of specific regulations allowed him to set 
up commissions and sub-committees at will, composed of the people he chose freely. That is 
why Gir6n opted to create a second commission to draft the SOE bill, after the first one had 
rejected the proposal of the Syndical Foundation of 18 July to take over the organisation of 
the health aspects of the Sickness Insurance Scheme. The second Commission, with 
Falangist majority, gave the running of the health services to the Syndical Foundation. In the 
case of the policy-making process for the unification of all insurance schemes, we find 
something similar. In the Commission chosen by Gir6n there was an overwhelming majority 
of Falangist members, but even more in the Sub-Committee 
- 
no wonder why the Syndical 
Organisation was granted the monopoly to affiliate the largest part of the Spanish workforce 
and to run the Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme. Moreover, Minister Gir6n 
prohibited the discussion of the work of the Sub-Committee by the Commission, in which it 
would have been fiercely criticised and eventually rejected by INP and other departmental 
representatives. 
Secondly, the content of the laws could be slightly changed by the Minister by 
exercising the power to issue regulations. That is what happened with the Regulations of the 
SOE, which granted the Labour Minister special powers to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction 
between the INP and the other private and public institutions involved in the running of the 
scheme. 
Thirdly, Minister Gir6n resorted to the use of the decree to pass all these reforms and 
policies. As I have already explained, the decree carried the signature of Franco and the 
relevant Minister. This meant that, as long as the Minister had Franco's support and 
approval, he could pass legislation via decree, without needing to face possible opposition at 
the Council of Ministers. Most probably, this is what happened during the troubled years of 
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the first half of the 1940s, in which most of the developments reviewed in this chapter took 
place. 
It is also worth noting that there were small but revealing differences in the policy- 
making practices and styles between 1936 and 1950. If the different public and private 
institutions were able to, at least, discuss the draft of the 1938 Regulations of the Family 
Subsidies Scheme, this did not happen with other policies from 1941 onwards. Institutions 
such as General Council of Doctors, the Faculty of Medicine, the Royal Academy of 
Medicine, the General Council of Pharmacists and the College of Dentists, were left out of 
the process of discussing and writing the drafts of the Law of the SOE and its Regulations. 
Although the General Council of Doctors and the Anti-Tuberculosis National Fund took part 
in the first Commission of the Law of the SOE, their predictable opposition to the Falangist 
strategy led the Minister not to include them in the second one. With regard to the plan for 
the unification of the social insurance schemes, any process of public consultation was ruled 
out. 
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Conclusion 
The political struggle between Falangist and Social Catholics for the control of the 
Francoist social insurance system shaped the way the latter developed. The study of the 
evolution of the INP between 1936 and 1950 and the policy processes that led to the passing 
of each social insurance scheme have reflected such a struggle. 
FET de las JONS was trying to acquire spheres of influence at the time the party and 
its dependent institutions were being put at the service of the state. FET de las JONS' 
strategy consisted of duplicating state institutions and public bodies with its party parallels. 
The political struggle took place within the institutional framework of the non- 
democratic regime. There were a set of political institutions which clearly reflected its non- 
democratic nature, leading to a policy making process which was highly centred on the 
minister and very ill-defined when it came to roles and jurisdictional competence. Minister 
Girön de Velasco became the most crucial actor, not so much in inspiring or drafting 
policies, but in manoeuvring in order to achieve Falange's goals by making use of the non- 
democratic institutional resources at his disposal. Helped by the lack of regulations in the 
Ministry of Labour, he managed to set up commissions and sub-committees at will, and 
placed his Falangist comrades in them. Using his ministerial power of issuing regulations, he 
succeeded in re-shaping social policy outputs. Counting on the support of Franco (who 
explicitly gave him permission to do so), he passed policy initiatives in the form of 
ministerial decrees and orders, thus avoiding criticisms and rejections from the Council of 
Ministers and the Council of State. 
The result was a social insurance system formed by a series of compulsory insurance 
schemes which, all in all, covered most of the possible risks for the worker and his/her 
family: old age, disability, death, professional accident, sickness, the birth of children and 
the maintenance of the family. But schemes overlapped with each other. The Labour Mutual 
Aid Insurance Institutions competed with the INP Insurance Schemes, blocking the 
development of the SOVI. Family Plus duplicated the Family Subsidies Scheme. In addition, 
the welfare institutions of the Syndical Foundations also provided their own insurance and 
healthcare services. 
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The management of the system was highly complex. Several institutions were in 
charge of organising and running different services, increasing inefficiency. Thus, the 
Syndical Organisation got the responsibility for extending the Family Subsidies Scheme to 
the agricultural workforce, for running the Maternity and Paediatric Services of the 
Maternity Insurance Scheme and for providing the healthcare services of the SOE. The 
Syndical Organisation managed to take charge of the process of registration of affiliates to 
the SOE, through the local offices of the Syndical Foundation of Social Insurance. In 
addition, the Syndical Foundation for Fighting Unemployment replaced the Subsidy against 
Forced Unemployment, which was abolished. 
On the other hand, the Francoist social insurance system was a workers' protection 
system, not a citizens' protection system. It lacked universal coverage of the whole 
population, because it was envisaged to protect only those workers participating in the 
formal labour market and because the benefits were obtained on the basis of being a worker 
or dependent upon someone who was a worker. The level of state spending on the insurance 
system was minimal and its funding relied wholly on workers' and employers' contributions. 
These developments coincided with the wave of social reforms which shook the 
world in the 1940s, provoking the introduction of new social policies. At the same time that 
Francoism was setting up a fragmented and limited social insurance system, the idea of 
implementing comprehensive and complete social security systems (as, for example, in the 
Beveridge Plan) was gaining ground all over the world. 
Why did Francoism fail to adopt a social security system? In my opinion, factors 
such as the Catholic culture, the dire economic situation after the Civil War or the lack of a 
labour movement cannot explain the inability of Francoism to imitate the innovations 
elsewhere and establish a more comprehensive and universal social security model. In fact, 
elite groups within the regime in the most autarkic phase of Francoism were well aware of 
policy developments across the world, were advocating more extended and generous social 
benefits and were proposing a Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme. Innovative ideas 
and policy solutions similar to those of other countries were on many Spanish policy- 
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makers' agendas at that time and alternative plans were proposed and discussed- from the 
more conservative and minimal to the most radical and generous in terms of benefits, 
coverage and organisation. Above all, what explains the adoption of a social insurance model 
is the role exerted by those political institutions of the non-democratic regime which shaped 
the actions of those involved in the power struggle. 
My aim now is to suggest the possible usefulness for comparative purposes of my 
study of the Francoist social insurance system and the institutional theoretical framework 
developed here. Obviously, the mapping out of the development of the Francoist social 
welfare system between 1950 and 1975 is the first evident future continuation of my 
research. Having identified a first period between 1936 and 1950, the second phase would be 
between 1950 and 1963, when the Law of Social Security was passed. The final phase would 
embrace those years between 1963 and the transformation of the system, with the transition 
to democracy after Franco's death in 1975. In both cases, an institutional approach can 
satisfactorily explain what happened. The economic reforms of the Development Plans at the 
end of the 1950s and political reforms (such as the government crisis of 1957 which ejected 
Girbn de Velasco from the Ministry of Labour, the Law of Litigious-Administrative 
Jurisdiction of 1956 with its implications for the policy-making process or the passing of 
regulations for the Ministry of Labour), together with the arrival of new generations of 
economists and social insurance experts (many of them trained abroad) opened a window of 
opportunity for the implementation of a social security plan. By the same token, the 
transition to democracy explains the introduction of new social welfare institutions and the 
abolishment of the INP and the rest of Francoist social insurance schemes. 
Secondly, I hope I have advanced our knowledge on how the policy process takes 
place in non-democratic regimes. There is still a long way ahead in our learning of how 
policies are created and implemented in those political systems. Thus, specific case studies 
help to accumulate the necessary knowledge that eventually will facilitate the production of a 
theory of the non-democratic policy process. There is now room for comparisons with other 
non-democratic regimes to find out whether ideas, actors and institutions have different 
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patterns of interaction to those of democratic regimes. Even more, if distinctive sub-patterns 
are found within the non-democratic ategory (suggesting, for example, the existence of 
different policy processes between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes), there might be a 
possibility that comparative research would overcome the current deadlock of the debate on 
political regimes. 
Thirdly and finally, I believe that my study is one of the few (if not the only one) 
which has directly tried to explain the origins and development of non-democratic welfare 
states. Thus, more research is needed. Although the thesis has only researched one case 
study, the comparative approach has always been somehow present. I have been particularly 
interested in three other cases: the social insurance systems of Vargas in Brazil, Salazar in 
Portugal and Peron in Argentina. For reasons of space and time, I cannot offer a 
comprehensive overview of these cases, but I would like to advance a glimpse of how my 
theoretical framework can be applied to just one case-study: Perbn's social insurance system. 
Juan Domingo Peron and Argentina's Social Insurance System 
The political developments which occurred in Argentina during the 1940s had an 
impact on the development of the social welfare system. The military coup d'etat of June 
1943 promoted Juan Domingo Peron to the post of Minister of War (Brooker, 1995). At the 
end of 1943, Peron became Secretary of Labour and Welfare and later, in July 1944, Vice- 
President of the Republic. 
By the Decree-Law of 1944, the National Institute of Social Insurance, the 
institution in charge of centrally controlling and running the social insurance schemes was 
created. The National Institute of Social Insurance was supposed to directly manage and 
administrate the social insurance system in a unified way. Therefore, the Dccrcc-Law 
designed a prospect of institutional unification of all insurance schemes. 
At that moment, Argentina's policy makers were seriously considering the 
possibility of creating a unified and universal system of social security. In 1945, Josa Arcc 
289 
published his proposal of creating a system based on Beveridge's principles'. In May 1946, 
the President of the National Institute of Social Insurance, Ricardo Rigucra, published the 
study entitled Seguro Social Integral, in which he proposed to progressively integrate the 
fragmented social insurance schemes (provided by the different occupation-based funds) in a 
single scheme, to unify contributions, to bring wealthier citizens into the system and to cover 
all social risks. 
However, social policy developments followed an exactly opposite direction. As 
Secretary of Labour and Welfare, Peron started granting social benefits to different 
categories of workers: judges, policemen, commerce employees, railway workers, industrial 
workers, military and civil servants (Mesa-Lago, 1977). The reason for this lay in the power 
struggles within the regime and the weak position of Peron, who therefore needed to co-opt 
social groups and gain support from the working masses. The institutional resources 
provided by his position as Vice-President of the Republic permitted him to manoeuvre to 
alter the shape of the social insurance system. 
Peron escaped the attempted coup against him, thanks to the massive popular 
demonstration of 17 October 1945, which forced the coup leaders to quit. With such support 
from the population, he won the presidential elections of 24 February 1946. Ills government 
soon moved into a "military type of ideological one-party system" (Brooker, 1995). The 
discourse of the regime was organised around populist ideas of social justice, nationalism 
and economic independence. 
However, the economic growth of the immediate post-war years started to decline by 
the end of the 1940s. The 1946 Economic Plan proved incapable of solving the crisis, forcing 
the regime to set up a new economic strategy in 1952. The economic crisis boosted the 
discontent of both the masses and the elite groups and especially of a growing section of the 
military. The failed 1951 coup d'etat was a symptom of the dangerous situation of I erdn's 
regime. It was in this atmosphere of economic crisis and political weakness that the Law 
Arce, J. (1945), Seguridad Social en la Argentina, Buenos Aires: Losada. 
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passed in 1953 reformed the existing social welfare system (put in place by the Decree-Law 
of 1944). 
The 1953 Law stripped the National Institute of Social Insurance of its power to run 
the social insurance system, bringing the insurance funds and similar private insurance 
institutions back into play. The Law stated that the National Institute of Social Insurance 
should not have affiliated members, run any social insurance scheme directly, or be self- 
funded. It only granted the Institute a supervisory role over the work of the Funds, from 
whose budgets it should be financed. It was then that the Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions 
became the key actors in running the insurance system, under the control of the General 
Directorate of Mutual Aid Insurance Institutions of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security. Again, Perbn's institutional resources granted him the ability to do this. 
Finally, in 1954, a military coup brought the dictatorship to an end. Perlin marched 
into exile and subsequent laws only fragmented the system even more. By the Social 
Insurance Law of 1954, other schemes were established 
-for independent workers, 
businessmen and professionals and later for rural workers and for household workers. 
As in Francoism, political struggles within the non-democratic institutions of 
Peronism shaped the evolution of the social insurance system. In both cascs, as happened in 
all the non-democratic regimes of Latin America and Southern Europe, social insurance 
schemes, instead of social security systems, were set up. 
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Appendix 
Ideological Profiles of the Members of the Governing Body 
and the Permanent Commission of the INP and of the 
different Commissions and Sub-Committees' 
Alvarez Sotomayor, German 
Falangist. In 1941, he was National Delegate of Syndicates (Rodriguez Jimenez, 2000). 
Alvarez Ude, Jose G. 
Social Catholic. Expert on social insurance. Member of the INP since the 1920s. 
Astigarraga Luzon, Francisco 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Ayats Surribas, Jose 
Social Catholic. Expert Actuary of the INP. 
Azaola Ondarza, Ramon 
As member of the Governing Body representing the National Office of Syndicates, most probably he 
was Falangist. 
Aznar Embid, Agustin 
Falangist, one of the founders of the Spanish University Syndicate. Doctor. Member of the National 
Council of FETde las JONS from 1937 to June 1938, when he was imprisoned, charged with trying to 
reform the party. Volunteer to the Division Azul. Agustin Embid was son of Severino Aznar Embid. 
Aznar, Severino 
Social Catholic. The most important Spanish Social Catholic sociologist of the first half of the 
twentieth century. Member of the INP since the 1920s. Chief of the National Service of Insurance. 
Founder in 1919 of the Christian Democratic Party Grupo de la Democracia Cristiana. 
Barcelb PIS, Jose Maria 
Falangist. Doctor. 
'For gathering these data, I have used: Jerez Mir (1982); Diccionario Biogrdfico Espailol 
Conlempordneo, (1970), Madrid: Circulos de Amigos dc la Ilistoria; who is who in Spain, 1963 (1963), Barcelona: Herder; Quien es quien en las comes espairolas (1971), Madrid: Documcntacidn 
Espanola Contemporänea. 
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Baylos Corroza, Ilermenegildo 
Catholic, member of the ACNdeP. University Professor. 
Benitez Franco, Bartolome 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Borrallo, Paulino 
Expert on Pharmaceutics. PhD in Pharmacy and Professor of Chemistry. Member of the Royal 
Academy of Pharmacy since 1922. 
Bosch Marin, Jorge Juan 
Social Catholic. Expert on Health issues. Doctor. Member of the INP since the 1920s. 
Brievas Sanchez, Manuel 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Camacho Banos, Fernando 
Social Catholic. Member of the Conservative-Catholic Party Accidn Popular. Appointed Under- 
Secretary of Finance in June 1941. 
Cardenas Llavanera, Joaquin 
Military. General. I guess he was related to the Andalucian horse owner Miguel Angel Cardenas 
Llavanera. 
Castro Rial, Buenaventura Jose 
Falangist. Professor of Commercial Law. Procurador in the Cortes. 
Cavestany Anduaga, Rafael 
Falangist. Minister of Agriculture in 1941. 
Corral Salz, Jose Luis 
Military. Jerez Mir (1982) identified him as a Falangist. Procurador in the Cortes. 
Criado del Rey, Sebastian 
Falangist. Volunteer to the Division Azu! 
Durän Torres de Castro, Antonio 
As member of the Governing Body representing the National Office of Syndicates, most probably he 
was Falangist. 
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Espinosa Ferrändiz, Joaquin 
Social Catholic. In 1927, he was the President of the Catholic Organisation Fedcracfdn de Estudiantcs 
Catdlicos de Madrid. Doctor. Member of the INP since the 1930s. 
Estrada y Segaler, Luis 
Falangist. 
Fernandez Bedla, Valentin 
Secretary of the Governing Body of the INP. I consider him to be a technocrat. 
Fernandez dc la Portilla, Jose 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Fernandez Sopcfia, Ramon 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Ferratges Tarrida, Antonio 
Technocrat. 
Fuente Chao, Alfonso dc la 
Falangist, member of the National Council of FET de las JONS. Procurador in the Cones. Ile was a 
doctor. National Secretary of Health. Director of the National Institute of Medicine and Safety at 
Work. Director of the journal SER. Member of the Royal Academy of Medicine. 
Fuentes Cascajares, Mariano 
Falangist. lie was Luis Jordana de Pozas's brother-in-law. His niece, Maria Luisa Jordana dc Pozas, 
does not catalogue him as Falangist (interviewed on 28 May 2000). Ile had worked since 1925 in the 
INP. In January 1944, he replaced Jose Munoz Rodriguez Laborda as Director of the National Fund of 
Family Subsidies. 
Galcerin Valdes, Isaac 
Falangist. In 1938, Galcerin was General Secretary of the Caja Asturiana de Prevision. 
Gamin dc Guimbn, Victor 
Businessman and technocrat. In the Governing Body of the INP, he represented those institutions 
involved in the running of the SOE. 
Garcia, Rafael 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
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Garcia Quirös, Rufino M. 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Garcia Vicente, Saturnino 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Girön de Velasco, Jose Antonio 
Falangist. He started his Falangist career in the Castilian Groups of Hispanic Action in the city of 
Valladolid. During the Civil War, he actively took part in the Northern Front. National Delegate of 
Ex-Combatants. Minister of Labour from 1941 to 1957. 
Gomez Jimenez, Angel 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Gomez Sabugo, Jose 
Expert on health care services. Doctor. He promoted the development of health services in Asturias, 
specially the Hospital de Cabuenes, at the beginning called Hospital Jose Gomez Sabugo. 
Gonzalez Bueno, Carlos Jose 
He was an expert on social insurance and a technocrat from the Ministry of Finance. For Quien es 
Quien en las Cortes Franquistas (1971), Carlos Gonzalez Bueno y Bocos was doctor in Medicine, 
President of the General Council of Colleges of Doctors, President of the Diputacidn Provincial of 
Madrid in 1965, Procurador in the Cortes and member of the Social Institute of Fishermen. 
Gonzalez Bueno, Pedro 
Falangist. Minister of Syndical Organisation and Action. 
Gregorio Villota, Isidro de 
Businessman. The book Who is who in Spain (1963) refers to Felix de Gregorio Villota, Director of 
the oil company Compania Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petröleos. Isidro could be his brother and 
also a businessman, which fits with his role in the Governing Body of the INP as member representing 
those institutions and companies involved in running the Working Injuries Insurance Scheme. 
Grerlo Pozurama, Francisco 
Falangist. The Falangist newspaper Arriba, 6 June 1941, referring to his appointment as General 
Director of Social Insurance, highlighted his Falangist profile and his commitment to the discipline of 
the party. 
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Ipina Gondra, Francisco dc 
Economist and expert on social insurance2. 
Jimenez Vicente, Inocencio 
Social-Catholic. Member of the INP since this was founded. Member of Accidn Cazdlica, he was 
appointed President of the National Technical Committee of Acciön Catölica, although he died before 
taking over the post. Member of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences 3. 
Jordana de Pozas, Luis 
Social-Catholic, although with sympathies to Krausism when young. Studied in England for a few 
years. Affiliated to the Catholic party Partido Social Popular (Alonso Olea, 1997). Member of the 
INP since the 1930s. Professor of Administrative Law. Member of the Royal Academy of Moral and 
Political Sciences since February 1940. Member of the Royal Academy of Judicial Law and 
Legislation. 
Lain Entralgo, Pedro 
At that time, Falangist. One of the most important Spanish philosophers of the twentieth century. 
Leal Ramos, Leon 
Social Catholic. Expert on social insurance. Member of the INP since the 1930s. 
Lobo Montero, Constantino 
Military. Captain. 
Lopez Valencia, Jose Maria 
Military. General Lieutenant. He belonged to the Council of State and was Under-Secretary of the 
Army. Also, President of the public armament company Empresa Nacional Santa Barbara. 
Madera Pefia, Vicente 
Social Catholic. Member of the ACNdeP in Oviedo (Asturias)4, having belonged to the Catholic 
Syndicates of Aller (Asturias). 
Martin Rodriguez, Servulo 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
2 Ipifia, F. (1947), `El Equilibrio Financiero en la Ordenacibn Tecnica de los Seguros Sociales', 
Revista Espanola de Seguridad Social, Vol. 2, pp. 759-77. 3 See Anuario de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Politicas, 1946, p. 45. Also see Minutes of 
the Plenary of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, 6 May 1941. 4Boletin de la ACNdeP, 1 January 1936, No. 210. 
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Martinez, Francisco 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Martinez Almelda, Pablo 
Falangist, although Eduardo Menendez does not believe so (interviewed on 22 May 2000). 
Martinez Ojinaga, Ricardo 
As member of the Governing Body representing the National Office of Syndicates, most probably he 
was Falangist. 
Martinez Orozco, Jose 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Menendez Tolosa, Camilo 
Military. General Director of Social Insurance in 1949, he fell in disgrace with Minister Girdn for 
criticising the waste of money in the Labour Universities, therefore being replaced in February 1950 
by Fernando Coca de la Piftera. Menendez Tolosa was Franco's friend, since their old army days in 
Africa. Franco and Menendez used to eat together once per week. Army Minister since 1963. 
Merino Charro, Martin 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Mestres Fernandez, Demetrio 
Businessman. In the Governing Body of the INP, he represented the companies of the "PAI regime". 
Miranda Junco, Agustin 
Social Catholic. During the Second Republic, he was member of the conservative party CEDA. 
Lawyer of the State. General Director of Labour between 1945 and 1951. 
Müjica Buhigas, Salvador 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
MuIilz Orellana, Jose Manuel 
Technocrat and businessman. Professor of Commercial Law. General Director of the private insurance 
company La Prevision Espanola. President of the Superior Council of Chambers of Urban Property. 
Member of the Advisory Committee of Insurance for the Ministry of Finance. 
Munoz Manzano, Juan 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
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Munoz Rodriguez, Jose 
Social Catholic. Very linked to Inocencio Jimenez Vicente. 
Norte Ramon, Francisco 
Technocrat. Military Engineer. Member of the Governing Body of the Social Institute of Fishermen 
and of the Immigration Institute. Procurador in the Cortes. I consider him to be a bureaucrat, although 
there are reasons to believe that he was Falangist too. 
Ochar'an Posadas, Enrique 
Businessman and technocrat. The book Who is who in Spain 1963 refers to Ocharin Posadas as 
President of the Council of Director of the Mines of Almaden and Arrayanes, and member of the 
National Institute of Industry. 
Ochoa Luxan, Francisco 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Palanca Martinez Fortün, Jose Alberto 
Catholic. Member of the Conservative Party CEDA. Military Doctor. Member of the Royal Academy 
of Medicine. 
Palao Martialay, Jose Luis 
As member of the Governing Body representing the National Office of Syndicates, most probably he 
was Falangist. 
Perez Gonzalez, Esteban 
Falangist. Under-Secretary of Labour. 
Quijano de la Colina, Miguel 
Businessman, linked to the business families of Santander. 
Quintana Lopez, Primitivo dc la 
Social Catholic. He took part in the Catholic Meetings in Gredos (Avila), organised by the Catholic 
Priest Alfonso Querejazu. Phd in Medicine. Health Provincial Inspector in Iluelva. Member of the 
ACNdeP. A Monarchic, signed the Manifiesto de Estoril in support of Don Juan de 13orb6n. Primitivo 
de la Quintana belonged to Don Juan's Private Advisory Council. Member of Royal Academy of 
Moral and Political Sciences and of the Royal Academy of Medicines. 
s See Garrigues y Diaz-Cafete, A. (1997), 'Primitivo de la Quintana Lopez: In Memoriam', Anales de 
la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Pollticas, No. 74, pp. 617-9. 
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Reyes Morales, Rodolfo 
Falangist. 
Rivero Meneses, Jesüs 
Falangist. Giron de Velasco said in his Memoirs that Rivero was the other candidate for Minister of 
Labour in 1941 (Girön de Velasco, 1994: 69). Civil Governonr and Provincial Chief of Falange since 
1941. He was in charge of organising the Second Syndical Council of 1941 and was appointed Chief 
of the Political Secretary of the General Secretariat of the Movement on 19 June 1941. 
Robert y Robert, Antonio 
Economist and Civil Engineer. Chief Engineer of the General Directorate of Studies and Programmes 
of the Ministry of Industry. Most probably, he had strong sympathies with Falangism. Jerez Mir 
(1982) thought he was Falangist, but essentially, he was not a politician, but a technocrat. In his book 
Un Problema Nacional. La Industrializacidn Necesaria, he advocated the autarkic economic system 
(Gonzalez, 1996). 
Rodriguez, Nicolas 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Rodriguez, Jose 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Rodriguez Gimeno, Antonio 
Falangist. Chief of the Technical Secretariat of FET de las JONS. Under-Secretary of Agriculture 
between 1941 and 1942. 
Rodriguez de Torres y Cardenas, Pedro 
Falangist. 
Romero de Lecea, Carlos 
Falangist. National Secretary of Falange in the early 1940s. 
Rubio Martinez Corea, Rafael 
Military. Captain of Engineers. Technical General Secretary of the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce between 1945 and 1951. 
Ruiz Garcia, Carlos 
Falangist and military. Captain. Chief of Franco's personal Iron Guard between 1948 and 1949. 
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Ruiz Järabo, Francisco 
Falangist. General Director of Labour between 1942 and 1945 and Under-Secretary of Labour 
between 1951 and 1954. 
Ruiz y Ruiz, Joaquin 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Sagües, Jose 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Sanchez, Manuel 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Sanchez Bordona, Jose Maria 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Sangro y Ros de Olano, Pedro 
Social Catholic. President of the Spanish Group of the International Catholic Union of Friburg and 
founder of the Group of the Christian Democracy. Member of the IRS since 19066. Member of the 
Board of Trustees of the INP in the 1930s. Labour Minister in 1930. Member of the Royal Academy 
of Moral and Political Sciences. Chief Executive of the Institute of Credit of the Saving Institutions 
(Instituto de Credito de las Cajas de Ahorro Bene icas). 
Santiago Rodriguez, Jose 
I have not been able to find detailed information on him. 
Sanz Bachiller, Mercedes 
Falangist. Onesimo Redondo's widow. Founder of Auxilio Social. Member of the First National 
Council of FET de las JONS. She was dismissed as National Delegate of Auxilio Social in 1939 by 
Ramon Serrano Sufier under the accusation of mismanagement of public funds. Although this was 
proved false and she was absolved, she never recovered her former prestige. 
6 Sangro y Ros de Olano, P. (1912), La Intervencidn del Estado y del lltunicipio en las Cuestiones 
Obreras segün los Principios Catölico-Sociales. Lecciones dadas en la V Semana Social de Espana, 
Barcelona: Imprenta de Pedro Ortega. 
7Cabanellas, G. (1975), La Guerra de los AN Dias, Buenos Aires: lieliasta. 
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Segarra Bonig, Silvestre 
Businessman. Owner and manager of the shoemaker company Segarra del Valle (le Uxio, in 
Castellon, which became one of the Model Companies and Best Family Companies during Francoism. 
He had a very paternalistic attitude to social welfare8. 
Tena Ibarra, Manuel 
Falangist, although his son, Manuel Tena, denied it. lie claimed that his father was in favour of the 
Monarchic solution and had a liberal ideology and sympathised more with England and the 
democratic nations than with Nazism and Fascism. He said that his father Manuel Tena used to listen 
to the BBC radio everyday (Interviewed on 23 May 2000). 
Urfa Gonzalez, Rodrigo 
Technocrat, prestigious lawyer. Ile has passed away recently. In 2000,1 tried to interviewed him but 
his secretary informed me that, after having read the letter by which I introduced myself, Rodrigo Urfa 
denied having ever belonged to the Governing Body of the INP. 
Zarzuelo Polo, Daniel 
Falangist. 
Zumalacärregul Prat, Jose Maria 
Social-Catholic. He took part in the Catholic gatherings of the Padre Vicent. Professor of Economics. 
Member of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1946. 
8 Viruela Martinez, R. (2002), `Organizacibn del Trabajo y Diferencias dc Genero en la Industria del 
Calzado durante la Autarquia: el Caso de la Empresa Segarra de La Vall D'Uixd', Scripta Now. 
Revista Electrdnica de Geografia y Ciencias Sociales, Vol. VI, No. 119 (82), 
http: //www. ub. es/geocrit/sn/sn 119-82. htni. 
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